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KAUNITZ

AND THE REFORMS OF THE CO-REGENCY OF

MARIA THERESIA AND JOSEPH II,

1765 - 1780

by

FRANZ A. J. SZABO



A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Kaunitz and the Reforms of the Co-Regency of Maria Theresia and Joseph II, 1765-1780" submitted by Franz A. J. Szabo in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes the role of Prince Wenzel Anton Kaunitz, foreign minister of the Habsburg Monarchy from 1753 to 1792, in the domestic reforms of the co-regency of Maria Theresia and Joseph II (1765-1780).

Part one (Chapters I - V) deals with Kaunitz's conceptions of the structure of government and his role in shaping the administrative apparatus of the monarchy. This part demonstrates that during the period of the co-regency Kaunitz successfully defended the administrative structure which he had been primarily responsible for introducing in 1761. While a strong centralist and absolutist who opposed all forms of aristocratic resurgence and particularism, he believed in autonomous ministries and a system of internal governmental checks and balances.

Part two (Chapters VI - X) deals with Kaunitz's view of religion and culture. Against the claims of the church he posited a strong statist argument which was distinguished from the equally strong statist claims of the Catholic neo-Jansenist reformers by its secular and humanistic quality. It is demonstrated that while Kaunitz's influence in this sphere was crucial, his name cannot be made synonymous with Josephinism.

Part three (Chapters XI - XIV) deals with Kaunitz's role in the military, economic, and social reforms of the period. His strong anti-militarist stand clashed with the militarism of the emperor and his influence in military reform was therefore negligible. Kaunitz even failed to convince the emperor of the necessity of a small navy, which he defended on commercial grounds. In economics Kaunitz is shown to be highly empirical

and eclectic. While fitting into the liberal camp, he continued to adhere to aspects of mercantilism when he felt the situation required it. Kaunitz's social policy was uncompromisingly progressive. Proceeding from populationist premises, he endorsed peasant emancipation, recommended the commutation of labour services to cash payments, opposed harsh censorship, insisted on the codification of a new liberal civil law code, combatted the introduction of a conservative penal code, and favoured broad education reform.

In all areas of domestic policy during the co-regency, Kaunitz's influence is shown to be so significant that he may be regarded as the single most important statesman of the Habsburg Monarchy in the era of enlightened despotism.

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INTRODUCTION

Traditional analyses of absolute monarchical government in the eighteenth century which have viewed the emergence of so-called "enlightened despotism" within the context of the evolution of the modern state, have had to give way in recent years to the more modern assessment that views enlightened despotism less as a stage in the development of monarchy than a response to specific social and economic crises.¹ This perception proves particularly valuable in analyzing the creation of the modern unitary Habsburg state in central Europe during the reign of the empress-queen, Maria Theresa (1740-1780). The integral unity of the diverse lands of the House of Habsburg, theoretically posited by the famous Pragmatic Sanction of 1713, became perforce the central policy of the empress. On the one hand the existential crisis posed by the attack on her inheritance required the principle of the Pragmatic Sanction to be defended by force of arms. On the other hand, the separation for the first time in over three hundred years of the crown of the Holy Roman Empire from those of the individual lands of the House of Habsburg in a sense liberated the empress from policies that tended to be a consequence of the Imperial dignity and permitted her to concentrate on her own lands.²

Seen in terms of a response to a specific series of crises, this policy of consolidation of the various lands of the Habsburgs can therefore be regarded as having two focuses. The initial focus was a response to the political crisis of foreign attack and consisted of an attempt to preserve the integrity of the monarchy against external threats. The attempt to recover Silesia from Frederick II of Prussia during the Seven Years' War

must be regarded as an aspect of this external focus. After 1763, however, a new internal focus emerged. This was primarily a response to the socio-economic crises provoked to a large degree by the dislocations of the previous two wars, and it addressed itself to the task of the consolidation of the central core of Habsburg lands on the explicit assumption that Silesia was not recoverable in the foreseeable future. This post-war shift in emphasis coincided with the death in 1765 of Maria Theresia's husband, Emperor Francis I, and the accession of her son, Joseph II, to the post of Co-Regent of the monarchy. Joseph, as a product of the generation of the Enlightenment, brought a more radical ideological dimension to the reforms of the era, and as a consequence was often in conflict with his more conservative and pragmatic mother. This conflict lent a unique character to post-war reform, above all by giving greater scope to ministerial initiatives. Maria Theresia had always felt that the selection of good advisers was "the most important task" of a monarch,³ and she was fortunate in her own choices. Indeed, her reign is distinguished by the number of talented and resourceful men that served her and by the empress' openness to new suggestions from these men. During the period of the co-regency, the influence of the servants of the crown increased as the conflict between mother and son was often utilized to lend decisive direction to particular measures.

The leading adviser and dominant personality of Maria Theresia's reign was her foreign minister, Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg.⁴ He was the second son of the Moravian provincial governor (Landeshauptmann), Count Maximilian Ulrich Kaunitz (1679-1746), by his north-German wife,

Countess Marie Ernestine Rietberg (1686-1758). He was born in Vienna on 2 February 1711 and was originally destined for an ecclesiastical career. His education at the Protestant University of Leipzig during 1730-1732 and his subsequent grand tour through Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and France in 1732-1734 undermined his commitment to an ecclesiastical future. Returning to Vienna in 1735, Kaunitz became an aulic councillor (Reichshofrat) and in the subsequent year married Countess Marie Ernestine Starhemberg (1718-1748) who bore him six sons and a daughter in quick succession before her untimely death. Kaunitz found his post as Reichshofrat stultifying and turned to diplomacy. In December 1740 he received the appointment of ambassador to Denmark and three months later was delegated to announce the birth of a crown prince in Rome, Naples and Florence. In the summer of 1742 he became ambassador at Turin, and in November 1743 he was made authorized minister in the Austrian Netherlands. He resigned this post in June 1746 and remained aloof from public life until November 1747 when Maria Theresia appointed him her envoy to the peace negotiations at Aix-la-Chapelle.⁵

The experiences of the war and the subsequent peace conference convinced Kaunitz that a complete re-alignment of traditional Habsburg foreign policy was necessary. At the vital State Conference of April 1749 he defended the proposition that Prussia, not France, was Austria's natural enemy and he recommended a concomitant change in foreign policy. As a preliminary step Kaunitz posited the break-up of the Franco-Prussian alliance, and in order to achieve this dissolution he was sent as ambassador to Paris in 1750. Although this aim met with no immediate success, Kaunitz was able to lay the foundations for its eventual triumph. Early in 1753 he returned

to Vienna and was given the presidency of the foreign ministry (Staatskanzlei). He reorganized the entire ministry and undertook a new diplomatic system which was crowned by the famous reversal of the traditional European alliances--the so-called "Diplomatic Revolution" of 1756. In this Kaunitz was able to muster a giant continental coalition against Prussia in order to win back Silesia and to reassert Austrian dominance in the Holy Roman Empire. Despite the lack of success in the war that ensued as a result, however, Kaunitz retained his post in the Staatskanzlei, remaining foreign minister until 1792 when he resigned. Thereafter he retired to his palais in the Viennese suburb of Mariahilf where he died on 27 June 1794.⁶

Kaunitz, however, was not merely the foreign minister of the Habsburg Monarchy. Despite the contention of some modern scholars that he "was almost exclusively concerned with the conduct of foreign affairs,"⁷ his involvement in every domestic issue of any significance was already pointed out by Arneth a century ago.⁸ This was particularly so when the shift of emphasis in governmental policy focused on domestic issues after the Seven Years' War. It has been suggested that Kaunitz "entered" domestic politics in 1760 as a result of the failure of his diplomatic system to achieve the desired results. Since he could not admit that his diplomacy was in any way at fault--so the thesis runs--he blamed domestic weakness for the failures of the war and began to take a personal initiative in domestic affairs.⁹

While it is evident that an unsuccessful war served as a catalyst for Kaunitz's attack on the administrative structures of Haugwitz, he

nevertheless did not "enter" domestic politics solely as a result of it. The concept of ministries of exclusive responsibility is a nineteenth-century one, and its conceptual framework should not be allowed to influence any analysis of eighteenth-century statecraft. Kaunitz's interest in domestic reform was not an extraordinary event for a man of his century. Much as the social sciences were united under the Enlightenment's banner of the science of man, so too all aspects of the body politic received attention in statecraft. In the case of Kaunitz, much as with the monarchy itself, the focus of his attention varied according to the specific priorities of the day, but his political concerns were generally universal in their scope.¹⁰ The universality of Kaunitz's concerns is borne out by the fact that, when in 1768 Joseph II prepared a memorandum for his brother on the state of the entire monarchy, he asked Kaunitz to double-check and correct what the emperor had written.¹¹ This not only reflects the breadth of the Kaunitzian involvement, but also highlights his unique position in domestic matters. He was the only minister with an overview of the entire government similar to that of the monarchs themselves in a governmental structure that left no room for an English-style prime minister.

Kaunitz's involvement in domestic reform was not limited to the period of the Co-Regency. It can be discerned in various degrees from the beginning of the reign of Maria Theresa to his death in 1794. But it was during the period of the Co-Regency that this involvement was most intense, most extensive and to a large degree most effective. In addition, while the domestic reforms during and prior to the Seven Years' War bear the very personal stamp of Maria Theresa and those after 1780 that of Joseph II,

the Co-Regency was a period of compromise between the approaches of the two monarchs. It is the purpose of this study to analyze the role of Kaunitz in this compromise, to investigate to what extent domestic policies were the result of either his initiatives or his intervention, describe the expedients he used to push his ideas through, and discover to what extent the "enlightened despotism" of the Co-Regency of Maria Theresia and Joseph II was the legacy of Kaunitz.

It may seem surprising that a man of Kaunitz's importance has received so little scholarly attention. Novotny has suggested several reasons why Kaunitz has seldom been popular among historians. German historians have shied away from the greatest opponent of emerging Prussia; Catholic historians have found it difficult to sympathize with this child of the Enlightenment; and even the late nineteenth-century liberal historians of Austria did not produce any large scale work on Kaunitz. This, Novotny speculated, has been due to three reasons. First of all Kaunitz did not appear to leave any visible legacy behind, and subtle methods would be required to discover his influence on the cultural and political development of Austria. Secondly, the era of Kaunitz's influence is overshadowed by Maria Theresia and her sons, and even if Kaunitz is largely responsible for the course the Habsburg Monarchy took in these years, it is the former that have penetrated more successfully historical consciousness. And finally there is the personality of Kaunitz himself. Unspectacular and eccentric, he was at best, as Novotny has called him, "a pretty difficult character."¹²

Tall, slim and sharp-featured, Kaunitz was often characterized by

contemporaries as inordinantly vain about his appearance and conceited about his abilities. Easily offended, he was callously offensive to others. Cold and pedantic in his methods, he lacked any passion or sense of humour. He was an intolerable hypochondriac whose eccentricities were notorious and readily seized upon by critics. The Imperial Court Chamberlain, Khevenhüller, described his manner as "unattractive" and "laughable".¹³ Ammon, the Prussian ambassador, found him affected and mocked his concern with appearance,¹⁴ and Joseph II himself often became impatient with his servant's slow pace.¹⁵ On the other hand, even his bitterest critics had to admit that Kaunitz could not be dismissed so easily. Frederick II marvelled at "this man, so superficial in his private life, but so profound in his politics,"¹⁶ and Maria Theresia, who was not blind to Kaunitz's weaknesses, noted with pride: "His dizzy head is dearer and more valuable to me than all our others in their strength and totality."¹⁷

There is no doubt that Kaunitz had his eccentricities and that these intensified as he became older. He was certainly scrupulous about his health and had a sense of order that bordered on the pedantic. He was not only an avid horse-back rider, but considered himself an equestrian connoisseur of the first rank. But in these things he was no more than a man of his century. A healthy mistrust of doctors was a wise policy when medical help could often do more harm than good, and the only real cure available was prevention. In addition it should be remembered that Kaunitz's genuinely delicate constitution made careful attention to his health even more imperative in his case. That all his health habits were carefully considered and his thoughts well reasoned, moreover, should be seen as a

measure of his wisdom rather than of his much maligned pedantry.¹⁸ Finally, his love of horses and riding was not merely a remnant of his aristocratic heritage, though this was an aspect of it, but also his form of daily exercise carried on well into old age.

While Kaunitz may have appeared, and often perhaps deliberately, humourless, cold, and unbending to some, it was not an assessment shared by all. A character sketch penned and published shortly after his death by a member of Kaunitz's household described him as an attractive man of moderation, honest, sincere, conscientious and tolerant. He could be witty, and though curt with members of his own class, was kind, gracious and affable with others. A man of great taste and varied interests, he was a friend and patron of men of letters, artists and scientists, and was regarded highly by the common man in general to whom he was known simply as "the old prince."¹⁹ Kaunitz's weakness for women, of course, was so notorious that Maria Theresia herself, usually tolerant of her principal servant's habits, felt called upon to ask him not to frequent actresses.²⁰ But he was usually discreet, and the point of view of the women who did know him well reveals a facet of his character that his critics tend to overlook all too easily. Charlotte Sophia von Aldenburg, Countess Bentick and correspondent of Voltaire, for example, spoke with great enthusiasm about Kaunitz's amiability, vivacity and humour.²¹ Indeed, Voltaire himself recalled the success of Kaunitz's charm and wit in Paris during 1750-1753.²²

Perhaps even more revealing is a letter by the famous German philologist, Ernst Platner, who saw an "extraordinary" man of great mental and physical energy even in old age, whom narrow-minded and short-sighted

people too easily accused of unheard-of pride and self-indulgent eccentricities. It was true, Platner noted, that in externals Kaunitz gave himself an air of greater splendour and majesty than the proudest king of Spain. But this air of pride and condescension was reserved for the aristocracy who had nothing but "their titles, orders and riches" of which to be proud. These he handled not only with pride but also with genuine hardness. In coming to dinner at the Kaunitz palais, no particular recognition was accorded their rank, and while the strictest etiquette was demanded of the guests, Kaunitz himself "allowed himself all the freedoms of a man at home with his family." Often letting them wait at the table for hours, he would wait for no one, "except precisely a man of no rank." Sometimes in a satirical and sometimes in a moralizing tone he would take the opportunity of a dinner to lecture his aristocratic confrères sternly about laziness, opulence, superstition, and incompetence,²³ but ordinarily would have very little conversation with people he did not cherish or respect. Men whom Kaunitz respected, on the other hand, were invariably received graciously at his home.²⁴

As far as Kaunitz's eccentricities were concerned, Platner reported further, most of the anecdotes so gleefully told were sheer fabrications, and it seemed, at least to Platner and to many common people, that even those few that were founded in fact were deliberate devices to show himself beyond peer pressure and to demonstrate his lack of concern for aristocratic etiquette. Within family circles he was a most generous and understanding father, grandfather, great-grandfather and father-in-law. A grand-daughter destined for a prestigious Liechtenstein marriage, for example, had fallen

in love with an impoverished count. Kaunitz not only approved and financed the match, he took great pride and joy in the girl's happiness and in his indifference to the riches of the Liechtensteins.²⁵

Kaunitz, then, was above all a man of reason and moderation. He was not, as has been observed, without feelings, but able to exercise extraordinary self-control.²⁶ He took both personal and political setbacks coolly and was patient and seldom known to lose his temper. His tastes and interests were catholic and his Weltanschauung cosmopolitan. He spoke French, German and Italian fluently, had a reasonable command of Czech and Latin, and also knew some English.²⁷ It has been said that he was filled with an esprit gaullois, and some contemporaries thought him totally frenchified.²⁸ But though he expressed himself best in French, it is interesting to note Platner's observation that he forced "all who have a German tongue to speak German."²⁹ In this, it seems, as in most matters, Kaunitz--individualist, humanist and hedonist--was completely a man of the Enlightenment.

Not merely foreign minister and domestic adviser, Kaunitz also played a major role in the familial life of the court.³⁰ Maria Theresa admitted that she valued his advice "in great as in little things,"³¹ and she took every opportunity to flatter him, showing deep concern for his health and indulging his eccentricities shamelessly.³² During the period of the Co-Regency, as death removed all her other confidantes one by one, she became more and more acutely aware of her reliance on Kaunitz. "You are always right when you explain yourself," she wrote to him after one disagreement. "After all that I have lost, nothing remains for me but

your confidence and assistance. It is quite clear to me that I have great need of it."³³ Arneth has correctly observed that their relationship was characterized by "a personal intimacy and spirit of unshakeable trust," and that Kaunitz truly loved the empress with a depth of feeling which he allowed himself with no other person.³⁴

Kaunitz's relationship with the sons of Maria Theresia was less intimate. Although they respected Kaunitz, both Joseph and Leopold were wont to consider him languid if not downright lazy.³⁵ Kaunitz's relationship with Joseph especially, remained an important factor in the period under consideration. In his younger days Joseph was easily susceptible to Kaunitz's flattery,³⁶ but as the years passed the emperor's single-minded and determined attitude put severe strain on their relationship. Kaunitz was not spared Joseph's ready sarcasm, and the former in turn became increasingly alienated by the emperor's imperious and despotic temperament.³⁷ But while the strains were sometimes severe, no irreparable ruptures occurred. Kaunitz and Joseph were perhaps closer intellectually than either cared to admit, and it was only for Kaunitz that Joseph made an exception of his usual rule to be inconsiderate of aristocratic prerogatives.³⁸ Furthermore, at times of personal tragedy, such as the death of Maria Theresia, Joseph's letters to Kaunitz have a tone of almost familial intimacy.³⁹ By 1780 some of the most bitter encounters between Joseph and Kaunitz were already behind them, and yet Joseph was still able to say when he ascended the throne that he was dissatisfied with everyone except Kaunitz.⁴⁰

PART ONE
THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

CHAPTER I

THE ERA OF TRANSITION

The reputation of Prince Kaunitz as a domestic adviser grew primarily out of the central role he played in the reorganization of the central administration of the Habsburg Monarchy between 1760 and 1765. Although this aspect of his career has received detailed analysis, Friedrich Walter, the principal historian of the reforms of 1760-1761 and 1764-1765, has been highly critical of Kaunitz.¹ However, no major administrative reform on the scale of those undertaken in 1749, 1761 or 1765 took place during the period of the Co-Regency. Kaunitz's actions in this field after August 1765 consisted mainly in defending his earlier reforms, or of directing minor amendments to them. A brief analysis of these reforms is therefore imperative to an understanding of Kaunitz's activities in shaping the structure of government during 1765-1780.

The first major reform of the central administration of Austria and Bohemia took place in 1749 under the direction of Count Friedrich Wilhelm Haugwitz² and followed the Prussian model of grouping the major agencies in a general Directory. It had among its chief aims the reduction of provincial and seigneurial particularism. Haugwitz strove for an optimum concentration of power, and made it clear that his intention was the total elimination of the Provincial Estates as political and economic forces. The essence of his reforms was the unification of the political and financial administration under a single direction, and the creation of a standing army of 108,000 men paid for out of a 14,000,000 fl. budget.

The monies for this were to be assured by a ten-year agreement, to which all Estates were "expressly" commanded to "subscribe voluntarily." The creation of a local and provincial bureaucracy completely beyond the control of the Estates and of a central supervisory and administrative organ, the Directorium in publicis et cameralibus, sealed the victory of 'bureaucratic absolutism'. After 1749 the Provincial Estates were almost completely excluded from most financial and political administration. The crown had now insinuated itself between lord and peasant, and destroyed the autonomous status of all the 'German' crown lands--that is, the Austrian hereditary provinces and the lands of the Bohemian crown.³

Haugwitz's reform was a peace-time system, and for that it was remarkably successful. The military allowances, for example, almost doubled from the contributions of 1739 to those of 1763. The total Estates grant, excluding Silesia, was 5,957,066 fl. in 1739; in 1763 it was 9,006,182 fl.⁴ After 1756, however, the strains of the new war began to tell. In addition to the financial pressures on the Directorium, it became clear over the years that the central agency was heavily burdened with the details of routine administration, much of which involved mutually exclusive concerns. Its failure during the Seven Years' War hindered the war effort and brought Kaunitz into the fray. The successful prosecution of what was, after all, "his" war was the State Chancellor's prime concern. In the pursuit of this he was prepared to utilize any and all means necessary--whether these involved diplomatic manoeuvres, direct interference in military operations, or a restructuring of the central administration.⁵

While continuing lack of success in the great project of the

destruction of Prussia, however, may have provided the occasion for Kaunitz's administrative reform proposals of 1760, it would be a mistake to find in it his sole motive.⁶ Kaunitz did not suggest that the introduction of his proposals would necessarily win the war; he merely documented his conviction that domestic inertia would lead to chaos. In his eyes the Directorium was bogged down in too many tasks with the exception of precisely the one that under the circumstances seemed the most important. It lacked an overview of the entire situation. A person or body charged with such a task did not exist, and therefore it was small wonder to Kaunitz that things were often at cross-purposes. Hence he suggested the creation of a permanent consultative council to be called the Staatsrat to secure co-ordination in all matters of internal policy.⁷ As Schünemann has pointed out, this Staatsrat was in fact the only point of departure for policies devoted to the entire state and provided the necessary check to ministerial particularism.⁸

The first thing that Kaunitz urged the Staatsrat to undertake was to advise Maria Theresia on the mechanics of dismantling the overburdened Directorium.⁹ This indeed was the second main thrust of Kaunitz's reform plan. On the unification of the political and financial administration in one body Haugwitz and Kaunitz were violently at odds. Haugwitz, influenced by such early cameralists as Becher, Schröder and Hörnigk and obviously impressed by the Prussian model, felt that a successful political administration was contingent on control of the economic administration by the same body. Kaunitz, on the other hand, although only eleven years younger than Haugwitz was intellectually the child of more recent times.¹⁰

He shared Haugwitz's distaste for autonomous or semi-autonomous corporations within the state with the difference that he saw in the Directorium precisely such a corporation. Haugwitz had, Kaunitz maintained, united administrative organs that ought by nature not be united, and he criticized the Directorium as a "monstrous institution" which "runs against the fundamental principle that no state is to be tolerated within a state."¹¹

Kaunitz proposed the division of the central administration into separate political and economic compartments. Although the pre- 1749 name of Hofkanzlei (Court Chancellery) was revived for the former, it retained in essence all the characteristics of the political administration of the Directorium. The Bohemian crown lands remained integrated with the German hereditary provinces¹² and the provincial and local bureaucracy remained centralist oriented. In addition, while the head of the provincial administration, the so-called Gubernium, was to be appointed by the crown, this position was further to be united with the office of head or capo of the Provincial Estates. Finally, justice, the last area of Estates competence, was also transferred to the Gubernium, thus not only totally eliminating all formal organs of Estates power, but setting a crown watchdog over them as well.¹³

In the area of economic administration Kaunitz relied almost exclusively on the recommendations of his principal economic adviser, Count Ludwig von Zinzendorf.¹⁴ Although his plans left the Kommerzienrat (Council for Commerce) under the Hofkanzlei, they called for the creation of a so-called Court Economic Board or 'Camera' (Hofkammer) charged with the administration of ordinary and extraordinary taxes, surcharges and

duties, including revenues from Crown lands, mintage, mining of gold, silver and salt, customs and excise. In addition they provided for a sort of caisse-générale (Generalkasse) into which receipts were to be paid and which would be in charge of all national debt and credit operations. Finally a Court of Audit or Bureau of the Budget (Rechenkammer), undoubtedly inspired by the French Chambre des Comptes, was to be established as the monarch's principal organ of control and supervision in all financial matters. It was to enjoy the right to prior audit.¹⁵

This aspect of the Kaunitz-Zinzendorf plan--the generic division of economic administration into three separate departments: administration, treasury, and audit--proved to be a difficult and touchy matter. Although the plans were in fact adopted, the danger of lack of co-operation among the three bodies was perceived clearly. And though Maria Theresia ordered weekly meetings of the heads of these economic authorities as early as December 1762,¹⁶ all did not run smoothly in subsequent years. Nor did debate on the subject cease. In the reform of May 1765 all economic business, save for that of the Rechenkammer and the Kommerzienrat reverted to the Hofkammer.¹⁷ The Vienna City Bank (Wiener Stadtbank), through which in practice a ministerial banking board (Ministerialbankodeputation) looked after the state credit, remained theoretically a private concern. It had been the only financial institution which had been able to capture public confidence, and it was regarded vital not to upset this confidence with overt government interference. But even the founder of the bank, Count Gundacker Thomas Starhemberg, had been a president of the Hofkammer, and after his death in 1745, the leadership of the bank remained in the

hand of high governmental officials who were simultaneously members of the Ministerialbankodeputation. Thus in 1765 the bank itself was drawn closer into the orbit of the central financial administration of the monarchy.¹⁸

Even in their moment of bitterest disagreement, however, Kaunitz would not attack Haugwitz personally. He did not consider Haugwitz power-hungry and conceded that he had made the Directorium run well. But he stated that the fortunate personal convictions of a Haugwitz should not influence the systematic creation of an institution. Such organs of state could not be based on a person, but had to be tailored to the political nature of things.¹⁹ Indeed, he was later to make clear that he "would hardly be just" if he cast the merits of Haugwitz's system in doubt, and he praised the many improvements for which his rival had been responsible.²⁰ Haugwitz too, although he retained his conviction of the efficacy of the maximum concentration of administrative power to the end, was not blind to Kaunitz's abilities. In his final attempt to push through his type of administration in May 1765, Haugwitz proposed the creation of a supreme central chancellorate and nominated as the only person capable of holding such an office none other than Kaunitz himself.²¹

It would be an error to underestimate the hard-nosed conviction with which Kaunitz and Haugwitz opposed each other, but not only was this opposition not without respect, it was also not without areas of substantial agreement. Only Haugwitz and Kaunitz, for example, held firmly to the belief that the administration of justice (Oberste Justizstelle) ought to be the concern of a completely independent organ of

government--a position they pushed through against almost unanimous opposition.²² But above all, as even Walter has pointed out, Haugwitz and Kaunitz were at one on the principal purpose for which they undertook and sponsored their various reforms: the destruction of the economic and political power of the aristocracy and the cementing of royal bureaucratic absolutism. When Kaunitz first entered the field against Haugwitz many nobles thought that the chancellor meant to restore the pre- 1749 powers of the Provincial Estates. Nor did Kaunitz in any way indicate that this was not his purpose as he pushed his reforms through during 1760 and 1761.²³ When by 1763 Kaunitz had done nothing for them, they began to take the initiative themselves to see whether the powers of which Haugwitz had deprived the Estates might be recovered.²⁴ Maria Theresia passed these proposals on to Kaunitz for comment and received a response on 1 May 1763 totally in the spirit of Haugwitz. Although he himself was a Bohemian aristocrat, Kaunitz stated, his duty to his sovereign and to the common good had to take precedence over his private self-interest. He warned that the ambitions of the aristocracy were highly dangerous and pointed out that "other sovereigns seek to curb the nobility more and more since the true strength of a state consisted in the largest portion of people, namely the ordinary man, who deserves priority consideration." He solemnly advised "before God and Your Majesty" that the reintroduction of government by the aristocracy would wipe out all the hopes and improvements for the state at one fell swoop.²⁵

If anything, Kaunitz was in this respect even more radical than Haugwitz. During the reform of 1749 Haugwitz had allowed the nobility at

least a reasonably free hand in the administration of justice.²⁶ Kaunitz now wished to see the Provincial Estates deprived of this privilege as well.²⁷ Indeed, he carried his animosity towards seigneurial particularism to such lengths that he even distrusted the Hofkanzlei--particularly after the chancellor, Count Rudolph Chotek, had supported the initiative of his peers in 1763.²⁸ Kaunitz was "most shocked by the mind of the Hofkanzlei" and feared that it blew "in the same horn" as the Estates.²⁹ Hence it is clear that at the root of Kaunitz's opposition to Haugwitz was the fact that he never trusted the Hofkanzlei to keep in mind that its members were homo principis and not statuum et nobilitatis.³⁰ Kaunitz essentially felt that the political administration would almost invariably be tainted if dominated by the mentality of the Provincial Estates, and this alone was sufficient reason to keep it clearly and totally separated from the financial administration.³¹

The death of Emperor Francis I in August 1765 radically changed the political situation in the Habsburg Monarchy. Beyond the fact that Maria Theresa herself was deeply affected by the sudden and unexpected death of her husband, the introduction of her son, Joseph II, as co-regent on 23 September 1765 created tensions which required Kaunitz to re-define the parameters of his activities in the domestic field. Although there was co-operation between Kaunitz and Joseph over the initial problems facing the young emperor concerning the testament of Francis,³² and although Joseph was certainly flattered by the older statesman's attention to him and left little doubt of his respect for the foreign minister, it was not long before Joseph revealed some fundamental disagreements with Kaunitz

as well.

In 1765, it must be remembered, Joseph was by no means a political novice. He had sat on Staatsrat meetings regularly since that body's inception and had certainly learned more than to recognize "the faces and wigs" of its members as he claimed.³³ His first proposals for domestic reform had come as early as April 1761,³⁴ and his iconoclastic temperament was an open secret.³⁵ Hence, it cannot be a complete surprise when at the close of 1765 Joseph presented his mother with a major memorandum on domestic reform. These famous reform proposals of 1765, in fact, began by excepting Kaunitz from the cruel generalization that no minister in the previous few years could pride himself on having rendered any significant service and held the Staatskanzlei up as an example of the only ministry that served the state well. But while he was not prone to join the anti-Kaunitz camp in the reform crises of 1760-1765, he left no doubt of his dissatisfaction with the running of the state in general. Furthermore, no matter how much he respected Kaunitz, Joseph's remedies were by no means those of the old chancellor. The whole tenor of his proposals had an austere air of regimented puritanism about it, and this alone would have been enough to alienate Kaunitz who not only could not intellectually appreciate this kind of temperament but whose whole life-style ran counter to it.³⁶

Hence, when Maria Theresia asked Kaunitz for his opinion of Joseph's memorandum, it can be no surprise that he seized the opportunity not only to prevent the implementation of Joseph's proposals but also to review at length his own analysis of Austria's domestic concerns. In

a major report dated 18 February 1766, he carefully prefaced his remarks with flattering comments about Joseph's concern for the state. In a philosophical aside he even commented on the relativism of all opinions. But when it came right down to it, Kaunitz left no doubt that his differences with Joseph were major on just about every subject to which the latter had made reference. Joseph's proposal that university education be removed from the corrupting influences of the capital, for example, met with the observation by Kaunitz that while the frivolities of Vienna might in fact infect scholastic discipline, they provided an urbanity that more than compensated for these defects. As Kaunitz put it, "to be deprived of these qualities renders men if not odious at least highly disagreeable in social intercourse." This, in his view, was after all what education, at least in part, was about. Throughout his memorandum Joseph revealed his penchant, which was later to grow into an obsession, for interfering in the tiniest details of people's lives in order to abolish luxury, decadence and corruption and to force men to be good. All this Kaunitz, a pragmatist to the core, rejected. He began from the premise that "all prohibition is odious" and carried it to Joseph's censorious despotism point by point.³⁷

Yet all these points were incidental, more symptomatic of the basic personality clash between Joseph and Kaunitz than serious political issues. Much more fundamental was Joseph's attack on the entire administrative structure of the empire and particularly on the Staatsrat. He wished first of all to convert that body into a ministerial council and then to entrust to it supervisory control of the entire machinery of

state. He suggested the re-creation of a Directorium which would once more unite the political and financial administration. He also pressed for the creation of a ministry of finance which would concern itself with projects to increase revenues, decrease the tax load, abolish luxury, handle all state debt operations, supervise commerce, and so forth. Finally, he wanted the Oberste Justizstelle to have authority over military justice, and he wanted to unite the ministry of war (Hofkriegsrat) with the military finance board (Kriegskommissariat).³⁸

On the last two points Kaunitz had no comment, but the rest cut him to the bone. Not only was the present constitution of the Staatsrat his personal accomplishment but his was also the prime responsibility for the thrust of the administrative reforms of the previous five years. From his point of view Joseph did not swipe at details but proposed to overthrow the whole system so painfully worked out. After a vigorous defence of the reforms of 1760-1765, Kaunitz concluded by describing the resultant and then existing system as "the simplest, most reasonable and best system of government possible." He rejected all attempts to convert the Staatsrat into a ministerial council, insisting that the key to the Staatsrat's utility was its total impartiality and that it was precisely for this reason that the heads of the various departments had been excluded from it. Indeed, Kaunitz reiterated, the Staatsrat had all the advantages of a prime minister and none of the disadvantages. An advisory council of this nature was less likely to abuse its authority than an individual, and its experiences would be cumulative and not lost each time a prime minister fell from power. For this same reason supervisory control was

also rejected for the Staatsrat as incompatible with its raison d'être. Above all, Kaunitz did not wish to see the functions of the Rechenkammer fall to the Staatsrat, as Joseph's plan for central supervision and control envisaged, since it would make his impartial advisory council merely "a department like any other."³⁹

Similar criticism was leveled at Joseph's proposed Ministry of Finance. Increasing the revenue of the sovereign while at the same time occupying itself with the reduction of tax burdens on the subjects of the land seemed to Kaunitz to be an argument filled with internal contradictions. It would be well advised not to entrust the two mutually exclusive pursuits to the same body. Since it was naturally in the self-interest of the provincial authorities to see to the welfare of their taxpayers by the reduction of these taxes and the encouragement of trade and commerce, Kaunitz felt these concerns were best left to the chancelleries. Finally, precisely these reasons were also the best in Kaunitz's view, for not re-instituting a Haugwitz-like Directorium: "It would re-unite under its direction contradictory things. The Camera was charged by the state to occupy itself with solidifying and augmenting the revenues of the sovereign as much as it could, while the Chancellery was delegated the interests of the provinces," thus leaving the sovereign and his councils "to decide between Rome and Carthage."⁴⁰

No matter how successfully Kaunitz defended the status quo, however, he could not fail to be disturbed by the new wind that was blowing from the young co-regent. Kaunitz's discomfiture was soon underscored by a reverse he suffered in the area of military reform. Less than two

weeks before Kaunitz's reply to Joseph's reform proposals, on 5 February 1766, Field Marshal Count Leopold Daun had died. Daun had never been a friend of Kaunitz: he resented the latter's interference in military matters during the Seven Years War, and Kaunitz in turn made no secret of the fact that he would have preferred the more aggressive General Ernst Gideon Laudon as supreme commander.⁴¹ Daun had also been a source of irritation for Kaunitz because he, aside from Kaunitz himself, was the one exception to the rule that no heads of departments were to be members of the Staatsrat. He had been one of the original members of the council and since 1762 also president of the Hofkriegsrat.⁴²

Now Kaunitz's influence in military matters was put to the test: he could sponsor the appointment of his protégé, Laudon, for the presidency of the Hofkriegsrat and at the same time prevent the entry of other department heads into the Staatsrat. Unfortunately for Kaunitz, Joseph felt that military matters were his principal métier--a sentiment re-enforced when Maria Theresia officially left all military responsibilities to her son in 1765. Joseph had gotten along well with Daun and had adopted Daun's candidate for heir to the Hofkriegsrat presidency, Field Marshall Count Franz Moriz Lacy,⁴³ as his own. In the event, Kaunitz was not even consulted on the matter. Laudon was shunted off to the provinces with the honorary title of "Inspector-general of Infantry", and Lacy was made president of the Hofkriegsrat.

At the same time Kaunitz was given the cold shoulder on a major memorandum on military reform which he had submitted on 2 December 1765.⁴⁴ He had admitted in his February 1766 answer to Joseph's great reform

proposal, probably more out of politeness than out of conviction, that he did not consider himself particularly well qualified to speak on military matters and readily endorsed all of Joseph's suggestions in the military sphere.⁴⁵ Now Joseph, who obviously could have been none too pleased with Kaunitz's reactions to his memorandum, turned the tables and ignored the December memorandum. Bitterness was no doubt increased on both sides when Lacy sought Daun's Staatsrat position in addition to his Hofkriegsrat presidency.⁴⁶ Maria Theresa, sensing Kaunitz's distemper, never seriously considered Lacy's application,⁴⁷ but in informing Lacy of his rejection Joseph left little doubt about his own sentiments. "Our system is in shambles; we will have to rot it out since we have neither the courage nor the men to build it anew. Only more chaos will enlighten people. To let the disorder crush them and carry them away so that they no longer know what they are about will improve and convince more people than all the best thought out plans."⁴⁸

Nor was this the end of Kaunitz's troubles. Lacy's attempt to enter the Staatsrat had merely been the culmination of a series of difficulties that began as early as 1762 with an anonymous proposal designed to simplify and rationalize the business of the Staatsrat. Hofkammer president, Count Karl Friedrich Hatzfeld zu Gleichen, and Ludwig Zinzendorf had felt the body was overburdened in 1764, and in the spring of 1765 Maria Theresa herself demanded a stabilization of the council.⁴⁹ Kaunitz, supported by Emperor Francis I, maintained that if the Staatsrat were brought back to its original structure and purpose the problems connected with it would solve themselves.⁵⁰ While Maria Theresa's resolution of

13 May 1765 adopted Kaunitz's suggestions in their entirety,⁵¹ Joseph's memorandum of 1765 shows that the issue was still not entirely resolved.

The deaths of two leading Staatsrat members, Haugwitz on 30 August 1765⁵² and Daun on 5 February 1766, and the required resulting changes of personnel, gave a new twist to the debate. On 14 January 1766 Maria Theresia indicated to Kaunitz that the Austrian ambassador to France, Prince Georg Adam von Starhemberg, who had been personally groomed by Kaunitz, should be recalled to take Haugwitz's place in the Staatsrat. Starhemberg was to be left the option of when and how to leave Paris since his immediate recall would leave an unfavourable diplomatic impressions--a point Starhemberg himself underscored in his replies to Kaunitz.⁵³ Starhemberg and the Austrian delegate to the Imperial Diet, Count Johann Anton von Pergen, who was to play an important role in the upcoming crisis, had both in fact been recommended by Kaunitz for the Staatsrat in 1760. Kaunitz felt at the time that the two would be "incomparable", but stated that they were unfortunately needed more in the diplomatic posts they held.⁵⁴ Now Maria Theresia and Kaunitz apparently also discussed Starhemberg's recall and appointment in advance, since it was Kaunitz who advised the empress that in view of the fact that a courier was leaving for Paris with a message for Louis XV, it was an opportune time to deliver these instructions to Starhemberg.⁵⁵

What Maria Theresia did not tell Kaunitz, however, was that she had an ulterior motive for recalling Starhemberg. In a letter of July 1766, Starhemberg alludes to the displeasure the empress had expressed "several times" over the leisurely pace of business in Kaunitz's foreign

ministry (Staatskanzlei) and makes reference to her correspondence of the previous November.⁵⁶ It is uncertain how long Maria Theresa had entertained such thoughts, for she was very careful not to reveal any of them even indirectly to anyone else, especially Kaunitz. What is certain is that Maria Theresa in no way wished either to offend or displease Kaunitz, but rather to provide him with assistants to lighten his work load. In early April she emphasized her continued confidence in him by bestowing the Grand Cross of the Order of Maria Theresa on him--by special dispensation, set in gold with diamonds and other gems valued by the Venetian ambassador at 20,000 fl.⁵⁷ Furthermore, she took the same opportunity to present Kaunitz's close friend and associate, Friedrich Binder,⁵⁸ with a ring of undetermined value--a gesture Kaunitz was bound to appreciate.⁵⁹ Even Joseph made a point of bending somewhat in Kaunitz's direction. When Kaunitz was unable to attend a meeting of a commission on commerce, Joseph wrote him: "You are too essential a member [of the commission] not to postpone the meeting."⁶⁰

Nevertheless Kaunitz, who was in any case highly sensitive to criticism, began to sense that something was amiss. His disagreements with Joseph and the struggle over the appointment of Lacy continued to fester. Joseph became increasingly sarcastic and critical with Kaunitz--so much so, in fact, that by September Maria Theresa herself had to intervene and upbraid her son for his treatment of the chancellor.⁶¹ Furthermore, it could only have been with increasing alarm that Kaunitz viewed not merely the strong personal friendship that had developed between Joseph and Lacy, but also Lacy's growing influence and popularity with Maria

Theresia.⁶² Finally, Starhemberg was known in governmental circles to be the heir-apparent to the Staatskanzlei, and even if he did not enter it upon his return to Vienna he was nevertheless moved a step closer to it.

It was under these circumstances that Kaunitz received the news, on 27 April 1766, that his principal adviser and aide (Referendar) on affairs for the Austrian Netherlands, Johann Jakob von Dorn, had suddenly and unexpectedly died at the age of forty-four. Five days later the Referendar for Italian affairs, Don Ludovico Giusti, was also dead. Kaunitz had been close to both men and was severely shaken by the twin blows. In addition, Binder was ailing and unable to continue fulfilling his tasks as principal aide on foreign affairs. At one blow therefore, the heads of all three departments of Kaunitz's Staatskanzlei were removed, requiring a complete reshuffling of the ministry. "These events," Kaunitz wrote Maria Theresia, "have caused me to re-consider a lot of things." He asked for six weeks to reflect on all these events and to decide what to do about them. This the empress granted in a highly personal and sensitive letter.⁶³

After suitable reflection, Kaunitz finally wrote Maria Theresia on 4 June that he felt he was no longer in a position to train new aides or otherwise reorganize his department; as a result he asked to be relieved of all his offices, including the essentially honorific one of Chancellor of the Maria Theresia Order. He recommended Starhemberg as successor to all his posts.⁶⁴ Much speculation has surrounded this resignation and historians have generally accepted Khevenhüller's judgement

that Kaunitz was jealous of Starhemberg and resigned in a pique.⁶⁵ Kaunitz was certainly aware that his position in government would be visibly altered as a result of the activities and enthusiasms of the young co-regent. Nor did events since December 1765 give him much hope that this change was for the better, and certainly these realities could not have been without influence. But given Kaunitz's usual candor towards Maria Theresa, at least as much credence ought to be given to the reasons Kaunitz himself gave. On principle and from experience he subscribed to the notion that nothing was more pernicious than half-measures, and since he felt he no longer could give his offices his most vigorous attention he thought it best to give them up altogether.⁶⁶

Maria Theresa was shocked by this precipitous action. She did not trust herself to reply immediately, she wrote in a note she personally gave Kaunitz three days later, so deeply had this resignation wounded her. She reproached him for abandoning her and made it clear that she felt he had betrayed her friendship for him. She returned his resignation and told him that she never wanted to hear anything of that sort again.⁶⁷ Kaunitz was now in turn deeply wounded by Maria Theresa's reproach. He attempted to see her at the palace but she happened by chance not to be there. He therefore addressed himself to her in another note reaffirming his own feeling of being unable to continue, offering all the help and assistance that his successor might need, and expressing disappointment that Maria Theresa could regard his move as ingratitude or that she could lend any credence to rumours that he was moved by envy or base jealousy.⁶⁸

On 12 June 1766 Kaunitz and Maria Theresa met personally and

worked out a compromise.⁶⁹ Kaunitz agreed to remain in office until such time as Starhemberg and Pergen had acquired sufficient exposure to run the Staatskanzlei, and Maria Theresia agreed that after this period (which Kaunitz felt should not exceed two years) she would not stand in the way of his resignation. "One has to love one's friends more than oneself," she wrote him, "to give in to all this." She further expressed every confidence that when the two years had passed, he would have changed his mind.⁷⁰ The following day Kaunitz reported the results of this meeting to Joseph who was on a military inspection tour of Bohemia.⁷¹ Relations between Joseph and Kaunitz, as has been seen, had already been strained, and it was precisely at this moment that a further conflict occurred. Joseph had wished to use the opportunity that a trip through northern Bohemia afforded him of meeting with Frederick of Prussia. Maria Theresia told Kaunitz that she wished to prevent such a meeting⁷² and that same day Kaunitz submitted a report to her outlining the reasons why such a meeting would be inopportune and suggesting ways of making Joseph abandon the idea.⁷³

This news probably did not reach Joseph, who was then at Eger, before his reply to Kaunitz's report concerning his resignation. Joseph was extraordinarily courteous, agreed that Kaunitz could be relieved of any physical labours he desired, but refused to countenance any notion that the prince should give up his role as principal adviser of the crown.⁷⁴ Kaunitz was highly flattered but reiterated that his peace of mind could only be maintained if he could count on the certainty of being allowed to withdraw from public life within two years.⁷⁵ Soon thereafter

Kaunitz retired to his estate at Austerlitz in Moravia. Joseph decided therefore to invite himself to dinner there,⁷⁶ and surprisingly enough indicated his complete agreement with Kaunitz that a meeting with Frederick was ill-advised.⁷⁷ Joseph obviously did not wish Kaunitz to resign any more than Maria Theresia. He visited Austerlitz on 18 July and spent several hours with "the master of logic," as he called Kaunitz, making any concession the latter wished except to permit him to withdraw from politics altogether.⁷⁸

Meanwhile Starhemberg, who according to Kaunitz's compromise plan was to become chancellor of the Staatskanzlei (Kaunitz retaining the title of supreme chancellor) as well as receiving Pergen as vice-chancellor,⁷⁹ informed Maria Theresia that he could not operate sandwiched between a vice- and supreme chancellor whom he was constantly obliged to consult. Nor was he able to endorse the notion that Pergen as vice-chancellor could handle the load previously carried by the three departmental heads and chief aides of Kaunitz: Guisti, Dorn and Binder. He therefore suggested that he either become Kaunitz's aide without any formal title or appointment, or that he be made chancellor in exactly the same fashion as Kaunitz had been. In either case, he believed, the three departments of the Staatskanzlei should continue to be handled by three Referendare and not by a single vice-chancellor.⁸⁰

Kaunitz conceded that Starhemberg's position might be untenable under the circumstances he had previously outlined and that he ought therefore be recalled without a specific Staatskanzlei appointment. But Kaunitz continued to press for Pergen's official appointment as

vice-chancellor.⁸¹ Maria Theresa consented to Pergen's recall but firmly rejected any notion of informing him that he had been appointed vice-chancellor of the Staatskanzlei. Both Starhemberg and Pergen were to be content with the titles 'minister of state' (Staats- und Konferenz-minister) and membership in the Staatsrat.⁸² Nor was Maria Theresa amenable to Kaunitz's suggestion that his resignation be widely publicized. Ably supported by her son, she made it clear to Kaunitz that a written promise from her that she would not stand in the way of his resignation after two years was the extent of the concessions he could expect from her.⁸³ After some weeks Kaunitz reluctantly accepted this verdict and proceeded with the re-ordering of his ministry.

It was not until now that Starhemberg and Pergen actually arrived in Vienna. Along with Binder, who had now been "retired" from the Staatskanzlei, all three became members of the Staatsrat. Their activities there, however, varied considerably. Binder was such a close friend and long-time working colleague of Kaunitz that no one believed he was actually leaving the Staatskanzlei. And in fact, despite Maria Theresa's open announcement designed to end "captious objections" to Binder's "irrevocable" promotion,⁸⁴ Kaunitz made it clear in a memo to all Staatskanzlei officials that his trusted friend's experience and expertise were not to be lost to the department, and that Binder would remain free to examine any Staatskanzlei documents or letters.⁸⁵

Furthermore, while Kaunitz was unable to push through Pergen's formal appointment as vice-chancellor, he left no doubt in his subordinates that this would be Pergen's functional post. He was entrusted with the

administration, supervision and control of all the employees of the ministry's three departments, with the running of the day to day business, and with the power to initiate or revise, subject only to Kuanitz's approval, all Staatskanzlei reports and memoranda. To emphasize Pergen's dominant position, no Referendare were appointed to replace Binder, Giusti and Dorn.⁸⁶ There were two reasons for this. In the first place Kaunitz had not totally given up the idea of combining the three posts into one vice-chancellorate, and formal title or no, this is what Pergen now assumed. But equally significant is the fact that Binder in the event spent most of his time in the foreign office and continued much as before in fulfilling the role of Referendar for foreign affairs even after he had officially given up the office. Kaunitz could therefore hardly fill a post that was not really vacant.⁸⁷

If Pergen's and Binder's involvements with the Staatsrat were thus largely chimerical, Starhemberg found himself in the reverse position. He became the titular head of the Staatsrat while his position in the Staatskanzlei was purely that of an observer. In fact, no mention was even made of Starhemberg in Kaunitz's instructions to his staff. The Staatskanzlei's designated heir was, therefore, apparently to be "trained" exclusively by Kaunitz himself and not by a process of immersion in the ministry's business. It was in essence the first step in Kaunitz's indefinite retention of his office and Starhemberg's exclusion from not only the business of the Staatskanzlei but also from his position as the heir-apparent to Kaunitz.⁸⁸ If this to some extent seems to confirm the contention that Kaunitz never meant to resign and merely resorted to the

tactic in order to remove his rival, it does so only by chance. Kaunitz had every reason to believe that given Joseph's temperament and the strained relationship between them, his resignation would be accepted. That he was himself genuinely ailing and really sceptical that he had the strength necessary to continue his work was borne out by the Venetian ambassador,⁸⁹ and that the deaths of Giusti and Dorn were a genuine blow cannot be doubted. It seems clear that Kaunitz was perfectly sincere in wanting to hand his offices over to Starhemberg, and that the latter's rather rapid fall from the position of chancellor-designate was more due to his growing unpopularity with Joseph than the jealousy of Kaunitz. Though Starhemberg was no less a member of Maria Theresa's as opposed to Joseph's 'party' than Kaunitz, he seemed unable to steer between the two poles as successfully as the latter.⁹⁰

Though Kaunitz would not appoint Referendare to head his ministry's three departments, he nevertheless saw that, even with Binder's continued activity in foreign affairs, Pergen could not fully saddle the load without further help. As a result, a series of privy councillors (Hofräte) were appointed with special areas of competence. Joseph von Sperges concerned himself primarily with Italian affairs, August von Lederer with the Austrian Netherlands, Heinrich Gabriel von Collenbach with the Holy Roman Empire and Elias von Hochstättern with the Levant. Andreas Adolf Krufft, a former secretary, was made a titular privy councillor with no special area of activity. The Staatskanzlei's number of court secretaries (Hofsecretarien) was increased from two to four. Among these, Anton Spielmann, who became Binder's special aide, and Franz Maria Thugut,

whose linguistic abilities singled him out as Hochstättern's aide, were both to rise rapidly and establish considerable reputations in the years to come.⁹¹ By mid-November the remaining vacancies for chancellery clerks were filled, including a special aide for Pergen,⁹² and Kaunitz was then able to provide Maria Theresia with a detailed list of expenditures.⁹³ The Staatskanzlei's budget was set at 70,000 fl.⁹⁴

CHAPTER II

THE REFORMS OF 1768

It is difficult to determine when Kaunitz gave up the idea of retiring within two years. There is no perceptible difference after September 1766 in his reports or memoranda, nor, indeed, does he cease to concern himself with domestic issues. Starhemberg remained confident for some time that Kaunitz's retirement was imminent and waited patiently for the call to the chancellorate.¹ In foreign affairs growing tensions in the Polish and Eastern Questions as well as in relations with the Vatican seem to have increasingly absorbed Kaunitz's attention. During 1767 Joseph and he were again in opposite camps over military reform,² while the economic and administrative structure of the monarchy seemed once more to be in need of an overhaul.³ Maria Theresia again turned to Kaunitz. In view of his knowledge of her "way of thinking" as well as her implicit trust in him, she told Kaunitz that no one was in a better position to have an overall perspective or "to recommend a firm system."⁴

Although Kaunitz had been involved tangentially with economic questions throughout the year, he remained uncertain if he should indeed assume as central a role as the empress had cut out for him. At the bottom of this ambiguity was his uncertainty of how Joseph would react to such an intrusion. Consequently, Kaunitz indicated to Maria Theresia that although her concerns were only all too well founded, he wished to be absolutely certain that Joseph shared her desire to have him submit his recommendations. Significantly, Kaunitz still felt that without Joseph's

cooperation and consent his involvement would do her service "more harm than good."⁵ Maria Theresia, however, assured Kaunitz that both she and Joseph were agreed that he was the man for the job and that they both impatiently awaited his recommendations.⁶

It would seem that his willingness to respond to this call, to allow himself to be involved yet again in a large-scale domestic issue which experience must have told him would find no rapid solution, as well as his immersion in the growing Polish and Turkish crises, were the turning points in his resolve to retire. Kaunitz would attempt to resign again several times in the years to come, but for the moment it became increasingly clear that during December 1767 and January 1768 he had made the decision to put off his retirement indefinitely. By the end of January 1768, therefore, he was ready with the proposals and recommendations that had been so urgently solicited from him.

On the twenty-fifth of that month Kaunitz presented Maria Theresia with his 125-page memorandum subdivided into eighty-one sections and an appendix.⁷ He began by noting that since finances were a major part of the entire domestic system and depended to a large degree on the smooth running of the latter, he would attempt to make suggestions on the whole as well as the particular problem. In general he felt that Austria's political system was not beset by any major problems or disorders in administration, and reiterated his central theme that the institution of the Staatsrat had been the major cure of the ailment from which the central administration had suffered. He called it the "point de reunion" of the diverse constitutions and privileges of the monarchy's provinces, and he

felt that a sovereign alone would find impossible to oversee all these, let alone be concerned with details of each in turn. He also repeated his claim of two years earlier that the Staatsrat had all the advantages of a prime minister and none of the disadvantages because it precluded a partisan approach to the problems of the state.⁸

In a comment that could not help but annoy the centralizing-minded Joseph, Kaunitz further warned of the dangers of excessive centralization in a state such as the Habsburg Monarchy. He held the existing structure of the central administration of the 'German' provinces to be in fact ideal, requiring only stricter adherence to its originally defined purpose by its personnel. Although the House of Habsburg had never been served by a more impressive array of statesmen, Kaunitz noted, all too often they wasted much time and energy in seizing as much power and influence as they could possibly get away with for their own departments. Any and all improvements for the state had to proceed from the two general premises that the principal purpose of government was "the happiness and enrichment of the sovereign, which is inseparably bound with the welfare, happiness and wealth of the people," and that all political calculations for improvements must be examined and analyzed without prejudice or precipitate action. Self-evident and platitudinous though these principles may sound, Kaunitz affirmed, they were all too seldom the basis of action or policy.⁹

Turning to specifics, Kaunitz pointed out that most government employees were so overburdened with petty details that they had no time to spare for their most essential duties, namely reflecting on needed

improvements. In Kaunitz's view, bureaucrats spent too much time writing and allowing paper work to reach endless proportions. Much of this correspondence and purely mechanical duplication of documents could be entirely abolished. Reports did not have to be re-written every time they passed from one office to another, and many of the formal and polite addresses and bureaucratic jargon could be eliminated altogether. Inquiries could be conducted orally instead of occasioning a vast correspondence, and routine reports could be shortened. Administrative authorities which were strongly tied to each other, such as for example the finance portfolios, ought to be housed under the same roof to facilitate communication. Referendare and privy councillors ought to be appointed to specific areas of concern not just as general advisers, and regular formal meetings among them could be abolished unless a specific problem came up. In short, Kaunitz wished to see bureaucratic red tape cut to the minimum in order that the central administration would not allow superficial forms to sidetrack it from its principal purpose.¹⁰

Underscoring his continued conviction of the vital role of the Staatsrat, Kaunitz suggested that it ought therefore be the sovereign's principal concern that such bureaucratic abuses as "the spirit of obstinacy, opposition, injustice, prejudice, hardness, thirst for power, favoritism, self-service, intrigue, etc." be above all not allowed to creep into that council. If the Staatsrat were to keep watch over all the other departments it had to the least flawed and most exemplary governmental institution of the monarchy. To do its job most effectively, however, it had to be relieved of all unnecessary work. In addition to

ordering the agenda by priorities, Kaunitz also recommended that the members of the Staatsrat submit their opinions (vota) not by rank (which invariably overburdened the junior member of the council who submitted the first votum to which everyone else then merely affixed qualifications), but that the task of submitting the first votum be rotated amongst the members. Whoever had this task, Kaunitz went on, should also submit a brief summary of the issue as well as a brief list of the main points of contention.¹¹

In what concerned the rest of the central administration, Kaunitz's suggestions tended at once to encourage departmental autonomy and responsibility while at the same time warning that all activities concerning the commonweal could never be left to the arbitrariness of single departmental heads whose perspectives he regarded as invariably distorted. In addition he addressed himself to the minor anomalies of the administration he still perceived, as well as touching on various domestic problems in general. The encouragement of autonomy was particularly underscored in the case of the Oberste Justizstelle. Kaunitz felt it needed "no particular improvements," and suggested that the majority decisions of the body in legal questions be considered final. He did not consider further reports to either the Staatsrat or indeed the sovereign himself to be necessary since neither could spare the time required to arbitrate a legal dispute.¹²

The Kommerzienrat, which had been left under the general umbrella of the Hofkanzlei in 1765 because of the complementary aims and purposes of the two bodies, had in fact only remained under the titular authority of the Hofkanzler and for all intents and purposes had evolved as an

autonomous board. Now Kaunitz suggested a tighter integration and closer cooperation of the personnel of the two bodies. The head of the Kommerzienrat should not act as president of a council, but rather, under the authority of the Hofkanzler, discharge business by means of Referendare and commissions. Nor did he see any reason why such economic considerations could not be handled under the direct supervision of the provincial gubernii.¹³

The remaining economic business of the monarchy, with the exception of the Rechenkammer, had since 1765 been the concern of the Hofkammer. But this was a three-headed body, including the Hofkammer proper, the Generalkasse, and the nominally private and autonomous Vienna City Bank which in practice operated through the Ministerialbankodeputation (sometimes referred to as just Banco). The Generalkasse had never in fact managed to establish any working autonomy within the Hofkammer, and indeed, since 1765 it was not even any longer included in the official administrative schema.¹⁴ The Ministerialbankodeputation, on the other hand, despite the fact that its president was traditionally also the president of the Hofkammer, became increasingly jealous and notoriously tightfisted with the revenues it administered. Here Kaunitz suggested that the revenues of the Banco and the Hofkammer should be united under one administration by the simple device of having all Banco councillors simultaneously named Hofkammer councillors. In addition the parsimonious tendencies of the body had to be recognized as counter-productive. "He who wishes to reap, must also sow," Kaunitz allegorized, and advised that the overemphasis on saving had to be "completely stamped out."¹⁵

Kaunitz was also strongly opposed to the nominal independence of the Hungarian Camera and suggested that its head, Count Grassalkowitz, be promoted to some honorific post in order that the body could be completely reorganized. Further, he noted that the Hofkammer's administration of mintage and mining revenues (Münz- und Bergwesen, also referred to merely as montanistici) had been conducted with ignorance and neglect, and definitely cried for improvements, though he made no specific suggestions. Finally he concluded with a vigorous defence of the Rechenkammer and its president, Count Ludwig von Zinzendorf, who, as might have been expected of an auditor, was under constant fire from the Hofkammer.¹⁶

With this vast report, Kaunitz expressed the hope of having fulfilled his commission. The usual procedure might now have been the circulation of this report among all the relevant ministers and councillors, followed by a debate amongst them of each of the points in turn made. Kaunitz, however, did not think this procedure suitable. In order to prevent any kind of departmental jealousy, Kaunitz suggested that Maria Theresia keep both the report as well as all oral communication with him a secret. She should, he suggested, regard his report merely as a point of departure, and solicit from Staatsrat members and other ministers independent and candid reports on what improvements they in turn felt should be made in the administration.¹⁷

Maria Theresia's acceptance of this last suggestion has had the effect of completely obscuring the primary role of Kaunitz in the great 'red-tape debate' (zur Abstellung der Vielschreiberei und Langsamkeit im Geschäftsgang) and the subsequent reforms of 1768. On 11 February 1768,

she sent largely identical notes to Starhemberg (and through him also to the members of the Staatsrat), to Rudolf Chotek at the Hofkanzlei, Hatzfeld at the Hofkammer and Zinzendorf at the Rechenkammer, mostly in line with Kaunitz's suggestions but without any mention of Kaunitz's report.¹⁸ The debate that ensued was therefore regarded by all who participated as having been occasioned by the empress herself.

In the case of the Staatsrat, Starhemberg transmitted the empress' orders to the members on 15 February. They then deliberated the matter in detail in a series of meetings from March to the beginning of August.¹⁹ During the course of this debate Kaunitz kept a low profile,²⁰ and it was not until Starhemberg presented the formal report of the Staatsrat commission to Maria Theresia on 18 August²¹ that he addressed himself at any length to the problem. In this report, dated 29 August, Kaunitz noted with pleasure that the recommendations of the Staatsrat tended to be almost identical to the recommendations he had made as early as May 1765. With respect to the organization of the Staatsrat itself, the commission also suggested the rotation of the first votum, though only among the junior members, every ten voti. Kaunitz supported this but felt that rotation on a weekly basis was more sensible. He also suggested that the proposed weekly meetings of the Staatsrat should be held at the palace and not at Starhemberg's residence, though he did not consider this point essential. Finally he recommended that the final instructions of the sovereign to the Staatsrat should include not merely the operational changes that were to be introduced, but a general delineation of the purpose of the body to serve as a guiding principle for the future.²²

It was, however, not until November that the work of the Staatsrat commission was completed on the remaining administrative bodies. Before her final decision, Maria Theresia again turned to Kaunitz for a final assessment of the various recommendations. On 29 November Kaunitz reported that the material he had to peruse was so voluminous that his report would have to be delayed until "next Saturday."²³ Unfortunately this report, submitted on 3 December, has been lost. Apparently it largely repeated his previous recommendations and also begged to be relieved of his duty to submit voti on all questions that came before the Staatsrat.²⁴ The imperial resolution concerning the council then followed on 16 December. The first votum in the Staatsrat was henceforth to be divided among Gebler, Stupan and Borié cyclically every ten voti. The agenda of the body was to be ordered by priorities, for which purpose three orders of importance were delineated. Considerable discretion in determining priorities was thus left the member with the first votum. Meetings of the Staatsrat were to take place either at court or a place specifically determined by the empress every Thursday morning. Voti were to be kept as short as possible and were to avoid repetition. And finally, the empress granted Kaunitz's request not to be required to submit voti on every domestic issue. He was nevertheless to receive all protocols, memos and resolutions, even where he had expressed no opinion, "so that he may, in accordance with his heretofore proved insight and experience, continue to advise me on what he considers useful for my service."²⁵

In essence, therefore, the reform of the Staatsrat in 1768 largely followed Kaunitz's recommendations much in line with the precedents

of 1760 and 1765. Walter has suggested that the inefficacy of these "palliatives" was demonstrated by the fact that within a year the Staatsrat debate flared up anew when the Referendar of the council, Anton König von Kronburg, attempted to increase the importance of his position by asking to have his duties redefined.²⁶ König's ploy, however, as Borié pointed out,²⁷ was more an indication of his ambition than of the inefficiency of the reform of 1768. In the event, König was duly reprovved by an imperial resolution of 8 August 1770 and the debate died there.²⁸ It is an indication of the importance Kaunitz placed on the entire issue that he, now relieved of the duty to report on all but genuinely important matters, never participated in the discussions initiated by König.

The reform of the Hofkanzlei, on which the final decision was not made till 28 December 1768, again saw little actual participation by Kaunitz in the deliberations, but results much in line with his original suggestions. Hofkanzler Chotek's concern tended to center primarily on intrusions on chancellery business by other ministries,²⁹ and these resulted in the transfer of some minor competences from the Oberste Justizstelle to the chancellery. But Maria Theresia had focused her primary attention on the area pointed out by Kaunitz--namely the relationship of the Hofkanzlei with the Kommerzienrat, and therefore ordered Chotek in a second instruction dated 28 February 1768 to address himself to that question.

Count Rudolf Chotek had long been one of the more conservative members of the imperial government. His aristocratic sympathies, it will be recalled, had resulted in a considerable degree of animosity between him and Kaunitz as early as 1763, and he remained extraordinarily sensitive

to any initiative emanating from the Staatskanzlei. He tended to regard Kaunitz and Zinzendorf with great suspicion and was wont to hold them responsible for any changes he considered undesirable, including his own retirement in 1771.³⁰ Thus, for example, when the Staatskanzlei sent the announcement of the change of the imperial coat of arms resulting from the elevation of Transylvania to a grand principality to the Hofkanzlei on 9 January 1766, Chotek simply returned the decree.³¹ Kaunitz demanded to know Chotek's grounds and returned the decree to him. Chotek in turn sent it back a second time, forcing Kaunitz to seek recourse to the empress.³² In the major confrontation that followed Chotek enlisted the help of the imperial chamberlain, one of Kaunitz's bitterest enemies, Prince Khevenhüller, to attempt to show that Kaunitz had overstepped the competence of his ministry. This required a lengthy legal and historical defence by Kaunitz on 22 January 1766 of the powers and prerogatives of the Staatskanzlei before an imperial resolution forced both Chotek and Khevenhüller to give up the fight.³³

In 1769 the confrontation flared up anew when Chotek discovered that Kaunitz had sent a business communication to the grand master of the Order of Malta. This time Chotek turned to Joseph, accusing Kaunitz of "repeated undeniable interference" in chancellery business. In reply to Joseph's question to what extent Chotek's accusation was true, Kaunitz merely cited the empress' direct order to draft and dispatch the missive. But to a second question on how such dispatches ought to be handled in the future, Kaunitz could not repress his sarcasm: the Staatskanzlei, he said, regarded it as a matter of total indifference who drafted such

dispatches--all that mattered was that they met with imperial satisfaction.³⁴ However, even if Joseph too now seconded Kaunitz and underscored Staatskanzlei prerogatives,³⁵ the precedents left Kaunitz sensitive to any suggestion that he might be interfering in the business of other departments. When a request came from a lumber company in Berchtesgaden to amalgamate with one in Austria, Kaunitz immediately noted that this was more properly the business of the Kommerzienrat (which was under the Hofkanzlei) and made no further comment on the matter.³⁶

It can, therefore, be no surprise that Kaunitz tended to remain aloof from the discussions concerning Hofkanzlei reform in 1768. What might seem surprising, however, is the extent to which Chotek's recommendations tended to echo those of Kaunitz. Here a rather simple explanation stands to hand. In fact Chotek had to receive several instructions before he would address himself to the problems Kaunitz had pointed out in his January report.³⁷ Indeed, it was not until the empress issued an instruction that all but repeated the relevant sections in Kaunitz's report in question form,³⁸ that Chotek finally submitted the recommendations Maria Theresa was seeking.³⁹ In the final resolution that ensued on 28 December, therefore, all three of Kaunitz's major proposals found legislative enactment: they included the tighter integration of Hofkanzlei and Kommerzienrat personnel, the transferal of several economic administrative duties to provincial authorities, and the creation of a State Economic Board (Staatswirtschaftsdeputation) to deal with those areas of Kommerzienrat business which required a generalized, and in a sense inter-departmental knowledge of economic and commercial affairs.⁴⁰ The board,

which sat under the presidency of the chancellor, met for the first time on 19 January 1769.⁴¹

Like Chotek, Count Hatzfeld, the president of the Hofkammer, accepted reforms in line with Kaunitz's suggestions with extreme reluctance. As an advocate of a concentrated central administration he had opposed the Kaunitzian innovations of 1760-1761. And although in 1764-1765 Hatzfeld joined Zinzendorf on Kaunitz's side, it was only because the reforms seemed again to turn to the road of administrative concentration. The Hatzfeld-Zinzendorf friendship did not last long. By the end of 1766 it had turned into bitter enmity, and in the following years the two found themselves on opposite sides in almost every economic issue. Hatzfeld's continued attempts to restrict the activities of the Rechenkammer not only embittered Zinzendorf all the more but also provoked Kaunitz's ire.⁴²

In this instance, however, Kaunitz was largely seconded by the entire Staatsrat, and before this united front Hatzfeld was forced to give way. The Staatsrat commission report of 9 August recommended that only the administration of the treasury proper (the Generalkassa) and credit operations should be left under the direct administration of the Hofkammer president. And while he would remain nominal head of all other economic administrations (except, of course, the Rechenkammer), these other concerns should really be run by semi-autonomous economic commissions. The Staatsrat also insisted on a rationalization of the revenues of the Banco and the Hofkammer, though in this instance Kaunitz's device of having Banco councillors simultaneously named Hofkammer councillors remained unused.⁴³

The device of autonomous economic commissions under the general umbrella of the Hofkammer was in fact also the key to combating excessive parsimony, for no one commission would now suffer at the expense of another. The Staatsrat commission also underscored Kaunitz's complaint of the woeful condition of the administration of revenues from mintage and mining. It suggested rather drastically and much to the discomfiture of Hatzfeld, that both montanistici and the administration of the Banat be removed from the competence of the Banco, and henceforth also be administered autonomously.⁴⁴ Maria Theresia responded to Hatzfeld's objections to these recommendations by laying out specific guidelines beyond which the discussion of the matter was not to go, but Hatzfeld continued to attempt to push his point of view. Finally, on 18 November 1768, the empress had to issue a direct order calling Hatzfeld to heel.⁴⁵

The final resolution on Hofkammer reform followed on 24 December. The administration of minting and mining revenues as well as the Banat became a completely autonomous branch of the Hofkammer. In addition, four autonomous economic commissions were established concerned with such things as customs and excise, the state salt monopoly, taxation and so on. Above all a special commission to control the Hungarian camera was clearly occasioned by Kaunitz's mistrust of the Hungarians. Finally, despite the fact that the Staatsrat commission report had seen fit to ignore Kaunitz's suggestion that some sort of rationalization not only of Hofkammer and Banco business but also of personnel was necessary, Maria Theresia did not. She demanded that Hatzfeld submit a detailed list of the duties and responsibilities of Hofkammer and Banco personnel to evaluate if and how

further changes needed to be made.⁴⁶

If the reform of 1768, finally, left the Rechenkammer essentially untouched, it was in no small measure thanks to Kaunitz's vigorous defence of it. An imperial resolution of 1 March 1768 did circumscribe the Rechenkammer's automatic participation in all administrative concerns indirectly touching on finance and limited it, except at the specific order of the sovereign, to direct financial audit.⁴⁷ However, as has been pointed out, this was in fact a great relief for everyone concerned, and Zinzendorf's fears that this minor reform might herald the beginning of further attacks on his office proved groundless for the moment.⁴⁸

Kaunitz had never made a secret of the fact that he considered Zinzendorf a much more competent minister than Hatzfeld, and this dogged support by the state chancellor could not but underscore Maria Theresia's continuing confidence in Zinzendorf. Thus it was Zinzendorf alone, of all the ministers involved in the reform debate of 1768, whose final instructions from the empress also included expressions of her "exceptional satisfaction" at his conduct of business.⁴⁹

During the course of the subsequent year many minor technical details--particularly those pertaining to the new duties of privy councillors, court secretaries and various clerks--had still to be ironed out. But Kaunitz seemed well pleased with the results of the 1768 reforms. On 29 September 1769, Maria Theresia sent him all the relevant documents concerning the minor technical adjustments that were still being made. Before she made her final decisions, she said, she wanted first to consult Kaunitz if there was anything he would care to add.⁵⁰ Kaunitz took some

weeks to look over the papers but finally reported on 23 October that since the imperial resolutions of the past year had generally been in accordance with his proposals of January 1768, he had nothing further to add.⁵¹

The reforms of 1768 did not introduce wholesale changes, but rather are to be regarded as a modification of the reforms of 1760 and 1765. Almost at every turn they followed closely the directions that had first been indicated by Kaunitz, and certainly they reflected his conviction that no radical disorders or problems existed in the administrative structure of the Habsburg Monarchy. The fact that debate on administrative issues did not cease after 1768 does not mean that this faith was misplaced. Personnel changes and individual ambitions should be regarded at least as much responsible for the further changes that took place as any supposed deficiencies in the actual administrative structure. Above all, from January 1769 onwards, Joseph II's increasing restlessness began to manifest itself, and in subsequent years was to occasion continuing and heated debate over the central administration.

CHAPTER III

THE MINISTERIAL SHUFFLE OF 1771

Within a month after the imperial resolution concerning Staatsrat reform, Joseph began to sense that he was the fifth wheel on the council cart. His advice seemed seldom to be heeded and his signature of protocols seemed a mere formality. During January 1769 he began to insist that he would no longer sign documents except with the qualification "ex consilio" or "qua Corregens" to indicate his secondary position.¹ He wished neither to be identified with nor held responsible for decisions with which he did not entirely agree or had not participated in.² Maria Theresia, on the other hand, had hoped that her son would be as accommodating in these matters as her husband had been, and attempted to maintain the fiction of Joseph's equality.³ Even Joseph's old friend, travelling companion and personal chamberlain, Simon Thaddaus Freiherr von Reischach, could do nothing to change the young emperor's mind,⁴ and in the subsequent twelve years Joseph usually signed formal documents adjunctively with the title 'Co-Regent'. That spring saw Joseph's departure for his famous sojourn in Italy, and though he had assured Starhemberg before he left that he was not displeased either with the system or the Staatsrat, or for that matter the entire conduct of the affairs of state,⁵ he was hardly the type to remain content with the status quo. In this respect the conflict of January 1769, not vital in itself, was symptomatic of the young co-regent's impatience and restlessness.

Difficulties in any case presented themselves with respect to

the Staatsrat, if for no other reason than a depletion of its personnel. During 1769 it became clear that Kaunitz's resolve to resign as foreign minister had all but disappeared. His designated successor, Starhemberg, had made a poor impression on Joseph, particularly during the period of maternal-filial stress, and had made few significant contributions as head of the Staatsrat. At first opportunity, therefore, Starhemberg was removed from the council. On 20 January 1770, the authorized Austrian minister at Brussels, Count Karl Cobenzl, died unexpectedly at the age of fifty-eight, and Starhemberg was immediately sent off to replace him.⁶ Soon thereafter Egid Freiherr Borié, one of the Staatsrat's most energetic members, was appointed Austro-Burgundian ambassador to the Imperial Diet at Regensburg.⁷ When it is remembered that no military expert had filled the gap left by Daun in 1765, that Kaunitz had ceased to attend Staatsrat meetings regularly in December 1768, and that both Pergen and Binder worked almost exclusively in the Staatskanzlei, the Staatsrat was reduced to four members: Blümegen, Stupan, Gebler, and the council's Referendar, König.

Gebler⁸ had only been appointed in 1768 and Stupan was in old age and poor health. This left Blümegen the unofficial director, a position which Joseph in particular felt was being abused. The emperor in any case regarded Blümegen as "too timid and compliant vis-à-vis la Mamman,"⁹ and the latter had now increasingly taken the liberty of drafting imperial resolutions on original reports before they had been officially accepted by either Joseph or Maria Theresia. This, of course, tended to give Blümegen's opinions more weight than anyone wished,¹⁰ and Joseph was not only quick to point out the abuse but equally quick to take advantage of

it. He proposed that he himself examine all resolutions of the Staatsrat before they reached final form,¹¹ and his mother accepted the proposal.¹² "It will be no small matter," he wrote his brother of his new duties, and obviously looked forward to adding his "own grain of salt."¹³

This new acquisition of responsibility on the part of the co-regent came precisely at a time when a serious socio-economic crisis, occasioned by the great famine of 1770-1772, beset the monarchy. The emperor became increasingly irritable about the tardy conduct of affairs in famine-stricken Bohemia, and after an inspection tour of that province decided that drastic socio-economic problems required even drastic administrative cures.¹⁴ In order to avoid chaos, Joseph now suggested to Maria Theresa with obvious reference to himself, "an honest, unselfish and also perspicacious and diligent person" should be selected, and be given "absolute confidence" to oversee the entire administrative structure.¹⁵ The lack of confidence in the empress that this recommendation implied affected Maria Theresa deeply. Differences of opinion between herself and members of her family were not matters to be paraded in public, but she indicated a willingness to listen to whatever specific suggestions he might have.¹⁶

In the meantime the wind of ambition blew from yet another quarter. Count Hatzfeld had not been happy with the restrictions the reforms of 1768 placed on his Hofkammer. During the subsequent months he continued to express his dissatisfaction with the administrative structure of the monarchy until, near the end of 1770, Maria Theresa finally asked him to delineate specifically how he felt the conduct of administrative

business could be accelerated.¹⁷ In a series of proposals during the spring and summer of 1771 Hatzfeld returned to the theme that only a greater concentration of the central administration could expedite business and avoid unnecessary duplications. He therefore recommended the unification of the Hofkanzlei (including the Kommerzienrat), the Hofkammer, the Ministerialbankodeputation and the Rechenkammer under the authority of a single minister who would then also join the Staatsrat.¹⁸ As has been pointed out, this centralization and concentration of power would have been even greater than that of Haugwitz, and would have made the Staatsrat an illusory institution.¹⁹

It is clear that Maria Theresia was not without sympathy for aspects of this plan. Certainly unnecessary delay and duplication of business remained a central concern of hers, and in the spring of 1771 she demonstrated that she obviously wanted to meet Hatzfeld's proposals half-way. She therefore decided that the ageing, ailing and increasingly conservative Chotek would have to be retired, and without in fact changing the structure of the administrative system, she essentially gave Hatzfeld the opportunity to demonstrate the efficacy of his suggestions by giving him Chotek's posts of Austro-Bohemian chancellor and president of the Kommerzienrat.²⁰ Hatzfeld nevertheless was not satisfied with this de facto accretion of power and pressed the acceptance of his entire scheme. The empress however, would not contemplate such a step without first consulting the Staatsrat.

This was one issue on which Kaunitz felt that not only the voice of his mouth-piece, Binder, but his own as well was needed. In the event,

not only Kaunitz and Binder, but Gebler, Stupan and Blümegen as well, expressed their determined opposition to admitting Hatzfeld to the Staatsrat. Binder's votum in particular was filled with bitter innuendos about Hatzfeld's overweening ambition, while Gebler, Stupan and Blümegen contented themselves with the assertion that such a heavy work-load would be too much even for the energetic Hatzfeld. Binder also violently opposed the theory of a concentration of the administration--a point which, on the surface, Kaunitz did not touch at all. Since the empress had seen fit to appoint Hatzfeld to Chotek's posts, he said, no further comments on the matter were necessary. All that remained was that Hatzfeld's Staatsrat ambitions and Rechenkammer reposals be rejected "simply and without further debate." But in fact, in a more subtle way, Kaunitz also reiterated Binder's philosophical objections:

I am, however, of the opinion that the domestic administration which, after so many deliberations, has been created and accepted by Her Majesty, is so well constructed that anything still necessary to perfect it can easily be accomplished by improving details without necessarily attacking and overturning the whole structure.²¹

At this juncture Joseph's ambitions also came into play. On 27 November 1771 he submitted the detailed report Maria Theresia had solicited from him, and his proposals spelled the death of Hatzfeld's ambitions. Joseph, in brief, attacked the personnel not the structure. He intervened in favour of independent ministries, and particularly of the Rechenkammer (whose agenda competence he was however prepared to see limited yet again) and the Staatsrat. More on the drastic side were the ministerial shuffles he recommended. Hatzfeld was to be taken into the

Staatsrat as directing minister akin to Starhemberg but stripped of all his other offices. Blümegen, on the other hand, was to be removed from the Staatsrat and made Austro-Bohemian Hofkanzler. In addition, Binder was also to be formally removed from the Staatsrat, given the honorary post of director of the Court Archive, and continued in his activities in the Staatskanzlei. Stupan and Gebler could remain in their posts, and the council be enlarged with the addition of Franz Karl Freiherr von Kressel²² and Paul von Festetics.²³ The post of Hofkammer president should be given to Count Leopold Kollowrat-Krakowsky and the Ministerialbanko-deputation to Count Eugen Wrba. Zinzendorf, finally, could remain Rechenkammer president, though the right to prior audit ought be removed from the ministry.²⁴

Maria Theresia immediately sent Joseph's recommendations to Kaunitz for comment. Apparently this consultation was done behind a veil of secrecy, for Kaunitz did not reply in writing. Nor, for that matter, was Joseph's report received by any Staatskanzlei personnel. The report was filed by Kaunitz personally and identified as secret by his own hand (a highly unusual procedure).²⁵ Clearly Kaunitz could have had no major complaints about the proposed shuffle, particularly since in essence it put an end to Hatzfeld's planned super-ministry. Indeed it was only three days later that Hatzfeld was informed of his promotion to the Staatsrat and simultaneous removal from his other posts.²⁶ Again Kaunitz's involvement here can only be surmised, though interestingly enough a copy of this order to Hatzfeld is to be found in Kaunitz's papers.

Neither Hatzfeld nor Blümegen were at all pleased with this turn

of events. Blümegen did not wish to leave the Staatsrat, and Hatzfeld continued to press his original plan.²⁷ Indeed, it would seem that in the subsequent week Hatzfeld even managed to win over Joseph. On 7 December the emperor confessed to his mother that though he had made his proposal with the best intent, Hatzfeld must have undoubtedly chosen the best plan. Since the latter rejected his suggestions, however, he would subscribe to those of Hatzfeld "out of trust, but not out of conviction." It therefore seemed only a matter of making either Hatzfeld or Blümegen supreme minister. Of the two, Joseph preferred Hatzfeld.²⁸

Despite Joseph's volte-face, however, Maria Theresia implemented what largely amounted to her son's original plan. Again it was unlikely that the change took place without close consultation with Kaunitz--especially in view of the fact that the changes involved Binder and Pergen and thus spilled over into the Staatskanzlei. Maria Theresia thought highly of Binder and was extremely reluctant, if for no other reason than the latter's close personal friendship with Kaunitz, to cause him the slightest offence. No matter how much titular honours might disguise it, Binder would not have been blind to the actual demotion involved in Joseph's suggested promotion.²⁹ It was obviously in consultation with Kaunitz, or perhaps even at his initiative that Pergen thus also became involved in the shuffle.

Pergen had by no means been satisfied with his post as functional albeit untitled vice-chancellor of the Staatskanzlei; he felt he received insufficient public recognition and was frustrated in his attempt to build a career for himself. In 1769 he had been appointed president of the

foreign language school, the so-called 'Oriental Academy', and in this capacity submitted his famous proposals on educational reform in August 1770.³⁰ Pergen, who had spent twenty years in northern Germany and picked up many northern prejudices and habits that were unpopular in Austria,³¹ was not happy with the initial response to his proposals. Near the beginning of 1771 he gave vent to his frustrations in a long lament to Kaunitz, asking the prince to intervene on his behalf in order to find a more fulfilling career.³²

Apparently Pergen's deep involvement with the debate on education reform during the course of 1771 not only made his talents in the domestic sphere but also his unsuitability for the Staatskanzlei clear to Kaunitz. Pergen's removal from the Staatskanzlei would therefore not only give him the opportunity to build the new career that he had pleaded for, but would also at the same time make room for Binder to return to an honourable post in the foreign ministry and thus soften the blow of the latter's removal from the Staatsrat.³³

Maria Theresia obviously made her final decision sometime on 13 or 14 December. Two memoranda to the imperial court chamberlain, Prince Khevenhüller, ordered the official proclamation of the new appointments on 15 December 1771. Hatzfeld received Starhemberg's old post at the Staatsrat, Blümegen was made Austro-Bohemian Hofkanzler but not simultaneous president of the Kommerzienrat, Count Leopold Kollowrat became president of the Hofkammer and Bankodeputation. The Kommerzienrat was made into an autonomous department of the Hofkammer under the direction of Thaddäus Freiherr von Reischach. The Rechenkammer remained in Zinzendorf's hands

though it lost its right to prior audit. Pergen retained his official title of Staatsrat member, though not the right to attend council meetings. Instead he was appointed co-adjutor and heir-apparent to the intendant (Landmarschall-Amtsverweser) of Lower Austria, the aged Prince Johann Wilhelm Trautson.³⁴ Binder was removed from the Staatsrat, made director of the court archives, received the rare post of 'secret privy councillor' (Geheimer Rat),³⁵ and returned to a position second only to Kaunitz in the Staatskanzlei. Kressel was appointed to the Staatsrat but Festetics was passed over in favour of Johann Friedrich Freiherr von Löhr,³⁶ a nephew of Borié.³⁷

The rejection of Festetics as a suitable candidate for the Staatsrat was in fact very significant. It in no way reflected on Festetics' personal qualifications but hinged on the important fact that he was an Hungarian. Officially the competence of the Staatsrat extended only to problems concerning the German hereditary provinces, but unofficially Hungarian affairs had also found their way on to the council agenda. Joseph lacked a sense for the subtle significance of the deviousness involved and noted, logically enough, that if Hungarian affairs were to be discussed in the Staatsrat then someone familiar with Hungary ought to be appointed to the body. Count Ferenc Esterhazy, the Hungarian chancellor, however, took immediate exception to any move that might suggest that the Staatsrat had any official right to concern itself with Hungary, and Maria Theresia was quick to let the matter drop.³⁸

The fact of the matter was, and it was a notion in no small way perpetrated by Kaunitz, that if the Staatsrat acted at all on Hungarian

matters, it was usually in the capacity of a watchdog favouring the interests of royal absolutism. Kaunitz had often expressed his vehement opposition to any kind of aristocratic resurgence, and it was in Hungary that the constitution of the kingdom not only gave it a special status within the monarchy but, through the Hungarian Diet, also gave the broadest berth to aristocratic particularism. If at all possible, Kaunitz wanted to abrogate the special status of Hungary and reduce its position to that of any other province. If the Hungarian constitution could be changed, he suggested, the strength of the House of Austria "would be doubled and the greatest resources and benefits of a wise administration could be drawn upon."³⁹

Unfortunately the Hungarian constitution could not be changed at will, and Maria Theresa was continually forced to work within the confines prescribed by her coronation oath. Hungarian resistance to any infringement of this oath culminated in the tumultuous Diet of 1764. Maria Theresa had summoned the Diet in order to change the structure of the isurrectio (Muster of Nobles)⁴⁰ and raise the contributio (war tax) but met with such opposition that she was required to drop the former in order to be able to concentrate on the latter. Even then the Diet insisted that the empress-queen first consider their gravamina (grievances) before any other business was concluded. To help her respond to these, Maria Theresa called Kaunitz, Blümegen and König (all members of the Staatsrat) to Pressburg.⁴¹

The main complaint of the Diet concerned the appearance earlier in the year of a book on the historic rights of the crown in ecclesiastical

matters in Hungary. The book, published in Vienna by the Court Librarian, Adam Franz Kollar, also called into question the basis of noble tax exemption,⁴² and as this was one of the issues Maria Theresia brought before the Diet, Kollar was naturally suspected of having been 'inspired'. Kollar's open punishment was therefore loudly demanded, indeed, one zealous member of the Diet even went so far as to suggest that both Kollar and his book be burned.⁴³ Again Maria Theresia turned to Kaunitz. He, for one, did not consider it politically fortuitous that such a book should have appeared at such a time but regarded that question as having been rendered academic. He suggested that the prince-bishop of Vienna, Cardinal Migazzi, be asked his opinion of the book (an opinion which Kaunitz was certain would be negative) and that this anticipated censure of Kollar should suffice. To placate the Diet, Kaunitz suggested that the chancellor, Esterhazy, should be instructed that Kollar's book be kept out of Hungary until such time as it had been examined for matters potentially dangerous to the faith. Significantly enough, the book was not to be condemned, merely examined, and it was to be made perfectly clear that this concession to the Diet was ostensibly made on religious not political grounds. He also advised the empress to warn Esterhazy earnestly that no further concessions in this matter could be expected.⁴⁴ In private Kaunitz lauded Kollar's zeal and saw to it that the author was rewarded. For her part the empress accepted Kaunitz's suggestion in every detail. With the remaining gravamina Maria Theresia consulted with Blümegen and König, instructing them to draw up her replies.⁴⁵

In this way the precedent was set for Staatsrat discussion of

Hungarian matters. By 1769 it had become a fundamental principle. In a memo to Starhemberg that year Maria Theresia told him that of all the Staatsrat's concerns, the improvement of the constitution of the Kingdom of Hungary should be of primary importance. She noted that this had been a Staatsrat practice from the beginning largely thanks to "the observations in precisely this matter that Prince Kaunitz-Rittberg has repeatedly proffered."⁴⁶ Nor was it without significance that after 1765 the word "German" no longer appeared in state handbooks in reference to the office which only in 1763 was described as "Staatsrat in German-domestic affairs."⁴⁷

The main thrust of Kaunitz's attack on the constitution of the Hungarian Kingdom was his attempt to encourage a breakdown of the kingdom into its constitutional components. This meant essentially that the Military Frontier Zones, the Banat, Transylvania and Croatia-Slavonia were to be distinguished as much as possible from royal Hungary, and Hungarian pretensions there were to be discouraged as much as possible. Thus when it was decided to raise Transylvania to the status of a grand principality late in 1765, Kaunitz urged Maria Theresia not to permit the inclusion of the Hungarian double cross in the coat of arms of Transylvania because "this could be interpreted as a dependence of Transylvania like any province belonging to the crown of Hungary." Not only should such a notion be rejected, he advised, but the decree publicizing the change of status should be issued with a golden bull instead of the regular seal in order to give it particular solemnity. The empress accepted both suggestions.⁴⁸ When the Hungarian Camera complained of the division of salt monopoly revenues between Hungary and Transylvania, Kaunitz saw no reason why the former

should be permitted to "swagger" about Transylvanian salt revenues.⁴⁹ Again the imperial resolution followed Kaunitz's suggestion.⁵⁰ When the inspector-general of the Military Frontier, Lieutenant Field Marshal Baron Philip von Beck, died in 1768, Kaunitz objected strongly to his proposed replacement, Lieutenant Field Marshal Count Joseph Siskovicz, not because he did not think the latter had the proper personal qualities but because he felt it would be politically unwise to entrust the command of the Croatian border guards to an Hungarian "with whose national principles this command would be in conflict." He felt it would weaken "that special trust" that was so necessary for the post, and would endanger the whole essence of the command.⁵¹ When Siskovicz was in the event sent to the Military Frontier for a six-week inspection tour of manoeuvres, Kaunitz feared his suggestion had been rejected. He saw the empress personally about the matter and was assured by her that Siskovicz would not receive Beck's post.⁵²

Nevertheless the paring down of the special privileges of Hungary was something that in Kaunitz's view had to be done with extreme care. Thus, for example, when in 1767 the opportunity arose to exercise the right to confer ecclesiastical benefices as Kollar had set out, Kaunitz suggested that though the sovereign's rights in the matter were beyond doubt, it would at the moment be unwise to exercise the right since the Hungarian urbarial patent was already generating so much opposition.⁵³ When it came time for Hungary to change its coat of arms to adjust to Transylvania's new position, he suggested the crown adapt itself to Hungarian demands as much as possible and pursue its ends in such a way as to forestall further

remonstrances and not betray the real intentions of the court.⁵⁴ In 1775 consideration was given to raising the Banat to the status of a principality. To do this without a specific reason or occasion, Kaunitz felt, would incur too much Hungarian opposition. He counseled the maintenance of the status quo "until time and circumstances permit a change."⁵⁵ In December 1777 the Hungarian chancellery took the initiative on the question and requested the incorporation of the Banat into the Kingdom of Hungary. Kaunitz was prepared to accede to the request, provided the change would mean no loss for the treasury and that the opportunity would be used as well as possible to push through "other designs of the court."⁵⁶ Again Maria Theresia's acceptance of the plan was publicized only with Kaunitz's important proviso.⁵⁷

The second aspect of Kaunitz's attitude was the realization that the Hungarian coronation oath was a millstone around the neck of bureaucratic absolutism and that special privileges for certain provinces was not in the enlightened interest of the whole. Maria Theresia liked the Hungarians and was prepared to go a long way to meet their demands, but she had been severely disillusioned by the recalcitrance of the Diet of 1764 and later by the opposition to the urbarial regulations of 1767.⁵⁸ After 1764 she never summoned the Diet again and governed through the issue of patents and rescripts. At the death of the Palatine of the Kingdom, Lajos Batthyany, in 1765, she did not fill the office again in her lifetime, appointing the husband of her favourite daughter, Prince Albert of Saxe-Teschen, governor-general instead.⁵⁹ Kaunitz articulated, encouraged and abetted this policy of douce violence when it came to the Apostolic Kingdom. His aim with respect to royal Hungary was to integrate it as

much as possible into the rest of the monarchy. This did not entail Josephinian centralization, but it did include the notion of the equality of all hereditary crowns before the sovereign. "For the future," he noted in the Staatsrat as late as 1790, "one supreme law remains valid; all the rest, if and when they collide with it, must yield to it, and that suprema lex is the salus universae republicae."⁶⁰

Kaunitz's main complaint about royal Hungary centered on its special tax privileges, and he quite consciously endorsed the policy which discouraged industry in Hungary and kept the land's economy agrarian at least until such time as the Hungarian aristocracy was prepared to reconsider its freedom from taxation.⁶¹ But the integration of Hungary was no simple matter, and Staatsrat deliberations over such carrot-and-stick policies had above all to be kept confidential. Kaunitz was not only ready to advise that the Hungarian chancellery be kept in the dark about the logic or motivation of policies affecting it, but indeed sometimes about policy itself.⁶² For this reason, therefore, the risk of appointing a Hungarian to the Staatsrat could not be taken, for experience suggested that even such loyal Hungarian puppets of the court as Esterhazy did not always maintain "the proper way of thinking."⁶³

If Joseph thus failed in his bid to bring an Hungarian into the Staatsrat, he carried his point on the reduction of the competences of the Rechenkammer. The principal complaint of opponents of the Rechenkammer had always been that it delayed the routine of the administration, and this was certainly the kind of argument to which not only the impatient Joseph but even Maria Theresia was susceptible. Hatzfeld in his bid to revive

a Haugwitz-style central administration had shown how the Rechenkammer of the Austrian Netherlands, which was but an arm of the camera there, worked much quicker than its Viennese counterpart. These assertions found a sympathetic hearing in the Staatsrat with Gebler, Stupan and Blümegen, though not, as formerly indicated with Binder and Kaunitz.⁶⁴ Joseph's position of retaining an independent Rechenkammer but limiting its auditing functions was, therefore, the middle-of-the-road position between Hatzfeld on the one hand and Binder on the other. Maria Theresia's final decision, which ensued on 2 March 1772, fully followed her son's proposal,⁶⁵ but the debate did not end there.

In May 1772 a Staatsrat commission was constituted to review the whole problem of the Rechenkammer. With Binder out of the council and Hatzfeld in, there seemed little doubt of the outcome.⁶⁶ By July the commission was ready to recommend the total subordination of the Rechenkammer to the Hofkammer. Largely due to Zinzendorf's vigorous defence of the status quo, and the surprising reluctance of the new Hofkammer president, Kollowrat, to see the disappearance of an independent Rechenkammer, the debate continued until January 1773. The fate of the Rechenkammer, however, was sealed. By a decree of 20 January 1773 it lost its independence and became an arm of the Hofkammer.⁶⁷ Curiously enough, Kaunitz did not intervene in the debate despite the fact that Zinzendorf was considered one of his protégés. It seems that Kaunitz became convinced by the arguments of the Rechenkammer opponents or at the very least that he no longer considered an independent Rechenkammer as important as before. Furthermore, the example of the successful internal cameral audit

in the Austrian Netherlands made it difficult for Kaunitz to combat the argument since Belgian lands were directly under his control through the Staatskanzlei. Kaunitz was clearly silenced if not convinced. He did not, as will be seen, give up the idea of an independent authority for financial audit, but he certainly was forced to acquiesce in the disappearance of the Rechenkammer as it then stood. Zinzendorf's retirement was duly honourable. He was made a member of the Staatsrat, though he never really became active there, and a member of the Order of the Golden Fleece,⁶⁸ marks of royal pleasure, as Maria Theresia wrote (significantly enough, to Kaunitz), that Zinzendorf's services and zeal merited.⁶⁹

CHAPTER IV

THE CONFLICT WITH JOSEPH

Perhaps the principal reason Kaunitz did not pursue the Rechenkammer issue was that by 1773 it had been overshadowed by more important problems. 1772 had been the year of the partition of Poland and the annexation of Galicia occasioned a considerable administrative debate which caught Kaunitz in the middle. Above all it was the final and most drastically felt year of the great famine of 1770-1772 which affected all of southern Germany and particularly Bohemia. Joseph's visit to the stricken province in the fall of 1771 had affected him deeply. In September 1771 he had complained bitterly to his brother, Leopold, about the "apoplectic lethargy and langour" with which the state faced these crises,¹ and this bitterness was only increased when his impassioned report on Bohemia which recommended sweeping social and administrative reforms was given over to a special Staatsrat commission which debated the issues for over seven months.² Finally, despite the fact that the administrative reforms and personnel changes of December largely followed his proposals, no fundamental changes were really made. The restoration of the administrative status quo was in fact the last thing that Joseph wanted.³

At the same time Joseph became increasingly anxious that Austria might be worsted in the area of foreign affairs. Above all, he did not appreciate the diplomatic significance of apparent inactivity--the course that Kaunitz pursued with such great success in the partition crisis of

1772.⁴ Joseph feared that everyone would profit from the crisis but Austria,⁵ and his aggravation naturally centered on Kaunitz. To Leopold he complained that Kaunitz spent his whole time at the riding-school or the theatre "while waiting for moments of inspiration." In the meantime, the emperor went on, "we are losing time, opportunities will escape us, and we will end up 'la fourche au cu' as they say."⁶

As the partition negotiations dragged on and the Staatsrat commission continued its deliberations during the winter and spring of 1772, Joseph wrote Leopold in exasperation that still nothing had been done about his Bohemian report and he was reduced to "a powerless spectator and innocent accomplice" in the suffering and death of his Bohemian subjects.⁷ The Bohemian crisis, he wrote two weeks later on 25 May, was a sad omen for the state.⁸ Maria Theresia too was deeply affected. "The whole terrible Bohemian affair," she wrote Kaunitz, had left her "sad and broken."⁹

Finally on 11 June 1772 the Staatsrat commission completed its work and submitted its report to the emperor. For Joseph it was the straw that broke the camel's back. He called the report "a monster, that says absolutely nothing. Everything is tediously and deliberately drawn out, and nothing will be done as a consequence."¹⁰ All that remained for him to do, he felt, was vigorous personal intervention. Only two days later he was ready with his counter-proposal. In a major report to his mother dated 13 June 1772 he insisted that only drastic methods could rescue the monarchy from the brink of catastrophe. Joseph recommended nothing short of the appointment of a dictator to ride roughshod over the monarchy's

constitutions and customs. This man should be permitted to employ "all possible means" to restore the socio-economic strength of the state, including complete freedom to make sweeping personnel changes. He must have "unlimited power" and "the complete trust" of the empress. Having restored order in the land, he could be made head of the Staatsrat and be as bound to the new system he had created as everyone else.¹¹ Joseph did not nominate a specific person for the job, but Schünemann has suggested that he had himself in mind. What is certainly clear is that this proposal represented nothing less than a vote of non-confidence in his mother and an attempt to remove her, at least temporarily, from the control of affairs.¹²

It could come as no surprise, therefore, that Maria Theresia found these proposals unacceptable. Again she turned to Kaunitz. She needed his "help in the affairs of Bohemia," she wrote in her own hand. In addition to the Staatsrat commission protocol and Staatsrat voti, she sent him Joseph's memorandum "for you alone, no one has seen it except Blanc."¹³ You can keep it as long as you want."¹⁴ It was a clear indication that she had no intention of acting on Joseph's suggestions and was looking to Kaunitz for a way out of this delicate problem. In the meantime Joseph continued his steady stream of complaints to his brother. "Everyone intrigues and no one works," he noted;¹⁵ "poor Bohemia laments and is helped with nothing but documents."¹⁶ The Staatsrat commission, he said, had "maliciously" ignored the most important points of his Bohemian report and no one wished to apply any efficacious remedies to the poor state of the administration. He had made a proposal to his mother,

Leopold was informed, but she had kept it and made no decision.¹⁷

At the same time the Polish partition crisis also reached its climax. In contrast to Kaunitz's almost maddening imperturbability, Joseph took on a tone of frantic desperation which saw him disagree with his foreign minister with acidic sarcasm at almost every turn during the diplomatic negotiations leading to the final partition agreement.¹⁸ Nor did this tension between Joseph and Kaunitz decrease after the partition convention was formally signed on 5 August 1772. The formal adjustment of the details of the new borders between Poland and Austria were left to direct negotiations between Warsaw and Vienna, and Joseph and Kaunitz were soon at odds over the specific demarcation of the border line. But even more significantly they disagreed almost at once on precisely how the new province should be administered.

Until the final ratification of the partition by the Polish Diet, Galicia remained in any case a foreign policy issue, and it seemed logical to both Kaunitz and Maria Theresia that the administration of Galicia should be entrusted to the Staatskanzlei not only until final ratification of the annexation but also on a continuing basis thereafter, much in the manner of Milan and the Austrian Netherlands. Joseph, however, was totally opposed to this. He wished to create a separate central ministry for Galicia in Vienna and could not be dissuaded in this resolve.¹⁹ Kaunitz at this time was not in Vienna. During much of 1772 he had been suffering from rheumatic attacks,²⁰ and in August he therefore retired to his country estate at Austerlitz in Moravia. During his absence Binder handled most of the routine Staatskanzlei business.

Joseph's adamant opposition to a permanent incorporation of the Galician administration into the Staatskanzlei naturally made it necessary to inform Kaunitz. In the face of Joseph's determined stand Maria Theresia became extremely depressed and hinted at retirement,²¹ and Binder, who was in any case highly temperamental, sent a bitter report of Joseph's stand to Kaunitz.²² Kaunitz's reply, however, indicated that he was by no means as perturbed by Joseph's stand as either Maria Theresia or Binder:

You know, my friend, that on a hundred occasions I have always held to this principle: a good citizen must strive as long and as hard as he can to serve the state and his sovereign well, often even despite him. For this reason therefore, and because it also appears that it could not have been so maliciously intended, let us for now temporize, my friend. . . .²³

But if the Staatskanzlei was therefore only to administer Galicia temporarily, it still remained to determine exactly how long that would be.

When Kaunitz returned to Vienna on 4 October, he therefore addressed himself first and foremost to this question. Since the provisional governor of the new province, Count Pergen, had arrived in Lemberg and was about to open his administrative correspondence, it was necessary to determine how this administrative business was to be managed. He suggested that Maria Theresia either entrust the Galician administration to the Staatskanzlei for a period of two years without any interference from any other ministry, or that she remove him entirely from the management of Galician affairs. In his eyes it was an either/or proposition basically because if she opted for the first recommendation he would have to make considerable personnel changes in his ministry.²⁴ Again Joseph intervened. He had come away from the Polish partition crisis with the firm impression

that Kaunitz with his increasing age was becoming slow and inefficient, and he did not want to see the Galician administration infected by these faults. He therefore prevailed on his mother to reject Kaunitz's first proposal without necessarily accepting the alternative. Galicia was to receive a chancellery exactly like Transylvania and Pergen was to be appointed chancellor "in a few months." In the meantime Kaunitz was to continue to oversee the administration of the province.²⁵ Kaunitz accepted the decision without comment, and on 14 October he sent draft decrees on the appointment of Pergen as chancellor and Count Andreas Hadik as governor to the empress for signature.²⁶

During this same time Maria Theresia also attempted to deal with her son's dictatorial ambitions. Emphasizing his Bohemian report of the fall of 1771 rather than his June memorandum, she urged Joseph to put the Staatsrat commission's suggestions in combination with his own into immediate effect. But significantly enough she completely ignored the emperor's demand for unlimited power and sweeping administrative reform.²⁷ Joseph replied that without the "introduction of another administration" all efforts would be wasted and he recommended once more the application of the more drastic means he had proposed.²⁸ Indeed Joseph had by this time not only become disgusted with the Staatsrat commission protocol, but also with the whole council itself. "When they ask me my opinion on the hundred-fifty thousand trifles with which the Staatsrat kills itself every year," he wrote to his brother on 29 October, "I always answer that as long as the foundation is not changed, all accessories are useless."²⁹ Nor was he at all pleased with his mother's actions. She was overburdened

with complaints and trifles, he noted, but on "these important points" there was nothing but silence.³⁰

Kaunitz had, in the meantime, answered Maria Theresia's call for help in dealing with her son's restlessness not by drafting a blue-print for administrative reform but by reiterating that no major overhaul was necessary and by drawing together the basic premises and principles of internal administration he had articulated in 1760 and 1765.³¹ But in view of Joseph's restlessness, the empress wanted more. She asked Kaunitz for his recommendations on ways and means the faults specifically within the domestic administration could be corrected.³² Kaunitz, well aware of the pressure from her son that the empress was under, set to work immediately. By the spring of 1773, however, Joseph's depression plummeted to new depths. He complained of a "mélancholie noire" to his brother, said he was "without hope for the future," and bid farewell to his "reputation and glory."³³

By mid-April 1773 Kaunitz had completed his commission. With the help of Binder he had prepared his longest and most far-ranging memorandum in the entire period of the Co-Regency.³⁴ Two hundred and forty-four pages in length, the report was divided into three sections. One concerned itself with the inequitable tax burdens placed on the people,³⁵ the second addressed itself to the "moral defects" of the administration, and the third concerned deficiencies in the governmental structure proper. Under these rubrics the report covered every facet of the domestic affairs of the Habsburg Monarchy, and in particular made an effort to come to grips with the specific complaints Joseph had made over the previous few

years. Indeed, Kaunitz went out of his way to accommodate Joseph. He quoted the emperor at length throughout, made clear his particular disappointment at the lack of action taken on Joseph's Bohemian report of 1771, and above all asked Joseph to peruse a preliminary draft and then made large-scale changes according to the emperor's suggestions, eliminating, among other things, an entire section advocating the lowering of salt and tobacco prices.³⁶

Yet it was clearly not a report in the Josephinian vein. Although Kaunitz conceded, as Joseph so often insisted, that a systematic and well-worked out administrative system was the major prerequisite of all good government, he continued, as in 1768, to regard the principal problem as one of execution rather than of structure. In the view of Kaunitz, the state needed "certain general principles and truths" as an antidote to the "moral defects" and as a premise for all governmental action. Such "political axioms" he maintained would prevent much needless debate, would prevent each issue from degenerating into a confrontation of principle, and would provide the basis for uniformity in the business of state.³⁷ He therefore listed at length some twenty principles that ought to be accepted as the sine qua non of all government. In many ways these represented a credo of enlightened despotism.

All servants of the state, Kaunitz began, should have as their single goal the pursuit of the "well-understood" (Kaunitz stressed the word) interests of the sovereign. These interests were identical with those of the state. The adherence to general truths will result in the fewest errors, for actions in accordance with these truths are for the

most part "soundly based and beneficial", and should therefore be adhered to until one is thoroughly convinced of the reasons for making an exception. Since the whole consists of parts, each part must be cared for. But if a contradiction becomes apparent, the parts must be sacrificed to the whole. From this proceeds no less the principle that a present benefit cannot be allowed to outweigh a fundamental long-range one. Once a decision has been reached on what is genuinely useful and necessary for the state, all debate over the decision must cease, and all energies must be directed to the question of how it can be carried out. The body-politic can only be strong if all its parts work together. "Individual intentions," he stressed, perhaps for the benefit of Joseph, "no matter how good they are, are of no use to the whole." No cost can be too high to maintain the integrity and honour of the monarchy. Hundred-year-old abuses must be "driven out with firmness," and above all, half-hearted actions must be avoided. The governmental system must be such that it does not unite what by nature should be separate, nor separate what should be united. The best administration is the one which affords the sovereign "a certain, thorough, and complete knowledge" of the entire domestic scene "from the capitals to the last village." Rather than pile order upon order without need or use, subordinate posts should be consulted for advice. It is necessary to guarantee not only the publication of all royal decrees, but also "their exact observance." The sovereign must be able to supervise the activities of all governmental employees from village judges upwards. In this supervisory capacity the monarch should issue informative instructions, and take care to punish disobedience and reward good behaviour. He should make

judicious use of the greed and ambition of his servants and encourage the spirit of competition in all that concerns the well-being of the state amongst them. It is above all the duty of a sovereign to strive for the optimum improvement of all the classes of his people.³⁸

Turning to the administrative and executive bureaucracy specifically, Kaunitz emphasized the necessity of issuing instructions that not only made the orders clear but also gave reasons for them. He warned against over-bureaucratization and against allowing the bureaucratic apparatus to become top-heavy. He pointed out that "hard, unfriendly and despotic conduct" on the part of heads of departments towards their subordinates would lead to demoralization, and he suggested that instead of enforcing "slavish obedience", greater freedom of action be given the lower ranks of the bureaucracy. Above all, heads of departments should not waste their time with petty and mechanical details which could easily be done by secretaries or councillors. Kaunitz also stressed that bureaucratic personnel had to be chosen very carefully with an eye towards any special talents or interests individuals might display. A reasonable security of tenure of governmental posts as well as set pensions for widows of state officials, finally, ought also to be guaranteed.³⁹

Kaunitz has been severely criticized for these "general principles", above all by Walter. They are dismissed as commonplace and meaningless generalizations in which "the prince betrayed his tendency to lose himself in trivialities."⁴⁰ But as has been pointed out, the daily conduct of affairs demonstrated only all too well how necessary it was to repeat constantly what in this century might be considered self-evident.

The bureaucracy, in Schünemann's phrase, had to be "inoculated with the spirit of activity."⁴¹ The peculiar admixture of conservatism and indolence which the poet Grillparzer later singled out as the great curse of the House of Habsburg with the couplet, "Halfway to halt, and doubtfully to aim/At half a deed, with half-considered means,"⁴² had constantly to be combated. And this was Kaunitz's ongoing aim. Whereas change was in many quarters considered dangerous on principle, he constantly prodded on the spirit of reform. Anticipating criticism even then, Kaunitz wrote:

The determination of certain general principles and truths cannot be dismissed as a matter of indifference, or, worse yet, as redundant theoretical speculations. Experience teaches us only all too well how easily the human mind can be diverted from the proper goal, lapse into secondary considerations, and draw the wrong conclusions.⁴³

Kaunitz's concrete recommendations concerning the governmental structure were in fact limited to two specific areas at the very top and at the very bottom of the administration. The first of these, of course, was his brainchild, the Staatsrat. Joseph's dissatisfaction with this body had been made apparent in varying degrees from the beginning. But the emperor became particularly bitter over its bureaucratic tardiness during the great famine of 1770-1772. Reaching the climax of frustration in the autumn of 1772, Joseph demanded drastic and sweeping changes in the Staatsrat.⁴⁴ Kaunitz, who was in any case the first to admit that the council still did not fulfill all the hopes he had had for it in 1760, therefore turned to this problem.

In an honestly impartial reconsideration of the very creation of the council itself, Kaunitz could still think of "no finer and more

beneficial institution than the Staatsrat." The premises and grounds for its creation, he insisted, were as justified as ever, even if its structure was not as perfect as it could be. Much depended on personalities, of course, and Kaunitz consequently warned that a very careful selection process was necessary for Staatsrat personnel above all. But beyond this there were some very important improvements that were imperative. First and foremost it was necessary that precise regulations for the council be formulated. On the more practical side there was the excessive detail with which the Staatsrat concerned itself. Kaunitz noted that the annual agenda usually covered over five thousand separate items, the vast majority of which should never have come to the council in the first place. Certainly there was no need to deal with every current issue as a matter of course, but rather only with those which were of really major import, those in which no agreement could be reached amongst the various ministries, or those in which the Staatsrat as a whole disagreed with a particular ministry. To underscore the importance of Staatsrat meetings, Kaunitz suggested not only a regular meeting place but insisted that all sittings be attended by the monarch personally. And while he found the personal presence of ministers and privy councilors useful in a consultative capacity, he felt they ought to be banned from actual debates in order to allow for a more candid and frank discussion amongst the members of the council. Members ought also to be kept fully informed of the oral reports ministers submitted at court each Tuesday in order to gain a more thorough understanding of the issues at hand.⁴⁵

The internal operational procedures of the Staatsrat which had

been established in the reform of 1768, however, continued to meet with Kaunitz's satisfaction. He indicated that if the protocol issued at that time were adhered to, nothing more needed to be said about the matter. Finally Kaunitz turned to what he termed "a still unripe thought" that showed that he had not yet completely abandoned the basic concept of a Rechenkammer. He suggested that the Staatsrat should become the monarch's principal organ of financial supervision. A thorough knowledge of financial matters seemed to him a vital aspect of the council, and such knowledge could only be acquired by "constant audit." Without such audit procedures the Staatsrat would have to have "blind faith in the assertions of the financial authorities." He therefore recommended the retention of central accounting entrusted to the Staatsrat.⁴⁶

The second specific area of the administrative structure to which Kaunitz addressed himself was that of local administration. The smallest administrative unit of the Habsburg Monarchy was the Kreis (district). The district office (Kreisamt) had originally been Estate-controlled, but the Haugwitzian reforms of 1749 transformed it into an office of the crown. It became in fact the principal crown organ overseeing and guaranteeing the peasant's capacity to pay taxes. This meant above all the prevention of undue seigneurial exploitation, and it became the job of the Kreisamt to render this protection "sine respectu personarum." In January 1751 district officers (Kreishauptleute or Kreishauptmänner) were forbidden to accept posts as bailiffs for the lords in their Kreis, were salaried and required to take an oath of office, and had to maintain a permanent office in the principal city of the district (Kreisstadt). After

1766 district officers were also required to pass exams in political administration and economics (Polizei- und Kameralwissenschaften). In many cases they were entirely dependent on their positions for their livelihood and hence became increasingly divorced from the interests of the lords and dependent on the government.⁴⁷

But while the institution of the Kreisamt was thus the most devastating single blow to the seigneurial particularism of the old Provincial Estates, in practice it took some time for the effects to be felt. From the very beginning the Estates launched a determined attack on the Kreisämte, and many district officers were intimidated by this aristocratic bludgeoning. Franz Greiner, a privy councillor in the Hofkanzlei and one of Maria Theresia's most trusted advisers, once noted that district officers often did not dare to speak out and were afraid of submitting reports that did not coincide with those of the wealthy land-owning nobility.⁴⁸ Maria Theresia became increasingly conscious of the seriousness of this problem throughout the period of the Co-Regency, and particularly after the revelations concerning peasant exploitation in 1769. Should investigations reveal illegal seigneurial oppressions in Kreise where no reports to that effect had been filed by the district officer, that officer had to be replaced.⁴⁹

Kaunitz's reforming zeal discerned yet another difficulty. It was one thing to combat indolence, conservatism and downright disobedience on a theoretical level, but these delinquencies had particularly serious consequences on a practical level as well. All the best legislation in the world would be to no avail if it were not properly enforced where it really

mattered most--and that was on the local level. Already in 1771 Kaunitz had called the deliberate disregard of royal decrees "the main evil of the monarchy" and singled out the Kreisamt as the key office in combatting it.⁵⁰ In his great memorandum of April 1773, he returned to this theme at length.

In Kaunitz's view the Kreisamt should be the one office that could be relied upon for complete information on every aspect within its district. He noted, however, that this was not the case. Local administration was largely neglected and the governmental structure could in fact be likened to "an inverted pyramid". The "essential requisites" of local administration, Kaunitz maintained, were "a complete knowledge of domestic conditions," guaranteeing "the sure and exact observance" of all decrees, and the maintenance of "constant supervision". To this end he suggested that each Kreis be subdivided into as many boroughs as were necessary in order for each section of the district to be effectively handled by one man. He also insisted that each Kreishauptmann had to reside in his respective district so as not to be too far removed from his subordinates.⁵¹

Joseph sympathized with Kaunitz's aims, but after the introduction of conscription and the establishment of so-called regimental draft districts in 1771 and 1772, he wished to see greater military control over the civilian administration in order to be sure that conscription was properly administered. Joseph's fears were quite realistic for it was precisely the Hofkanzlei, the central authority of the Kreise, that put up the greatest resistance to conscription. In addition to the usual military administration the emperor therefore also wished to integrate the military draft directors who had been established in each district into the Kreis

structure. Indeed, these officials, like the Kreishauptmänner, were to be civilians responsible to the Gubernium, so that Kaunitz was readily able to avail himself of the description of 'vice-circle captain (Vice-Kreishauptman)' for them. Joseph also wished to see each Kreis furnished with an adjunct, and where the need arose, some commissars charged with inspection tours. These together would form a sort of "district council", and instead of hiring specific borough officials, borough duties could be assigned to the bailiffs of the lords who were best acquainted with the conditions of the peasants. Implementing such a Kreis structure would keep district personnel to a minimum and above all would save the crown considerable expense.⁵²

Kaunitz could subscribe to neither of Joseph's two basic points. As one of the bitterest opponents of conscription and as a firm believer in the total separation of civilian and military competences, he did not wish to see draft directors integrated into the Kreis structure. But rather than base his opposition on arguments which he had by 1773 already lost, he attempted to make a case for administrative efficiency. The greater the personnel in the directorial part of Kreis business, Kaunitz countered, the more likely jealousy, animosity and duplication of work were likely to occur.

As far as entrusting borough supervision to the bailiffs of the lords was concerned, Kaunitz, usually the bitter enemy of over-bureaucratization, in this instance could not support the emperor's curmudgeonly approach. Here he was particularly outspoken: "How could one entrust the most essential part of the country's supervision and administration to

such types of people, when the greatest service of a borough official would consist in keeping a watchful eye precisely on seigneurial bailiffs, the blood-suckers and tyrants of the peasants." In this instance he felt that the costs incurred in hiring borough officials could in no way be regarded as futile or superfluous but rather as "uncommonly profitable" and necessary.⁵³

As soon as Kaunitz had finished his great memorandum he informed Maria Theresia that he intended to talk it over with Joseph before submitting a final draft to her. The empress expressed relief that Kaunitz had completed his commission and placed great hopes in his cooperation with the emperor.⁵⁴ And, indeed, all indications were that Kaunitz and Joseph would come to a meeting of minds. Joseph returned the draft copy to the chancellor with a list of recommended alterations and a flattering covering letter about what a pleasure it had been for him to read "this great and laborious work."⁵⁵ He indicated that he himself had already also put together a memorandum on the Staatsrat, and that he found the particular suggestions of Kaunitz "very well drawn up." He also said that he was at that very moment working on a memorandum which would make his position on the entire central administration clear and which would show that the emperor had already considered most of the points raised by his foreign minister.⁵⁶ Kaunitz therefore had every reason to believe that there had been a meeting of minds between himself and Joseph, and that his recommendations would hence be implemented shortly.

But Joseph's sentiments were not what they seemed. On 22 April he wrote his brother, "I have again had to refute a giant 240-page plan

which Prince Kaunitz gave me. . . . it is made up of theoretical ideas of which one can repeat nothing except the impossibility of executing them in practice."⁵⁷ Five days later he submitted his own plan for administrative reform to the empress. The premise of his proposals, Joseph wrote, was that despite his mother's "constant and fatiguing labours" during the thirty-three years of her reign, she could not coordinate all arms of the state as precisely as was necessary. The net result was that contradictory instructions were often issued to the various ministries that were not in the best interests of the whole. In a word, "no genuine supervision at the center . . . exists."⁵⁸

To combat this defect, Joseph wanted to convert the Staatsrat into a secret cabinet under the leadership of either himself or some suitable minister directing both domestic and foreign policy. The head of this cabinet would then separate essential from unessential business and determine what items were to be left to the discretion of the various departments. Within the cabinet itself he would decide which questions were to be debated and which were merely to be handled by Referendare or by himself. Debate over new legislation would have to include the appropriate ministers and take place in the presence of the empress. A secretary would keep the empress constantly informed over all matters, and all imperial decisions would first always be communicated to the cabinet. Besides yet again revealing a certain lack of confidence in the capacity of the empress to direct the state, these proposals were also particularly wounding for Kaunitz. Joseph's assertion that supervisory inspection of all reports from and instructions to ambassadors was "absolutely necessary" to make

sure no important matters went by without debate was an open vote of no confidence. Insisting on this procedure for the Belgian and Milanese departments because "we do not even have the least information about them, and your Majesty must either blindly accept [what happens there] or trust a third person who because of lack of information would make well-meaning but not the best suggestions," was even a harder blow. Having for some time been dissatisfied with the administration of Milan in particular,⁵⁹ Joseph concluded that the Staatskanzlei was not a "suitable" ministry to run these departments. Furthermore he passed its present administration of Galicia by because "its future unification with the German hereditary province [was] already established."⁶⁰

Joseph seconded Kaunitz's emphasis on Kreis reform, but felt it should only be the beginning of a whole administrative shake-up. He wanted to create a middle-level provincial authority between the Kreisamt and the provincial gubernia in order to supervise and expedite Kreisamt activity. He felt that the sphere of operations of the provincial authorities could be enlarged and even thought the Estates should be given the right to elect their own head. His recommendations for the central administration, furthermore, again turned towards a more concentrated Haugwitz-Hatzfeld type of system, leaving only the Oberste Justizstelle as an independent ministry.⁶¹

Joseph must have been sufficiently realistic about the prospect these plans had for fulfillment, however, since he also sent Maria Theresia a "second project" concerning only improvements in the Staatsrat "with retention of its present form" in case the empress chose to reject his first scheme entirely. This second proposal was much closer in spirit and

content to that of Kaunitz. The emperor completely seconded the suggestion that Staatsrat members ought to be more fully informed on all governmental business and also agreed that while ministers ought to be consulted they should not be permitted to be present at Staatsrat debates. Finally Joseph agreed that the council agenda ought to be ordered by priorities. This job he proposed for none other than himself in order to avoid any bias in the distribution of the material.⁶²

Kaunitz knew nothing of Joseph's projects when he submitted the final draft of his memorandum to Maria Theresia on 1 May, but her reply to him hinted very strongly that all was not well. She regarded his memorandum as her own testament, the empress wrote, for it had given her crushed spirits new hope. Then she added cryptically, "I will certainly take great pains to support you. In case I do not succeed, however, I must declare to you that I will no longer bear this burden. After devoting fifty-six years of my life to the world, I will abdicate and finally spend my last moments in peace."⁶³ Apparently Maria Theresia decided to wait until her son's departure from Vienna before divulging his new projects to Kaunitz. Joseph left on his tour of the Banat and Transylvania on 6 May. Sometime in the subsequent ten days she passed on the emperor's proposals to both Kaunitz and Hatzfeld.⁶⁴ Kaunitz must have discussed the matter with the empress orally, for on the seventeenth he supplied her with proof of Joseph's duplicity "in order to fully comply with Your Majesty's wishes."⁶⁵ This proof consisted of Kaunitz's draft complete with the additions and deletions Joseph had suggested as well as the emperor's covering letter.

When on 1 June 1773 the empress put the imperial resolution on

the final bound copy of Kaunitz's memorandum, it was clear that she had decided to reject Joseph's schemes and concentrate only on his "second project"--the renovation of the Staatsrat. In this area, she noted, she was pleased to see agreement between the two men and she charged Kaunitz not only with the submission of further proposals but also to begin putting his Staatsrat reform suggestions into effect immediately.⁶⁶ Kaunitz proposed that the empress solicit written suggestions on Staatsrat reform from all council members as well as Count Blümegen, who had previously been head of the body.⁶⁷ Maria Theresia replied that if the Staatsrat were perfected it would be "one of the greatest services that the prince has performed for the state," and added that she would also consult Binder, a former Staatsrat member and Kaunitz's close friend on the matter.⁶⁸ The appropriate orders, drafted by Kaunitz himself, were issued from Laxenburg on 27 July.⁶⁹ Two days later Kaunitz noted to the empress that since he had already submitted his Staatsrat proposals in his large memorandum, he hoped to fulfill this new imperial commission by drawing together the individual incoming opinions into a "systematic whole" and presenting this to the empress when it was ready.⁷⁰

During this time Joseph had been touring Transylvania, and in mid-June he decided to use his opportunity to also visit the newly-acquired and neighbouring province of Galicia. Maria Theresia, who did not like to see her son expose himself to the hazards of extended travel, was strongly opposed to such an extension of his trip.⁷¹ Again she sought the advice of Kaunitz. His response shows that he no longer felt Joseph could be persuaded. "Since His Majesty the emperor is resolved to go to that land at

this time, I can in all humility see no reason why, since the trip is almost inevitable, he should not also receive proper homage there."⁷² Similarly, when Pergen wrote Kaunitz from Lemberg wanting to know more details about the emperor's arrival, he answered that Pergen was probably better informed than he, adding, "you know how little inclination I have to seek such information." Answering a second question on the proposed structure of the Galician administration, he wrote:

To clarify this point I think I must in the meantime confide to you that not only am I not certain if it is the intention of His Majesty the emperor to establish an independent department for the reconquered country [Galicia] here . . . [or] if he now inclines to unite the central administration of that country with that of the German hereditary provinces: a disposition which is a matter of total indifference to me in particular.

Kaunitz recommended that Pergen merely wait until the matter had been settled.⁷³

In the meantime, however, Kaunitz continued to discharge conscientiously his duty as temporary head of the Galician department. He provisionally expanded the department and, "in order to unite the promotion of the all-highest service with all possible economy," took on the privy councilors of the now defunct Rechenkammer.⁷⁴ He participated in the Staatsrat debates on the matter, the reports from and instructions to Pergen continued to flow smoothly and the organization of Galicia proceeded apace. But Joseph, who was now in Galicia, deluged Vienna with memoranda, complaints and questions.⁷⁵ Kaunitz himself, while on summer vacation at his estate at Austerlitz, abruptly received a list of one hundred and fifty-four questions on various details concerning Galicia which the emperor

wanted answered immediately. When Maria Theresia heard of this she wrote Kaunitz, "When the emperor receives your answers as well as those of Lacy and Pergen, what will he do with that huge pile of paper? I fear all this work is harming his health and it can only delay his return . . . I therefore wish to receive some good advice from you."⁷⁶ Kaunitz sent the empress a polite answer about the necessity of having complete information on such an important matter, and how answering the emperor's questions was therefore "very useful preparatory work."⁷⁷ Obviously he was being less than candid, and it soon became apparent why. In a note to Joseph dated 2 September he excused himself for not answering the one hundred and fifty-four questions sooner and pleaded that it just could not be done any faster. Besides his answers he also enclosed Maria Theresia's question about the "huge pile of paper" as well as his own sober answer to it.⁷⁸ Joseph had meanwhile decided against Pergen as Galician chancellor, deciding on the basis of his experience with him there that the latter was after all not a suitable candidate for chancellor of the yet-to-be created Galician Chancellery. He recommended Count Eugen von Wrba in his place, and Kaunitz quickly acceded to this wish.⁷⁹ Finally when the emperor indicated that he would like to stop off at Austerlitz on his way back to Vienna, Kaunitz immediately replied with a highly obsequious letter of welcome even though Joseph was by then less than two hours away from the estate.⁸⁰

It is obvious that during the summer of 1773 Kaunitz had decided to restrict his communication with the emperor to those things that Joseph wanted to hear. It was also clear that his exasperation at the emperor's behaviour and his growing resentment at the emperor's treatment of him was

reaching the breaking point. During the autumn of the year he made one more effort to ease the tension. Seeing that most of the areas of friction had their source in the Galician matter, he decided to resign his post as provisional head of that department. Citing the emperor's own contention that the business of the Galician administration was overburdening the Staatskanzlei, he begged to be relieved of these responsibilities immediately, "completely and forever."⁸¹ In a very personal message Maria Theresa granted his request. But she added, "after so many proofs of the prince's most zealous behaviour . . . we continue to expect that he will never fail to offer advice in this as in all other matters."⁸²

Soon after writing this she received a note from Binder who felt that since Kaunitz was about to hand in his resignation as provisional head of the Galician department, the empress should know that though Kaunitz had given his "full approval to the proposal concerning Count Wrba," he in fact would not have recommended either him or Count Pergen as future head of the Galician Chancellery. Maria Theresa replied that she had already received the resignation and that it had broken her heart. Then she added, with reference to Wrba and Pergen, "Kaunitz, as in all things, in his honest way also knew better than we in this instance not to want to recommend such wanting people."⁸³ Despite this apparent agreement between the empress and Kaunitz, however, Joseph's wish to install Wrba went unopposed.

But if Kaunitz hoped by this resignation to ease the tensions between himself and Joseph, he soon discovered how bitterly mistaken he was. Even after the Austro-Polish Convention of 18 September 1773 which

formally ceded Galicia to Austria, diplomatic conflict between the two countries continued. Vienna insisted that the eastern border of Galicia should run along the river Sbrucz while Warsaw wished to draw the line along the river Sereth. Maria Theresa wished to be conciliatory but Joseph insisted on the maximum extension of territory. Kaunitz, in a major foreign policy memorandum of 25 November, though he sympathized with the empress, outlined the pros and cons of both sides of the question without himself making a specific recommendation one way or the other.⁸⁴ When the empress asked Joseph's opinion, he expressed himself in the most violent terms. He labelled any recommendations that supported territorial concessions to Poland acts of cowardice and irresponsibility, and held tenaciously to his point of view.⁸⁵

Kaunitz, who was not opposed to the hard line Joseph was taking but who at least wanted to consider all the diplomatic ramifications and alternatives, could not have helped but be wounded in the extreme by the emperor's vitriolic outpouring. His forbearance was at an end. On 7 December, at the end of a regular memorandum on the border adjustment question, he added a request in his own hand to be relieved of his duties and to have a successor named to his posts as soon as possible.⁸⁶ Maria Theresa did not return the memorandum with her resolution immediately. Instead she sent Kaunitz a separate note, also in her own hand. "Your note did not shock or surprise me, but it grieved me greatly." She had anticipated such a move on his part for some time, she said, but she still could and would not accept his resignation. She counted on him not to abandon her in this cruel situation and expressed the hope that together

they could still do service to the state. If they failed, she concluded, they could retire together.⁸⁷

On the morning of 9 December Maria Theresia then must have delivered a stinging verbal reproach to her son, for Joseph felt compelled to respond immediately in writing. He complained that his position was one of "practically insurmountable difficulties" because he suspected his dignity of Co-Regent was nothing but "an empty title." If in conscientiously discharging his duty he alienated men from her who were a hundred times more useful and capable, then he begged to be relieved of that position. He would restrict himself to affairs of the Holy Roman Empire because he sincerely did not wish to be responsible for causing her grief and perhaps even the loss of her minister.⁸⁸ To this outburst the empress also responded in writing. She needed his help and advice, she said, and the simultaneous abandonment of her by both him and Kaunitz was enough to overwhelm her. She pleaded that he participate in the reform of the Staatsrat without insisting on wholesale structural and personnel changes, and that he at least consult Kaunitz and Blümegen who had been members of the council from the start. She concluded with an appeal to filial loyalty and promised him all her confidence.⁸⁹

CHAPTER V

RECONCILIATION AND VICTORY

It is entirely possible that Joseph was not aware of the extent to which he had offended Kaunitz over the previous two years. His irascibility usually tended to be the result of frustrated good intentions and an almost fanatical devotion to duty. His tendency to indulge in sarcastic and hyperbolic expletives was the natural product of combating obstinate obscurantism over the years. Generally Kaunitz tended to be indulgent about such human failings, but his endurance was not endless and in December of 1773 it had reached the limit. Perhaps even Joseph was aware that this time he had gone too far. After the exchanges with his mother on December 9, he became much more conciliatory. Now the empress was able to return Kaunitz's resignation with the words: "I have the satisfaction to assure you that the emperor thinks as I do that your retention is as dear to our hearts as the confidence we have in your counsels."¹ At the same time Joseph wrote a personal note to Kaunitz in the friendliest possible terms. "I beg you, my prince, to believe truly and sincerely the esteem and confidence I have in you. Its endless source is your character and spirit which I have seen as long as I have lived devoted so fruitfully to a monarchy and mother that are my only two concerns."²

With this the crisis seems to have passed. Kaunitz not only immersed himself again in his regular duties as court and state chancellor but also continued all his activities in the domestic field as well. The one significant exception to this was the Galician problem. He adopted a

determined stand on the border adjustment question and both Russia and Poland ultimately acceded to the Austrian demand to push the eastern border of Galicia to the river Sbrucz.³ But having resigned his responsibilities as head of the Galician department, Kaunitz was extremely loth to get involved in any debate concerning the organization of that province. During discussions on the introduction of a taxation system there at the end of November, Kaunitz indicated that although he could not agree with many of the recommendations of other Staatsrat members, he considered the articulation of his opinions "superfluous." Since he had been relieved of his Galician duties, the appropriate proposals and preparations ought to be made by the department that would be entrusted with the province.⁴

But while Kaunitz adopted a basically passive stance toward Galician problems, he nevertheless managed to carry his point on two major issues. The first concerned the person of his successor as head of the Galician department. Joseph's candidate, Count Wrbona, it will be recalled, had been endorsed by Kaunitz even though he did not think him the best man for the job. He had done it basically to placate Joseph, and Wrbona accordingly was appointed on 7 January 1774.⁵ In pursuance of orders he attempted to make the transition for Wrbona as smooth as possible by submitting a report on how Galicia had been run since its occupation.⁶ Thereafter, it was Wrbona himself who showed that Kaunitz had been right about him all along. No sooner was the Galician department raised to the status of a chancellery in May of that year⁷ than Joseph's dissatisfaction with the pace of business came to the surface. All his recommendations on Galicia, he wrote his brother, "have still not borne fruit."⁸ Within less

than two years, Joseph decided that Wrbona would have to be replaced. He seized the opportunity offered by the death of the Court Chamberlain, Prince Khevenhüller, to 'promote' Wrbona to a ceremonial post, and incorporate the Galician chancellery into the Austro-Bohemian one.⁹

The second issue in which Kaunitz managed to carry his point without excessive effort on his part concerned the provincial structure of Galicia. One of the most fundamental and consistent tenets of Kaunitz's political creed was his resolute opposition to any form of aristocratic resurgence. The almost violent animosity towards Provincial Estates which Kaunitz shared with Haugwitz had, largely thanks to these two men, become one of the principal characteristics of the Theresian regime. But it was not an attitude that the young emperor shared. His reform projects of April 1773 envisaged a considerable extension of the powers of the provincial nobility,¹⁰ and in August he recommended the creation of Estates in newly-acquired Galicia.¹¹ Kaunitz on the other hand identified "the all too excessive power of the aristocracy" as the main defect of the new province, and considered the Banat, which had no Estates at all, the ideal at which to aim.¹² Although Joseph continued to insist for the remainder of his mother's reign that the crown would be better served if the nobility were given greater responsibilities,¹³ this was one point in which she insisted that the advice of Kaunitz must prevail. She reluctantly acceded to the creation of Provincial Estates in Galicia but was adamant that it had to be a powerless body with no right to request legislation or determine its own constitution.¹⁴

The one area in which Kaunitz retained the initiative, however,

was the Staatsrat reform that had been ordered the previous July. The opinions that had been solicited then in fact only began to be submitted in the fall, with the last of them, Hatzfeld's, dated 16 November. In essence few if any novel ideas came to the fore. Blümegen returned to the complaints of 1768 without proposing specific remedies. Stupan maintained that everything possible had already been said on the matter and it merely had to be drawn together in a formal instruction. Kressel seconded Stupan. Löhr also seemed satisfied with the structure of the body and only wanted duplication of voti avoided. Hatzfeld, finally, practically ignored the Staatsrat proper and saw the only salvation of the state in his old plans of 1771.¹⁵ It was small wonder that Joseph was able to write his brother in view of these opinions that his recommendations would "probably embarrass everyone, . . . please no one, and consequently will not be adopted."¹⁶

The most essential votum, that of Kaunitz, however, was at that time still outstanding. He had wanted to wait until all the others were in, but by the time that happened the confrontation with Joseph reached the breaking-point. It was therefore not until the beginning of the subsequent year that Kaunitz, with the help of Binder, set to work on the project again. He assiduously tried to work in Joseph's proposals with his own and produced within two months one of the tightest, most compelling reports he had ever written. One hundred and twenty pages in length, it was formally submitted to the empress on 20 February 1774.¹⁷

Kaunitz began his report with the assertion that the essence of the necessary reform depended not so much on the nature of the various proposals at hand, but "on the manner of their execution." And as a premise

for any decision on that he felt it necessary to reiterate and clarify the purpose for which the Staatsrat was created, the nature of its agenda, the required characteristics of its members and the details of its organization and operation. The purpose of the body, Kaunitz wrote, was to aid the monarch to survey, examine and evaluate every facet of domestic affairs because this was a job that it was physically impossible for one person to handle alone. He emphasized that a directing or prime minister could not fulfill such a task precisely for this reason. In addition he would have the drawback of being concerned with the extension of his own authority which would occasion intrigues and cabals and also give him an undesirable share of the supreme direction of the state. He repeated his old contention that the Staatsrat had all the virtues of a prime minister and none of the drawbacks. He felt that the council's lack of executive power made its members more devoted to their consultative functions and their inability to hold other offices made them less prone to partisanship.¹⁸

Addressing himself to the nature of the Staatsrat agenda, he indicated that above all the council needed a set of precise regulations under which to operate. He had often suggested that the council draft such instructions for itself, he noted, but each time his reports were regarded as a sufficient guideline to which no one wished to add anything. He repeated the necessity of laying the groundwork of such an instruction with the determination and articulation of general principles, then added: "Unfortunately I have often, and only just recently, been forced to see to my grief and no slight consternation that even Staatsräte, undoubtedly with best intent . . . regard this as idealistic and pedantic speculation." But

one could not build without premises, he emphasized. The uncertainty, the quarrels, the endless consultations, the voluminous paperwork and the general waste of time is the result of everyone having different opinions to which, precisely because of the lack of agreed upon fundamentals, they cling obstinately. The Staatsrat agenda must also include, Kaunitz continued, deliberations designed to make sure all state employees receive precise instructions from the top. It should not, however, deliberate insignificant matters. Finally he expressed the hope that the council would be guaranteed complete financial audit.¹⁹

On the characteristics of Staatsrat members Kaunitz was brief. They should be free of greed and ambition, not toadying but candid and open in their opinions, and have in addition to some experience, good sound common sense. On organizational and operational procedures he basically reiterated his recommendations of the previous spring, adding only the suggestion that Staatsrat deliberation be placed under a seal of strict secrecy. He also cautioned against any excessive dominance of the head or chairman of the council because under such circumstances it would structurally degenerate into a ministerial mould and lose the character of an advisory council.²⁰

Turning to Joseph's recommendations Kaunitz emphasized the areas of agreement between them. He accepted the emperor's specific order of priorities for Staatsrat deliberations, agreed that all domestic business should run through the funnel of the Staatsrat, and noted that they were of the same mind on the consultation of ministers and the necessity of holding meetings at court. Concerning Joseph's proposal that he himself

distribute material for deliberation according to its priority, Kaunitz indicated that the same end could be served and the emperor spared excessive mechanical duties if every Staatsrat member looked at all the materials and determined his own priorities. Concerning Joseph's wish to turn the Staatsrat into a cabinet Kaunitz expressed the conviction that there was functionally "no important difference" between the cabinet envisaged by the emperor and the new and improved Staatsrat that would result from the implementation of these reforms.²¹

The one area in which Kaunitz would not be accommodating, however, was with Joseph's suggestion that the cabinet he proposed also supervise foreign policy. He defended himself against Joseph's accusation that one had really a lack of information from the Staatskanzlei by insisting that few sovereigns in Europe could boast such a complete knowledge of the international situation as Maria Theresa and Joseph II. He noted that all reports and instructions of any importance were not forwarded to the empress in extract form but rather in the original. Matters of small or no consequence were delivered in precis form but always with the original attached. No instructions left the Staatskanzlei without royal approval, and all communications with other ministries, including the most mundane and routine, were entered into record books, complete with a precis, that were always open for inspection. If the organization of his ministry was in any way incomplete, Kaunitz wrote, he awaited any orders it pleased the monarchs to give. But in defence of the existing system he pointed with pride to the incorruptability of his staff, their esprit de corps, and the lack of a single complaint over the twenty years he had had the honour of

directing the foreign policy of the monarchy. He called the maintenance of the strictest secrecy "the soul of all diplomacy" and claimed that excessive bureaucratization in this area would lead to inevitable leaks.²²

Maria Theresa assured Kaunitz in her reply that there could be no question of a cabinet of any sort. She thought to entrust the implementation of "this whole great work" to the emperor, and indeed did not want to permit him to leave Vienna until he had done so. She asked Kaunitz, however, to change some of the sections of the report that referred very strongly to the directing minister because they could be offensive to Hatzfeld.²³ On 10 March Kaunitz returned the appropriately edited version of his report suggesting that the empress might again wish to consult certain members of the Staatsrat. Under these circumstances he felt that it would be wiser to separate his report into two: one dealing with the Staatsrat and one with Joseph's proposed cabinet.²⁴ The empress accepted the second suggestion as "very useful," but did not wish any further debate on the matter.²⁵

On 12 March she sent Kaunitz's reports, along with all the other relevant documents, to her son with the note:

In remitting to you all the papers and opinions on your great work, you will see that that of Kaunitz, who was able to enter into the matter better than all the others and who is accustomed to give his opinion with that confidence and clarity that we cherish and demand, almost completely matches yours. I beg you therefore to carry out the second project on improving the Staatsrat. . . . Whatever you do will be agreeable to me. I only ask you to have no more deliberations or circulation [of the material]. If you want to talk or consult with Kaunitz alone, or with Hatzfeld, or even with Blümegen . . . I have nothing against it. But what I do ask you is to get everything done before your departure.²⁶

Joseph complied. On 14 April Hatzfeld was ordered to draft the appropriate instruction for the Staatsrat.²⁷ Within a week he had done so and on 12 May 1774 the royal order was officially released.²⁸

Joseph won his point on personally ordering the priorities of Staatsrat deliberations, but in everything else, including the council's right to financial audit,²⁹ Kaunitz carried the day. Indeed rather than accommodating himself to Joseph, it was the emperor who had accommodated himself to Kaunitz. The implementation of Joseph's "second proposal" was no consolation to the emperor for he continued to insist even several years later that the more the Staatsrat took the form of a cabinet the better and more useful it would be. What was even more significant was that Joseph was far from indifferent about the rejection of his Staatskanzlei proposal and continued to complain that the information emanating from Kaunitz's ministry was insufficient.³⁰

With this reform, moreover, all further modifications of the Staatsrat came to an end. Indeed, not only were no further reforms on the council undertaken in the remaining reign of Maria Theresia, no major changes were initiated in the subsequent reigns of Joseph II and Leopold II either.³¹ What is more, although the gap that had existed in the Staatsrat since the death of Daun was filled on 28 May 1774 with the appointment to the council of Lacy,³² the latter was able to assume this post only because he had resigned his office of president of the Hofkriegsrat some months before.³³ Kaunitz's principle that no minister with the exception of himself should hold a Staatsrat post thus remained in effect both in theory and in practice.

The second area of the governmental structure that Kaunitz had emphatically singled out for attention was the Kreisamt. His position was that in the hiring of governmental personnel in general and in district officers in particular the sole consideration had to be merit.³⁴ Thus, for example, when during the introduction of district officers into Galicia the appointment of commoners was resisted by aristocrats who would have to serve in subordinate positions under them, Kaunitz recommended with acidic determination:

As far as I am aware, in the civil, religious military and diplomatic services subordinates no matter how aristocratic are required to obey their superiors even if they are of common origin. However in order not to do violence to dear nature in these appointments, this important objection could be eliminated if Your Majesty would simply be pleased to ennoble them gratis.³⁵

In these posts it was always the essence and not the form that concerned him. Titular and legalistic considerations were characterized as "the most indifferent thing in the world."³⁶

Because of the Kreisamt's responsibilities towards the peasantry, administrative reform on the district level naturally followed in the wake of general agrarian reform. After the debate over peasant labour obligations had resulted in the regulatory decrees of 1775 for Bohemia and Moravia, it became obvious to the central government that the Kreisamt would be the key office in enforcing the new legislation. At this point Joseph returned to his idea of a tighter integration of civilian and military authority on the Kreis level. He wished the two civilian officials, the circle captain and the military draft director, to cooperate closely with the two military supervisors that existed on the Kreis level within the army's hierarchy.

This meant that in effect each Kreis would be administered by four officials of whom the circle captain remained the highest ranking.³⁷ To study these proposals Maria Theresia then created a special inter-ministerial commission consisting of members of the Hofkanzlei and the Hofkammer whose final report was then sent on to the Staatsrat. Before doing so, however, the empress, well aware of Kaunitz's strong opinions on this subject, was quick to seek his counsel.³⁸

For Kaunitz the necessity of improving the existing Kreisamt structure was beyond doubt. Indeed he insisted that the appropriate execution of all orders, the accurate assessment of all local conditions and even "the practical perfection of all legislation" positively depended on it. After considerable thought he abandoned his borough proposals and decided to support Joseph's plan. His reasons for this apparent volte-face were probably two fold. On the one hand Kaunitz must have been aware that the conscription issue was a closed book and rather than obstinately shutting his eyes to reality he could direct what could not be changed. On the other hand, as he himself admitted, fundamental reforms of the Kreise could only follow "a practical knowledge of all relevant factors and local conditions." He therefore had to choose Joseph's plan above all others because it opened the way to a step by step improvement with the fewest changes of the existing over-all governmental structure as well as the fewest actual costs. But he insisted that the men to be employed for the task be made well aware of their duty to propose practical means for "the genuinely fundamental improvement of the entire Kreis system."³⁹

To this end, of course, the duties and raison d'être of the

Kreisamt had to be made perfectly clear. These, in the view of Kaunitz, consisted of the following: that the exact execution of all orders was guaranteed; that obstacles in the way of this execution were either removed or the orders tailored to local circumstances; that all the reasons for any such exceptions were discovered and removed; that all obstacles standing in the way of an improvement of the sustenance level of the peasantry were discovered and reported; that the trust of the peasantry was won and the conviction that the crown strove for their best interests was spread; that all proposals for the "enlightenment, relief and reassurance" of the peasantry were submitted; that all serf-seigneur negotiations to commute labour services to cash payments were assisted and accelerated; that thought was given to which industries were to be encouraged and how existing ones were to be improved; and that justice and good order were best established and suited to local conditions. If these duties were conscientiously discharged, Kaunitz concluded, it would not be long before the new officials would be ready with proposals that were the products of experience on "how the whole Kreis machinery had to be set up."⁴⁰

The support of Kaunitz proved decisive. Joseph's proposals were implemented in all Austrian, Bohemian and Galician Kreise, and with the resultant increased efficiency, the Kreisämter became even more than before the bêtes noires of the landed aristocracy and the driving forces of reform on the local level.⁴¹ The order that was drafted by the Staatsrat instituting the new system met with Kaunitz's full approval. He noted that since it was in complete accord with his proposals, he could not find "the slightest thing of importance" to which to draw attention.⁴²

Another area in which there was agreement between Kaunitz and Joseph concerned the Kommerzienrat. Acting as an autonomous department of the Hofkammer since 1771, it proved to be the focal point of all mercantilist resistance to the growing free trade movement of the 1770's. Kaunitz and Joseph, though eclectic in their economics; were both opposed to the plethora of internal tariffs within the Habsburg Monarchy. The Kommerzienrat, which vigorously defended the particularist interests of the Austro-Bohemian manufacturers, remained a strong proponent of these. In April 1774 Kaunitz was primarily responsible for pushing through a resolute free trade order with which Joseph was in agreement at least with respect to internal tariffs. When the Kommerzienrat attempted to subvert this order, Joseph decided that the department had to be eliminated.⁴³ Kaunitz did not participate in the debate which resulted during 1775. His position had always been that commercial matters tended mostly to concern the provincial authorities and as such should fall within the agenda of the appropriate ministry in Vienna, the Hofkanzlei.⁴⁴ After 1772 he was proven correct when Kommerzienrat business passed with increasing frequency through the hands of the Austro-Bohemian chancellor as well as the president of the Camera. The resultant bureaucratic tie-ups therefore also militated in favour of the incorporation of the department's agenda into that of the Hofkanzlei. Accordingly, on 2 January 1776 the Kommerzienrat was officially abolished and its functions taken over by the chancellery.⁴⁵

Joseph's and Kaunitz's similar position on the Kommerzienrat did not, of course, mean that the two had reached some sort of fundamental accord. Indeed by the end of March 1776 they again came to such a serious

confrontation on East Indian trade that Kaunitz was prepared to resign once more.⁴⁶ But above all there could not have been any genuine reconciliation between the two men as long as Joseph was not entirely satisfied with the running of Kaunitz's own ministry, the Staatskanzlei. In April of that year he even reiterated his cabinet proposal designed to get greater supervisory control of the ministry.⁴⁷ The real problem, however, as the Polish crisis had proven, was that Kaunitz and Joseph were often at odds on the conduct of foreign policy itself. The War of the Bavarian Succession was to highlight this problem, and feelings often tended to run high on both sides.⁴⁸ But because Maria Theresia usually tended to side with Kaunitz in matters of policy, Joseph was obliged to focus his dissatisfaction not so much on what was being done but how it was done.

In all fairness, however, it must be admitted that Kaunitz's pride in his own ministry and in his running of it was essentially justified. The personal loyalty of his staff was invariably the direct result of his deep concern for their welfare. In 1768 for example he recommended that the number of couriers not be increased because he wanted to be certain that his present staff would not be placed in need as a result of salary cuts.⁴⁹ He considered it part of the duty of his office, he wrote, "to support able subordinates and stimulate their service zeal through royal favours as much as possible without placing an excessive strain on the treasury."⁵⁰ Indeed, sometimes he even persuaded the empress to reward his entire staff as a whole for their efficiency and loyalty.⁵¹ But generosity was always combined with economy. Kaunitz was above all no empire builder, and when cut-backs were required he not only acknowledged

but was usually the first to recommend them.⁵² In short, he always made a point of accommodating Joseph's obsession with thrift.

But this was not enough to convince the emperor. Indeed his dissatisfaction with the Staatskanzlei, as his brother Leopold reported during his visit to Vienna in 1778-1779, was an open secret. Leopold's assessment, too, was harsh in the extreme. Although he considered Kaunitz himself a man of great talent, he nevertheless pictured him as a very old and lazy man who liked his comforts too much to want to disturb them by work. He observed that Binder was always obsessed with various vain projects and that the emperor thought him no longer capable of discharging any work. The rest of the staff of the Staatskanzlei were dismissed with the words, "nearly all of them are young and there is not one that counts for much." They all knew, Leopold concluded, that the emperor was discontent with their department, and were very afraid of him as a result.⁵³

Leopold's negative evaluation of Kaunitz must of course be taken with a grain of salt and is, as Wandruszka has observed, even more important for an understanding of the character of Leopold than the people he describes.⁵⁴ Further it must be remembered that precisely at this time Leopold worked closely together with his mother against Kaunitz and Joseph, who, despite their own differences, pursued a foreign policy with which neither the empress nor Leopold sympathized.⁵⁵ Kaunitz in a sense suffered the consequences of Leopold's basic dislike of his older brother. Ironically enough, however, the grand duke's critiques were not unlike those of the emperor and, indeed, echo much of what Joseph had written him about Kaunitz over the years.

What is nevertheless beyond doubt is that Joseph was not at all happy with the Staatskanzlei, and that this escaped no one's attention. He would flatter Kaunitz when he needed him but was always the first to ridicule his eccentricities when he did not.⁵⁶ This also did not go unnoticed by Kaunitz, and he certainly had no reason to think anything would change in this respect. And since the Staatskanzlei clearly ran to his own satisfaction, he undoubtedly found it difficult to envisage what he could change. Kaunitz therefore decided to take Maria Theresa up on her 1766 promise to permit him to retire within two years. At the same time that he laid the Peace of Teschen agreements before her for signature, Kaunitz also submitted an oral plea to be relieved of all his duties.⁵⁷

Again Maria Theresa refused the resignation. She assured him that she would be amenable to any plan by which she could retain his services, and this time, when Kaunitz returned to his old suggestion of a vice-chancellor, she accepted his arrangement. On 21 May he formally proposed the Austrian representative at the recent peace conference, Count Philip von Cobenzl, for the post. Kaunitz had been impressed by Cobenzl's handling of the Teschen negotiations and found him to have a systematic and perceptive mind, a ready practicality in the conduct of business, and a generous and conciliatory nature.⁵⁸ Cobenzl had also made a very favourable impression on Joseph, whom he had accompanied on his trip to France in 1777.⁵⁹ Since Cobenzl's appointment would furthermore result in the retirement of Binder, who had functionally held this post but for whom, as noted, the emperor had but little respect, the change must have been doubly consoling for Joseph.

To make room for Cobenzl Kaunitz accordingly also submitted Binder's resignation along with Cobenzl's nomination. Binder's age, Kaunitz noted, made it impossible for him to fulfill the duties of a vice-chancellor in all but name, but he had nevertheless exacted the former's personal promise to continue working in the Staatskanzlei on a more informal basis.⁶⁰ To this Maria Theresia appended the brief but personal note: "I agree to everything that will alleviate and conserve the prince and that will demonstrate to the honest Binder my gratitude."⁶¹ The next day Kaunitz sent the empress drafts of the formal announcement of Cobenzl's appointment which were duly released. In his covering letter he promised Maria Theresia that he would consecrate the rest of his life to her.⁶²

There remained the issue of Cobenzl's official titles and salary. In order to make sure that no one would think his post inferior to the one Pergen used to hold, Cobenzl asked also to be named "minister of state", that is, receive the dignity of being a member of the Staatsrat without in fact ever working in the council. Both Maria Theresia and Joseph acceded to this request, and demanded only that Kaunitz submit the formal application. On 28 May Cobenzl therefore sent Kaunitz a suitable draft and asked him to sign and dispatch it.⁶³ The next day Kaunitz did so "very gladly", and the empress acceded to this formal request setting Cobenzl's salary at 16,000 fl.⁶⁴ On the thirty-first Kaunitz was able to congratulate Cobenzl on his new title as member of "this poor Staatsrat which, unfortunately, exists but precariously, as you well know."⁶⁵

This bleak reference to the Staatsrat showed that Kaunitz was still not aware of the extent of his success with Joseph. He worried that the council would soon come under attack again, and with respect to his own

ministry was obviously in no position to tell as yet what effect the appointment of Cobenzl would have. Despite this, however, Kaunitz had no intention of receding into the background to become an occasional grey eminence. He firmly cautioned Cobenzl that all Staatskanzlei business, whether written or spoken, had to be conducted in his name "for as long as I will be in my place."⁶⁶ And he continued to discharge his duties at the same pace as usual so that it seems clear that for Kaunitz nothing had really changed except that Binder had been replaced with Cobenzl.

For Joseph however, the change was plainly salutary. He was, of course, the type of person who seems to be afflicted with constant discontent, and at the death of his mother in November 1780 he repeated the generalization he had made at the beginning of the Co-Regency, namely, that no one was doing a satisfactory job. Yet, as in 1765, he named a single exception--Kaunitz.⁶⁷ When Leopold visited Vienna again in 1784, he bore out the fact that Kaunitz had Joseph's "complete trust and respect". And indeed, the grand duke's assessment had also changed for the better. Kaunitz was now described as still vigorous despite his age, discharging his affairs "with the accustomed honesty and celerity."⁶⁸ Neither of the two brothers could have guessed that the old chancellor would continue to do so until well after their own respective deaths.

PART TWO
RELIGION AND CULTURE

CHAPTER VI

KAUNITZ AND JOSEPHINISM

Few issues in Austrian historiography have occasioned such heated debate as the nature and origins of Josephinism. At the center of the problem is the perennial question of the relationship between church and state, and here Kaunitz's role is the principal matter of contention. Ferdinand Maass, a Jesuit historian, has so closely identified Josephinism with the statism articulated by Kaunitz¹ that his Capuchin student, Anton Ellemunter, has been able to suggest that a distinction has to be made between what he terms "ministerial Josephinism" and "imperial Josephinism". The latter was a continuation and intensification of the traditional Habsburg participation in ecclesiastical affairs that was the result of military and socioeconomic necessities and had no particular connection with the Enlightenment. The former, however, originated in the Enlightenment's concept of absolutism and as such should more properly be called "Kaunitzianism."²

The Marxist, Eduard Winter, on the other hand, has insisted that Kaunitz was not "the spiritual father, but merely the organizer of the second phase of Josephinism."³ For him Josephinism must be regarded essentially as Austrian reform Catholicism that has its origins in the neo-Jansenist and Gallican ideas that spread into the Habsburg Monarchy during the reign of Charles VI.⁴ Naturally both proponents were quick to insist that Josephinism could not be defined merely as statism on the one hand or reform Catholicism on the other,⁵ but this has not prevented

subsequent historians from setting up the polarized concept "statism or reform Catholicism" as the parameter of the debate.⁶ But while attempts at defining Josephinism as a rather vague Enlightenment phenomenon⁷ have foundered on the rock of the central nature of the church-state question,⁸ it has become increasingly popular to regard Josephinism as a complex and multi-faceted manifestation of Austrian intellectual history that cannot be reduced to either one or the other,⁹ nor be simply regarded as the Austrian version of the Enlightenment.¹⁰

There is no doubt, however, that the reform movement within the church itself was one of the constituent elements of Josephinism. Not only such important figures as the two Viennese archbishops, Johann Joseph Cardinal Trautson (1751-1757) and Christoph Anton Cardinal Migazzi (1757-1803)¹¹ and the court physician, Gerard van Swieten,¹² but even the empress herself had embarked throughout the fifties on a programme of an increasingly neo-Jansenist nature that enhanced the state's control over the church.¹³ Indeed, in the pontificate of Benedict XIV (1740-1758) a movement to return to the patristic purity of the church swept Rome itself,¹⁴ thus sustaining the already powerful neo-Jansenist movement in Austria. This was, of course, an extremely heterogeneous body of persons who shared little but a common animosity towards the Jesuits.¹⁵ But despite the presence of a powerful statist strain, by 1760 the dominant impulse stemming from the empress herself remained a strong neo-Jansenist pietism.¹⁶

The attitude of Kaunitz toward the church during these years must be seen within the context of the Seven Years' War. If it appears

that his tone was obliging and his actions conciliatory,¹⁷ it must be kept in mind that the papacy was a temporal power with considerable influence, particularly in Catholic Germany. The extent of this influence had been demonstrated in the early years of the pontificate of Benedict XIV when his recognition of the Wittelsbach emperor, Charles VII, put considerable strain on the relationship between Rome and Vienna.¹⁸ Of course this did not mean that Kaunitz was ever a defender of the church. During his French embassy in a confrontation between the French state and church, the crown had been forced to give way. The lesson could not have been lost on Kaunitz. The clergy formed a corporation and as such posed a threat to the modern absolutist secular state. But as long as the clergy in Austria and indeed the pope himself accommodated themselves to the imperatives of the state, Kaunitz was prepared to reciprocate with what for him was, after all, merely another state.¹⁹

In so doing, however, Kaunitz judiciously steered a middle course. While he held back any anti-clerical rhetoric and showed that he was prepared to cooperate with the papacy, he would not allow himself to be recruited into any ultramontane front designed to counter the neo-Jansenist movement in the Habsburg Monarchy. When Charles of Lorraine, the empress' brother-in-law and her governor in the Austrian Netherlands, forbade the publication of the anti-Jansenist bull Unigenitus in 1755, the papal nuncio in Vienna was instructed to protest and above all win over Kaunitz. The latter, however, refused to exert his influence on Maria Theresia so that an attempt had to be made to win the empress through her Jesuit confessor, Father Ignaz Kampmüller.²⁰

It was the papacy, not Kaunitz, that was responsible for the chancellor's change of attitude and his abandonment of a position of studied neutrality. With the death of Benedict XIV in May 1758 and the election of the Venetian, Cardinal Carlo Rezzonico as Clement XIII, a fundamental policy reversal took place at the Vatican. Rezzonico had only reluctantly been accepted by Vienna because he had been the French candidate--and French domestic interests demanded an anti-Jansenist pope. Matters were compounded in October of that year when Clement appointed Cardinal Luigi Torrigiani, "an exceedingly great friend of the Jesuits," to the sensitive Secretariat of State.²¹ Clement and Torrigiani began to launch a counter-attack against neo-Jansenist tendencies and the rationalist Enlightenment almost immediately. It was the kind of policy that to Kaunitz's mind indicated that the papacy had ceased to be reasonable.

Concrete evidence for this was not long in coming. Clement XIII and Torrigiani were determined to retain as free a hand as possible in all investiture cases in which they were not specifically obliged by a concordat to consult the relevant prince. One such case was the bishopric of Como. The Habsburgs though without any legal right traditionally had been consulted in the nomination of the bishop. In the spring of 1760 the bishopric became vacant and was immediately filled by the pope without consultation with Vienna. As the empress' candidate was in fact chosen no break with Rome occurred. But Kaunitz did not fail to observe that this deliberate disregard of a traditional act of courtesy was not customary behaviour in the relationships between courts and princes.²² A sharper confrontation occurred in March 1762. The consultative rights of

the Dukes of Milan were more firmly based in the case of the bishopric of Mantua. Therefore, when Clement again appointed the bishop without imperial approval, Kaunitz was severely taken aback. Even if the Austrian candidate was invested, it was clear to Kaunitz that the pope was attempting to establish a precedent for unilateral action. An apologetic response to a strong protest from Vienna claimed ignorance of any consultative right in this case and sent Kaunitz scurrying for documentary evidence. In the face of this the papacy backed down, though not before prolonged negotiations that only served to embitter Kaunitz all the more.²³

During this time negotiations were also under way with the papacy attempting to secure for the Grisons, which was under Austrian protection, a concordat similar to the one in effect in Milan. Because of the strategic and economic importance of the Veltlin and the necessity of eliminating their Venetian rivals there, the Austrians had undertaken to negotiate a concordat with Rome which would guarantee resident Protestants freedom of private worship, and which would surrender to the state favourable amortization of church lands. After negotiations had dragged on for several years, the papacy finally rejected a Grisons concordat on 22 August 1764.²⁴ Kaunitz did not give up hope since precisely at that moment the bishopric of Como again fell vacant. Since the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Como included the Grisons, the appointment of an Austrian candidate there could still salvage the situation. In the hope that the previous investiture confrontations in Como and Mantua had made the papacy realize how vital Vienna deemed its recommendations, the names of two acceptable candidates were immediately dispatched to Rome. The almost

equally immediate rejection of these brought Kaunitz's anti-papal feelings fully to the surface.²⁵

Maass' bitterly phrased critique that Kaunitz only regarded ecclesiastical issues from the political angle²⁶ is essentially correct. A great deal of Austria's power in Germany depended on its influence with the papacy in the appointments of prelates, and the Como and Mantua investiture conflicts set dangerous precedents. Despite Kaunitz's own rebuttal,²⁷ moreover, the papacy's objection that the Viennese court had negotiated with the Grisons as if it had supreme ecclesiastical authority²⁸ was also well founded within the context of a less secular age. Kaunitz basically regarded the papacy as a temporal power with considerable moral influence outside its political boundaries. He repeatedly referred to it as "the court of Rome" and emphasized that "the court of Rome . . . does not constitute the church."²⁹ It is revealing that Kaunitz would characterize the uncooperative attitude on the part of the papacy as uncourteous behaviour not suitable in the relationships between "courts".³⁰ He could understand that the papacy was subject to internal political pressures and was willing to be as cooperative as he would be in relations with any other state. But to this end reciprocity was imperative. What Kaunitz could not forgive was the papacy's apparent disregard of Austria's political necessities.

This, however, does not mean that Kaunitz was "so captivated by his own rationalist way of thinking" and so hindered by "his vanity" and his "ruthlessness" that he was incapable of working out a genuine compromise between the interests of the church and those of the state.³¹ In

his view Rome itself had forced Austria to reconsider the whole question of the rights of the sovereign in ecclesiastical matters by its "despotic" behaviour in the Milanese investiture conflicts.³² Legalistically the letter of the concordats largely justified the papacy's claims. Yet Kaunitz used nothing less than the one weapon the Vatican had always used against heretics who emphasized the letter of the scriptures, the weight of tradition. The maintenance of the traditional consultative rights of the Habsburgs was the least the papacy could do after all the services the House of Austria had done the church. The problem, as Kaunitz pointed out, was that Rome and Vienna basically proceeded from fundamentally different premises:³³ the former from those of the counter-reformation, the latter from the modern age. It is a shallow analysis that turns Kaunitz's phrase "an invasion of rights" around and directs it to Kaunitz himself.³⁴ It was more than legal rights that were in question here, it was what the eighteenth century might have called "natural rights". Kaunitz repeatedly emphasized that the church's duty should be the care of souls and not the manipulation of political power. This was neither a kind of hypocrisy nor a "sarcastic ridicule" that the church could well do without,³⁵ rather it was a perspicacious analysis of present and future social realities with which the church had to seek an accommodation sooner or later.³⁶

As is often the case with those who obstinately cling to an old and outmoded order, Clement and Torrigiani in the event lost more than they would have had they been prepared to compromise. Kaunitz's correspondence with his authorized minister in Milan, Count Karl von Firmian,³⁷

reveals an increasing hardening of the anti-papal position from the summer of 1764 onwards.³⁸ In February 1766 all church lands in Milan acquired since 1716 were subjected to the same taxes as lay property. A few months later Kaunitz ordered Firmian to replace the ecclesiastical censorship board of Milan with a secular one. On 3 August 1767 the so-called Giunta Economale (Stewardship Council) was created. Responsible for the release of all papal announcements, breves or bulls, the tight supervision of all monastic orders, the control of anything connected with mortmain laws, and the maintenance of all state rights in relationship with the church, it not only affirmed state sovereignty but gave it a strong weapon to translate theory into practice. On the same day new state agents were appointed to regulate ecclesiastical communication with the curia, and three days later the statist incursions into the mortmain laws of Milan were renewed and intensified.³⁹

Despite these firm steps in the direction of statism in the Duchy of Milan, Kaunitz did not want to make the error of underestimating the papacy. He therefore remained almost surprisingly cautious in his ecclesiastical recommendations in Austria proper. He restricted his policy suggestions to Staatsrat meetings and seldom departed radically from the majority opinion.⁴⁰ In part this was the result of despair. Experience made him sceptical about any positive outcome resulting from negotiation with Rome on any topic of church-state relationships. For example, when the Hofkammer suggested a fifteen year extension of a tax on the clergy designed to meet maintenance costs of Hungarian and Croatian-Slavonian fortifications, Kaunitz indicated that no concessions could be

expected from Rome "at least under the present pope and his ministry."⁴¹ Reiterating Kaunitz's words literally, the empress decided to drop the demand and ordered the renegotiation of the tax on the usual five-year basis.⁴² When the levying of a probate duty on church property was suggested, Kaunitz conceded that a "thorough investigation of ecclesiastical property" was desirable, but added that in this case "prudence demands that frequent changes and excessively harsh decrees be avoided." He recommended that the Staatsrat in conjunction with the finance ministries launch an investigation instead.⁴³ Again the empress's decision followed Kaunitz's votum.⁴⁴ Even Stupan's complaints about the high number of religious orders and the profusion of church processions and pilgrimages solicited from Kaunitz the cautious response that this well known and great evil was "immensely difficult to remedy." He insisted that a direct attack on it "would bring more harm than good and also attract the most malicious attention." Again he counselled further investigations and deliberations on the part of the chancellery.⁴⁵ As usual the empress followed Kaunitz's suggestion.⁴⁶

There was however a limit on Kaunitz's caution. He insisted, for example, that it was "beyond all doubt" that the empress, in the pursuance of her duty to her subjects, had the right to send the clergy of the monarchy to whatever part of the empire and for whatever purpose she wished.⁴⁷ He readily joined the unanimous chorus of Staatsrat voices that rejected the claim of the Hungarian bishop in the vicinity of the fortress of Erlau to reannex the fortress now that it no longer served the purpose it once had in warding off the Turks.⁴⁸ And he insisted that

the right to confer ecclesiastical benefices in Hungary belonged to the sovereign alone, and that the confirmation of this law should be drafted by none other than that firm statist, the court librarian, Adam Franz Kollar.⁴⁹ These recommendations too found royal approval.

But the fact of the matter is that others were prepared to be far more radical than Kaunitz. In 1755 Pope Benedict XIV had granted the subjects of Maria Theresia living in the Vorlände the right not to be summoned out of Austrian territory when appealing a case to the papal nuncio of Lucerne within whose jurisdiction they were. Although this concession did not apply to ecclesiastical cases, the provincial authorities interpreted the papal patent to in fact include these. In two separate ecclesiastical cases in which an appeal to the nuncio in Lucerne was launched, the provincial authorities refused to recognize recourse to the nuncio as legally valid. This occasioned a vigorous papal protest to Kaunitz early in 1767.⁵⁰ Again the latter reacted with caution. He wrote the Hofkanzlei requesting more information on the cases and the grounds for the papal protest. He knew very well, he said, that one could simply refer to Austrian rights and liberties, but added that "as soon as one takes this up with such an imposing court [as that of Rome]," it was necessary that one be able to cite the letter of any agreement.⁵¹

Kaunitz's relations with the Hofkanzlei and particularly with its head, Count Rudolf Chotek, were poor at the best of times, and especially strained at this time in particular.⁵² Therefore a reply to Kaunitz's request of 16 May was not unexpectedly given low priority. Even when the chancellery finally got around to it some months later, the

job of drafting the reply was given to the youngest and newest privy councillor of the Hofkanzlei, who had only arrived in Vienna after Kaunitz's inter-ministerial memo, Franz Joseph Ritter von Heinke.⁵³ In Heinke, however, the chancellery had found a dedicated statist firebrand. In his reply to Kaunitz, dated 15 August 1767, he insisted that every sovereign had the right to keep his subjects from being summoned abroad. Such a right could not be the result of any papal dispensation since appeal to the papacy was in itself only a privilege granted by the sovereign. That this privilege had grown into a law was merely a result of the notorious Isidorean Decretals⁵⁴ and therefore did not bind the state. He concluded by sternly reminding Kaunitz "that to give way in this matter even in the very slightest would be the same as declaring that the clergy are not subjects [of the crown], which fundamentally erroneous and dangerous principle one can never concede without overturning the entire constitution of the state."⁵⁵

The Hofkammer too seemed not to be intimidated by the power of the papacy. Despite the fact that the empress had decided in favour of Kaunitz's cautious approach on clerical taxation, the Camera seems not to have given up pressing for a fifteen rather than a five-year recess. At the end of July Kaunitz had begun negotiations with the papacy for a five-year agreement,⁵⁶ but by January of the next year he was again pressing for a fifteen year one.⁵⁷ Even as late as 26 February 1768, though conceding that the pope could not be permitted to decline an agreement, Kaunitz felt that the matter was of such importance that it should be deliberated by the Staatsrat. He reported that he had threatened that

the taxes would be collected without an agreement, but indications are that this was but a negotiating position. Maria Theresia, however, was much firmer in her resolve. She would not submit the matter to further deliberations. She would give "the court of Rome" some more time to see if it would simply accede to her demands. If it did not, no further negotiations were to be begun with it. "I am resolved," she wrote, "to avail myself of my due rights, and to proceed on my own authority in this case."⁵⁸ Clearly Kaunitz was still not the spearhead of the anti-papal movement.

Indeed within the context of the times, what becomes clear is not Kaunitz's "ruthless and single-minded activity" against the church,⁵⁹ but his remarkable restraint. The radical circumscription of ecclesiastical power in the Bourbon and Braganzan courts highlighted by the expulsion of the Jesuits from Portugal in 1759, from France in 1764, from Spain and Naples in 1767 and finally from Parma in 1768,⁶⁰ had a much sharper anti-papal tone than anything Kaunitz had thus far uttered. The confrontation between church and the catholic states in Europe was in full swing, and Austria would not be far behind in following the example of the other courts. It was in this spirit that Kaunitz informed his ambassador to Rome, Cardinal Alessandro Albani, that the time had come to abolish ecclesiastical abuses and that he could therefore only hope that the pope would be cooperative.⁶¹ This note, however, was not meant as a warning to the papacy, but merely as information for Albani.

What Kaunitz had in mind when he spoke of abuses becomes clear in the perspective of his great memorandum on internal reform that he was

preparing at this very time and which was submitted to the empress on 25 January 1768.⁶² He emphasized mainly the improvement of ecclesiastical discipline, the limitation of excessive holy days, and the conversion of fasting obligations into other good works. He suggested that detailed reform recommendations ought to come from the Staatsrat or some specially constituted commission. His rationale was simple. Religion, to his mind, was as much a political as a spiritual concern and was very important to the welfare of the state. "Virtuous and Christian subjects," he maintained, "fulfill their duties to their sovereign in fuller measure, and uniformity of religion unites the energies of the state." But even more revealing than these recommendations were the ones that Kaunitz, upon second thought, decided to leave out of the report. In these he had recommended making common cause with the Bourbon courts in the Jesuit question and demanding the complete abolition of the order. He also recommended that all sums of money exacted from the clergy should be spent on visibly good causes in order "to make a good impression."⁶³ Neither the radicalism of the former nor the open cynicism of the latter were deemed appropriate at that point by Kaunitz. On the contrary, the papacy was formally reassured not only by Maria Theresia but also by Kaunitz and Joseph that Austria would take no action against its Jesuits similar to that of the Bourbon courts.⁶⁴ What is more, restraint also marked Kaunitz's reply to the papal protest on the jurisdiction of the nuncio of Lucerne. Despite Heinke's reproach, Kaunitz did not question the legality of Benedict XIV's relevant dispensation and contented himself with an evasive reply designed to avoid confrontation.⁶⁵

But the papacy of Clement XIII was geared for battle. On 30 January 1768 the anti-clerical legislation and literal middle-of-the-night expulsion of the Jesuits by the Duke of Parma was answered with an excommunication of the young prince.⁶⁶ And at the same time that the decision was reached to confront the Bourbon courts by making an example of the least powerful of them, the papal nuncio in Vienna, Eugenio Visconti, was instructed to protest against the flood of anti-ecclesiastical decrees recently issued in Milan--and particularly the replacement of the ecclesiastical censorship board with a lay one.⁶⁷ It seems that Albani too was recruited for the papal cause, for he responded to his chief's indication that the climate of reform was in the air by firmly expressing his conviction that the state should not meddle in affairs under ecclesiastical jurisdiction.⁶⁸ Maria Theresa had never liked Albani,⁶⁹ and Kaunitz himself worried that a cardinal could not discharge the duties of an imperial ambassador properly.⁷⁰ Now Albani had to be severely reprimanded,⁷¹ and the whole problem of church-state relationship reexamined. Kaunitz was reaching the point where his latent militancy was coming to the surface.

The excommunication of Ferdinand of Parma had far-reaching consequences not only in the Bourbon courts but also in Austria. The Duke of Choiseul had decided to use this issue to force papal retrenchment. He attempted to unite all the Catholic powers in protest, and therefore appealed to Austria to join in.⁷² Maria Theresa clearly had not been pleased with Clement's radical step, for Ferdinand of Parma was to marry her sixth daughter, Maria Amalia, and she naturally wished any

papal conflict with the duke settled quietly and peacefully.⁷³ For Kaunitz the excommunication had even greater ramifications. In a major report dated 20 March 1768, he noted that this issue opened the far more fundamental problem of "how far papal power and authority extends not only in matters of faith but also in others which have influence on secular government and concern the good political order, welfare, peace and security of the state." He felt that both lay and ecclesiastical theoreticians had already proven "in the previous century" that the church only had authority in matters of faith and conscience and that all temporal power had to be exercised by the sovereign. After Constantine put the church in a position of political power, it merely pursued self-serving ends until it thus caused the Reformation and tore Christendom asunder. Since then, Kaunitz noted, the papacy had been more careful. In fact Benedict XIV himself had taken "a very reasonable approach to the contemporary world situation." Unfortunately this was not the case with the present pope and particularly not with his Secretary of State, Torrigiani, who had revived the "exorbitant presumptions" of medieval days. Because of this, as well as "an all-too-zealous defence of the Jesuits," the papacy was on such poor terms with all the Catholic courts. Indeed, even the empress herself had been forced "to adopt a stern tone" in the defence of her rights in Milan. Under these circumstances he saw no option but to join the Bourbon protest.⁷⁴

The excommunication itself, Kaunitz continued, could not help but have serious repercussions for other princes. It could set a precedent which would embolden the papacy to take further and sharper

action, and it could lead to the practice of excommunicating all monarchs who issued legislation similar to that of the Duke of Parma. In order to make the proper impression on the papacy, a united front was mandatory. Individual protests, he feared, would only reinforce the court of Rome's "harshness and obstinacy." Furthermore, the empress' voice could moderate the excessive demands of others and thus perhaps prevent a schism in the church. Above all, Kaunitz emphasized, this was the ideal opportunity to find some sort of common ground with the other Catholic powers in order to put an end to abuses of papal power, improve ecclesiastical discipline and determine the actual boundaries between lay and ecclesiastical authority. "The court of Rome," he concluded, "must be convinced once and for all that this is no longer the time to want to prescribe laws, with the exception of those in matters of faith, to temporal princes and to deprive them of a large part of their sovereign power." Maria Theresia seemed pleased with the report. She not only endorsed every detail, but ordered that "this important matter should also be circulated among the other ministers."⁷⁵

As Choiseul decided to act against the papacy in favour of the Duke of Parma before receiving the Austrian reply,⁷⁶ the united front was broken before it began. The Bourbon courts in any case took such radical steps, which Austria could not have endorsed, that the issue soon became less clear-cut. France seized Avignon and Naples Benvenuto, and the pope became even more resolute in defiance. Under these circumstances Kaunitz advised that Austria disengage herself from any direct or indirect involvement in the affair. On 11 July 1768 Joseph advised Kaunitz that the

empress "conformed entirely" with his view.⁷⁷ The crisis came to an end during the papacy of Clement XIV (1769-1775) when an understanding was reached in which the Vatican emerged victorious.⁷⁸ After the dissolution of the Jesuits, Ferdinand of Parma in fact became one of their greatest defenders and by 1793 even thought of restoring them in his duchy.⁷⁹

The Austrian disengagement from the specific excommunication issue, however, did not mean that the more general problem that this issue had raised would be dropped as well. On the contrary, Maria Theresia had already decided that a new "firm regulation in ecclesiastical matters" was imperative,⁸⁰ and such incidents, no matter what their outcome, only served to underscore this necessity. If this was insufficient to stimulate a re-evaluation of church-state relationships, moreover, yet another inducement was at hand. Emperor Ferdinand II had granted the congregation of the Propaganda Fide a certain proportion of the income of the Bohemian salt monopoly (cassa salis) to use at their discretion for ecclesiastical purposes in the kingdom of Bohemia. The collection and distribution of these funds had proceeded without incident until the early 1760's when the Hofkanzlei, under war-time economic pressures, began to demand the right to prescribe how the cassa salis funds ought to be spent. Although this went completely against the letter of the agreement with the Propaganda Fide, Maria Theresia was nevertheless persuaded by 1766 to suspend the distribution of the funds in an attempt to channel them into areas determined by the Austrian government.⁸¹ The counter-proposal of the Propaganda Fide on how it wished to spend the money solicited such a bitter reproach from the Hofkanzlei that its

report of 23 January 1768 had to be submitted to the Staatsrat for further deliberation four days later.⁸² The matter was circulated among the council's members over the next two months, Kaunitz being the last to submit his recommendations on 25 March.

Kaunitz began by noting how difficult it was in this situation to find a productive remedy to the problem that would not be offensive to either side. Justice and reason were on the side of the empress, but the letter of the agreement on the side of the court of Rome. He doubted that the papacy's legal rights would escape the Vatican, and in order to avoid a "collision" with the pope while at the same time retaining some of the newly arrogated power, he earnestly recommended a compromise. He suggested that the empress recognize "in full measure" the rights conferred on the papacy by Ferdinand II, but that she insist that she and the Archbishop of Prague were in a better position to tell where the cassa salis funds were best spent. She was to note that since the opening of the reign of Clement XIII the Propaganda Fide had even ceased to ask the archbishop of Prague's opinion on distribution and had begun to dole out moneys to totally unworthy causes. And she was to suggest that in future she herself would nominate a number of worthy religious causes, always at least three in excess of the number the funds justified, from which the papal court could then choose and determine specific allocations. To this end Kaunitz recommended that the empress offer to hand over all cassa salis funds held back since 1766 if her compromise were accepted. If the Propaganda Fide, on the other hand, continued to distribute these funds to chapters and monasteries that did not meet with her and the Archbishop

of Prague's approval, she would be forced to tax these very ecclesiastical institutions, in the first year the exact amount doled out to them, in the second double that amount, in the third triple, and so forth.⁸³

Not only did Maria Theresia accept Kaunitz's compromise on 2 April,⁸⁴ she issued the official order to the Staatskanzlei to have Albani present this offer to the pope on the same day.⁸⁵ It is important to note that her order to Kaunitz repeated verbatim the votum he had submitted to the Staatsrat the week before. This order to Kaunitz therefore did not show him how far the empress had permitted herself to be "lured into an agitation" by the Hofkanzlei; nor was this order any indication that the empress completely lacked the power of abstract thought, giving Kaunitz the green light to propose even more radical anti-clerical legislation, as Maass has claimed.⁸⁶ Essentially, the order was drafted by Kaunitz himself and represented a compromise position between the rights of the Propaganda Fide and the demands of the Hofkanzlei.

It was, furthermore, a position that, in the opinion of the Hofkanzlei, was too compromising. Its objections were again strong enough for the matter to be submitted once more to the Staatsrat on 21 April.⁸⁷ But by that time, as Kaunitz noted in his votum,⁸⁸ the order had already been sent off to Albani. The latter acknowledged that he had received the instruction on 22 April, but he soon let himself be recruited yet again for the papal cause. In his reply to his chief, dated 4 May, he expressed surprise at the clearly irregular nature of the new demands from Vienna⁸⁹ and obviously dragged his feet in the matter as much as he could. Almost

eighteen months later the empress finally demanded to know what results had been achieved.⁹⁰ Kaunitz replied that though the death of Clement XIII on 2 February 1769 had interrupted the flow of business, he had instructed Albani as early as 25 May to press for action. He therefore recommended that Albani now be reprimanded once more and ordered to press the matter with all due earnestness.⁹¹ Significantly Joseph replied on behalf of his mother, endorsing the proposal and instructing Kaunitz to keep the impatient Hofkanzlei informed.⁹²

Thus, Maass' contention that Kaunitz was able to pursue relentlessly anti-ecclesiastical measures with his characteristic "hypocrisy and cold cynicism" because Maria Theresia was basically too naive and shallow in her religious perceptions to see through him,⁹³ ignores the important neo-Jansenist drift in the empress' religious persuasions during these years,⁹⁴ and also totally ignores Joseph's role in determining religious policy during the period of the Co-Regency.⁹⁵ As early as 1765, Joseph had discussed ecclesiastical problems in his great memorandum on domestic reform. He lamented the excessively religious orientation of education which only would be acceptable in his view "if our state were a monastery and our neighbours Carthusian nuns and friars." He felt that education should, in making children good Christians, also make them good subjects. He insisted on a reduction of the number of monasteries, endorsed the state's right to send the clergy wherever in the opinion of the sovereign it was needed, tentatively posited a policy of religious toleration and recommended legislation forbidding anyone from joining a monastic order before the age of twenty-five.⁹⁶

It is interesting to observe that Kaunitz's assessment of these proposals, which were drawn up at the request of Maria Theresia, do not at all give the impression of a scheming opportunist carefully looking for loopholes through which he could slip yet another anti-clerical measure past the unsuspecting and dull-witted empress. Admittedly his main concern in his assessment of Joseph's reform proposals was to defend the administrative reforms that had been ushered in since 1760. But with reference to the ecclesiastical matter, although Kaunitz generally approved of the drift of Joseph's policy, it is even more important to point out that he cautioned against an excessive reduction of religious orders and expressed considerable reservations about an age requirement for monastic aspirants.⁹⁷

In March 1768, when Joseph was preparing a memorandum on the condition of the Austrian monarchy for his brother Leopold, he again turned at some length to the problem of the relationship between church and state. He noted how in recent "more enlightened" centuries the political influence of Rome had been on the wane and that "wise and prudent popes" had not been "unreasonable" about this development. But the present pope and his "violent" Secretary of State would ruin everything by attempting to revive old abusive powers. Here Joseph listed the Vatican's unwillingness to abolish the Jesuits, its reluctance to give the Spanish church rights similar to the French one, and its dispatching a papal nuncio to Poland to stir up the "false zeal" of the Catholic reactionaries. Even in its relations with Austria, the emperor noted, the papacy had revealed "a nearly insupportable spirit of chicanery and

stubbornness" in such matters as ecclesiastical probate duties, the reduction of holy days, processions and pilgrimages, the cassa salis issue, the censorship debate, and even in annulment cases. It had all been borne with patience, Joseph wrote, but not without learning the lesson that the simplest way to deal with the court of Rome was to present it with faits accomplis. While quarrelling with all the Catholic courts, furthermore, the papacy had shamefully ignored its own domestic problems, leading everyone to await anxiously the death of the pope.⁹⁸

There seems little doubt that the similarity of Joseph's and Kaunitz's opinions did not stem from any promptings on the part of the latter. It is true that the emperor asked Kaunitz to double-check the memorandum destined for Leopold, but this explicitly only for factual errors and grammatical structure.⁹⁹ Joseph's thoughts on the matter are therefore very significant in acting as a political barometer of the religious problem as distinct from Kaunitz's specific views. It is clear that all branches of government shared with Kaunitz a certain exasperation --whether justified or not--with the policies of Clement XIII. If Kaunitz was able to inform his privy councillor for Italian affairs, Joseph von Sperges, that the long-awaited moment had now come to inform the curia of the new principles governing Austrian religious policy, however, it was not because he perceived the moment opportune to manipulate the empress. She herself had in fact ordered Heinke, on the recommendation of not only Kaunitz but also van Swieten, to work out "a fundamental system" clarifying the respective competences of church and state almost a full month earlier.¹⁰⁰ While Kaunitz was clearly in the thick of the debate,

he was not its only driving force. If he instructed Sperges to draft the memo to Rome in such a way as to calm the empress' mind about the move, it is because he knew she was conscientious about presenting a well-founded case.¹⁰¹ The statement to the Vatican was not a declaration of war but an attempt to clarify the basic premises upon which ecclesiastical policy had been based for at least the previous five years. It was the last act of patience before resorting to the device of the fait accompli.

While Sperges was preparing the statement to the papacy and Heinke drafting the preliminary report on the church-state relationship in Austria, Kaunitz engaged himself in a similar task: drawing up a set of instructions more clearly delineating the function of the Giunta Economale in Milan. There was nothing unusual about this. Kaunitz was always concerned that any governmental department be supplied with explicit and detailed instructions outlining the fundamental premises from which it was to proceed. If this was not always done in every ministry, he could at least make sure that departments under his jurisdiction were thus provided for. The purpose of the Giunta Economale, the instruction stated, was to protect the legitimate rights of the church and the state. These rights were closely defined: "Everything which was not divinely instituted as a specific competence of the clergy, is subject to the supreme legislative and executive power of the sovereign." Only that was recognized as divinely instituted which "Christ himself transmitted to his apostles," namely, the preaching of the Gospel, the proliferation of Christian dogma, the divine service, the

administration of the sacraments, and the maintenance of internal church discipline. Beyond this the clergy enjoyed no rights without the consent of the sovereign, and therefore it remained the prerogative of that sovereign to alter or recall any privileges or rights he may at one time have given the clergy. The same held true for the decisions of all councils and canons that did not concern themselves with purely spiritual matters.¹⁰²

Maria Theresia endorsed these instructions "on the black day of 15 June 1768," as Maass melodramatically puts it.¹⁰³ On the next day she signed the official decree abolishing ecclesiastical censorship in Milan,¹⁰⁴ and on the twenty-fifth the official dispatches prepared by Sperges went out to Rome.¹⁰⁵ At the same time Kaunitz was asked to channel yet another statist demand to the Vatican. The Hungarian Chancellery had pressed Maria Theresia for the creation of a new uniatic bishopric centered on the town of Munkacz (now Mukachevo in the Carpatho-Ukraine), insisting that it was the right of the Apostolic King of Hungary to create new bishoprics in accordance with the Hungarian constitution while the papacy retained no rights but those of confirmation. A papal protest had merely been transmitted without comment to the chancellery by Kaunitz, but it remained so deaf to all objections that the organization of the new bishopric was undertaken without permission from Rome. Under these circumstances Kaunitz recommended that both the papal nuncio in Vienna and Albani be informed of the strong statist assertion of the Hungarian Chancellery. "I agree completely," Maria Theresia replied, and asked Kaunitz to draft the appropriate notes.¹⁰⁶ Four days later these were

dispatched and the actions of the Hungarian Chancellery given royal assent.¹⁰⁷

With this flood of statist assertions, the papacy geared itself for the counter-attack. In June the nuncio, Visconti, began by lodging a formal protest with Kaunitz about the way papal objections to the jurisdictional quarrel in the Vorländer had been dismissed.¹⁰⁸ When Kaunitz rejected this protest with an air of finality, emphasizing the new principles that were governing Austrian ecclesiastical policies,¹⁰⁹ it became clear to the Vatican that any hope of recovering lost ground could only come by successfully undermining these new principles and not by a piecemeal attack on specific problems. Clement XIII took the momentous step on 22 April 1768. In a personal appeal to the piety of Maria Theresia, he began by pointing out the dangers of abolishing ecclesiastical censorship in Milan and went on to beg her not to accept the false statist premises from which such policies proceeded. He asked her to protect her lands from the new principles of which her ministry had informed Rome and begged her to consult her conscience and not her political adviser in this serious matter.¹¹⁰

If Kaunitz had been the only obstacle in the pope's way, the appeal might have succeeded, but this was not the case. By the time the pontifical appeal reached Vienna, it was already too late. Heinke had submitted his preliminary report and Kaunitz had been ordered to prepare French copies of his secret instructions for the Giunta Economale to all ministries and governmental departments as "Principles established by Her Majesty the Empress and Apostolic Queen to serve as a guide to all

her tribunals and magistrates in ecclesiastical matters."¹¹¹ Hence, when Maria Theresia received the papal appeal from the hands of Visconti, she merely transmitted it to Kaunitz who was at the moment in Austerlitz. Kaunitz noted that the pope's rejection of the principles the empress had expressly underscored made it appear as if she had not given the matter proper thought and allowed herself to be swayed excessively by her minister. This notion had to be rejected emphatically. He therefore undertook to draft a point-by-point rebuttal, promising to send this to her as soon as possible. The empress agreed to delay the audience with Visconti until then, and in the event respond the way Kaunitz would suggest.¹¹² Clearly the decision had been made; only its implementation remained.

CHAPTER VII

CHURCH AND STATE

Franz Joseph von Heinke was officially commissioned to draft a fundamental new system outlining the actual respective rights of church and state on 10 May 1768. His preliminary report was ready early in June, for it was immediately circulated in the Staatsrat beginning with Binder on the twelfth. Despite its strong statist strain, one of the most significant things about Heinke's report is its essentially religious character. In advocating a complete separation of church and state, leaving the former authority only in spiritual and supernatural matters, he did not depart much from Kaunitz's secret instructions for the Giunta Economale. But Heinke emphasized the exemplary purity of the patristic church. He noted the long line of canonized popes and the flowering of the faith at precisely the time that the church was least tied to temporal things, and drew the logical conclusion that religion was at its optimum when its priests were detached from worldly titles. He ascribed the degeneration from this utopia to the fact that the clergy was after all only human, and that as a result "greed for worldly things" was allowed to creep in. All reform to date had to his mind been insufficient. He evoked the Biblical dictum of giving to Caesar what was Caesar's but significantly also stressed the corollary of giving to God (and here he meant the church) what was God's. He lamented the "risky and unnecessary complications" that resulted from a conflict between church and state, and recommended making use of all members of

the clergy who were aware of the abuses that had crept in over the centuries. He found "nothing so holy, nothing so great, nothing so worthy as church, religion and priesthood" and blamed the papacy for lack of foresight in this matter. It therefore became the duty of the sovereign, Heinke concluded, "to come to the aid of the declining condition of the holy religion" by specifically prescribing the legitimate rights of church and state.¹

Given the strong neo-Jansenist strain in Heinke's preliminary report, it is surprising that Winter did not attempt to incorporate him into the Catholic reform movement which he catalogues.² Indeed, even Maass has noted that Heinke was strongly influenced by Gallican, Jansenist and Febronian ideas and always made a point of distinguishing between the curia and the pope as head of the church.³ In this respect he was much closer to Maria Theresia⁴ than to Kaunitz, and he fit well into the pietistic mainstream that characterized ecclesiastical reform in the decade of the 1750's. Significantly enough in his Staatsrat votum Binder, while conceding that Heinke's points were "indisputable", also emphasized that they were "already known to the more enlightened segment of the public."⁵ It was therefore the methodical thoroughness of the preliminary report rather than its original content that impressed the members of the Staatsrat and made Binder, Starhemberg and Kaunitz recommend that Heinke be encouraged to proceed to the drafting of his proposed major regulatory statute on church-state relations. But all three remained cautious, reserving any suggestions of what actually to do with Heinke's report until its completion.⁶

How satisfied with Heinke's orientation Kaunitz was remains open to question. Since in his view it was desirable that the public "be ever more enlightened" with such discussions,⁷ the work of Heinke was valuable in adding fuel to the fire. But if Heinke's report contributed momentum to the already strong statist movement, its focus was still not on what concerned Kaunitz most. Though he could write with a certain amount of satisfaction to his friend and ambassador to Venice, Count Giacomo Durazzo, that in religious affairs Austrian policy in Italy was pursuing "the path of reason and of reality,"⁸ matters were not that clear-cut in Austria proper. Sometime in the autumn of 1768 Kaunitz began to work on a more sweeping elaboration of his Giunta Economale instruction. In his papers are to be found several dozen drafts on various aspects of the religious problem, including a copy of the article on ecclesiastical discipline from the Encyclopédie, which it appears Kaunitz planned to use in either an anonymous pamphlet or a memorandum.⁹ By early 1769 these various drafts resulted in a memorandum entitled "Concerning the sovereign power of Roman Catholic princes with regard to the religion and the clergy."¹⁰ At approximately the same time Heinke's much more voluminous final report "On the reorganization of the relationship of church and state in Austria" was submitted to the empress.¹¹

Of the two, Heinke's memorandum was more theoretical than Kaunitz's and more thoroughly grounded in religion. It began with the premise that religion, the church and the priesthood were holy, proceeded to a discussion of the essence and purpose of the existence of church and state, and delineated their respective competences. Basically this memo

represented an expansion of the preliminary report in which Heinke emphasized the sovereign's rights over the persons and property of the clergy. Here his argument was enlarged and buttressed by extensive quotations from both scripture and canon law, elaborate and intricate citations of historical precedents, and widespread references to leading authorities such as Samuel Puffendorf and Hugo Grotius.¹²

The memorandum of Kaunitz was in sharp contrast to that of Heinke. Kaunitz expressed the conviction that his memo was the first "which can be hoped to be read by everyman" because it avoided the double error of being excessively prolix and of having recourse to "loathsome quotations". Indeed he justified yet another tract on this problem mainly on the grounds that it proceeded from a completely different premise than all other hitherto known material. To that point, Kaunitz noted (and it certainly applied to Heinke), proponents on either side of the argument had attempted to defend their respective rights by citing of laws and authorities. This, to Kaunitz's mind, was merely a variation on the devil quoting scripture to his purposes. "Since there is not a single principle which cannot be opposed by other different ones, this type of defence has resulted and has had to result in only all the more confusion, doubt, and uncertainty rather than enlightenment." His memorandum on the other hand, he maintained, had attempted to combine "irrefutable truths with accurate syllogisms, moderation and fairness."¹³

Kaunitz's principal focus was the sovereign power of the state. From this followed not only the theoretical proposition that the clergy, much as any other profession, is not to be regarded as anything more or

less than any other citizen of the state. In his view the state not only was entitled to but had as part of its responsibility the supervision of everyone who had been appointed or was permitted to hold any office in that state. This right and duty included the supervision of the clergy in view of the fact that the execution of its apostolic office determined to a large degree the fundamental mental attitudes of the citizens of the state. It therefore followed that the autonomy or independence of the clergy within the state was a myth, and any claims on the part of the church that conflicted with the imperatives of the state were invalid.¹⁴

The logical extension of this premise was a series of fundamental and practical reforms. Papal dignity could entail no more than it had in the patristic church and therefore all papal taxes could theoretically be cut off. But in view of the fact that papal dignity existed and that the Vatican had become a temporal court, Kaunitz wrote, fairness demanded that these taxes only be restricted not abolished. The remainder of his programme was less compromising. Sovereignty entailed the exclusive right of conferring benefices and of preventing pluralism, it forbade episcopal recourse to courts of appeal outside the state, and it could not permit the existence of ecclesiastical courts within the state. The state could not permit the church the right to grant asylum to anyone; ecclesiastical participation in the censorship of books was not a right and could only occur insofar as the state permitted it; separate schools for the clergy were incongruous with uniform education for all citizens, which was essential to any well-ordered state; an excessive number of holy days and fastdays were socially and economically counterproductive and therefore

had to be restricted. The great proliferation of contemplative orders was particularly harmful not only because it deprived the state of many thousands of potentially useful citizens, but also because of "the irreparable harm to future generations" caused by the vow of celibacy. Above all, Kaunitz concluded, the maintenance of peace and order demanded that the clergy in the exercise of its office not be permitted any kind of interference in the agenda of any other office in the state.¹⁵

This memorandum marks the culmination of Kaunitz's gradual radicalization and can be regarded as the final crystallization of his attitude towards the relationship between church and state. It is significant that Kaunitz not only asserted the rights of the state vis-à-vis the papacy but also against the clergy within the state. The position therefore transcends mere Gallicanism and is an extension of that consistent attack he launched on Haugwitz's Directorium or on the assertions of the Provincial Estates--namely, that the existence of autonomous or semi-autonomous corporations within the state could not be tolerated. In contrast to Heinke, Kaunitz's recommendations have a sharp practical bent, outlining a specific reform programme. Above all, the focus is completely secular, and for all its emphasis on the virtues of the early church and on moral values, it can by no stretch of the imagination fit into the pietistic neo-Jansenist Catholic reform movement.

This is of particular importance in view of Kaunitz's oft-repeated emphasis on the necessity of religion for the masses. It is only within the context of Kant's dictum that a public reaches enlightenment but slowly that the apparent contradictions in Kaunitz's attitude

toward religion are to be understood. His willingness to recommend waiving the printing costs for a Franciscan publication of the life of their docile founding saint,¹⁶ for example, or his endorsement of a popular catechism,¹⁷ basically were politically motivated. Religion was a convenient and effective teacher of civic virtues, and as such could be invaluable to the state. But there was no room for the austerity and asceticism of the powerful neo-Jansenist circle of Vienna in Kaunitz's view of the matter. In January 1754, for instance, the papal prohibition on the use of timpani and trumpets in church services was proclaimed in Austria. The ban had obviously had little impact as the Hofkanzler, Chotek, found occasion to complain about the continued use of these instruments in June 1767. When the matter was taken up by the Staatsrat Chotek found little sympathy with his position. Starhemberg discovered an Old Testament precedent for the use of such festive instruments and Kaunitz claimed that he never heard of the papal prohibition in the first place. Trumpets and timpanies, he insisted, served to enliven people, and their use could "cause no one any reasonable scruples." An imperial resolution by Joseph rather than the more pietistic Maria Theresa sanctioned their continued use.¹⁸

Indeed the position of Kaunitz was as sternly anti-Jansenist as it was anti-ultramontane. He realized, he once wrote, that "in this country one does not tolerate anything which is or has the appearance of being contrary to good morals,"¹⁹ but he did not remain passive in the face of any bleak restriction. Things that could not be changed could at least be directed, and this, as he confessed to his friend Calzabigi, was

his avowed policy.²⁰ It was thus perhaps after seeing Heinke's final report that he decided to submit his memorandum to the empress, but it is also possible that Kaunitz had not yet seen the report and that he had merely made up his mind that the time had come for action. In any case, on 10 February 1769 he submitted his memorandum to Maria Theresia. In his covering letter he decried all the "unjust and unreasonable" opposition to ecclesiastical reform, warned that the confrontation was growing more embittered every moment and even raised the spectre of schism. In a series of rhetorical questions he asked the empress if it was not time to take in hand the reform of all the abuses listed in his memorandum. He would consider his labours adequately rewarded, he concluded, if this problem "has the fortune to appear to the enlightened eyes of Your Majesty as clear and as decisive as it appears to mine."²¹

Kaunitz, however, was to be spared the full-scale confrontation with Clement XIII for which he had geared himself. Within two days he received word from Albani that the pope had died.²² It was hardly unwelcome news. Nor could Maria Theresia have grieved very much over this death. When Kaunitz tried to arrange an audience for the papal nuncio, she replied perfunctorily: "He should come tomorrow . . . at 10 o'clock; otherwise I'll go to Pressburg."²³ In subsequent audiences in March and April she expressed her preference for a new pope who was not from the Jesuit party. It would also be useful, she told Visconti, if the new pope had some knowledge of the world and showed some capacity to adapt himself to the spirit of the times in his conduct of affairs.²⁴ The Austrian case was bolstered when Joseph himself traveled to Rome and

appeared at the conclave in mid-March. The emperor remained officially aloof from the election but dropped strong hints to influential cardinals that a conciliatory pope on the order of Benedict XIV would be welcome.²⁵ But the intrigues surrounding the election of the new pope were not primarily occasioned by Austrian demands. The principal issue at stake was the Jesuit question, and the main intrigues were the result of the pressures the Bourbon courts brought to bear in order to elect a pope who would suppress the order. Such a man was the Franciscan First Consultor to the Congregation of the Inquisition, Cardinal Lorenzo Ganganelli, who was finally elected as Clement XIV after a three-month conclave.²⁶

Despite the fact that Kaunitz had ordered all the Austrian cardinals to co-operate with their colleagues who were acting on behalf of the Bourbons to elect a man acceptable to the Catholic courts,²⁷ he remained sceptical. Leopold of Tuscany's chamberlain and political adviser, actually Maria Theresia's personal agent in Tuscany, Count Franz Xaver Orsini-Rosenberg, had guided his young prince into an ecclesiastical policy similar to that of Vienna.²⁸ In February 1769 Rosenberg sent Kaunitz a series of proposed regulations sharply curtailing the rights of the church in Tuscany and asked for Austrian support. Kaunitz replied that it was "to be hoped that the new pope will be obliged to listen to reason," but that he really did not expect success. In a postscript he added:

Most of the articles in question are things inherent in the rights of sovereign power. As far as I am concerned, my dear friend, one should never embark on the useless course of asking for them, but implement them entirely without saying anything by seizing suitable opportunities

for the purpose. The more anyone enters into negotiations with these gentlemen, the priests, the more he can count in advance on having lost his case. . . .²⁹

Joseph, who met the new pope in May, found him "a man of spirit" but also "a great casuist". He thought him to be "the sworn enemy" of the Jesuits but beyond that could make no firm assessment. "It is to be hoped," Joseph wrote his mother, "that he will be more reasonable than his predecessor."³⁰ And Maria Theresia in a note to Kaunitz at the end of July still wondered "if the election was fortunate or unfortunate."³¹

No one waited to find out. The direction of Austrian ecclesiastical policy had already been determined and it was going to be carried out with or without papal cooperation. Though the proper ministry for the preparation and introduction of ecclesiastical legislation in Austria was the Hofkanzlei, the memorandum of Kaunitz obviously had its effects. In May 1769 Maria Theresia ordered the Austro-Bohemian chancellery to use the ecclesiastical legislation of Milan as a model for its own. Chotek complied by asking Kaunitz to send him the appropriate decrees and to keep him informed on any subsequent ones as a matter of course.³² The diversity of the ecclesiastical problem soon became apparent, and to cope with it piece by piece required the energies of more than one man. The outgrowth of this was the creation of a special commission to deal with the political dimensions of the ecclesiastical issue, the so-called consensus in publico-ecclesiasticis. The commission, headed by chancellor Chotek,³³ included both lay and clerical members: the then Hofkanzlei secret privy councillor, Kressel, the privy councillor and professor of natural law at the University of Vienna, Karl Anton von Martini, the two neo-Jansenist

canons, Simon Ambros von Stock (director of the university's faculty of theology) and Johann Peter Simen (director of the faculty of philosophy) and of course the all-important Heinke. The youngest chancellery court secretary, who had married one of Maria Theresia's personal servants, Franz Greiner, was made secretary of the commission.³⁴

Clement XIV, for his part, was quick with conciliatory overtures to Vienna. Only two days after his election he addressed a friendly personal letter to Joseph which, though basically a more courtesy note, left no doubt that the pope wanted to be able to count on Austrian benevolence.³⁵ Joseph replied that the best assurance of that was a full recognition on the part of the vicar of Christ "that the maintenance of the rights of the sovereign is the only and surest buttress of the religion." He told the pope that his views on church-state relations were exactly the same as his mother's, and that her piety and zeal were well known.³⁶ The lesson seemed not to have been lost on Clement. In the summer of 1769 he quickly issued a dispensation for the daughter of the empress, Maria Amalia, to marry the still excommunicated Ferdinand of Parma, and in September he sent a letter of indulgence for the court chapel that Maria Theresia had asked for, also with a warm personal message.³⁷ Kaunitz remained uncertain whether the pope's actions were the result of politics or "a genuinely positive disposition,"³⁸ but the net result was the same. He was therefore quick to recommend that the empress send the pope a personal note of thanks, which protocol did not demand, and utilize this "suitable opportunity" to win further concessions.³⁹

The real test, however, would come with the continuation of

confrontations with the Vatican begun in the reign of Clement XIII. The first of these concerned the disposition of the cassa salis funds in Bohemia. It will be recalled that it was precisely at this time that Albani had to be pushed into pressing the Austrian case. As Albani procrastinated yet again, not only the chancellery but the empress too became impatient and asked for Kaunitz's advice.⁴⁰ At this stage Kaunitz recommended an ultimatum with a one month time limit which the empress accepted.⁴¹ This time Albani, whom Kaunitz had described as "always more the cardinal than the minister,"⁴² had no option but to act, and on 20 March the papal nuncio was able to inform Kaunitz that the pope had acceded to Austrian demands.⁴³ Kaunitz, however, remained cautious and advised the empress that he considered an oral commitment insufficient and had demanded a written one instead.⁴⁴ When problems of interpretation came up in the summer of 1770 this precaution proved justified and Maria Theresia lauded Kaunitz's foresight.⁴⁵ By the end of August the agreement was formalized.⁴⁶ The state had carried its point.

Another matter of unfinished business concerned the creation of the uniate bishopric of Munkacs. The Hungarian Chancellery had done all that it could to establish this new bishopric, but in the final analysis a bishop still had to be confirmed by the pope. Kaunitz must have been favourably enough impressed with Clement XIV's policies to that stage, for when Maria Theresia turned to her state chancellor seeking advice on the Munkacs bishopric, he recommended she write the pope a personal letter because, as he put it, one could be confident that Clement had a reasonable attitude.⁴⁷ The problem from the point of view of the curia,

of course, was that if an independent uniate bishopric were pushed through, it would functionally be a metropolitanate. The curia was willing to concede a considerable extension of the autonomy of the extant uniate vicar at Munkacs but did not want to sever any part of the jurisdictional area of the Roman Catholic bishop of Erlau, under whose authority Munkacs remained. The empress remained determined to erect a separate bishopric, conceding only that the new uniate bishop could be made responsible to the primate of Hungary. Clement acceded to her wish and in January 1771 a new uniate bishop at Munkacs was appointed.⁴⁸

One of the principal points of the programme outlined by Kaunitz in his memorandum of 1769 was that the state could not allow the church to grant asylum to criminals. This was a widespread conviction and had received particularly strong backing from the Hofkanzlei for many years. Legislation limiting the asylum rights of the church was in fact promulgated as early as 1757, and in 1764 Maria Theresia even threatened to take the matter into her own hands if the Vatican did not come to some sort of agreement with her. But the matter did not seem to be of particularly great interest to the empress, for it was not pursued when it met with resistance in Rome.⁴⁹ It is quite possible that the impulse to re-open the debate came from Tuscany. The secretary of the duchy's state ecclesiastical committee (Regio Diritto), Giulio Rucellai, had long been such a strident statist that even Maria Theresia warned Leopold in 1765 that Rucellai went "too far", and hoped that her son would himself "not fall into the same error vis-à-vis the Roman curia."⁵⁰ Rosenberg seemed to have been very impressed with Rucellai, however, because it was the

latter who drafted the series of proposed regulations that were sent to Kaunitz in February 1769.⁵¹ One of Rucellai's biggest complaints was the church's right to grant asylum, and its possible that this matter was brought to the attention of Maria Theresia through Rosenberg.⁵²

In any case, on the last day of December 1768 she demanded information about church asylum from Chotek and solicited his advice on what changes the chancellery deemed necessary.⁵³ It was almost a year before the chancellery was able to supply the empress with the answers she wanted. The practice of granting sanctuary varied considerably from diocese to diocese, and it took some time to cull all the information. The recommendation that resulted from these investigations was that the empress abolish the asylum rights of the church. Whether to do so unilaterally or in consultation with Rome was left to the discretion of the empress.⁵⁴ The draft decree that had been prepared was then sent to Rosenberg in Tuscany, not by Kaunitz but by Maria Theresia's cabinet secretary, Baron von Püchler. Rosenberg suggested that lengthy justifications and explanations be left off the final decree and that it be issued unilaterally, merely informing the pope a few days in advance of its proclamation. It was only at this stage that all the relevant documents were passed on to Kaunitz through Binder.⁵⁵

In his report of 30 May 1770 Kaunitz strongly seconded both of Rosenberg's suggestions and personally revised the draft decree accordingly. Maria Theresia accepted the recommendations and the revised decree and ordered Kaunitz to send everything to Rosenberg "because of Tuscany."⁵⁶ Presumably concerted action was sought in the sanctuary

issue, and it was here that the matter bogged down. A unilateral abolition of the asylum right of the church had been undertaken in Tuscany the previous November,⁵⁷ and Rosenberg could only regard the documents sent by Kaunitz as matters of information, hence making no reply.⁵⁸ In the subsequent eighteen months nothing further happened, but this was not unusual. Maria Theresia had allowed a year to elapse before receiving the reply to her original request for information from Chotek, and had waited almost eighteen months before she became impatient about the progress on the cassa salis negotiations. In this case the matter was complicated by the low priority the empress clearly gave it. On 17 December 1772 she finally wrote Kaunitz asking how the introduction of asylum legislation was progressing and what still had to be done in the matter. Kaunitz replied three days later that he had received no instructions beyond the order to send everything to Rosenberg and therefore awaited further orders.⁵⁹

Again the matter got overwhelmed by other priorities. The climax of the great famine, the ministerial shuffles, the agrarian problem and the Polish crisis overshadowed the issue of ecclesiastical sanctuary. Kaunitz's report was set aside and finally forgotten. In the spring of 1775 a specific instance of two priests giving sanctuary to an escaped thief caused the chancellery to raise the matter again with the empress.⁶⁰ She in turn sent the chancellery report to Kaunitz with a note that made clear her confusion on the matter. In enclosing the report, she wrote, she wanted to know how negotiations with the papacy were progressing on the asylum question.⁶¹ Kaunitz reminded her

that she had endorsed the idea of issuing the decree unilaterally and had accordingly accepted his revised draft of 1770. He noted that he had expressly asked for specific instructions in 1772, but had never received any and that he had therefore made no overtures to Rome on the sanctuary issue. He again enclosed his revised decree and awaited her orders.⁶² This time his original recommendations were implemented and the decree was officially promulgated on 15 September 1775.⁶³

A second point in Kaunitz's reform programme was the reduction of the number of holy days and fastdays. This too was an area in which Kaunitz was not alone. Indeed, the problem had been perceived as early as 1753 when a concession was exacted from Benedict XIV by which twenty-four holy days were declared half holy days. This meant that the attendance of mass was still obligatory, but that work was to be permitted in the second half of the day as on any other day.⁶⁴ In practice however, these half holy days proved unworkable and the pressure to abolish them soon increased. In the event it was to be the first problem to which the consensus in publico-ecclesiasticis was to address itself. It was probably through the offices of Martini that the consensus turned to a major memorandum on the subject by Martini's elder colleague at the university, Paul Joseph von Riegger, who specialized in canon law. Riegger not only recommended the abolition of all half holy days but a sizeable reduction of the remaining full holy days as well.⁶⁵ The consensus endorsed this view and Chotek accordingly presented it to Maria Theresia on 19 March 1770. The empress remained doubtful about so vast an innovation and submitted the matter to the Staatsrat for consideration.⁶⁶

Again Kaunitz was the last to submit his votum. Borié had suggested that an abolition of half holy days was sufficient and that demanding a further reduction of full holy days was excessive. The rest of the Staatsrat agreed, and so at first did Kaunitz. Upon reflection, however, he changed his mind. The original draft of his votum was rejected and he drew up a new one because, as he wrote, "it is likely that, given the disposition of the present pope, something more can be had just as easily as something less." He insisted that the necessity of a further reduction was "beyond all doubt", and he advocated the "complete abolition of all fast days" or, at the very least, their transference to the Saturdays of Advent as Gebler had suggested.⁶⁷ Four days later the empress decided to follow the advice of Borié and Gebler rather than that of Kaunitz. Her foreign minister, she ordered, was to make representations at Rome only for the abolition of half holy days and the transference of fast days to Advent Saturdays.⁶⁸

Kaunitz remained undaunted. He persisted in pressing his views orally and within six weeks the empress gave way. On 14 July he was able to present her with a draft personal note to the pope not only demanding the abolition of all half holy days but a further reduction of the remaining full ones as well. He had little doubt that the pope would accede to these demands, he said, but he placed considerable emphasis on the way the matter should be initiated in Rome. He suggested that the pope's probable disposition towards such reform be felt out first and only then for the letter to be sent.⁶⁹ The empress agreed, but it was clear that such a delicate matter could not be entrusted to Albani. Instead an

Austrian agent in Rome by the name of Francesco Brunati was entrusted with the task. Five weeks later Kaunitz was able to report that Brunati had received a favourable response from the pope. Now, however, it was the empress that remained sceptical. "Results will have to prove it," she wrote to Kaunitz.⁷⁰

This scepticism too proved justified. When Brunati tried to get a firm commitment from the pope, he was first evaded⁷¹ and after almost two months finally was told that the Vatican could not oblige on the abolition of quite as many extra full holy days as demanded, nor agree to exactly the same number for Milan as for Austria proper. To Kaunitz the pope was merely trying to play politics, and he remained convinced that a firm stand would bring total compliance. Maria Theresia, however, wanted to give the pope more time. She preferred, she said, to have the reduction uniformly introduced throughout Germany.⁷² Again Kaunitz persisted in his point of view. Rather than wait for the decisions of other princes, Kaunitz wrote, the empress should proceed without delay and act as an example to the other princes. Not only would such a course of action be more in keeping with the imperial dignity, it was more likely to produce practical results than protracted talks ever could.⁷³

Maria Theresia kept Kaunitz's report for almost a month before replying. In the meantime, however, she held an audience with Visconti. She had compromised on a few days, she later reported to Kaunitz, but withal remained firm in her position. The finalization of the agreement was to be handled by Kaunitz, but she wanted to be sure that the measures

took effect by Easter 1771.⁷⁴ Almost immediately Kaunitz was obliged to report that the finalization was not proceeding quite as smoothly as was hoped, particularly on the issue of uniformity with Milan.⁷⁵ Though the empress expressed concern that the matter not be delayed by haggling over details,⁷⁶ it was still not until 6 August that Kaunitz was finally able to report the finalization of the agreement.⁷⁷

It is interesting to note in the implementation of the decree, finally, how thoroughly statist the premises of the Austrian government had become. There were a number of parishes in the border areas of Austria that were in fact centered outside the monarchy and others that centered in Austria but extended beyond its borders. In these circumstances, Kaunitz recommended, the line of the applicability of the new law was to be the Austrian border. All areas within it, whether parts of foreign parishes or not, were to be subject to the new law; all parts outside of it could do as they wished. The empress accepted these guidelines and had Kaunitz himself draft the appropriate order.⁷⁸ Within two years this concept had become such a firm principle that a complete separation of all domestic dioceses from the jurisdiction of foreign bishops was undertaken. Maria Theresia herself had come to recognize this as "a very important defect in our domestic governmental structure," and charged Kaunitz to initiate the appropriate negotiations with the Vatican.⁷⁹

These steps indicate a thorough acceptance of the principle so strongly asserted by Kaunitz that it was the right of the state to mould and shape ecclesiastical administration to suit its own needs. Thus, for

example, when the politics of limiting Hungarian ambitions demanded the severing of the two Transylvanian dioceses of Hermannstadt (Sibiu) and Kronstadt (Braşov or Orasul Stalin) from the jurisdictional control of the Hungarian archbishop of Gran (Esztergom) and their integration in the geographically more logical and politically more suitable archbishopric of Transylvania, it was affirmed that while the pope could be allowed input in the purely spiritual side of the matter the fundamental objective was not to be questioned.⁸⁰ When the monastic orders of Bohemia complained about lay collection and administration of intercalary revenues, Kaunitz assured Maria Theresia that she was "certainly entitled to hire lay administrators." Why should one have doubts, he asked rhetorically, about decreeing what was necessary and what would in the end in any case have to be decreed.⁸¹ The empress' order unhesitatingly affirmed this assertion.⁸²

But while the firm statist demands articulated by Kaunitz in his memorandum of 1769 found easy acceptance with the empress, he was far from being the narrow-minded hypocritical statist blind to all ecclesiastical rights and willing to exploit every success to initiate yet further statist incursions into church affairs that Maass has painted. When the abbey of Salmansweiler came into a jurisdictional dispute with the local bishop of Constance, it attempted to exploit the statist tendencies of the day by appealing to Joseph to intervene. The Hofkanzlei was quick to assure the emperor that the bishop of Constance was encroaching on his sovereign rights.⁸³ When Joseph turned to Kaunitz for advice, however, the latter did not support the chancellery. Since this was basically an

ecclesiastical dispute, he noted, the best that could be done for the abbey was that Albani could be instructed to plead its case in Rome.⁸⁴ When this "careful advice", as Maria Theresia called it, was implemented, the abbot continued to press his case.⁸⁵ When the case was lost, he appealed again to the emperor, who, in turn, again turned to Kaunitz.⁸⁶ He suggested that the abbot could be told that the emperor was doing the best that he could and that the state was even prepared to act as mediator. But insofar as the dispute concerned merely spiritual canonic and not temporal laws, only the curia was in any position to make a final judgement. "I find the proposal faultless," the empress wrote, thereby ending the matter.⁸⁷

Indeed, Kaunitz's fairness extended even to individual clerics who found themselves opposing what the chancellor would have called the just rights of the state. During 1775 it was decided to remove the ecclesiastical town of Fünfkirchen (Pécs) from the control of the local bishop and raise it to the status of a royal free city. The bishop had agreed to this alienation of territory on condition that the pope did so and therefore invoked a papal decision. When this proved negative, the Hungarian Chancellery became incensed and demanded the immediate punishment of the bishop for having dared to have recourse to Rome.⁸⁸ Kaunitz could not agree. He vigorously defended the bishop on the grounds that no laws had been broken. The bishop had merely acted in accordance with an episcopal oath introduced during the papacy of Clement VIII and could not be punished for refusing to break his oath. Kaunitz blamed the system, not the man. As long as clerical education was left to "curialists"

and as long as bishops were permitted to take such an oath "under the very eyes of the sovereign," it would be unjust to punish this particular bishop. He suggested instead that the absolute power of the state be invoked and that the change be instituted without consulting either the bishop or the pope.⁸⁹ With this recommendation Kaunitz achieved a double effect. While Fünfkirchen was raised to a royal free city, the bishop was spared a reprimand.⁹⁰ Soon thereafter a complete investigation of clerical education was ordered with the aim of eliminating the teaching of all doctrines of papal power in Austria. Episcopal oaths to the papacy were also to be investigated "so that everything that could infringe too closely on the true rights of the sovereign can in future be avoided."⁹¹

The attempt by the state to create ecclesiastical jurisdictional boundaries that coincided with the political ones encountered further obstacles with the annexation of Galicia. The uniate bishop of Lemberg was the co-adjutor of the metropolitan of Kiev, but with the partition the bishop feared the loss of his position. He appealed to Vienna noting that since the metropolitan of Kiev had been expelled from the city when it was annexed by Russia and had thereafter lived in the Polish bishoprics still under his authority, the Austrian government should come to an agreement with Warsaw making Lemberg the new permanent seat of the metropolitan, with future candidates chosen alternately from Polish and Austrian nominees. In reporting this plan to the empress Kaunitz could not endorse it. In view of the Austrian policy of severing all Galician dioceses from the jurisdiction of Polish bishops, he did not see how the

Poles would be amenable to such an agreement. He recommended instead the revival of the long extinct metropolitanate of Halicz and the complete severance of it from the metropolitanate of Kiev. In time all uniate bishoprics of the monarchy could be subordinated to this new metropolitanate--a rationalization of the ecclesiastical administration that in Kaunitz's words could mean "various important benefits in political considerations." In this matter, however, Kaunitz felt the government of Vienna could take its time. For the moment it was merely important to cultivate the bishop of Lemberg, who was also bishop of Halicz and Kamenez and whose brother was bishop of Przemyśl, since it was he who could make ecclesiastical reform in Galicia facile or difficult. To this end the bishop was to be sent an assuring but dilatory answer and compensated for the revenues lost from those diocese formerly under his control but now still in Poland. Not only was this suggestion accepted, but Maria Theresia also ordered that "serious consideration" be given to the plan of reviving the metropolitanate of Halicz.⁹² It was not until 1808 that the plan was in fact put into effect.⁹³

For much the same reason that Kaunitz advocated the reduction of holy days, he was also opposed to pilgrimages and processions. In 1767 he had been cautious when a drastic reduction of church processions and religious pilgrimages had been advocated by Stupan and had recommended a Hofkanzlei investigation.⁹⁴ In accordance with the empress' orders this had taken place, and by March 1769 the chancellery was ready with its report.⁹⁵ Its recommendations were those of Stupan, and as the matter was then submitted to the Staatsrat for discussion, Kaunitz threw his

former caution to the wind. He now characterized excessive pilgrimages and processions as "very harmful" and recommended that pilgrimages to foreign countries be forbidden, that all pilgrimages that required an overnight stay even within the country also be forbidden, that processions be abolished on most holy days⁹⁶ and that others, such as the famous Corpus Christi processions, be transferred to Sundays.⁹⁷ Despite the general support for this position, however, the empress remained unconvinced. She reflected on the matter for over six months and finally ordered to let it be until further notice.⁹⁸ Even when the consensus in publico-ecclesiasticis turned its attention to the problem six months later and again pressed for a reduction of processions and pilgrimages, the empress demurred. She wanted to consult further opinions before making any decisions, and for the present only conceded some limitation on excessive pilgrimages to a particular shrine, Mariazell.⁹⁹

This underscores an important point. Kaunitz was certainly not always successful in pushing his point of view through, and while in some cases he would persist, in others he would not. Hence it was not gratuitous anti-clericalism that motivated Kaunitz, but rather the political imperatives of the state as he understood them. These were clearly ordered by priorities. Matters such as the reduction of pilgrimages and processions invariably took second place to more vital issues. Many enlightened reformers, but particularly Joseph II, were often unable to distinguish between the essential and the unessential and more times than not were required to abandon the substance for the shadow. Not so

Kaunitz. Fundamentals were pursued with determination; secondary considerations were put off for more suitable occasions.

CHAPTER VIII

MONKS, NUNS AND JESUITS

One objective that was considered fundamental concerned monastic and other ecclesiastical orders. Kaunitz was such a determined opponent of monastic orders that his fears often bordered on paranoia. In his memorandum of February 1769 he had denounced them as an invention of the third century, the cause of the corruption of the patristic church, and he had squarely laid at their door the responsibility for the Reformation.¹ He disliked and distrusted monastic orders to the point where he would believe almost any derogatory rumour about them. For example, he accepted without question the assertion of the bishop of Lemberg that his position was being undermined by the subversive activities of Basilian monks.² And when, after the reduction of holy days had been decreed, a parish priest by the name of Kruppa secretly reported to Kaunitz that monastic orders were spreading dissatisfaction among the people about the decree, even in their very confessionals, he pressed for immediate action. "Although this report is not proven," he wrote, "the observation that the monks lose various benefits because of the reduction of offerings and donations [that result from the decree] gives it a degree of probability." Experience taught, Kaunitz maintained, to what extent monks were often motivated by avarice. Such activities, he noted, had to be nipped in the bud and all transgressors of this legislation had to be "most severely punished." He even went so far as to recommend that police authorities investigate not only what opinions were expressed from the pulpit but in

the confessional as well.³ When an investigation revealed that Kruppa's accusations had been groundless, Kaunitz recommended that the matter not be pursued further. Above all he successfully defended Kruppa against libel charges, saying that the man's actions were the result "not of any spiteful or malicious intent but merely of what seems to be an over-zealous desire to serve."⁴

It can come as no surprise, therefore, that when the consensus in publico-ecclesiasticis turned its attention to problems associated with monastic orders, Kaunitz would use his first opportunity to press for the reduction and even elimination of monasticism. Already in its second sitting the consensus addressed itself to this situation and presented a report recommending the reduction of monastic clergy on 6 May 1770. The assertions of the consensus, however, met with scepticism in the Staatsrat where severe doubts were expressed that the number of monastic clerics in Austria was excessive. Kaunitz alone felt otherwise. He began from the populationist premise that the vow of celibacy was a serious threat to "the propagation of the human race" and added that the problem was aggravated because often the most talented people entered monasteries, thereby removing themselves from useful social functions. He attacked the social and economic privileges of monastic orders and in particular their possessions in mortmain. The very existence of monastic orders, Kaunitz maintained, was "highly detrimental" to the state, adding that "their existence can only be justified by necessity." Under these circumstances "the supreme law of public welfare demands the reduction and limitation of this class of citizen as much as possible." He insisted that such a

reduction would not harm the cause of religion by emphasizing the exemplary purity of the early church when no monastic orders existed, and recommended as a first step that the state force all monasteries to adhere strictly to their original charters, most of which, particularly with reference to numbers, had long been transgressed.⁵

Kaunitz was persuasive enough that the entire matter was ordered to be re-circulated in the Staatsrat. But his fellow council members failed to be convinced and Kaunitz saw himself forced to defend his propositions point by point in great detail.⁶ In the meantime the consensus had come up with its first practical suggestion to reduce the number of monastic clergy. Since monastic vows were often taken as early as the age of sixteen, many people became monks and nuns before being fully aware of the ramifications of such a step. The consensus therefore recommended the age for permitting entry into a monastery or convent be set at twenty-one and the age at which the final vows were to be permitted at twenty-two. Young girls who had been reared and educated in convents were to be required to live in the world at large for at least a year before being permitted such a commitment.⁷ The report was submitted to the Staatsrat even while the very principle of reducing orders was still under debate, and while this proposal generally found greater favour with council members,⁸ Kaunitz proved to be even more radical. He insisted that the state should unilaterally legislate the age at which entry was to be permitted at twenty-four and the age of final vows at thirty.⁹

It was not without reason, however, that Kaunitz began to sense a certain degree of isolation in his determined opposition to monasticism.

Within the consensus itself it seems to have been Heinke who supplied the most driving impulse in this matter, and Kaunitz was quick to laud his activities. He strongly recommended that the consensus be given every sign of royal satisfaction and that Heinke in particular be encouraged and stimulated to continue in his zeal.¹⁰ But if he were to succeed in his policies, Kaunitz needed more powerful help than that of Heinke and the consensus. On 4 July 1770 he turned to Joseph. It will be recalled that Joseph had recommended a reduction in the number of monastic clergy and the setting of a minimum age for admission to an order as early as 1765, and that at that time Kaunitz had remained unconvinced.¹¹ Now it was Kaunitz who turned to the emperor for support in the pursuit of both these ends. He pointed out to Joseph how much resistance such policies were likely to encounter, but maintained that this was a very vital first step in this "important and delicate matter". Under such circumstances the emperor's "strongest support" was imperative.¹²

Whether or not Joseph in fact gave Kaunitz his "strongest support" is uncertain. But despite Kaunitz's isolation in the Staatsrat his opinions remained weighty enough for this matter too to be recirculated in the council and for his opinions to prevail at least in part. The imperial resolution of 18 August accepted the age of entry recommendation of the consensus but extended the age of final vows to twenty-four.¹³ It was not without reluctance that Maria Theresia officially issued the appropriate decree unilaterally on 17 October, for she would have preferred to have consulted the pope in the matter.¹⁴ Joseph at this point clearly did not fail Kaunitz, for Blümegen was ordered at about the same time to

send the emperor copies of all Staatsrat resolutions in ecclesiastical matters. Blümegen complied only two days after the official proclamation of the age limit decree.¹⁵

Encouraged by this success, the consensus attempted to go one step further. On 28 November it recommended that the decree of 17 October be made retroactive and that all novices of monastic orders under the age of twenty-four who had taken their vows before the newly-enacted minimum age, not be permitted to remain at a monastery. When the matter was submitted to the Staatsrat on 1 December its response was again cautious. And again Kaunitz proved the exception. He agreed completely with the consensus, he wrote, and considered the incongruity with "the clear letter of the barely released law" very hazardous.¹⁶ But again matters seemed to be moving too fast for the empress. The proposal was left without any final decision,¹⁷ and a few weeks later it was finally dropped.¹⁸

If matters were moving a bit too fast for Maria Theresia, it can easily be imagined how the decree of 17 October affected the Vatican. Clement XIV had decided that in future he would forego the use of his nuncio in Vienna in really serious matters and appeal to Kaunitz personally.¹⁹ In two letters dated 20 February 1771, Clement wrote to both Kaunitz and Maria Theresia protesting the new legislation and claiming that it would result in a dearth of pastoral care for the subjects of the monarchy. He proposed that some sort of compromise solution be found which would be less detrimental to the welfare of monastic clergy.²⁰ These letters reached Vienna at the beginning of March and were submitted

to the empress by Kaunitz on the ninth. He noted that a papal protest was to be expected, dismissed its validity and recommended the empress consult the Staatsrat. Maria Theresia, however, wished to meet the pope half way and indicated that she wanted negotiations opened with Rome.²¹

Kaunitz now knew that the decree was in danger of severe modification and perhaps even complete repeal. In the Staatsrat he reiterated his position, expressed in July 1770, that the matter was of no concern to the Vatican. But since the pope was now in fact involved--something which he had wanted to avoid--it was necessary to face the problem as it was, not linger on what could have been. He suggested that he himself be authorized to tell the nuncio that the state could tolerate no interference with its rights, and that while Vienna was prepared to allow the pope a part in the matter, it was an "absolute necessity" that the end result would be the same.²² The Staatsrat generally agreed, defending its position that the age limit was imperative,²³ but the empress remained unconvinced, refusing to authorize the recommended declaration to the nuncio.²⁴

Having failed to move the empress through the Staatsrat, Kaunitz now proceeded to draft the letter to the pope that the empress had requested.²⁵ His draft letters naturally tried to cling tenaciously to his previous position. He dismissed the pope's fears that the decree portended a dearth of clergy, emphasized that for several centuries there had been no monastic orders at all, and insisted that the age limit was not negotiable--it was merely wished that the pope endorse it. Though the empress finally accepted the principle, she objected strongly to the

assertive and strident tone in which Kaunitz had couched the reply. "This is a polite letter, not a manifesto," she noted in the marginalia, and ordered a new draft prepared.²⁶ Stung by the reproach, Kaunitz included a lengthy defence of his first draft along with the second. He wondered how after thirty years of loyal service the empress could ever think him capable of laying anything improper before her or doubt his unabated zeal for her service and dignity. As usual, the empress met Kaunitz's reproach with a reproach of her own. That a thirty-year acquaintance with her could "give him no better a notion and trust" than this hurt her in the extreme. She would not have expected it from the least of her servants, and certainly not from him, her first servant and best friend. But she conceded that she should not have doubted him, and asked him to forget the whole thing. Under pressure from Joseph the decree was left untouched.²⁷

As the excessive numbers of monastic clergy were combatted by setting a minimum age for monastic vows, so monastic possessions in mortmain were combatted by severely restricting acquisitional rights. This problem was addressed by the consensus in its seventh protocol, dated 16 November 1770, in which a sharp curtailment of what monastic aspirants could take with them or leave to their order when they joined was recommended. The consensus of the Staatsrat was that all monastic candidates be limited to 1,500 fl. in what they could bring to their order. Again Kaunitz was less generous and even found himself disagreeing with his old friend Binder. In his opinion, "monks and monasteries must be completely debarred from all future acquisitions."²⁸ But while the

imperial resolution rejected Kaunitz's radical solution and limited acquisitional rights to 1,500 fl. per candidate,²⁹ the matter did not end there.

Within the consensus itself Martini also disagreed with the 1,500 fl. maximum that was accepted and submitted a minority report in which he advocated the foundation of a poverty relief-fund into which all goods of monastic candidates should be given. Such a plan would severely limit monastic cash reserves and make future mortmain acquisitions extremely difficult if not impossible.³⁰ This plan found great favour with Joseph who also rejected the 1,500 fl. maximum.³¹ Indeed, the emperor had by this time become so militant in the statist assertions of his ecclesiastical policy that Kaunitz found it increasingly unnecessary to participate in Staatsrat debates over consensus reports. Kaunitz saw his programme fulfilled as growingly severe anti-monastic legislation followed at a steady pace until the dramatic expulsions in the personal reign of Joseph II.³² Kaunitz concentrated in the meantime on the limitation of size and even partial secularization of the monastic houses of Milan, which he pressed with ever more success during the subsequent months.³³ By 1773, when a new and dramatic ecclesiastical problem presented itself, the state's victory over monastic orders had already been won.

The ecclesiastical issue which was to overshadow all others in the year 1773 was the suppression of the Society of Jesus. It was not an unexpected event and had attracted the attention of European cabinets for at least fifteen years.³⁴ Kaunitz, it will be recalled, had

considered recommending that the empress make common cause with the other major Catholic courts in demanding the abolition of the Jesuits in his famous memorandum of January 1768. But in the event he had decided against this suggestion and did not even mention the Jesuits in his final report. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note what recommendations he had in fact thought to make, since these throw an important light on Kaunitz's attitude to the whole question. Since the order seemed to be abolished in one country after another and since there seemed little prospect that this was not going to continue in the remaining countries such as Poland, he wrote, making common cause would only make what seemed inevitable in any case happen with fewer vexations. But he could not advise, Kaunitz hastened to add, following the example of other states and expelling all Jesuits from the country. He suggested making other use of "so many innocent and useful subjects," and insisted that their funds be channelled into "pious causes" such as education.³⁵

Since these recommendations were deemed inappropriate or untimely by Kaunitz and therefore never submitted, they can be considered his most extreme position in the Jesuit question. Of course Kaunitz had never been a friend of the Jesuits, but he also did not seem to share the ruthless and bitter hatred of them that characterized some of the neo-Jansenist ecclesiastical reformers. Joseph's position, as reported to his brother Leopold and proof-read by Kaunitz himself, that Austria wished to avoid a commitment on the Jesuit question one way or the other because it did not have "sufficient reason to wish their destruction,"³⁶ was the policy Kaunitz pursued as well. In this instance he was swayed

only by reasons of state. And the one reason of state that could impel Austria to make common cause with the Bourbon courts in demanding the abolition of the order, was to reinforce her alliance with them.

Both the Habsburgs and the Bourbons were aware of this, and the pressure from the latter to join the anti-Jesuit front increased, especially after the election of Clement XIV. The occasion of the marriage negotiations between the Dauphin and Marie Antoinette provided a particularly apt lever for the Bourbon courts. Choiseul appealed personally to the emperor, and Charles III of Spain to the empress through the medium of their respective ambassadors in Paris, Counts Fuentes and Mercy-Argenteau. But these appeals were to go for naught. Joseph replied on 15 January 1770:

With respect to the Jesuits, and your plan for their suppression, you have my perfect approbation. You must not reckon much on my mother. . . . However, Kaunitz is your friend; he can effect everything with the empress. With regard to their suppression, he is of your and the Marquis of Pombal's party; and he is a man who leaves nothing half done.³⁷

Since the emperor did not follow these assurances with any concrete actions, they must be regarded primarily within the context of the marriage negotiations and cannot be construed as firm a statement of policy as the report to his brother. Furthermore, just how much Kaunitz was prepared to "effect" with the empress becomes clear when we examine the reply that Mercy was instructed to give Fuentes for Charles III. The empress would be more than pleased, it read, to endorse such an abolition if the pope wished it, but would not take the initiative herself.³⁸ Even a personal appeal by Choiseul to Kaunitz misfired. He regretted, he

wrote, but Austria could not make common cause with the Bourbon courts in demanding the abolition of the Jesuits from the pope.³⁹ Indeed, the fable that Kaunitz persistently hounded the Jesuits with repeated reports of their corruption and duplicity to Maria Theresia has been dismissed even by Jesuit apologists.⁴⁰

Since Austria clearly rejected any role for herself in demanding the abolition of the Society, and since the pope repeatedly insisted that he could not take the initiative unless there was a consensus to do so among all the Catholic powers,⁴¹ the situation had all the makings of a stalemate. It was only the energetic persistence of Charles III of Spain, who was the soul of the abolitionist movement, that was able to break this seemingly vicious circle. In September 1772 the Spanish ambassador was instructed to present the pope with a draft patent for the abolition of the order and to accompany it with a threat of schism. After heated five-month negotiations the ambassador was finally able to send his king a draft of a papal bull ordering the abolition if the Society of Jesus.⁴² No sooner was Charles in possession of this draft than he sent it to Maria Theresia, reminding her that she had agreed to support the abolition of the initiative came from the papacy.⁴³

Austrian concerns, however, were not focused on the abolition but on the consequences of the abolition. The action had been expected for at least five years,⁴⁴ and in his report on the reception of Charles III's missive, Kaunitz treated what was clearly the main concern of the king almost casually. Nothing had happened since 1770, he noted, "which would require us to change our opinions on the matter." Just as

Austria would do nothing to undermine the order, it would not stand in the way of abolition. Kaunitz's main concern was an article in the draft bull which gave the papacy some rights to the property of the Jesuits. This Kaunitz could never accept. He insisted that if the order were abolished, all its property had to revert to the state and indicated that this was not a matter open to question.⁴⁵ Incorporating these sentiments into a draft reply to Charles III, Kaunitz asked Maria Theresia not to make any "change or addition." The empress complied and signed the formal reply the same evening.⁴⁶ From that moment on the abolition itself was regarded as a fait accompli and all subsequent discussions concerned themselves with ex-Jesuits and their property.

Joseph above all wasted no time. On 3 April, before the answer to Charles III was even sent off, he submitted a memorandum to his mother which began from the premise that there was no longer any question about whether the Society would continue to exist. His main focus of attention was on the effects the abolition would have on the educational system which the Jesuits had largely monopolized and on how to guarantee a secure transfer of Jesuit property to the state. On the former problem he felt that the Jesuits should continue to be permitted to fulfill their teaching functions at least while the entire educational system was reviewed. On the property problem he expressed concern that members of the order might attempt to smuggle funds out of the country and recommended a commission to control and supervise the transfer of goods and funds to the state. He also felt that the state should have a detailed plan on what to do with Jesuit funds and that the whole prospect of abolition

should be kept secret until the state was ready with its plans.⁴⁷ Orally Joseph requested that the empress send his memorandum to Kaunitz and solicit his opinions. She did so without comment of her own, except that she also felt the matter should be kept secret for at least a month.⁴⁸

Kaunitz by and large endorsed Joseph's recommendations, though he felt that the drawing up of a specific plan on what to do with Jesuit property could be left to a commission constituted to handle the matter. His main point was to underscore the state's rights over the property of the clergy and to this end enclosed his theoretical observations on the subject which he had drawn up in preparation for his memorandum of February 1769.⁴⁹ Both Joseph's and Kaunitz's reflections were then referred to Kressel, a member of the consensus in publico-ecclesiasticis. Kressel so effectively endorsed and expanded on the Joseph-Kaunitz position,⁵⁰ that Kaunitz expressed his hearty agreement with everything Kressel had said and even concurred with those parts of Kressel's memorandum that modified his own.⁵¹ This was a flattering recommendation, and it can therefore be no surprise that when the empress set up a special commission to deal with all the problems resulting from the imminent abolition of the Jesuits, Kressel was made its chairman.

Kressel's Jesuit commission, which included Martini, Greiner, and the empress' confessor, Father Ignaz Müller,⁵² consisted not only of men who enjoyed the empress' particular trust, as Arneth has pointed out,⁵³ but also, as Duhr has noted, of men in the mainstream of the neo-Jansenist reform movement.⁵⁴ The commission was instructed to address itself to several questions: whether the Jesuits could still be used as

teachers after abolition; how other teachers could be procured to replace them; but above all, how to acquire accurate information on Jesuit property and how to subsequently collect, administer and utilize it.⁵⁵ Despite Joseph's incessant complaints that matters were not moving fast enough and that one would end up being served "the mustard after the dinner,"⁵⁶ his fears were misplaced. By the time Clement XIV officially signed the bull Dominus ac Redemptor which abolished the Society of Jesus on 21 July 1773, and then after a brief misunderstanding personally assured Maria Theresia that ex-Jesuit property rightfully fell to the state,⁵⁷ the Jesuit Commission had already submitted several reports which in accordance with its instructions had taken this principle for granted.⁵⁸

From the very beginning the neo-Jansenist orientation of the Jesuit Commission revealed itself in the board's protocols, and as a result, Kaunitz quickly found himself in disagreement with it. A commission protocol of 9 June was submitted to Kaunitz for comment at about the same time that he was being asked his opinions on the worsening agrarian problem and his great conflict with Joseph was reaching its climax. Despite these other involvements the recommendations of the Jesuit Commission were obviously a matter of some importance to him. While submitting his opinions on the agrarian issue he asked for a little more time to draft those on the Jesuit question.⁵⁹ Three days later this report too was ready. The commission had concentrated mainly on the consequences that the abolition of the Jesuits would have on the educational system and to what extent ex-Jesuits could still be employed in it. With the first recommendation that ex-Jesuits be excluded from the teaching

of all theology and ecclesiastical history, Kaunitz was in full agreement, insisting that history had to be taught "purely from genuine sources and without ideological prejudices." He also agreed with the commission that if any teaching post fell vacant it should be opened to applicants by means of a competitive examination. Finally he agreed that monastic orders could be relocated in ex-Jesuit houses if necessary, but added that under such circumstances the old monastic house had to be surrendered to the state "because otherwise one would in a very short time have two instead of one monkish cloister."⁶⁰

But agreement stopped when the commission recommended that chairs of theology, ethics and metaphysics vacated by Jesuits could be filled by other monastic orders. Here Kaunitz's bitter dislike of monks came fully to the surface. Replacing one order, such as the Jesuits, by another which shared the corruption but not the learning of the former, he wrote, "would truly be a contradiction." In his view a monk, no matter how educated, how perspicacious, or how convinced of "genuine principles" of statism, neither could nor would ever oppose the fundamental esprit of his order. Recourse had to be sought in secular priests who did not share any monkish esprit de corps, any "suspicious connection" with a superior in a foreign country, or any interest opposed to the general welfare of the state. A second recommendation that Kaunitz violently opposed was the employment of a secular eating-house keeper in the residences of these new clerical teachers in order to pressure them into soliciting lunch invitations from friends, relatives and parents of students, thereby saving the state considerable meal expenses. "I do not

understand how it was possible for the commission to overlook, because of the savings that lunch would entail, the highly evil consequences that would necessarily follow," he wrote in exasperation. Making teachers so dependent on social intercourse was in his view the surest way of making them neglect their studies and turning them into "vagabonds and parasites."⁶¹

Kressel wormed out of the second accusation by insisting the commission had only meant to suggest that occasional social intercourse was good for academics, but he met Kaunitz head-on in the contention over monks. He insisted that there were just not enough qualified secular priests to do the required job, but there were plenty of monks, particularly Augustinians, who did not share the "slippery morality" of the Jesuits. He cited specific cases of monastic clergy that could not be accused of a monkish esprit de corps, accused Kaunitz of plainly not being in possession of all the facts and concluded that the use of monastic orders in these posts was absolutely imperative at least until appropriate secular priests could be trained.⁶² Rather than putting an end to the debate, Kressel's note had the effect of inciting Kaunitz to even harsher anti-monastic remarks.

The lunch debate was terminated when Kaunitz said he had no objections to teachers being invited out occasionally, as long as it did not grow into a common practise. On the problem of monks he made a similar concession: the employment of secular priests had to be the rule; the use of monks the exception resorted to "only in cases of most extreme need." But Kaunitz still would not concede that such a need

existed. If the empress accepted his recommendation to found a theological boarding school, it was only a matter of eight vacant posts to be filled. Three posts were concerned purely with Latin, Greek and Hebrew languages and could be filled by ex-Jesuits without contradicting their exclusion from strictly theological subjects. And since one suitable Augustinian teacher had already been hired, it was only a question of finding four more qualified candidates in the entire monarchy. In terms of qualifications monasteries were the last place to look. Too many of their members had never even attended university, and even the more qualified ones were still dominated by "the muddled old scholastic system." Nor would Kaunitz accept Kressel's contention that there was nothing to fear from monkish esprit de corps. The "experience of several centuries" proved the contrary, he insisted, and if a specific monk was free of it, it was "a very rare exception" which did not alter the rule. In his conclusion Kaunitz worked himself up to such a pitch of passion as he seldom permitted himself in any other report:

Most gracious Madam! I would and could never regret it enough, if under Your Majesty's glorious reign such an important and unexpected event as the abolition of the Jesuit Order were not utilized for the true benefit of the religion and the state in every possible way, and if, without the slightest need, the establishment of the contradiction of having removed what was perhaps the best of the clerical orders from teaching posts only to set worse ones in their place were allowed. . . . If one permits monks to occupy teaching posts from the very beginning and without urgent need, they [the monks] will in a very short time find a way to install themselves so that they will be very difficult if not impossible to remove.⁶³

After this salvo Kressel and the Jesuit Commission agreed to recommend the use of monks only in cases of dire need, and under those circumstances

Kaunitz finally endorsed the report. With this endorsement, the empress approved the official enactment of the recommendation.⁶⁴

The decree officially turning over all ex-Jesuit property to the state was published on 9 October 1773. Kaunitz for his part took little part in subsequent deliberations except when he was asked, in his capacity as foreign minister, to send instructions or information to Rome. Part of this lack of involvement may have been due to the general problems surrounding his attempted resignation of 1773, but for the most part it seems to have been the result of the fact that the basic principle had been settled and only its implementation remained. This was left basically in the hands of the Jesuit Commission and the empress, and under those circumstances the prospects of the ex-Jesuits were not very bright. The commission's protocols over the subsequent months reveal a very militant and harsh anti-Jesuit tone. Fears constantly surfaced that the order was attempting to rob the state of its just rights to the Society's property. An ongoing fear of plots to ferret large sums of money out of the country characterized the reports of the commission, and its recommendations usually called for draconian measures.⁶⁵

The empress moderated the almost rabid anti-Jesuit sentiments of the commission somewhat, but she had lost the obvious respect she had had for the order in her youth, observing:

I have not been too predisposed toward the Society for many years; I removed myself and my children [from the Jesuits] as much in matters of education as in the confessional. After the abolition of the Society, no one strove more vigorously than I to remove them from all theological chairs; and where posts were impossible

to fill, I insisted that it was better to leave them vacant for a year than to allow them to [the Jesuits].⁶⁶

Although she would not allow herself to believe derogatory rumours about the Jesuits without proof, and could be generous in individual cases of old or sickly ex-Jesuits, the order as a whole received little consideration from her. Indeed she even ordered the destruction of all their papers and manuals because she considered them obsolete and potentially dangerous if they fell into the wrong hands.⁶⁷ Some of these papers were burned while others were sold as scrap paper at two gulden per hundred-weight.⁶⁸

Maass has expressed considerable shock and surprise that in her anti-ex-Jesuit measures Maria Theresia went "further than even State Chancellor Kaunitz."⁶⁹ Given the strong neo-Jansenist tendencies prevalent among ecclesiastical reformers in Austria but not shared by Kaunitz, this really should not come as a surprise. As indicated before, opposition to the Jesuits was often the only thing that held the reformers together, and the empress' inclinations in that direction had been manifested for some years,⁷⁰ as even she herself confessed. Kaunitz's attitude towards the Jesuits was much more surgical and dispassionate, and in the final analysis he certainly preferred them to the monastic orders. In short, he shared an attitude common to many philosophes of the Enlightenment that, by saying that the Society of Jesus represented the best of a bad lot, thus uttered its final word on the problem of monks, nuns and Jesuits.

CHAPTER IX

TOLERATION

The principal religious problem of the final years of the reign of Maria Theresia focused not on the confrontation between church and state but on the essentially counter-reformation piety of the empress in the face of the Enlightenment attitudes of Joseph and Kaunitz. In the spring of 1777 popular missionaries in Moravia discovered some 10,000 self-proclaimed Protestants in and around the town of Wisowitz (Vizovice). The revelation shocked and disturbed the empress. Both her personal strong commitment to Catholicism and her ideological inclination which held unity of religion to be one of the surest props of the unity of the state were basically seventeenth century in their orientation; and when the seventeenth century remedies of repression were applied to combat this problem they were sure to conflict with those attitudes of the eighteenth century that regarded the maxims of the previous century as outmoded and superceded by more pressing priorities. Both Joseph and Kaunitz viewed the discovery of "secret Protestants" in Moravia through the eyes of the latter, making the conflict with Maria Theresia almost inevitable.¹

While the crisis of 1777 brought the confrontation to the surface, however, there was nothing novel about the positions taken by the empress, Joseph or Kaunitz. Maria Theresia's lack of religious tolerance was no secret. For example, when the primacy of the Catholic Church in Galicia came under fire in the final stages of negotiations over the partition agreement, she made it perfectly clear to Kaunitz that she

"would not find it easy ever to accede to this."² She only reluctantly tolerated the Protestant minorities of Hungary and Transylvania and considered betrayal of the religion a greater crime than treason to her person.³ Kaunitz was well aware of this and always took care not to overstep his bounds in this very sensitive matter. He couched many of his statist assertions in the language of religious reform, expressed an abiding concern for the welfare of Roman Catholicism as long as the empress was alive, and even went so far as to have his attendance of confession certified by a priest and sent to the empress when he was unable to attend Holy Week religious services at court as was the custom.⁴

Joseph was devout and considered himself a loyal son of the Church, but these convictions were fundamentally personal. In his view priorities of the state had made the enforcement of religious uniformity unfeasible. Totally within the mainstream of the populationist theories of his age, his God, it has been pointed out,⁵ was a cameralist God. As early as 1765 the emperor had insisted that "the service of God is inseparable from that of the state, and God wants us to utilize those whom he has endowed with talents and capacity for things, leaving the reward of good and the punishment of evil to his divine mercy."⁶ His mother's views on the subject, however, were as clear to him as they were to Kaunitz, and until the crisis of 1777 the emperor maintained a judicious silence on the whole question of religious toleration.

Kaunitz on the other hand, cautious as he was in this matter, did not remain silent. Throughout the period of the co-regency he continued to chip away at the edifice of intolerance with two principal

arguments: the first, like Joseph's, pressed populationist imperatives; the second insisted on the inefficacy of force in matters of conscience. Kaunitz also counselled generosity in religious questions. Thus when a petition for the free exercise of religion was made by the small orthodox community of Keskemeth in southern Hungary and the chancellery proved unresponsive, Kaunitz, while granting that the empress had every right to force religious uniformity on the community, insisted that fairness dictated a more tolerant course. Since the Greek Orthodox community of Keskemeth had been granted freedom of worship some years previously on the understanding that it could be revoked at any time, he wrote, and since it had done nothing to merit such a revocation, it would be unreasonable to renege on an act of generosity without cause. He pointed out that the Hungarian prejudice against Orthodox Catholics was well known and that measures supporting these prejudices would have detrimental consequences with the entire "Illyrian nation."⁷ In her resolution and subsequent note to Esterhazy Maria Theresia accepted Kaunitz's argument, but without enthusiasm. She firmly underscored the point that it was a pure act of generosity on her part and permitted the community of Keskemeth only those precise rights of freedom of worship it already had.⁸

At about the same time the Austro-Bohemian Chancellery launched a vigorous complaint about people who were mocking and slandering the church and recommended the promulgation of a decree designed to meet such outbursts with severe repressive measures. Kaunitz, in opposing the promulgation of any such decree, pointed out that sufficient provisions already existed in criminal law to deal with any overt interference with

religious services. It was therefore merely a question of finding any offenders and applying existing laws. For this purpose, Kaunitz felt, oral instructions to the proper authorities would be sufficient. The real problem, he then continued, was that such offenders did not understand the essence of the faith. Irreligion could only be attacked at its roots, and these for Kaunitz amounted to a decadent and corrupt clergy giving the people a poor example of the meaning of Christianity. He posited the maxim that "though harsh punishments are the easiest, they are not the most productive and most Christian means to check disbelief," and he insisted that there was "no better remedy" to combat scepticism than "to stimulate the clergy" to fulfill its offices properly and conscientiously.⁹ Again, while the empress accepted the suggestion that no specific decree be issued and that the authorities merely be informed orally to enforce existing laws, she went into great detail on precisely how what laws were to be enforced. She insisted that all freethinking books be burned, ordered a very close investigation of all potential free-thinkers and other religious trouble-makers, and concluded with only minimal reference to Kaunitz's suggestion of clerical reform.¹⁰

More religious difficulties arose in May 1767 when the Hungarian Chancellery objected to a general resolution which the Hofkammer had persuaded the empress to pass, designed to induce Protestant immigration to Hungary. The chancellery wanted to restrict the invitation to skilled craftsmen only, but Kaunitz pressed for all types of people on populationist grounds. "People are the first and greatest riches of a state," he noted, and concluded that everything which increased the population of

a state therefore also increased its wealth. Given the variety of religion in Hungary it was in any case apparent to Kaunitz that "a few thousand non-Catholics more or less" could hardly pose a threat to the dominance of Catholicism, and therefore he advised against the amending of the immigration decree.¹¹ This time Kaunitz could not even win a partial success. The decree was amended, limiting the invitation of Protestant immigrants to manufacturers and skilled craftsmen.¹²

Kaunitz suffered yet another setback when his friend and protégé, Rechenkammer president Zinzendorf advised the empress to compile detailed lists of the religious denomination and place of birth of all Rechenkammer employees. Kaunitz opposed the notion that people should be required to identify their religious affiliations. If there were any non-Catholics in the Rechenkammer, they outwardly followed formal Catholic ritual as prescribed and could therefore not be discovered "since no one but God sees into the hearts of men." Under these circumstances Kaunitz regarded the compilation of such lists as not only useless but petty work for Zinzendorf and the entire ministry. It would furthermore merely serve to undermine the "spirit and zeal" of civil servants who had converted to Catholicism if the implication that they were somehow second-class citizens were even suggested.¹³ But all these objections were of no use. Not only was Zinzendorf ordered to compile information on place of birth and religious affiliation but also on prior employment. At the same time Chotek, Hatzfeld and Lacy were ordered to do the same in their ministries.¹⁴

Indeed, Maria Theresa proved highly sensitive to religious

questions even when dealing with the ambassadors of foreign powers. When complaints reached her ears that the Russian ambassador, Prince Demeter Galitzin, had set up a private chapel outside the embassy, she became quite disturbed about it and turned to Kaunitz for advice. Kaunitz enumerated the possible repercussions of restricting Galitzin's religious activities not only on the Austrian embassy in St. Petersburg but also on the Franciscan missions in Russia. He suggested that the ambassador be permitted to hold religious services outside the confines of his residence or embassy, and if formal permission could not be given, the chapels should at least be tacitly tolerated.¹⁵ The empress, however, could not accept this. "The Russian minister," she wrote Kaunitz, "cannot be permitted to hold religious services outside his house." She ordered Kaunitz to inform Galitzin that he was to transfer his chapel to his residence and then commanded a careful surveillance to make sure that this order was carried out.¹⁶

Kaunitz had, therefore, only enjoyed marginal success in matters concerning religious toleration when the "discovery" of 10,000 Protestants in Moravia became known in Vienna in May 1777. Despite this apparent conflict, Maria Theresia nevertheless turned to Kaunitz for advice in the matter. In his reply of 23 May he began by positing three "truths" which he considered were beyond doubt. First, he assured her that the existence of heresy in Moravia was really nothing new and that the questions of the popular missionaries had merely brought it to the surface. Secondly, he considered it beyond doubt that the "careless conduct" of the clergy was primarily responsible for this state of affairs; this meant that lost

ground had to be recovered and remedies found that would help not aggravate the situation. Thirdly, he insisted that it was impossible to eliminate by force an evil that had crept in over generations. Indeed, the use of force would do little but "strengthen the fanaticism" of these heretics. From these premises Kaunitz felt that it was evident that the first concern of the authorities should be to return to the conditions that existed prior to the "discovery". This was best done by permitting secret or private Protestant worship. Since reversing heretical conviction was not something that could be done quickly, the authorities could only have recourse to "patience, gentleness and clear instruction." Above all he felt that the problem had to be attacked in such a way as to avoid causing any sensations and to concentrate on the root of the evil.¹⁷

These recommendations at first strengthened Maria Theresa's resolve to let the matter be until her son had returned from the trip to France he was currently undertaking. But as continued reports of heresy reached her, she began to change her mind. By the end of May she seemed to have decided on more drastic measures, principally the transplantation of all discovered Protestants to Transylvania.¹⁸ When Joseph was informed of this decision, however, he wrote his mother, at first cautiously and then more insistently, that religious diversity was not a political evil unless it occasioned fanaticism and partisanship--which it would not do if all men were treated equally.¹⁹ Things could not be done by halves, Joseph insisted, and therefore the only option was between complete freedom of religion or expelling all those of another faith "who do not

use the same forms to adore and serve the same God." Considering the economic value of people, however, what power could arrogate such an expulsion to itself, he asked rhetorically. Consciences could not be commanded; people could not be saved despite themselves. As long as people served the state and obeyed the laws there was no necessity to insist on anything else.²⁰

Naturally such overt and strident utterings found little sympathy with the empress. She dispatched a shocked reproach to her son,²¹ who replied that it was certainly not indifferent to him if his subjects became Protestants or remained Catholics. Indeed, he added, "I would give everything that I own if it could make all the Protestants of these states Catholics." Tolerance, he insisted, only meant that in "purely secular things" he would employ anyone "without regard to religion."²² But even this was not enough for his mother. Toleration and indifferentism in her view would undermine the state. She pointed by way of example to the unfortunate consequences of the Edict of Nantes for France. If everyone were permitted to pursue his own fantasy, if there were no fixed cult or submission to the church, society would revert to the law of the jungle. Above all the empress expressed maternal concern for her son's salvation and the hope that he would not be seduced by "false arguments" and "evil books" to stray from the religious path of his ancestors.²³

The failure to win Joseph to her point of view forced the empress to deal with the problem alone. After an initial on the spot investigation by Kressel, it was decided to set up a mixed lay and ecclesiastical

commission with inquisitorial rights to look into the whole problem. Kaunitz had no objections to a commission as such, noting only that everything depended on the principles under which it operated or would operate. By way of recommendations, he merely suggested that the restoration of tranquillity should be considered the first priority of any authority delegated to deal with the matter.²⁴ Some weeks later, however, the commission, headed by the zealous Blümegen, was ready with recommendations prescribing stern rather than lenient measures. The 're-education' of Protestants was of course suggested, but the use of the military to preserve order and the arrest of the community's leaders were also proposed. Though the commission recommended the immediate implementation of these measures, the Hofkanzlei wished to wait a few weeks to see if re-education would have any effects. The empress accepted this delay but issued the draconian orders nonetheless, to be implemented once the period of grace had passed.²⁵

Quite in character, Joseph insisted on seeing the trouble-spot first hand and travelled to Moravia soon after his return from France. He was there when the empress' instructions to the Moravian authorities were issued, and as soon as he heard of them he dispatched an indignant letter to his mother. He condemned the instructions to the Moravian authorities and advised the empress to seek the counsel of people other than those who had dreamt up such things. If such a decree were passed and implemented, he said, he would be forced to resign his co-regency.²⁶ The empress reproached Joseph for always threatening to resign his post as co-regent over every little disagreement and would not give way by

revoking her order.²⁷ Joseph responded that he would submit to her will, but insisted that his desire to resign was "no pretext, no passing enthusiasm, no grimace" but his most fervent desire. The empress had endorsed something he considered unjust and harmful, and since he had the misfortune to disagree with her he could, he claimed, be of no further use to her.²⁸ Although Maria Theresia expressed the hope that he would listen to reason when he returned to Vienna,²⁹ and although Joseph made yet another submissive reply,³⁰ to his brother he confided that he would remain firm in his position, and that if he had to give way he would only do so by declaring to the whole world that it had all been done against his will.³¹

Joseph's obstinate stand was not without effect. The empress may have remained firm as ever about the principle of toleration, but she was clearly shaken by her son's reproach that she had not sought counsel with the proper people. As usual, in seeking additional advice no one could be more proper than Kaunitz. Even before the commission and Hofkanzlei reports reached him through the Staatsrat where he would in any case have an opportunity to express his opinions, his advice on this religious problem was now solicited separately. In view of Joseph's inability to change the empress' mind, Kaunitz knew that he would have to go about positing a position of toleration very carefully. But he had learned a lot from his own failures in the area over the previous decade, and he saw to it that the report would be as carefully phrased as possible. When his secretary submitted the final draft to him for signature, he noted with satisfaction, "I find this whole work faultless."³²

Despite this approval, however, Kaunitz did not sign the report. Instead he re-considered the matter for another five days and then decided that some of his points needed to be reinforced and his recommendations needed to be expanded. It was this second version, dated 18 October, that was finally submitted to the empress.³³

Kaunitz began by noting that heresy had existed in the lands of the Bohemian crown since pre-Reformation times, and then sketched a brief history of the official attitude toward it since the reign of Ferdinand I. Despite the fact that it had been made a capital offence by patents of 1726 and 1754, he explained, heresy had still maintained itself. The question, therefore, was what to do about it. His first premise was that nothing ought to be done which conflicted with "the essence and spirit of true Christianity and with the welfare of the state." Force, to his mind, was not concomitant with true Christianity. The teachings and examples of Christ and his apostles, the gospels, the church fathers and all enlightened ancient and modern theologians were, according to Kaunitz, at one about this. Faith was a gift of God and the result of the operation of divine grace. Religious coercion was therefore un-Christian and could not be considered a part of the right of a sovereign. A sovereign could only refuse heretics entry into his state, and exile or transplant those already there. Exiling such people, however, would depopulate the state and undermine its essential socio-economic welfare. Transplanting them to areas where Protestants already existed would also be counter-productive since as long as they were in a Catholic environment there was still hope for their souls. In a Protestant environment, not only they

but their descendants would be lost to the faith. And in any case the expense and inconvenience involved would be too great. Under these circumstances, Kaunitz concluded, the only feasible option was to grant a certain degree of toleration and hope for effective results from the "apostolic zeal of the clergy," which should be instructed to attempt to reverse heretical beliefs with "Christian love." He therefore recommended that the Moravian authorities be issued a secret instruction, drafted according to the following principles: 1) a distinction had to be made between peaceful, law-abiding heretics and overt trouble-makers, 2) the latter could be dealt with by the ordinary process of the law, 3) the former had to be left to the mercy of God and the care of the clergy, 4) the heretics were to be permitted private worship in their homes, 5) only those heretics were liable for punishment who openly slandered Roman Catholicism, 6) since a forced partaking of the sacraments led to sacrilege, only "Christian patience" could be applied, 7) though heretics should not formally be excused from attending religious instruction, local authorities should look the other way, proceeding "with all possible forbearance, restraint and prudence," and finally, 8) minors were to be obliged to attend religious instruction.³⁴

Before accepting such recommendations, Maria Theresia passed them over to Blümegen and Kressel for comment. In the meantime she sent Kaunitz the inquisition documents on specific heretics already arrested, asking how, in the light of his eight principles, each in turn ought to be handled. Kaunitz declined to comment on the cases where an imperial decision had already been made, but in the fifteen remaining cases he

recommended the immediate release of five, hard labour from one to six months for eight others who had given instruction from heretical books, one year hard labour for a man who had held others back from attending religious processions, and finally two years hard labour for a man who had openly preached that an imperial patent was about to be released granting toleration, cutting taxes and abolishing labour services.³⁵ The assessment of these cases was also sent to Blümegen and Kressel, and within less than a week both had submitted their comments.

Both Blümegen and Kressel accepted Kaunitz's assessment of the fifteen heretics who had been arrested but not yet judged, though Kressel made a point of underscoring on principle the necessity of making an example of anyone who had resisted the military, had openly incited others, or had gone from town to town circulating announcements of open Protestant meetings. But Kressel completely agreed with Kaunitz's eight general principles, and Kaunitz in turn accepted Kressel's insistence on firmness.³⁶ Blümegen, however, while accepting Kaunitz's recommendations in the specific cases, expressed some reservations about the general principles. He considered the patents of 1726 and 1754 which Kaunitz had criticized only temporarily inapplicable. He thought that if heretics were allowed to gather in private in their homes, it would be no better than if toleration as such had been legislated, and he insisted on very careful investigations to prevent heretics from spreading their gospel.³⁷ Kaunitz objected to the excessive inquisitorial tone of Blümegen's comments. He insisted that the patents of 1726 and 1754 should not only be temporarily ignored but never again enforced "since what is once unjust

will remain forever unjust." Kaunitz insisted that there were different gradations of toleration and that he had merely recommended the least of these. If the gathering of three or four friends in a private home took place, this was no concern of the authorities. No one should be prevented from visiting his friends, and if Protestants doing so were arrested on the suspicion that they were holding religious services, it could have nothing but detrimental consequences. In this case, Kaunitz maintained, "the sovereign must seek to ignore as much as is possible, and therefore inquire into as little as is possible."³⁸

At about the same time the commission and Hofkanzlei reports of September, having made the rounds of other Staatsrat members, reached Kaunitz. He took advantage of the opportunity to press his case with renewed vigour. Like the other Staatsrat members he opposed the draconian measures proposed by the commission. He was far from suggesting, he said, that those who really ought to be punished should not be so, but he could not recommend draconian measures for anyone who, according to his proposed eight principles, was innocent. Since he expected his principles to meet with royal approval he recommended that all cases of arrested heretics be reinvestigated in a more generous light. Kaunitz also expressed his opposition to the idea of transferring arrested heretics to the farthest reaches of Hungary. He felt that transplantation on principle should be reserved only for extreme cases. In addition, if transplantation was to take place, the family in question ought to be set up in the same condition which it had enjoyed in Moravia "since expatriation in itself is a hard enough punishment."³⁹ It was a votum

of which Kaunitz was again particularly proud. In a pencil note to his secretary he wrote: "This votum is also incomparably put, short, but complete."⁴⁰

Kaunitz could well congratulate himself. The Staatsrat completely endorsed his views, and Hatzfeld even drew up a report, dated 28 October, in which the unanimous Staatsrat support of Kaunitz was reinforced. What was perhaps even more surprising was that the report of the Hofkanzlei, dated 7 November, also seconded Kaunitz's eight principles. Indeed even the clerical members of the investigatory commission supported them. And of course there was the emperor himself, who, as he had said to his brother, continued to remain firm in his position. Kaunitz did not fail to point this unanimity out to a still reluctant Maria Theresia. He was certain, he wrote her, that this unanimity would without doubt ease her mind and reassure her conscience and therefore move her to a resolution in accordance with his original recommendations. Given this conviction, he concluded, he would not address himself to the matter further but content himself in editing the chancellery's draft of the instructions to the Moravian authorities which basically embodied all his suggestions to date.⁴¹ This time Kaunitz succeeded. Two days later the empress issued the official instructions not only containing Kaunitz's principles, but indeed in most places his very words.⁴² Joseph was not entirely happy with the result, feeling that his insistence on toleration had been compromised, but he also realized there was no way to omit the qualifications of his position that Kaunitz had introduced to soothe the empress, and he expressed contentment

with what had been achieved.⁴³

The success was not without its setbacks however. The Hofkanzlei again recommended the transplantation of a number of heretics still in custody, and while Kaunitz in the Staatsrat reiterated his sentiments about such a dislocation and argued against it in specific cases,⁴⁴ the empress only followed his advice in a few cases, choosing to endorse the harsher chancellery suggestions in most.⁴⁵ Furthermore, despite the release of the official instructions to the Moravian authorities on how to deal with the Protestants discovered there, local officials, particularly on the district level, continued to show more inquisitional zeal than Kaunitz would have like to see applied. Houses were searched for heretical books, military force was often used and further arrests took place. When the matter came before the Staatsrat, Kaunitz was incensed: "To ransack the houses of these poor people in order to discover forbidden books there, or worse yet to incite the army to do so by offering rewards, is diametrically opposed to the guidelines established by Her Majesty," he wrote. It was obvious, Kaunitz noted bitterly, that the spirit of the instruction was not being followed, and that the authorities proceeded to make inquiries without pressing need, instead of winking at or ignoring private heretical activities. He therefore recommended that a stern reminder go out to the Moravian authorities demanding "the most precise observance of the prescribed system and its true spirit."⁴⁶ By now Maria Theresia was convinced. The suggested order went out, again using in large part the very words of Kaunitz.⁴⁷

What followed this order was at best an uneasy peace. Maria

Theresia had considerable expectations that the policy of tacit toleration would lead to the return of many heretics to the true fold; many Protestants in Moravia saw it as the first step towards full legal toleration; and local authorities soon reneged if not on the letter then at least on the spirit of their instructions. By October 1779 the monthly reports from Moravia again revealed Protestant discontent and agitation for the right to hold public religious services.⁴⁸ In the Staatsrat Kaunitz put the blame squarely at the feet of the local authorities. For him this was merely one more example of "the principal defect" of the monarchy, namely, that instructions either were not carried out at all or were only very poorly carried out. In this instance, Kaunitz noted, the very reverse of what was ordered was in fact done. His bitterness over this was undisguised:

All will be for naught, however, if the execution of the all-highest commands remains in the hands of such people who, because of their own blind and insurmountable prejudices neither can nor want to understand them, and who continue to retain the firm conviction that that which is only to be regarded as the result of God's mercy, human gentleness and persuasion, can and must be extorted with arrests, canings, hard labour and other criminal punishments.

He therefore recommended that all levels of provincial authority in Moravia be relieved of their duties in this matter, and that a special crown commission be appointed to handle them. Kressel was suggested for the post.⁴⁹

This, however, was something that the empress could not bring herself to do. When the reports for November 1779 came in, they were sent to the Staatsrat for new opinions. At the same time the October

reports were also re-circulated.⁵⁰ Kaunitz noted that the November reports were the same as the October ones, and this in his eyes lent only further weight to his previous recommendation.⁵¹ The suggestion did not lose its radicalism by being repeated. The empress left the debate unresolved and turned instead to one of the commissioners appointed in 1777 to look locally into the whole problem, Johann Leopold Hay, the bishop of Königgrätz. Hay felt that the only way to avoid further confusion and problems was to release a formal patent clearly stating the rights and limitations of them of the Protestants of Moravia. It was not a step Maria Theresia was likely to take without consulting Kaunitz. For his part Kaunitz was not opposed to the idea. While Hay emphasized the necessity of releasing such a patent in order to forestall any false hopes among the Protestants that legal toleration would be granted, Kaunitz, while paying some lip-service to this logic, was basically concerned with formalizing the existing rights of the Protestants, limited though they were. He therefore edited and then seconded Hay's draft patent enthusiastically in his report of 9 February 1780.⁵² In a covering letter Kaunitz told the empress that he had managed to keep closer to the wording of Hay than he had expected and expressed the hope that he had done her a useful service. Maria Theresia, whose motivations were closer to those of Hay than Kaunitz, expressed her pleasure at this bridging of an apparent contradiction and told Kaunitz that she hoped to be in a condition to return his favour.⁵³

Not surprisingly the patent, motivated by basically conflicting concerns, generated equally conflicting criticism. Blümegen suggested

that it would be a mistake to release the patent because it represented only a repetition of already existing legislation and because it would not serve as an instrument of conversion. The hopes for conversion that motivated Hay were also dismissed by Joseph, but he rejected the patent because it was insufficient. He completely opposed all force and recommended the complete abolition of the inquisitional tribunal that had been set up at Brünn.⁵⁴ The emperor's assessment put Maria Theresia into a new quandary, and she immediately turned to Kaunitz with the words: "Tell me what I should say to this. . . . It is from you alone that I await advice in this most critical affair."⁵⁵ The advice the empress received, however, was not what she seemed to hope for. In two separate memoranda Kaunitz turned on Blümegen's criticisms and affirmed the emphasis on toleration he had meant to give the patent. The patent was based on the premise of political toleration, he said, and was meant to formalize the abolition of religious coercion and of secular conviction for heresy. After two years the facts had to be faced that these were unconvertible Protestants, Kaunitz noted, and added that this did not mean that they could not remain good subjects.⁵⁶

Joseph remained unenthusiastic about the idea of releasing a patent but acceded to its publication on three conditions. The first was that the patent and its accompanying instructions follow the exact sentiments of Kaunitz's last two memoranda. Secondly he wanted a firm commitment from the empress that happen what might, the new legislation would be enforced without the slightest deviation. Finally, he insisted that the guidelines of this patent apply to all other cases of discovered

or yet to be discovered heresy in the entire monarchy.⁵⁷ At the same time that these conditions were being dispatched to the empress, a copy of them also was sent to Kaunitz. Under the circumstances Kaunitz thought the release of the patent imminent. He described Joseph's conditions as "founded in the nature of the matter and the necessary consequence" of the resolution to be adopted. He even drafted the formal orders the empress was to give to himself and to the Austro-Bohemian chancellery.⁵⁸

These hopes, however, were to be disappointed. For a week the empress fought with her conscience, and then she wrote Kaunitz in her own hand: "For six days I have been in the most cruel predicament, the calm which you procured me did not last long. You have seen how troubled I am about the conditions that the emperor added for his consent, and the more I consider them the less I can accept them." She therefore ordered Hay and Heinke to meet Kaunitz and draft a new instruction affirming tacit toleration and abolishing the inquisitional board at Brünn.⁵⁹ Kaunitz replied that he was "very grieved and highly astonished" at the empress' decision to abandon the patent at such a moment of unanimity amongst her advisers. He enclosed a draft instruction as ordered, but thought it was "entirely superfluous" because the emperor had already said all there was to say.⁶⁰ This response, however, had no effect. The empress curtly informed Joseph that "no patent or further regulation is to be published, rather I will only permit and prescribe a continued exact observance of the measures determined on 14 November 1777." She agreed to the abolition of the inquisitional tribunal but no more.⁶¹

Kaunitz did not accept this decision with grace. In a second note to the empress he confessed he could not understand her objections to the patent and reaffirmed his conviction that any appropriate new instructions had to be cast in the mould of Joseph's sentiments.⁶²

Events were soon to confirm Kaunitz's conviction that a mere re-affirmation of the instructions of 1777 was an insufficient measure. On the empress' last birthday, 13 May 1780, four thousand Protestants gathered in a field near Wisowitz and openly celebrated the imperial birthday with a Protestant religious service.⁶³ Though the presiding preacher was arrested, the Staatsrat advised his release. Kaunitz seconded this advice, and then added that in the main the incident had been the result of popular uncertainty on the entire issue of toleration. This, he noted, could already have been dispelled if his advice had been followed in February. Since this was not done, he concluded, it only remained for him to hope that "still more serious consequences and incidents than the present one would not arise sooner or later."⁶⁴ It was hardly a comment devoid of bitterness, and to underscore this mood Kaunitz refused to take any further part in any question touching on toleration. Any and all documents on the subject that came to his ministry from that date on were simply given to Binder, and all reports to the empress on the matter were henceforth drafted and signed by him.⁶⁵ In pursuit of the principle of toleration, success largely eluded Kaunitz. It was not a failure he took lightly.

CHAPTER X

THE CULTURAL DIMENSION

It is often overlooked that problems concerning art or culture in general are central to any investigation of reforms touching on religion. As Klingenstein has pointed out, the criticism of Josephinism that romantics in time were to make, its spiritual sterility and lack of imagination, was not necessarily merely the result of the oft-cited arid rationalism of the Enlightenment, but also of that neo-Jansenist affinity towards the ascetic that resulted in the subsequent labelling of many of the more morose Josephinists as "sourpots."¹ Indeed the religious austerity of the neo-Jansenist movement can be seen as having added an important dimension to the tone of secular reform in the Habsburg Monarchy during the Enlightenment: a stern duty-conscious statism whose rationalist and utilitarian norms were upheld with ideological fanaticism. This led to inflexibility and resulted in the kind of bleak approach to government that regarded the cultural dimension of the social organism either as a superfluous frill or as an unprofitable adornment. The Weltanschauung of Kaunitz was in complete antipathy to this. His fundamentally humanist inclinations and total aversion for the puritan tradition are highlighted by his engrossing concern with cultural matters.

An analysis of this, however, involves two closely linked but separate problems: one concerns the question of Kaunitz's personal aesthetic tastes, while the other involves the more important question of Kaunitz's view of the role of culture in a modern society. A mere personal

enthusiasm for the arts by itself could in fact have limited significance. Indeed an archetype of this kind of narrow cultural focus was at hand in the person of King Frederick II of Prussia, whom Voltaire acidly but accurately accused of having brought Athens only to his study while maintaining Sparta as the real model for his country.² The view of culture as a broader political consideration, however, also found a precedent in the reign of Louis XIV. Louis recognized the political ramifications of the arts and fostered the cultural despotism of a Lully, a Molière, or a LeBrun as a deliberate instrument of royal absolutism.³ Kaunitz transcended both these examples.

In general the cultivation of the arts was vital for Kaunitz on a personal level. It was, he confessed, his principal consolation in adversity made all the more precious for him because it depended on no one but himself.⁴ Whatever else might go wrong, he wrote to his friend, the poet Calzabigi, he fortunately loved the arts, and with these he could always occupy himself agreeably. However, unlike many members of his class, he did not consider the arts merely as a form of escape or amusement. It was a self-enriching process in which he prided himself on having "very extensive theoretical and practical knowledge on each and every one [of the arts] without distinction."⁵ This was no empty boast, for Kaunitz did enjoy a considerable reputation as a Maecenas of the arts. As a result of this reputation he was often deluged with requests to use his influence in favour of this or that poet, painter, or composer,⁶ and in many cases he willingly obliged even when such people were beyond the fringes of respectable society. For example, the personal intervention of Kaunitz won the

notorious Giacomo Casanova a reprieve when the latter had run awry of the authorities in Vienna,⁷ and the younger brother of the poet and memoirist, the painter Francesco Casanova, even received a permanent post in Kaunitz's household.⁸ He stood by the adventurer, poet, and librettist, Raniero Calzabigi, even after the latter had incurred the displeasure of the empress,⁹ and he continued to be concerned for the welfare of the French actors and actresses after the French stage in Vienna had been forced to close.¹⁰

While there is extensive evidence that Kaunitz was a revered protector and patron of the arts in general, it is more difficult to determine precisely how sophisticated his aesthetic perceptions were or what exactly his personal taste was. Neither his library nor his art collection survived intact, being dispersed or auctioned off within forty years after his death. There is no doubt however that Kaunitz had a particular enthusiasm for the visual arts. He told the Duke of Braganza in 1781 that the appreciation of paintings was one of his "principal amusements", and that he had by that date already more than doubled the total collection accumulated by his ancestors.¹¹ In the 1820's the auction lists alone enumerated over 320 canvases and 1,600 engravings, while a report from 1800 indicated that the private collection of Kaunitz in his palais in Mariahilf consisted of over 2,000 pictures.¹²

The auction lists reflect a broad spectrum of paintings from all areas of Europe and of various dates from the Renaissance to his own time. Determining Kaunitz's personal taste from such lists, as Novotny has indicated, is extremely difficult. One cannot really distinguish between

those that he inherited and those he acquired himself. Furthermore many paintings and prints were gifts and as such have limited value in reflecting Kaunitz's tastes.¹³ One enthusiasm, however, can be pointed out with reasonable accuracy, and that was his love of Rubens. The diary he kept during his grand tour of 1732-1734 is replete with perceptive references to the art works he was encountering and is particularly eloquent on the canvases of Rubens.¹⁴ Rubens seems also to have been well represented in his own collection,¹⁵ and in a memorandum to the empress in 1777 he earnestly recommended the acquisition for the imperial gallery of four great Rubens canvases that had become available. These masterpieces, he noted, had "a great reputation among all the connoisseurs of Europe."¹⁶ What Kaunitz seems to have liked about Rubens was less the Baroque exuberance of the man's work than its careful form and above all its grand scale.¹⁷

Certainly the violence of the Baroque held little appeal for him in later life. During the period of the Co-Regency and thereafter, he seems to have been an enthusiastic disciple of the neo-classical revival. Artists commissioned to do portraits of him, such as Steiner,¹⁸ Krafft,¹⁹ Schmutzer²⁰ or Lampi,²¹ all worked within that idiom, and the one contemporary major painter who seems to have enjoyed Kaunitz's particular respect was Pompeo Batoni whose elegant neo-classicism found its roots in Raphael and whose deliberate attempt to keep alive the classical values of the Renaissance pre-dated the neo-classical revival of the 1760's.²² An even older artist in this tradition was Sebastiano Conca, whose "Holy Family" Kaunitz acquired from a Venetian collector in 1783.²³ Anton Raphael Mengs, whose "Parnassus" was the first manifesto of the neo-classical movement,

was similarly represented in the famous auction lists.²⁴ Kaunitz also must have been quite enthusiastic about the urban scenes of Bernardo Belotto, a man famous for his neo-classical vedute, because during his stay in Vienna Belotto was commissioned to paint the Kaunitz palais in Mariahilf, including the famous triangular-shaped grounds in classical lay-out.²⁵ Indeed the gardens and buildings themselves, both in Mariahilf and at Austerlitz, are reliable mirrors of Kaunitz's taste since he considered himself his own chief architect, gardener, and "sovra stante en chef" (chief supervisor) of everything that was done under his eyes.²⁶ In this capacity, furthermore, the influence of Kaunitz is clearly recognizable in the decorative structures and sculptures of the Schönbrunn gardens, where Maria Theresia relied on his advice and help.²⁷

Above all, however, it is clear that Kaunitz prized the intellectual contributions of the art historian Johann Joachim Winckelmann, perhaps the single most important figure in the neo-classical revival of the eighteenth century. After Winckelmann's death in 1768, the Imperial Art Academy in Vienna proposed to reprint his masterpiece, Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums (History of the Art of Antiquity), originally published in 1764. The Academy proposed to dedicate the reprint to Kaunitz, who gladly accepted. The dedication was to include Kaunitz's portrait and a complete list of his titles. Sperges, who was handling the transactions on behalf of Kaunitz, objected to the format. He considered the "long list of ministerial posts and titles" superfluous and in poor taste, and suggested instead that the portrait of Kaunitz be published but without "the outmoded ostentatious display of honorary titles." In the tradition of Greek, Roman, and French

classicism, Sperges noted, the format characterized by "noble simplicity" was to be preferred. Kaunitz agreed with this wholeheartedly.²⁸ After publication, Kaunitz furthermore successfully pressed the emperor to forbid any and all other reprints of the work in Germany, so that the Academy would not suffer financial loss.²⁹

At approximately the same time Kaunitz further betrayed his debt to Winckelmann in an instruction he issued to Austrian art students sent to Rome on government scholarships. After outlining the specific conditions of the scholarship, Kaunitz emphasized two important points. In contrast to the precedent of governmental sponsorship of the arts under Louis XIV, he not only made it perfectly clear that the students were completely free to adopt any style they liked, he specifically cautioned against a slavish imitation of any current fashion in Rome and encouraged the development of "their own genius." Nevertheless, his second point was to recommend that the student take advantage of the examples of antiquity. He praised the classicism of the Roman school which, since Raphael's time, had sought to preserve the qualities of "noble simplicity, truth, quiet grandeur, unaffected but refined expression, easy contour of figures, and particularly the precise drawing of the character of the genuinely beautiful."³⁰ It was nothing short of the neo-classical language of Winckelmann who had made the description "noble simplicity and quiet grandeur" famous.

Despite this strong inclination towards neo-classical style, however, Kaunitz certainly did not limit himself to it. The auction lists contain such names as Parmeggianino, Caravaggio, Velasquez, Pieter Brueghel, Rembrandt, van Dyck, Dürer, and Cranach,³¹ and clearly some of these were

acquired by Kaunitz himself. In 1783 he purchased the colossal crucifixion scene of Jan Brueghel dating from 1608,³² and in the same year he was negotiating for the purchase of two landscapes by Claude Lorrain.³³ Novotny has suggested that Kaunitz was uncertain in his taste and that his main ambition was to possess representative works of all the great masters.³⁴ While there is some circumstantial evidence for this contention, the extent of its validity can never be known. However, if Kaunitz's aesthetic perceptions were uncertain he was never guilty of that strident philistinism that often accompanies poor taste. On the contrary, he always approached art and artists with the highest respect.

A good example of this can be found in Kaunitz's musical interests. Unlike so many members of the Austrian nobility and even the royal family itself, Kaunitz did not play any musical instrument, but he did stage plays and concerts at his palais which included large orchestras and choruses.³⁵ By the mid-1780's he had become an increasing recluse, and fewer concerts took place at his residence, though his letter of recommendation for Haydn in 1790 did show that he remained in some contact with the musical scene.³⁶ Thirty years earlier, however, he was not only in the midst of much musical activity, but was the main aristocratic protector of Gluck's circle. In fact it was Kaunitz, by his support of the former Genoese ambassador turned theatre manager, Count Giacomo Durazzo, and above all of the poet, Raniero Calzabigi, who proved to be the political lynchpin of Gluck's opera reform.³⁷ The main characters of Gluck's clique--Durazzo, Calzabigi, and Duke Johann Carl of Braganza, a member of the Portuguese royal house in exile in Vienna --were all close friends of Kaunitz, and Gluck himself when appealing to

Kaunitz for financial aid a few years later (which he apparently received) referred specifically to "the high protection and especial favour which your Serene Highness has heaped upon me at all times" and noted that he already had "enough evidence" of Kaunitz's generosity.³⁸ Kaunitz apparently even supervised the rehearsals of Gluck's compositions for court festivals.³⁹

Kaunitz also proved to be one of the strongest patrons of the young Mozart when the boy visited Vienna in 1762 and 1767-1768.⁴⁰ Some weeks after their arrival in Vienna for the second visit, Mozart's father reported that "we see a good deal of the Duke of Braganza, [and] Prince Kaunitz,"⁴¹ and although Kaunitz refused to come in contact with Mozart during the latter's smallpox attack that winter,⁴² by the next summer Mozart could again count on his support. Indeed, the Kaunitz residence in Mariahilf even became the scene of some rehearsals for Mozart's opera La Finta Semplice in September 1768.⁴³ During Mozart's permanent stay in Vienna after 1781 when he had lost his attraction as a child prodigy, Kaunitz continued to laud the young genius. After 1780 Kaunitz no longer attended public concerts or court ceremonies so that his name does not appear in subscription concert lists, but Mozart gave several private recitals at Kaunitz's home, including one in the winter of 1785 demonstrating one of the first new piano fortes.⁴⁴

Mozart's life in Vienna was not easy. Joseph, grown accustomed to the bel canto trifles of Paisiello and Salieri, found Mozart's music too difficult and too thickly orchestrated.⁴⁵ Even more typical of the kind of reception Mozart received from the aristocracy in general was that of Count Karl von Zinzendorf, the emperor's comptroller general of finances.

Zinzendorf attended many of Mozart's concerts and operas but was almost invariably condescending.⁴⁶ Zinzendorf's colossal insensitivity can be contrasted with the comments of Kaunitz which Mozart reported to his father in August 1782:

Countess Thun, Count Zichy, the Baron van Swieten, even Prince Kaunitz, are all very much displeased with the Emperor, because he does not value men of talent more, and allows them to leave his dominions. Kaunitz said the other day to Archduke Maximilian, when the conversation turned on myself, that "such people only come into the world once in a hundred years and must not be driven out of Germany, particularly when we are fortunate enough to have them in the capital." You cannot imagine how kind and courteous Prince Kaunitz was to me when I visited him. When I took my leave, he said: "I am much obliged to you, my dear Mozart, for having taken the trouble to visit me."⁴⁷

Clearly, for Kaunitz art was more than a social divertissement, and artists more than mere domestic servants.

What is even more significant about the comment on Mozart is the conviction on the part of Kaunitz that domestic artists had to be fostered to enrich the state and that art in general provided a valuable humanistic dimension to society. Above all he believed that it was in the interest of the imperial dignity that the monarchy become a well-known patron of the arts and humanities. When, for example, the owner of a famous geographic collection, a certain Baron Stosch from Florence, died in 1768, Kaunitz earnestly recommended the acquisition of the collection for the imperial library.⁴⁸ With the support of van Swieten,⁴⁹ whose perspicacity Kaunitz praised, the collection was quickly acquired.⁵⁰ Kaunitz also favoured the acceptance of book dedications or honorary patronage posts from abroad.⁵¹ Even in cases where he personally was not particularly enthusiastic about

the work to be dedicated to the emperor or empress, such as for example, Klopstock's Hermannschlacht, he nevertheless would recommend acceptance if he thought it would enhance the monarchy's prestige.⁵² For the same reasons he pressed for the vigorous propagation of the products of Austrian ingenuity, as is well illustrated by his attempts to spread the fame of Anton Mesmer's magnetic discoveries.⁵³

Promoting the official enhancement of the imperial residence as a center of the arts was a natural concomitant of this policy. Here Kaunitz could act in an official capacity. In 1766 the engraver, Jakob Mathias Schmutzer, who had been sent to Paris and London by the government to learn his art, returned to Vienna and proposed the creation of an academy for drawing and engraving.⁵⁴ Kaunitz was a particular enthusiast for the art of engraving,⁵⁵ and probably at his own request received the post of "Protektor" of the new academy, which was ceremoniously opened on 8 June 1766 by Kaunitz's son, Joseph.⁵⁶ When the Academy was officially incorporated on 10 November, Schmutzer, who had become its director, made a point of thanking the empress for appointing "such an enlightened and for the arts particularly respected minister" to the post.⁵⁷ Schmutzer had reason to be pleased, for Kaunitz was always to take his post seriously and never regarded it as merely an honorific position.

From the very beginning Kaunitz became an active agent, pressing the interests of the academy with the empress. In July 1767 he supported the lifting of an import duty for engravings from abroad;⁵⁸ in November 1769 he solicited a crown subsidy so that art students could take trips into the countryside in order to draw landscapes, and at the same time

requested an exemption from the one-kreutzer duty for passing the city gates after 9:00 P. M. for academy students;⁵⁹ in August 1769 he secured permission for the students of the academy to copy the paintings of the imperial gallery and succeeded in having the academy quarters enlarged;⁶⁰ and a year later he issued "passports" signed by him personally to the students of the academy so that they could move freely about the countryside and not be arrested as spies while drawing landscapes from nature.⁶¹ Above all, Kaunitz was instrumental in securing the consent of the monarchs to expand the personnel of the Academy. After Schmutzer had told him that the academy needed a permanent secretary,⁶² Kaunitz pleaded the case with the empress at great length. He recommended the man who had hitherto performed the functions of a secretary voluntarily, the famed Joseph von Sonnenfels. Kaunitz expounded on the necessity of a secretary, praised Sonnenfels' writing, artistic taste, and general attitude, pointed out the man's theoretical knowledge of art and his devotion to it, and suggested a salary of 400 gulden for him.⁶³ Soon after securing the Sonnenfels appointment, Kaunitz proposed that the engraver Johann Friedrich Bause, a member of the Leipzig Academy of Art, be lured to Vienna by offering him twice his current salary. Kaunitz indicated that enrolment pressures made such an expansion necessary and submitted a laudatory critique of Bause's engravings. Here too his efforts met with success.⁶⁴

The Academy of Drawing and Engraving, of which Kaunitz was Protektor, however, was not the only academy for the visual arts in Vienna. The leading and oldest school was the Academy of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture, the roots of which ran back to the reign of Charles VI. The

Painting Academy, as it was known in brief, was taken under imperial protection in 1751 when it was formally incorporated and given specific statutes. This academy was headed by a "rector" who was appointed for a three-year term, but in 1759 the court painter, Martin von Meytens, received the rectorship and the three-year rule fell into disabuse. Meytens remained head of the Academy until his death on 23 March 1770, and this eleven-year period was considered by many of his contemporaries, but especially by Schmutzer, as an era of decline and decay.⁶⁵ Schmutzer, it might be added, was in the vanguard of the neo-classical revival while Meytens still painted in a rather stiff and mannered Baroque court style.⁶⁶ It could come as no surprise, therefore, that the death of Meytens occasioned considerable discussion about the fate of the Painting Academy.

Soon after the establishment of Schmutzer's Academy for Drawing and Engraving, the energetic director recommended the foundation of yet another academy--this one devoted to gold and silver smithing, embossing and related crafts. His plans were accepted, and the embosser Anton Domanök was appointed director early in 1767. Early in 1770, at the specific request of Domanök, Kaunitz took over the Protektorat of this academy as well.⁶⁷ The personal union, as it were, of these two academies under one head and the almost simultaneous death of Meytens, took little imagination to put together. The logical conclusion to be drawn was that efficiency dictated the unification of all three academies, not only under one protektor but into an integrated new Academy for the Visual Arts. Precisely such a plan was proposed in May 1770 by the Abbé Johann Marcy, the

canon of Leitmeritz (Litoměřice) and an honorary member of the Academy for Drawing and Engraving.⁶⁸ Marcy later suggested that his plan would assure the world that in Vienna "the fine arts will be on the throne," adding that "certainly no one is in a better condition to undertake and establish such a fine institute for our country . . . than Prince Kaunitz."⁶⁹ The empress agreed that at least no one was in a better condition to comment on Marcy's recommendation, and passed the plan on to Kaunitz.

The reply that Kaunitz made to this request is one of the most important documents to reveal his attitude towards culture in general. He began by insisting that the patronage of the fine arts deserved the attention of wise rulers. The arts are not only decorative but economically beneficial: they attract foreign visitors, the good taste they generate invariably affects the mechanical arts, and they stimulate trade and industry by fostering luxury. That posterity would be thankful for bountiful art patronage was beyond doubt for Kaunitz. He pointed to the France of Louis XIV and suggested that the great masters such as Poussin and LeBrun gave more to France by improving its taste than the great generals like Condé, Turenne and Vauban. Because art "awakened" the "genius of discovery" and because it refined the taste, France became the governess of style and thereby drew vast sums of money to that country. Similarly the tourist attractions and art sales of Italy also increased the wealth of many cities there. The Germans, however, were more renowned for their industry than their creativity and had therefore tended merely to copy other models. This was quite understandable since even native genius required study to be refined. Art academies in the capitals of the monarchy would serve this purpose admirably, and though Emperors Leopold I and Charles VI and indeed

even the empress herself had made fine starts in this sphere, the work still needed to be brought to fruition. Kaunitz noted that the two academies under his Protektorat were well frequented, but the Painting Academy had become "stale and feeble." Marcy's plan, he concluded, would help all three and therefore had his full support. The three academies often worked at cross-purposes, and unification would definitely be in the interests of efficiency.⁷⁰

Kaunitz, however, did not stop there. He went on to suggest that the whole issue involved more than merely an improved constitution for the art academies. Marcy, Kaunitz said, had dealt only with structure of the academies and not with the equally important question of "the extension and improvement of their curricula and good taste." He pointed out that there was an integral connection between art and the humanities, and that refinement of the former required cultivation of the latter. At a time when a systematic aesthetics was only beginning to be formulated by philosophers, Kaunitz already insisted that the teaching of art history, aesthetics and related humanities had to be an integral part of any art academy, and that there should be reciprocal co-operation between artists and scholars. To this end it was necessary to attract scholars, philosophers and art historians to the Academy in Vienna, and such men could then be instructed to publish a journal so that the works of Austrian artists could become known to the world. Kaunitz wanted to recruit famous men for this task and suggested that someone like Winckelmann, who was by then already dead, would have been ideal.⁷¹

For three months Kaunitz waited patiently for a reply from the

empress. Hearing nothing from her he decided in his report on Bause, on 15 August 1770, to drop a strong hint about the unification of the three academies.⁷² Again there was no response. After a seven-month silence he decided to raise the subject once more in a general report on academy funding, saying that his memorandum of May 1770 had after all been submitted at the "express command" of the empress and that as a result of not hearing anything from her the necessary promotion of the arts was still swimming in a sea of uncertainty.⁷³ The empress, however, seems to have been concerned with the economics of unification and sent Kaunitz's original plan to the Kommerzienrat for comment. This body agreed that fostering the arts could have beneficial consequences for the economy, and Kaunitz was therefore encouraged to press his case with renewed vigour in yet another memorandum on 15 May 1771, in which he asked to be appointed Protektor of the new unified academy once it was established.⁷⁴ This time he finally received his reply, though it was Joseph not Maria Theresia who sent it. The unification plan was accepted, and Kaunitz was commissioned to draw up the statutes of the new academy. But the implementation of the plan would have to wait for a "future better time," because of financial reasons.⁷⁵

By the end of the year there were no signs that unification was imminent. Soon thereafter, however, Kaunitz was galvanized into further action. In February 1772 the former rector of the Liechtenstein art collection, Vincenz Fanti, submitted a plan for the unification of the three academies, proposing himself as head of the new unified academy.⁷⁶ Kaunitz would brook no rival and in a report of 20 March he dismissed Fanti's proposals, reiterated his own and Marcy's, and asked for the resignation in

his favour of the current Protektor of the Painting Academy, Count Losy.⁷⁷ Maria Theresia in the meantime had sought yet another opinion on the matter from the Austrian painter, Anton Maron, who was then residing in Rome. Maron's suggestions were similar to those of Kaunitz,⁷⁸ and under these circumstances, the empress wrote Kaunitz that she was resolved on unification. Since Losy had also resigned on his own she further appointed Kaunitz to his post.⁷⁹ Kaunitz was officially proclaimed Protektor of the Painting Academy on 18 October.⁸⁰ Long before then, however, he had displayed considerable impatience, which was quite uncharacteristic of him, to get the unification over. On 23 May, for example, he cautioned the empress that the longer she waited to undertake the creation of the new unified academy, the more complications would arise and the more costs would mount.⁸¹ The empress, however, had in the meantime called Maron to Vienna and expressed the wish not to do anything until he arrived.⁸²

Frustrated on that front, Kaunitz pursued another tangent. During 1771 his great memorandum of May 1770 had been circulated in the Staatsrat where it received such full support that the empress approved the eventual acquisition of an art historian. After the recommendation had been seconded by the Kommerzienrat as well, Kaunitz nominated a certain Professor Friedrich Riedel of the University of Mainz for the post. Although Riedel was approved with a salary of 1,500 fl. and notified of his acceptance, the death of his father delayed his journey to Vienna.⁸³ In the meantime Maria Theresia received reports that Riedel was an immoral character⁸⁴ and quickly notified Kaunitz that she did not want him in Vienna if any of these charges were true.⁸⁵ Kaunitz hastened to inform Riedel to submit a defence

in writing,⁸⁶ which the latter did with the inclusion of many supporting documents.⁸⁷ Kaunitz transmitted these to the empress with the comment that he thought Riedel innocent of any wrongdoing, but after examining the documents Riedel's Protestantism, not his morality, proved the insurmountable barrier for Maria Theresa. "I cannot bring myself to employ this man here," she wrote Kaunitz, "the prince will therefore see to it how we can be rid of him in the easiest possible way . . . even if he became a catholic I could not resolve to keep him here as a teacher."⁸⁸ Kaunitz suggested a compensation of 1,000 ducats and an honorary title, both of which the empress gladly accepted.⁸⁹ Riedel, who had in the meantime arrived in Vienna, also seemed to be satisfied and even asked for an audience with Maria Theresa in order to thank her. This favour too was granted him.⁹⁰ Unfortunately no art historian replaced him, and Sonnenfels filled in the gap on a part-time basis for the next decade or so. It was only in 1786 that Kaunitz finally succeeded in having a permanent chair in art history and related disciplines established at the Art Academy.⁹¹

While Riedel was preparing to leave Vienna, Maron had arrived. After coordinating Maron's proposals with his own Kaunitz was therefore finally able to submit his report on the unification of the three art academies of Vienna into one on 27 October 1772, almost two-and-a-half years after his first similar proposal. This time Maria Theresa finally gave the long awaited royal assent.⁹² Kaunitz wasted no time. On 1 November he issued a formal Protektorat-decree announcing the creation of the "Royal and Imperial United Academy of Visual Arts."⁹³ Early in the new year he instructed the academy members to elect an academic governing

council,⁹⁴ and on 19 December he promulgated the official statutes of the academy.⁹⁵

Kaunitz always took his post of Protektor seriously. He took an active interest in the hiring of academy personnel, supervised academic competitions and the distribution of prizes, used his influence to guarantee adequate funding for the institution as a whole as well as for various individual artists, carefully followed and commented perceptively on the internal administration of the academy, and, in short, demonstrated at all times uncommonly enthusiastic support for the arts.⁹⁶ At the suggestion of Sonnenfels, Kaunitz undertook to help artists rid themselves of the comparison with artisans by recommending the abolition of the guild regulations to which they were still subject. Using the example of the Austrian Netherlands where the exercise of art was free from any such regulation, Kaunitz convinced Joseph to enact similar legislation for Austria proper.⁹⁷ He demonstrated considerable faith in native artists, and indeed enthusiastically supported a plan to discover talented young artists by having the drawings done at provincial intermediate schools submitted to the Academy twice a year.⁹⁸ In fact Kaunitz developed such an impeccable reputation as a man with wide knowledge in the arts, that it was he who in 1780 was appointed to supervise the organization of the imperial gallery in the Belvedere, including every detail from cataloguing to deciding where and how the pictures were to be hung--a job which Joseph lauded for having been done in a particularly "tasteful manner."⁹⁹

In the best tradition of the eighteenth century, however, Kaunitz, though he encouraged and patronized local talents, did not permit a narrow

parochialism to limit his aesthetic horizons. This is demonstrated above all by his energetic support of French theatre in Vienna. Kaunitz had long been an enthusiast for the classical French stage in general and for Molière in particular. During the period of his French embassy he was completely at home in the literary circles of Paris, surprising many with his familiarity with French literature.¹⁰⁰ Upon his return to Vienna his theatrical interests had by necessity to be curtailed. There were two important theatres in Vienna, the Theater beim Kärntnertor and the Theater bei der Hofburg, the latter of which was devoted primarily to the French stage. An imperial restriction of 1752, however, severely limited the days on which theatre could be staged. The strong neo-Jansenist pietism of the empress did not easily tolerate the frivolity of theatre on days officially given over to religious self-renunciation, and in practice this meant every Friday and Saturday, the entire Lent and Advent seasons, and the week of Corpus Christi. During the Seven Years' War the fortunes of theatre suffered a further setback when, under the economic pressures of the war effort, the imperial subsidy to the two theatres was severely restricted. Finally, with the death of Francis I, Maria Theresia ordered general mourning and had both theatres closed entirely. The Theater beim Kärntnertor did not re-open for eight months, while the Theater bei der Hofburg was ordered to remain closed for at least two years.¹⁰¹

By early 1767, however, the pressure for the re-opening of the Theater bei der Hofburg and for the return of French theatre began to mount. Kaunitz was in the vanguard of this lobby. He pleaded with the empress to permit the re-opening of the Hofburg theatre and to lend imperial

patronage to the various subscription series, in order to restore German and French theatre and Italian opera buffa to a level "worthy of the court . . . and a public as distinguished as the one of this city."¹⁰² As the soldier-turned-impresario, Giuseppe d'Afflisio, offered to take over the direction of the Hofburg theatre and promised to mount suitably impressive productions without an imperial subsidy, Kaunitz lent him his complete support.¹⁰³ Afflisio, like most eighteenth century impresarios and theatrical entrepreneurs, was no model of virtue, and this made the empress extremely ill-disposed toward him. Above all she did not want the name of Kaunitz mixed up with him or even less with the French actresses and Italian prima donni with whom he dealt. Therefore, while she would consent to the re-opening of the Hofburg theatre under Afflisio's control, she would not permit him to assume any official post in the theatrical activities of Vienna.¹⁰⁴

Of course this did not stop Kaunitz from throwing himself into the theatrical *melée* in order to preserve the French stage in Vienna. He drafted the subscription notice himself,¹⁰⁵ personally contacted many members of the high aristocracy in Vienna in an attempt to solicit subscriptions,¹⁰⁶ and played a central role in securing first-rate actors and actresses.¹⁰⁷ Despite Kaunitz's best efforts, however, Afflisio was soon in financial difficulty, and by 1770 he was forced to leave Vienna. At this Kaunitz only intensified his efforts to retain a suitably splendid French stage. He made a public appeal for a lottery designed specifically to rescue the theatre¹⁰⁸ and redoubled his efforts to find sufficient subscribers.¹⁰⁹ When, after Afflisio's departure, the Hungarian magnate, Count Johann Kohary,

was appointed director of the two Viennese theatres, Kaunitz continued his intense involvement in theatrical affairs. He supervised contracts Kohary signed with particular actors,¹¹⁰ and in one instance instructed Kohary to warn a certain Mademoiselle la Dorsey on his behalf that her co-habitation with an actor named Desmarest would probably solicit a visit from Maria Theresia's infamous morality police, and that she should therefore take appropriate steps to protect herself.¹¹¹

Finally, in July 1770, Kaunitz attempted to transform his unofficial influence into an official position by presenting Kohary with a letter the latter was to give to the empress, requesting the appointment of Kaunitz as Protektor of the two theatres in Vienna.¹¹² But for Maria Theresia the stage, unlike the art academies, remained tainted by the suggestion of rampant immorality. She would permit Kaunitz no part of this and the plan came to naught. From this point on, one setback followed another. With the emergence of Austrian bourgeois culture, new theatrical directions were beginning to be sought. Above all there was growing support, led by Joseph von Sonnenfels, for the new wave of reformed German drama. In August 1770, Sonnenfels published his famous Report on the new theatre direction in the name of Kohary, emphasizing this new wave, mostly at the expense of classical French drama. Kaunitz was incensed, both at Kohary and Sonnenfels. He charged Sonnenfels with attempting "maliciously to incite the public against foreign drama" and called his Report "a tissue of useless, malicious, and prejudiced things." He severely reprimanded Kohary for having taken this step without first consulting him and threatened to withdraw his support completely.¹¹³ But Sonnenfels represented the wave of

the future in this dispute. Over the subsequent year attendance at French plays continued to decline, and on 29 February 1772 the curtain fell for the last time on classical French drama in Vienna.¹¹⁴

Kaunitz did not give up without a struggle. He attempted to solicit the support of Maria Theresia and Joseph to lend their influence to a revival of French plays, and as late as 1775 he was still drafting projects designed to generate public support for such a revival.¹¹⁵ But it was all in vain. Joseph had thrown his support energetically behind Sonnenfels and the new wave. In 1776 he transformed the Hofburg theatre into the Deutsches Nationaltheater (German National Theater), making it a center of reformed German drama. The court took over direction of the new theatre, and the German actors now needed became employees of the crown.¹¹⁶

PART THREE

MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS

CHAPTER XI

DAMOCLEAN SWORD

A standing army was one of the chief factors contributing to emerging absolutism after the Thirty Years' War. It served both to affirm the sovereignty of a prince's state in relationship with others and as one of his principal instruments in the domestic struggle with aristocratic particularism.¹ The integral relationship of the two functions was underscored in the early reign of Maria Theresia. The maintenance of the integrity of her inheritance depended on military might, and the need for a certain level of military power in turn became the lever by which the Provincial Estates were deprived of much of their power. In the era after the Seven Years' War, however, new factors began to influence governmental decisions about the military establishment. The experiences of the war and the examples set by Frederick II of Prussia led to new attempts to completely 'nationalize' the military establishment, forging it into a more reliable instrument on the Prussian model.² The failure to achieve total victory in the war was ascribed not to leadership but to organization.³ Prussian drill and Frederick's organization of military districts or 'cantons' as conscription units proved to be an example to which the younger generation seemed to be irresistibly drawn. Above all the levels of military strength estimated to be sufficient in 1748 seemed to prove insufficient during the war. In direct conflict with this lobby was a party that regarded the ordering of Austrian finances as the first priority of government--a priority that even during the war itself led to demands for a reduction not an

increase of the military establishment. The leader of this party was Kaunitz.⁴

Joseph, on the other hand, had aligned himself quite early with the advocates of increased military spending. His very first memorandum on political reform, dated 3 April 1761, had emphasized primarily military matters. Sternly opposing any reduction of military strength, the young archduke even went so far as to recommend the doubling of the standing army once peace was restored.⁵ Joseph's hand was strengthened with the death of his father. As the Co-Regent of his wife, Maria Theresia, Francis I had been given supervision of military matters, and the empress was resolved to give her son the same honour. Despite her own enthusiasm for the army, she wrote her friend and adviser, Count Sylva Tarouca, she wanted to leave her son all responsibilities for military matters because he would have more to do with such things than her, and because his fortunes depended largely on the measures he proposed to take in this field.⁶

Joseph accepted the responsibility with great enthusiasm. No sooner did he enter his new office than he immediately adopted, in his capacity as head of state, the Prussian custom of appearing in uniform at all formal occasions.⁷ In consultation with the president of the Hofkriegsrat, Field Marshal Daun, he began preparations and planning for major manoeuvres in Bohemia and Moravia in the fall of the following year.⁸ In the intervening time he appointed three military inspectors to see to the maintenance of the battle-readiness of the troops now quartered in various parts of the monarchy.⁹ Finally, at the end of 1765, he returned to his theme of increasing military strength in his famous memorandum on

domestic reform. The emperor now suggested the adoption of a Prussian-style 'canton' system, a tightening of military discipline, and the introduction of a three-year military service prerequisite for any young aristocrat wishing to join governmental service.¹⁰

Although Kaunitz insisted, in the assessment of Joseph's memorandum which he prepared for Maria Theresia, that he was no military expert and therefore found it necessary to decline comment on Joseph's proposals in that area,¹¹ he by no means lacked interest in military matters. Field Marshal Daun had found reason to complain about Kaunitz's constant interference with and influence on military matters as early as 1757,¹² and Kaunitz's patronage of General Ernst Gideon Laudon, Daun's principal rival, did not ease the situation. Laudon had not been happy with the fact that after he had secured the devastating victory of Kunersdorf over Frederick in 1759, Daun was unable to rouse himself to administer the final coup de grâce.¹³ Kaunitz shared Laudon's disenchantment, and after Laudon's victory at Landeshut in 1760, he could not resist the observation, directed squarely at Daun, of what could be done in war by "reasonable, rapid and hearty resolve."¹⁴ The final straw came in August of that year. For Kaunitz it was the decisive campaign. What could not be achieved then, he wrote Laudon on the thirteenth, could never be achieved.¹⁵ Two days later Laudon had encircled the Prussians at Liegnitz, but his appeal to Daun for re-enforcements at the critical moment remained unanswered, and the battle was lost. Laudon immediately reported to Kaunitz what had transpired and only then sent in his official reports which left off the acidic references to Daun that Kaunitz had received. Kaunitz replied that no one

could blame Laudon for a defeat whose sole cause had been the irresolution of Daun.¹⁶

By the summer of 1761 the Hofkriegsrat itself began to seek new expedients to increase military efficiency. The introduction of conscription was suggested and increased military spending, endorsed as previously noted by the young Joseph, was deemed imperative. Kaunitz's refusal to accept either contention only widened the gulf between himself and Daun. He conceded that the Prussian 'canton regulation' of 1733 had worked well for Prussia, but he still regarded Austria's recruiting system of 1748 as best for the monarchy. He insisted that military spending could not recklessly outpace the state's economic capacities, and focused on anomalies within the military administration as priority areas of reform.¹⁷ Kaunitz's insistence that Staatsrat members other than himself should hold no ministerial appointments further aggravated his relationship with Daun. A member of the Staatsrat since its inception, Daun's name was suggested for the presidency of the Ministerialbankodeputation in 1762. While Kaunitz managed to defeat this appointment,¹⁸ he could not do the same when Daun was made president of the Hofkriegsrat that same year without having to relinquish his Staatsrat position.¹⁹

After the conclusion of peace in 1763 the debate on national security continued. In response to a Hofkriegsrat request for suggestions on improving the defensive posture of the Habsburg Monarchy, it was none other than Haugwitz who suggested a healthy increase in military strength, particularly in the infantry. The Hofkriegsrat's reaction was to agree that the standing army had to be enlarged, but instead of increasing

infantry strength, it suggested the creation of a complementary militia. Kaunitz opposed both suggestions. He felt that national security could be guaranteed without enlarging the army by merely re-distributing existing military strength to sensitive areas such as Bohemia, and by encouraging immigration to the Military Frontier areas, thus increasing the size of the border guard establishment. To his mind the state could simply not afford increased military expenditures. Despite the fact that Kaunitz had even gone to the lengths of consulting the commanding general of the Military Border on the logistics of inducing immigration, a Hofkriegsrat report of July 1765 totally ignored all his suggestions, limiting itself to those of Haugwitz.²⁰

Kaunitz continued to remain hopeful, however, when the empress herself ordered him to co-ordinate plans for the transfer of Italian and Belgian troops to Bohemia with her brother-in-law, Prince Charles of Lorraine, during the wedding festivities at Innsbruck in August. One can only speculate what effect the death of the emperor Francis and the accession of his militaristically inclined son had on Daun and the Hofkriegsrat, but in a further report of September 1765, the ministry not only again ignored every suggestion Kaunitz had made, but made no mention of those of Prince Charles either. On top of all that all plans for a militia were now dropped, and Haugwitz's original suggestion to increase infantry strength in peace time was adopted. Kaunitz indignantly appealed to the empress. He reiterated his suggestions of re-distribution, and continued to insist that the state's economy and population could not bear the burden of an army expansion. Financial resources had been stretched to the limit

by the war, he wrote, and demanded recovery not further strain. Kaunitz even incorporated populationist arguments into his position. If the land were not to be depleted of its population, he noted, military personnel could not constitute a ratio higher than one to one hundred of the ordinary population. Under such circumstances the population resources of the monarchy demanded military reductions rather than increases. Foreign regiments and a strong Military Frontier should be the basis of a peace time army, Kaunitz concluded.²¹

Though Kaunitz had asked for a decision from the empress in the matter, it was Joseph who had become the supreme authority in military matters. And at the very time Kaunitz was demanding an economically realistic military establishment, Joseph was drafting his famous memorandum of 1765 which demanded the reverse. Consequently, Kaunitz's suggestions were ignored again. In the meantime Kaunitz suffered yet another reverse in the military sphere. On 5 February 1766 Daun died. Kaunitz's protégé, Laudon, might have been the logical successor to the Hofkriegsrat presidency, and certainly his war record was second to none in the monarchy. But Daun, who had had his conflicts with Laudon, had his own candidate for his succession, Field Marshal Count Franz Moritz Lacy. Both Maria Theresia and Joseph were impressed with Lacy--the emperor in particular finding Lacy a man to his liking.²² Laudon, on the other hand, had made few friends at court beyond Kaunitz. An anonymous French observer remarked at about this time that Laudon was "excessively modest, reserved and taciturn," and that the empress had never liked him. It was doubted, the observer continued, that Laudon would ever hold an important command if Kaunitz

retired.²³ Under these circumstances Kaunitz's favourable view was insufficient. Lacy was appointed Hofkriegsrat president, and Laudon received Lacy's old post of "Inspector-general of Infantry." Lacy shared Daun's envy and dislike of Laudon,²⁴ and the latter appointment was little more than a temporary sop to his pride. Three years later the post was abolished and Laudon went into retirement.²⁵

Lacy's star on the other hand was on the rise. His private correspondence with both Joseph and Maria Theresia showed that he was on increasingly intimate personal terms with both rulers,²⁶ and in military matters his opinions were decisive. In fact it was Lacy's criticism of the old recruiting system in a memorandum of 19 July 1764 that moved Joseph to recommend the adoption of the Prussian canton system in 1765.²⁷ After Daun's death, Lacy ably carried on planning for the manoeuvres of 1766 and accompanied Joseph on his military inspection tour of Bohemia that summer. The result of this tour and the subsequent manoeuvres was a new memorandum by Joseph devoted exclusively to military matters. Before committing his thoughts to paper, however, he again consulted Lacy, asking him to draw up a detailed analysis of military requirements. Lacy's report, which was highly technical and precise--he recommended an increase of military strength by exactly 64,022 men at a cost of 16,352,005 fl. 25½ kr.--found great favour with both the empress and the emperor, and it became the basis of Joseph's memorandum on military reforms submitted on 28 December 1766.²⁸

Joseph began his memorandum with the famous Roman adage, Si vis pacem, para bellum. And war, in his opinion, was something for

which the monarchy was not prepared. The last war, he indicated, proved that even by leaving the defence of the Netherlands to France and that of Milan to Modena, by denuding Hungary of troops and by having German and Russian allies, the military strength of Austria was still inadequate. Increases were therefore imperative, and the creation of a Prussian style canton system was "the only true, useful, efficacious and inexpensive way" to secure them. The canton system, Joseph noted, would make every soldier a citizen and every citizen a soldier, leading to quicker justice and the "assurance that all orders will be executed militarily, that is to say to the letter." The system would further facilitate basic training, so that the armies of the monarchy would contain more than "mere peasants masqueraded as soldiers." Men of a stature unfit for the infantry could be conscripted into the artillery, a process for which the canton system would again be ideal. In addition Joseph recommended the completion of the fortifications programme begun shortly after the war, an intensification of cavalry training and the guaranteeing of a sufficient number of horses for it, the stock-piling of arms, equipment and military grain supplies, and an increase in the officer corps. Specifically, current military strength had to be augmented by 65,000 men, 14,000 cavalry horses, 3,000 supply wagons, 1,900 pack horses or mules, 14,000 artillery horses, 3,000 pontoon horses, 100,000 new firearms and other supplies. Joseph made no mention of costs.²⁰

He did, however, go beyond specific recommendations, positing by way of a conclusion his three main premises, or, as he called them, "incontestable axioms." The "axioms" are remarkably similar to German military thought prior to 1914. The first was that another major military conflict

was inevitable before very long and that Austria had to prepare itself for it. The second was that the war would be "very bloody and violent" on an extremely large scale, in which the first campaigns would be so decisive that preparations for it could not be delayed until its actual outbreak. Finally, he insisted on the incontestability of the proposition that "nothing is more desirable for a state . . . than to have a good and large army." If such a policy turned the state into an armed camp, Joseph did not mind. "The duties of citizen and soldier," he wrote, "have never appeared and still do not appear to me to be incompatible."³⁰

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion so bitterly reached by Leopold in 1778³¹ that Joseph's attitude, strident and despotic in tone, all too enthusiastically modelled itself on Prussian militarism. It also foreshadowed an age when military priorities were to dominate society and to permeate every aspect of life. This was not a prospect that Kaunitz welcomed at all. His evaluation of Lacy's and especially Joseph's memoranda, prepared at the request of Maria Theresia and submitted on 24 January 1767, was diametrically opposed not only to the recommendations made but also to the very premises on which they were based. Above all he could not subscribe to the view that the defeats of the previous war were the result of inadequate troop strength. It was the superior military strategy of Frederick and his generals that was in Kaunitz's view the key to Prussian success. There could certainly be no doubt that a strong and mobile military force was a political necessity, he continued, but two very important fundamentals could never be ignored. First of all, no matter how numerous an army was, it could never reach the same proportions as the

combination of all possible adversaries; and secondly, there had to be an accurate and integral relationship between the military and domestic economic strength of a state. There was no question that armies were the principal shield of a state, Kaunitz noted, but the purpose of such a shield was to provide security, not to crush those whom it was meant to protect by its weight.³²

From this basis Kaunitz therefore opposed both of Joseph's main recommendations, the increases in military strength and the introduction of the canton system. The outcome of a war depended less on the readiness for the decisive first campaign than on an ability to endure for an extended period of time. This in turn depended above all on the restoration and maintenance of the economic health of the state, which required the greatest possible fostering of agriculture, industry and trade, not increased military expenditure. By way of an historical example Kaunitz maintained that Louis XIV had laid the groundwork for French weakness in the War of the Spanish Succession precisely by attempting to maintain an unrealistically huge and expensive military establishment during his reign. As far as the canton system and its attendant conscription were concerned, Kaunitz conceded that such a reform would probably be the most efficient way of raising military strength, but he felt that the social repercussions of such a move outweighed any benefits it could possibly produce. Contrary to Joseph's aim of making every citizen a soldier, Kaunitz praised the recruiting system of 1748 precisely because it provided for a complete separation of the military and civilian segments of society. He predicted large-scale resistance to conscription both on the local and provincial level and

suggested that the imposition of this new burden "on the peasant who is already only all too oppressed by nearly unbearable ordinary and extraordinary taxes" would make his lot inferior to even those peasants chafing under Prussian despotism. Oppress the peasant further, ran the Kaunitzian maxim, and the entire financial structure of the monarchy, "the only support of the military," is undermined. As for the expected resistance to conscription, one had merely to recall the difficulties encountered when troops were quartered on peasant households during the war. "In the case of a conflict between the maintenance of the peasantry and favouring the military, the former, as the basis of everything else, must be preferred over the latter," Kaunitz concluded.³³

These arguments did not fail to have their effect on the empress. On 4 February 1767 she sent Joseph a note replying to his military reform proposals of December. She enclosed Kaunitz's report, noting that she had specifically requested him to look at the proposals from a political angle. With respect to military increases Maria Theresia indicated that she did not wish to go into the matter herself, but pointed out that Kaunitz's observations about the size of armies were borne out by the experiences of the previous war. In the final analysis, however, she left any ultimate decision on the matter to Joseph and his military advisors. With respect to the canton system and conscription she again echoed Kaunitz's sentiments, saying that the matter needed extensive reflection and deliberation before any thought could be given to introducing it. She suggested that Joseph consult Starhemberg, Lacy and Blümegen and draw up a protocol for her further information.³⁴

While Joseph continued to cling firmly to his position, he nevertheless began a series of consultations on military matters with the Staatsrat over the subsequent months, and within this context Kaunitz was never far removed from the debate. In March Lacy wanted to introduce a central supply depot for all military equipment and uniforms which had hitherto been locally purchased. The Rechenkammer cautioned that the sudden introduction of such a system would not be wise, and Kaunitz, along with the rest of the Staatsrat, endorsed this view.³⁵ Joseph cautiously resolved to begin a central supply experiment with four or five regiments, but the conflict only widened the chasm between proponents of financial restraints and those of military increases. Kaunitz, above all, became increasingly outspoken in insisting on economy. When Lacy submitted a lengthy report on 11 May continuing to insist on the necessity of military increases, Kaunitz at first asked for time to draft a response rebutting Lacy point by point. By July he had deemed such a detailed rebuttal unnecessary, saying that in the final analysis everything boiled down to the question of what was best for the state as a whole, and this question he had already answered at length. Maria Theresia, however, would not let Kaunitz brush off Lacy's work in such a flippant manner and commanded him to appear at the emperor's room in the palace the next morning to expound his views at length. If he found it necessary to bring Hatzfeld and Ludwig Zinzendorf along to bolster his economic case, he was permitted to do so.³⁷ There is no record of the oral exchanges that took place on 29 July, but subsequent events show that Kaunitz did not moderate his view. By September he had committed such outspoken criticism of increased

military expenditures to paper that he himself realized he had gone too far. Not wanting to alienate Joseph completely, he asked Maria Theresia to suppress his latest memorandum--a request the empress granted no doubt with great relief.³⁸ In the Staatsrat, however, Kaunitz's opinions lost none of their candor. When Field Marshal Colloredo suggested the establishment of a special fund for the military academy at Wiener Neustadt on 28 October, Kaunitz noted that military academies were certainly indispensable, but he insisted that if the annual 95,000 fl. budget for it came from anywhere, it had to come from military funds.³⁹

By 1768 Kaunitz became increasingly aware that he was fighting a rearguard action. In his grand reform proposal of 25 January 1768 he did not dwell at any length on military matters. "I have insufficient knowledge of military affairs," he wrote as in 1766, adding not without irony, "and these are in any case under His Imperial Majesty's enlightened special jurisdiction." Despite the disclaimer, however, Kaunitz insisted that the extent to which the introduction of the canton system was commensurate with the true welfare of the state be especially investigated. He reiterated his view that wars are not ended by one fortunate battle but that only "those warring parties that can bear the costs of war the longest can promise themselves the upper hand, and that most wars are only ended by lack of funds." In times of peace only such a military establishment should be maintained as to afford the state a measure of security. "What we need most, however," Kaunitz added bitterly, "are more competent generals and education in military science." One certainly would not find Prussian officers as woefully ignorant of military history, for example, as the

Austrian ones seemed to be, he concluded.⁴⁰

But Kaunitz was aware that an expansion of the military establishment was almost inevitable, and he therefore returned to an old theme, suggesting that an increase of the border guards was "the most beneficial and economical" addition the army could want.⁴¹ Here at least there was little argument. The border guards had made distinguished contributions in battle during the recent war, providing about 40,000 men (a full quarter of the mobile war force) at the beginning of the conflict and a total of over 88,000 men in the war as a whole.⁴² But these war years also left the military frontier destitute; the heavy drain of manpower had ruined the agriculture which was the basis of the area's economy.⁴³ Under the circumstances, conditions in the military frontier area had to be improved before any substantial increases could be made.

In the Staatsrat Kaunitz soon emerged as the most vociferous proponent of the border guards. When in April 1767 the Inspector-General of the military frontier, Baron Philip Levin von Beck, reported that duties, tariffs and extraordinary taxes were an unbearable burden on the border guards, Kaunitz was quick to insist that the maintenance of the military frontier was more important than any income that might be derived from duties, tariffs or other taxes and that as many of these as possible should accordingly be abolished.⁴⁴ Joseph agreed and ordered a full investigation.⁴⁵ In the face of difficult conditions, desertions were not uncommon, particularly after the near famines of 1764 and 1765.⁴⁶ The only way to prevent such desertions Kaunitz insisted was by making the living conditions in the military frontier superior to those across the border. The border guards

had to be fostered and their burdens significantly decreased.⁴⁷ This too Joseph supported, issuing detailed instructions designed to benefit the military frontier establishment.⁴⁸ In this respect the main concern remained an adequate grain supply, and though Joseph tended to be protectionist, the Hofkriegsrat felt it knew the local conditions better than anyone and pressed for the right to control grain export and import. Kaunitz and Borié so effectively supported this request⁴⁹ that Joseph consented to it.⁵⁰ The result of this was that the old practice of barter trade of Croatian sea salt for Turkish grain and other food products revived. The Hofkammer naturally tried to tax this trade, but this led to bitter complaints on the part of the Hofkriegsrat. Again Kaunitz supported the latter. Tariffs, he maintained, if they did not destroy the trade would at least so hinder it that no improvement in the living conditions of the border guards could be anticipated.⁵¹ Again the reluctant Joseph gave way.⁵²

Nevertheless economic conditions in the Military frontier remained hard. Though the frontier was extended to the Banat and Transylvania during the 1760's,⁵³ the anticipated increases did not materialize. Administrative bureaucratization increased, particularly after the general army regulation (Generalsreglement) of September 1769,⁵⁴ and additional tasks demanded of the border guards created burdens that only increased economic hardships to the point where it became questionable whether economic conditions would permit the continued existence of the border institution.⁵⁵ In 1770 Austria established a permanent quarantine line along its entire frontier with the Ottoman Empire to protect itself against incursions of the bubonic plague which was still endemic there, and the administration of

this so-called 'sanitary cordon' (Sanitätskordon) was also entrusted to the border guards.⁵⁶ Under these circumstances Kaunitz's hopes for a flourishing Military Border were bound to be disappointed.

If border guard strength levels never reached their projected goals during the period of the Co-Regency,⁵⁷ it did not dash Joseph's hopes for military increases. These hopes were based on the anticipated introduction of conscription. Kaunitz had never really succeeded in channeling demands for military increases into a policy of merely strengthening the Military Frontier. Indeed, this had been regarded at best as supplementary by Joseph and Lacy, and plans to put a canton system into operation continued apace. The turning point came when Lacy managed to convince Maria Theresia that with the introduction of a leave-system, a peasant could return to his work after an initial training period and remain capable of national defence merely by participating in annual six-week manoeuvres held after the harvest season.⁵⁸ At the same time Lacy attempted to defuse financial criticism by economizing measures within the Hofkriegsrat itself,⁵⁹ which even Kaunitz had to admit were more efficient than those of most other ministries.⁶⁰ Lacy also tried to demonstrate that conscription would not mean the imposition of a new inhuman despotism by promoting measures designed to improve the social conditions of soldiers. This included, for example, care for invalids, soldiers' wives or orphans, pensions for veterans, and facilitating military marriages.⁶¹ These sorts of measures Kaunitz also supported fully,⁶² and the change for the better in the Austrian army that Joseph reported to his brother on 8 September 1768⁶³ was undeniable. Only a year later the Venetian ambassador was able to report

that the state of the Austrian army was excellent and second to none in Europe.⁶⁴

By January 1769 Lacy was ready to begin the conscription system. He appealed to the patriotism of the Estates--from whom resistance was expected--and tried to show that the new measures would not, as feared, turn everyone into soldiers.⁶⁵ But as Kaunitz had predicted, conscription met with determined resistance at every level: the Austro-Bohemian Chancellery did not like the introduction of a new military administrative structure into the provinces; the public feared that conscription would disrupt their personal lives and that of their families; and the landowners foresaw drastic economic consequences if their labour force were conscripted.⁶⁶ Indeed, the seigneurial lobby, led as in 1763 by Rudolf Chotek, created such a storm that Lacy felt it was a selfish and gratuitous personal attack and reacted with extreme paranoia.⁶⁷

On 8 March the matter came to the Staatsrat. Starhemberg, Borié and Binder all expressed their opposition, leaving, as usual, the final word to Kaunitz, who submitted his votum on 2 May. Kaunitz began by noting how similar the proposed canton system was to the Prussian one, saying that the Hofkriegsrat proposals even went further than that by proposing the inclusion of all urban centers, with the exception of Vienna, in the new regulation. To the question of whether or not it was advisable to adopt these proposals on the whole, he felt he had already expressed his view adequately in the previous three years:

I hope to have proven at that time Kaunitz wrote that the introduction of this Prussian institution . . . is incompatible with the internal constitution of our monarchy,

with the customs and culture of our people, with the provincial system existing since 1748, with royal commitments made to all Estates, with all the principles established since the creation of the Staatsrat, and with the agricultural, industrial and commercial goals that have been set.⁶⁸

On the whole, however, the Hofkriegsrat had made some useful proposals, and its goal of having an efficient army was certainly laudable. It was therefore a question, he added, of determining "carefully and impartially," how the goal of the war ministry could be accomplished without the "introduction of the Prussian slave military system." Kaunitz then proceeded to divide the Hofkriegsrat proposals into three parts: acceptable ones, unacceptable ones, and those that needed further investigation.⁶⁹

In order to compile reliable conscription lists, the Hofkriegsrat had suggested a numbering of all houses and a census of all male burghers, peasants, craftsmen and domestic servants and their male relatives, double-checked with parish records, to be taken by a mixed civilian-military commission. Kaunitz agreed that a reliable census was needed and that the numbering of houses and the consultation of parish records were ideal aids to guarantee accuracy. But Kaunitz supported a census for other than military reasons and therefore insisted that everyone be counted regardless of class or sex. He also felt that this should be done by civilian authorities only, in order not to upset the populace. Certain other proposals of the Hofkriegsrat, however, were totally unacceptable to Kaunitz, even if conscription were introduced. These included the war ministry's proposal to have all potential draftees weighed and measured, the abolition of the old recruiting system once the cantons were erected and the inclusion of all cities except Vienna in the system. Kaunitz felt with Borié and

Blümegen that urban centers should be exempt, saw no reason why volunteer recruits could not continue to fill the ranks once conscription was introduced, and thought the weighing and measuring of potential draftees to be a particularly inhuman and odious practice. If the canton system were in fact adopted, officials in each canton would have sufficient indications approximately how many able-bodied potential draftees were to be found in that district, without having to advertise in advance who had been "singled out as the slaughter victim." As both Binder and Starhemberg had pointed out, Kaunitz noted, people so marked would do anything in their power to escape their fate. In conclusion, Kaunitz added that the Hofkriegsrat proposal to create a militia to complement the army could only be discussed once the accurate population statistics were available.⁷⁰

The opposition of the Staatsrat, however, only delayed not prevented the introduction of the canton system. The empress indicated that she did not want to act in the face of all this disagreement,⁷¹ but she made it perfectly clear in a note to Chotek on 21 May 1769 that she was only flexible about the way in which the measure was to be introduced not about the principle. She sent him a draft resolution which ordered conscription and commanded him to form an extraordinary commission to investigate any problems that might come up. The question whether or not the measure should be introduced, she explicitly added, was not to be entered into.⁷² With these strict guidelines the commission report was ready on 31 May and it was presented to the empress by Chotek on 6 June.⁷³ Given the limitations imposed by the empress, the only problems the report foresaw were on how the matter was to be communicated to the Provincial Estates: should they

be consulted, and if so should they be informed of the plan all at once or in installments, and finally, should conscription begin before or after consultation with the Estates? These questions were again submitted to the Staatsrat, and Kaunitz realized that Estates opposition was the last barrier in the way of conscription. For once he found himself on their side. He advised that the Estates indeed be consulted, and that this consultation should take place without hiding any of the facts, before conscription was actually introduced.⁷⁴

But the imperial resolution still showed that both Maria Theresa and Joseph remained firm in their resolve to introduce conscription. The new system was in the true interest of the monarchy, it read, but because it was to replace an older system that had been negotiated with the Estates, these were to be consulted. However, only the process of introduction not the virtues and demerits of the measure were to be discussed. Furthermore in the presentation to the Estates the phrase "regimental enlistment district (Regiments-Werbungs-Bezirk)" was to be used rather than the pejorative word "canton", and the entire system was to be called not "conscription" or "the canton system" but referred to as a "recruiting regulation (Recroutirungs-Regulament)."⁷⁵ As was to be expected, the Estates ignored their precise instruction and continued their opposition. But in a report of 25 November 1769 the Hofkriegsrat decided that sufficient 'consultations' had taken place and presented precise proposals on the process of introducing conscription.⁷⁶

This report was sent to the Staatsrat on 27 November and most members of the council resigned themselves to the inevitable. Kaunitz had one

more weapon--a weapon he often used so effectively in diplomacy--inactivity and delay. For over a month he did nothing. Then on 5 January 1770 a note arrived from the empress at the foot of a routine diplomatic report Kaunitz had submitted that day. The new recruiting system was pressing, it read curtly.⁷⁷ Judiciously predating his votum to 4 January, Kaunitz submitted his Staatsrat report. The main thing about introducing conscription, he said, was not to make an issue of it. A total not partial census should be taken by civilian authorities without military interference, and so forth in the same vein he had previously outlined.⁷⁸ It was the last resistance from Kaunitz. On 1 February 1770 the imperial resolution followed, and Kaunitz ceased thereafter, with some few exceptions, all further involvement in military questions.

The resolution began with the affirmation that, after much consideration, the new military system was indeed deemed to be in the best interest of the state. To prepare for it, therefore, a full census was to be conducted by Kreis commissars in co-operation with military officers. It was to be taken in urban as well as rural areas and include the nobility and clergy. At the same time houses were to be numbered and animals counted. To guarantee the accuracy of the census, parish records were to be consulted for verification, and the strict penalty of two years' hard labour was prescribed for anyone who tried to evade the count. The new system was to take effect immediately in Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Görz, Gradisca and Silesia, and on 1 October 1770 in Bohemia, Moravia and Upper and Lower Austria. Tyrol, the Vorlande, the Littorale and Hungary were not affected by the regulations since constitutional oaths prevented

the monarch from introducing them. The Military Frontier, as a military colony, was also not affected. Until the new system was completely introduced, the old one would remain valid.⁷⁹ Despite this firm order, resistance to conscription and the canton system persisted at all levels, and it was therefore not until 8 April 1771 that the new system was officially decreed.⁸⁰ Even then the census proceeded very slowly, and it was not until March 1772 that the Hofkriegsrat could report that the conscription lists had been compiled and that nothing further stood in the way of the establishment of regimental draft districts.⁸¹ It was with justice that Frederick II could now say of the Austrian army that they were "Prussians in white uniform."⁸²

For five years thereafter Kaunitz remained silent on military reform. In the intervening time, as Joseph reported with satisfaction to his mother, not the least part of the old military structure remained in existence.⁸³ In May 1774 Lacy retired for health reasons and was succeeded as Hofkriegsrat president by Field Marshall Count Andreas Hadik. The Polish partition crisis and the recently concluded Russo-Turkish war had led Hadik to the conclusion that further military increases were again necessary. Near the end of 1774 he prepared a major military reform. The growing strength of Russian and Prussian power coupled with the feebleness of Austria's ally, France, had aroused his concern. The increased defence requirements resulting from an increase in territory also dictated an increase in the military strength of Austria.⁸⁴ Lacy, who was still acting as the emperor's military adviser, agreed with Joseph that increases were

imperative and suggested that instead of creating new regiments, every company in the army be strengthened by the addition of nine men.⁸⁵ In January 1775 Joseph laid this plan before his mother. On 3 February Maria Theresia responded with observations of her own on every detail of the proposed reforms. On the central question of military increases, she was at one with Hadik, Lacy and Joseph, if it could be done without imposing further burdens on the peasants. Since conscription guaranteed a ready access to manpower, she did not see why infantry strength had to be increased until it was actually needed. She suggested instead that modest cavalry increases be made, and added in conclusion that Kaunitz be consulted in order to facilitate "a more certain decision."⁸⁶

Kaunitz was clearly reluctant to involve himself in this debate. In his reply of 14 February he noted that the army was in 'excellent shape, and since all necessary improvements were in any case being made by Joseph, all he could do was to voice his "humble approval." For this reason Kaunitz refused to enter into a discussion of the details of Hadik's proposals and contented himself with answering the main question of whether and how troop increases should be made. He agreed that the annexation of Galicia made military increases necessary and added that the monarchy's finances were in good enough shape to afford it. But rather than impose further conscription pressures on Austria and Bohemia, Kaunitz suggested the retention of the Belgian and Italian regiments already in Austria and the raising of three or four new ones there. He felt that 800,000 fl. annually to finance such an operation could be raised in the Netherlands and Milan.⁸⁷

Joseph, however, stuck by his plan of increasing each company by

nine men, estimating an annual cost of 1,200,000 fl. for the purpose. He enthusiastically endorsed Kaunitz's plan of raising 800,000 fl. in the Netherlands and Milan, but noted that the remaining 400,000 would have to come from the Generalkassa. Kaunitz was ordered to introduce the appropriate measures to raise the 800,000 fl. immediately.⁸⁸ Within a week the State Chancellor submitted his formal report, including a draft note to himself which Maria Theresia immediately signed.⁸⁹ No further comments ensued from Kaunitz thereafter on the matter, and he remained reluctant to discuss military questions. When in May of that year Joseph inspected the military border and ordered Kaunitz to comment on the imperial report from there,⁹⁰ the latter again evaded a serious debate. After praising the Military Frontier as an institution, he basically did little more than support Joseph's proposals designed to improve conditions there.⁹¹

Kaunitz's reluctance was clearly the result of the fundamental and apparently irreconcilable difference of views between himself and Joseph on the place of a military establishment in society. This clash came to the surface one final time during the Co-Regency at the end of the War of the Bavarian Succession. Pressing for as rapid a demobilization as possible, Kaunitz said that war was to society what illness was to the body, "a more or less general disturbance of the natural order of things." Once the life of the patient was saved, he continued the analogy, it became necessary to restore his bodily strength in order not to expose him to further illnesses. Hence, the utmost priority of the state should be to return as many people and horses to the land as quickly as possible. He suggested the immediate discharge of as many soldiers as possible in order

to permit them to return to their civilian duties, and felt that horses appropriated from the peasants during the war should not be sold but given back to these peasants free of charge as a sort of compensation for the hardships that had been imposed on them during the course of the war.⁹²

But Joseph's views, even in peace time, remained precisely the reverse. In his reply to Kaunitz the emperor wrote:

Our provinces are impoverished and cannot afford to maintain the present military establishment. . . . only the improvement of our agriculture, industry, trade and finance will make possible the upkeep and expansion of our military forces to meet future eventualities.⁹³

Thus while Kaunitz felt that the army had to be tailored to the society, Joseph felt society had to be tailored to the kind of army he insisted on maintaining. In the eyes of the emperor, Kaunitz's duty was therefore not to question military expenditures so much as to find new expedients to raise more funds to cover them. But though Kaunitz discharged this duty conscientiously,⁹⁴ the philosophical gap between him and the emperor was never bridged.

Ironically enough this remained the case, though for opposite reasons, in the debate over the creation of an Austrian navy. The need for sea armaments had first been brought to the attention of Kaunitz during the Seven Years War when two cutters flying Prussian colours had harassed the Adriatic coastline of the Habsburg Monarchy. This "insult", as Kaunitz called it, was still fresh in everyone's mind when the fragile peace with the Barbary Coast pirates was broken in 1764.⁹⁵ After the loss of Silesia, however, Austrian commerce sought new markets in the Levant and Mediterranean areas, and piracy operating out of Algiers became a serious commercial

concern. Under pressure from merchants and the port and municipal authorities of Trieste, therefore, the Kommerzienrat presented an extensive report on 11 September 1764 proposing the construction of two frigates for the protection of Austrian commerce.⁹⁶ The urgency of the matter was underscored when the Republic of Venice concluded a separate peace with the Barbary Coast pirates, allowing them refuge in Venetian ports after raids on Austrian Adriatic trade.⁹⁷ Under these circumstances Maria Theresia had quickly endorsed the construction of two thirty-gun frigates, and by the spring of 1767 these were completed.⁹⁸

The Kommerzienrat, however, had second thoughts on the value of this infant navy when the cost of arming the two frigates, 60,000 fl., became known.⁹⁹ Though there was sympathy in the Staatsrat for the financial plight of the Kommerzienrat, naval armaments nevertheless received unanimous support. Stupan suggested that the matter was of sufficient importance that funds could be allocated to it from the Cameral Kassa, that is, the income from crown lands. Kaunitz endorsed this recommendation, and the empress accepted it in June 1767.¹⁰⁰ Once funding was assured the Kommerzienrat, under whose jurisdiction the two frigates remained, began to worry about what precisely it should do with them. Again the matter came to the Staatsrat where it was once more unanimously recommended that such a decision ought to be put off until the appointment of a commander for the two ships. In his votum Kaunitz also took the opportunity to reinforce the necessity of a navy and to outline his long-range policy with regard to it. "This small beginning," Kaunitz wrote, would give Austrian commerce if not complete at least adequate security. Its culmination, he indicated, should

be the negotiation of a common naval policy with Tuscany, Rome and Naples.¹⁰¹ A beginning towards such a policy had, in fact, already been made. In March 1767 Kaunitz had convinced Maria Theresia to grant a request made by Leopold of Tuscany to allow Tuscan ships to operate under imperial patents and to fly imperial colours.¹⁰²

Again at the recommendation of Kaunitz, negotiations were undertaken with the Grand Master of the Order of Malta to acquire a French knight of Malta as commander of the Austrian frigates. The Grand Master recommended first Johann Chevalier de Meaussé, and upon the latter's resignation in August 1768, another Frenchman, Joseph Chevalier d'Acton.¹⁰³ With the arrival of Meaussé in the spring of 1768 the debate on the precise nature, functions and purpose of the new naval forces re-opened. Was it to be a strictly military operation under Hofkriegsrat control, a civilian one under Kommerzienrat direction, or a mixed one under both authorities? Kaunitz recommended the last course. Where the defence of commerce was most needed should be determined by the Kommerzienrat, he wrote; how this defence should be effected, however, should be left to the Hofkriegsrat. The navy should be a military institution and Meaussé accorded the rank of major-general. The empress concurred: "I agree fully with everything," she wrote Kaunitz, "as the frigates already exist nothing better can be done than is here proposed."¹⁰⁴

But apparently neither the Hofkriegsrat nor the Kommerzienrat were particularly anxious to accept responsibility for the fledgling navy. The former indicated that it was willing to give Meaussé a commission, provide the crews of the two frigates with uniforms, recruit the necessary personnel

and administer military justice in the navy, but it wanted to leave all further equipping, financing, and determination of how the navy was to be used exclusively to the Kommerzienrat. Kaunitz suggested that the empress compromise with the Hofkriegsrat, commanding Meaüssé to accept all his orders from the Kommerzienrat except in those areas in which the war ministry had agreed to accept directional control. He drafted the appropriate notes to Chotek and Lacy which Maria Theresia accepted and signed.¹⁰⁵

While this compromise relieved the Hofkriegsrat of any financial responsibility for the new navy, it pleased neither the Kommerzienrat nor Meaüssé. The latter, having in any case considered two frigates insufficient to meet the proposed defence requirements,¹⁰⁶ felt he could not operate under the conditions now presented to him and submitted his resignation. The former, having now to bear the expenses of a navy, had a change of heart as to its efficacy. In a report of 12 July Chotek suggested that the navy was a luxury the state could not afford and should therefore be liquidated.¹⁰⁷ In the Staatsrat Kaunitz reacted strongly to this suggestion. He repeated all the reasons why a navy had been founded in the first place and agreed that it was an expense that could itself not promise any profits. But, he added, all military expenditures were a necessary evil whose complete abolition, if possible, would be "very desirable." The problem in this case was to spare no effort to help foster trade from the port of Trieste. The bad impression that the liquidation of the navy would make not only abroad but at home with Austrian commercial interests could have serious consequences. If the whole matter were in confusion now, Kaunitz noted bitterly, it was all the result of the indecision and confusion of

the Kommerzienrat. If the council had an answer to the question of how to deal with the Barbary Coast pirates, it should submit it. Kaunitz therefore suggested that the Kommerzienrat be ordered to do precisely that, and that the subsequent report should be debated at length by the Staatsrat. Meanwhile the navy should continue to exist as constituted, and Meaussyé should be granted his resignation with a generous compensation.¹⁰⁸ Again the empress accepted Kaunitz's recommendations in every detail.¹⁰⁹

While it took almost two years for the Kommerzienrat report to be initially submitted and then debated by the Staatsrat, the question of costs was ultimately the deciding factor. The empress resisted attempts for an immediate liquidation of the navy before the debate was terminated,¹¹⁰ but in the end it was decided to sell the two frigates to Tuscany and to leave the defence of Austrian Mediterranean commerce to Austria's Italian allies, particularly Tuscany and Malta. Kaunitz accepted the decision without resistance. In May 1770 he was ordered to get in touch with the governor of Trieste, Count Auersperg, and to arrange the details of the transfer of vessels with him.¹¹¹ Although Kaunitz did so immediately,¹¹² the frigates remained officially Austrian for some years yet. A common naval policy was arranged with Tuscany, and by the summer of 1772 Leopold asked for the actual transfer of vessels to take place. But Kaunitz now raised diplomatic objections. Given Austria's position of armed neutrality in the current Russo-Turkish War, he pointed out, the sale of the frigates could be interpreted by the Turks as a move favouring the Russians. For this reason he insisted that the frigates not be sold until the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish peace. The empress accepted the recommendation, and it was hence

not until 1774 that the shortlived naval experiment came to an end.¹¹³

Kaunitz, however, did not give up his conviction that Austria should have a moderate navy of its own. In January 1778 he approached Joseph with a naval project because the emperor had remained relatively silent on the whole question and at one point even indicated that a navy would be a good idea. Kaunitz now reminded Joseph of what the latter had said and inquired whether, given the danger of another Russo-Turkish war, trees should not be felled that very winter in order to amass a supply of lumber for the construction of two warships. He repeated all his arguments about the protection of Austrian commerce, but met with little success. Joseph replied that he did not think there was sufficient wood for the purpose near the Croatian coast, and added that in case of need Austria could always rely on the naval resources of Tuscany and Malta.¹¹⁴

The matter arose again early in 1780 when a colonel in the Austrian army who had accompanied Joseph on his trips to Trieste and Croatia, a certain Count Benjowsky, submitted a detailed plan for the creation of an Austrian navy. Benjowsky's proposal was well worked out to the last detail. It included complete maps of the Adriatic coast line and the navigable internal river system, a detailed budget calling for an initial outlay of 500,000 fl. and a subsequent annual budget of 170,000 fl., and full plans for the construction of a sixty-gun battleship, two frigates of thirty-two and twenty-six cannons respectively, and sixteen smaller vessels carrying among them thirty-four additional cannons.¹¹⁵ Kaunitz took a keen interest in this plan and allowed himself to be convinced by Binder that only the open and firm backing of the State Chancellor could give the project any

chance of success.¹¹⁶ On 29 March 1780 Kaunitz accordingly submitted a report to Joseph backing Benjowsky's project. He began once more from the position that Austrian commerce needed protection from attack by Barbary Coast pirates if it were to grow. This necessity was clear: "the powerful influence of maritime commerce on industry and the general wealth of the state is proven as much by the example of those states that cultivate it as those that do not." In the past, Kaunitz noted, naval projects had always fallen through either through lack of proper personnel or through lack of funds. In this case he claimed that neither problem existed. In the "energetic" Benjowsky the right man had been found to carry the project out, and as to funding an easy expedient was at hand. The pope could be convinced to issue a crusade bull of the type already granted the Kings of Spain, Portugal and Naples, permitting the state to levy an extraordinary tax on all monasteries and abbeys whose annual income exceeded 80,000 fl. for the purpose of combatting Barbary Coast piracy.¹¹⁷

Joseph, however, was sceptical. He replied the next day that he did not have sufficient confidence in Benjowsky to carry such a "dangerous" and "grand enterprise" through, and expressed concern that the building of a navy might "excite the jealousy" of the English, Dutch, Danes, Swedes, Turks, French, Spaniards and Venetians and lead to diplomatic embarrassments.¹¹⁸ Kaunitz hastened to respond the same day. If Joseph could spare the time for a personal conversation with him in the not-too-distant future, he wrote, he believed he could ease his doubts on the matter. The request was granted with an alacrity that set Kaunitz aback: "If you don't mind," Joseph's answer read, "I will come to chat with you tomorrow

morning my dear prince."¹¹⁹

Kaunitz had little time to prepare his case. On short notice he sought Binder's help to plan for Joseph's anticipated objections. Binder told Kaunitz that Joseph had linked in his mind plans for a navy with those calling for a government-backed East India Company, and being opposed to the latter he was automatically opposed to the former. The first problem would therefore be to separate the two plans in the emperor's mind. To Joseph's fear of arousing the ire of the maritime states Binder suggested the arguments that such a small navy could cause no one any harm and that the diplomatic constellation was in any case such that no power could afford to alienate Austria. To underscore the necessity of a navy Binder suggested Kaunitz point out to Joseph that current defence measures for Austrian commerce were inadequate as some Austrian ships had only recently been seized by pirates. Above all, Binder added, a navy would become absolutely imperative if a war broke out with the Turks--an eventuality that seemed imminent. Finally, he concluded, Kaunitz could ease the emperor's mind about Benjowsky by reminding him that the latter had travelled through the area bordering the Adriatic with the emperor and had a full and detailed knowledge of it.¹²⁰

Kaunitz probably used all these arguments and more in his conversation with Joseph. And though there is no record of the conversation itself, subsequent events show that all of Kaunitz's persuasiveness was to no avail. In Joseph's mind the naval project remained inseparably linked with the East India Company project. After his return from Russia late in 1780 Joseph remained adamantly opposed to such a company, giving among other

reasons for his opposition the contention that the state would have to create a navy to protect East Indian trade. But this, he added, was out of the question since the state could hardly build a satisfactory navy when, as the War of the Bavarian Succession had demonstrated, it still did not have a satisfactory army.¹²¹ Six months after the death of the empress he repeated these sentiments, calling a navy a "most useless and vain" enterprise because it could not be adequate enough to properly reflect the might of the monarchy and to be competitive in the face of other naval powers.¹²² On that rock, Kaunitz's naval projects foundered for good.

CHAPTER XII

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF THE MONARCHY

An anonymous French observer remarked around 1770 that although Kaunitz was "the principal mover of all the important deliberations of the monarchy," he tended to view things "en grand" and to neglect details.¹ While, as has been demonstrated, this was certainly not always so, a good case can be made for this perception of Kaunitz in the economic sphere. This is, of course, not to suggest that Kaunitz's economic memoranda lacked detail. Indeed his position of head of the Italian and Belgian departments of the Staatskanzlei often required involvement in credit, loan and tax operations of extreme intricacy. But on the whole Kaunitz did not participate in debates on finance with the same determination that marked so many of his other activities. Above all he seldom took the initiative and contented himself with attempts to steer a general economic direction rather than involve himself in specifics.

The most decisive voices in financial matters remained the two finance ministers, Rechenkammer president Ludwig von Zinzendorf and Hofkammer president Karl von Hatzfeld. Zinzendorf, who was well acquainted with the financial structures and conditions of all the major European states and whose career had found its niche in economics from the beginning, tended to surpass Hatzfeld in his comprehensive theoretical knowledge of economics. Hatzfeld on the other hand had risen through the ranks of the political administration, acquiring a certain practical economic knowledge through a concern with the economic condition of the province of Bohemia.²

Kaunitz had become acquainted with Zinzendorf during his Paris embassy and was sufficiently impressed that he not only became a strong supporter of the latter but with time also tended to lean rather heavily on Zinzendorf for economic advice. Hatzfeld and Zinzendorf initially worked well together, but near the end of 1766 a rift began to appear between the two men that grew into a bitter personal enmity. Kaunitz tended to support Zinzendorf, but Hatzfeld eventually won the battle. The strong convictions of Zinzendorf and the driving ambition of Hatzfeld, whatever their disagreements, certainly resulted in an energetic approach to the economic problems of the monarchy so that Kaunitz found his usual role of gadfly somewhat superfluous.

Certainly energy was imperative in dealing with the financial crisis of the Habsburg Monarchy. As Mitrofanov has pointed out, the Habsburgs often had talented servants, good armies and efficient bureaucracies, but they hardly ever had any money.³ The situation was particularly critical during the reign of Maria Theresia. When the empress ascended the throne her treasury was depleted and total revenues were less than half of what they had been in 1736. During the War of the Austrian Succession only the annual English subsidy of £300,000 provided any degree of financial security, and after 1748 it was clear that radical reform was necessary. Under the direction of Haugwitz fundamental change came quickly. Seigneurial land lost its freedom from taxation and contributions demanded from the Provincial Estates were raised by over 50%. These reforms on the whole achieved their object, but they were not sufficient to meet the needs of the Seven Years' War. The national debt, which had been

101,000,000 fl. in 1740 and 118,000,000 fl. in 1756, skyrocketed to 271,000,000 fl. by the end of the war. Furthermore the annual deficit, which had been estimated at 12,000,000 fl. in 1761, could not be eliminated with the return of peace. Despite the imposition of a variety of new ordinary and extraordinary taxes, the post-war deficit was still 7,500,000 fl.⁴

The greatest millstones around the neck of the monarchy's finances were military expenditures and interest payments on the ever-rising national debt. In 1766 these expenditures were characterized by Kaunitz as "the only or at least the greatest essential ills" of the monarchy.⁵ Joseph, as has been seen, would brook no reduction of military spending, and indeed constantly demanded increases, so that the single most efficacious expedient for the monarchy in ordering its finances remained to reduce the interest payments on the national debt. Zinzendorf had indicated as early as 1758 that such a reduction was imperative. Kaunitz supported this idea in the Staatsrat in 1761, and on 28 July 1762 he submitted a memorandum in which he demonstrated that the state could save several millions a year by reducing national debt interest payments, and he strongly recommended that every effort be made to do so immediately after the establishment of peace.⁶ Maria Theresa accepted this suggestion. The national debt had been accumulated at various rates of interest ranging from 3% to 6%, and the first attempt the empress made to relieve the pressure of interest payments was to tax all interest income of her domestic creditors which exceeded 4%. Revenues from this tax, however, proved to be extremely disappointing, and on 25 November 1764 the empress instructed Hatzfeld to undertake deliberations

in order to find means to reduce all 5% and 6% rated interest payments to 4%.⁷ It was in the midst of these deliberations that Emperor Francis I died.

Content to accept a secondary role in political matters and untalented in military ones, the emperor had had a genius for finance. Beginning in 1736, he had accumulated a personal fortune estimated in 1755 to exceed 20,000,000 fl., and he had established the basis for the future private wealth of the Habsburgs.⁸ In a last will and testament drawn up in 1751 Francis made some modest provisions for his friends and family, but he surprised many by declaring his oldest son his sole heir for the bulk of his fortune. Both Maria Theresia and Joseph were apparently in agreement that at least some portion of this inheritance should be used for the benefit of the state and that another portion of it should be used to set up a private family fund to secure the financial security of future generations of Habsburgs.⁹ Provisions for the establishment of the private family fund were arranged without difficulty, and the fund was officially created by a decree of 16 October 1765.¹⁰ But the declaration of Joseph as universal heir immediately caused problems. Francis originally had thought that Joseph would succeed him in Tuscany and therefore had made all private Tuscan funds over to his oldest son as well. Since that time, however, it had been decided that Tuscany would become a Habsburg secundogeniture under the second oldest son, Leopold, and the question arose whether under these circumstances Joseph still had a right to family funds from Tuscany.

In the face of this dilemma Maria Theresia immediately turned to Kaunitz. She felt that the testament was "not executable" and sought his

advice on what to do. Until he had expressed his opinion, she added, she would keep the whole matter secret.¹¹ On 9 September 1765 Joseph too turned to Kaunitz for advice. He was also worried about the Tuscan funds and wondered if the testament should be made public as was customary.¹² Kaunitz recommended a closed conference of the leading ministers of the state under his chairmanship to decide these questions. The conference took place on 7 October. Two days later Kaunitz was able to report to Joseph that, though there were manifest problems involved, the testament in fact existed as it stood and that no extenuating circumstances made any of its provisions invalid. But because the current arrangements with Tuscany clearly contradicted the provisions of the will, the text of the testament should not be publicized. The information that a will existed and that the emperor was the sole heir was all that the public needed to know. In a separate note he also assured the emperor that his position of sole heir did not make him responsible for all Tuscan debts, a position that was endorsed by the other members of the conference. Joseph consulted his mother once more and then approved Kaunitz's report.¹³ The very next day the emperor wrote his brother that he had decided to give his inheritance to the state, "not reserving the least for myself." Since their father had not brought his private Tuscan income to Vienna, Joseph asked Leopold to send it to him immediately, sweetening the bitter pill by promising a 4% interest to the Grand Duke for life.¹⁴

Leopold did not give in to the demand without a struggle. Guided by his principal minister, the Marchese Antonio Botta-Adorno, Leopold attempted without success to convince Joseph that the removal of what amounted

to about 2,000,000 fl. from Tuscany would cause irreparable damage to the duchy's economy. Joseph grew increasingly bitter, particularly at what he saw as unwarranted interference by Botta in private family affairs.¹⁵

Kaunitz had every opportunity to moderate the emperor's tone. He followed every detail of the debate and was specifically asked by Joseph "to speak freely" to him on the subject.¹⁶ Indeed, there is every indication that Kaunitz was instrumental in formulating the arguments directed at Botta and Leopold. Before sending a particularly bitter reproach to Botta, Joseph sent the letter to Kaunitz with the words:

I am sending you herewith, my prince, the draft of the letter I am going to send Botta. You will note that in essence it consists of the so accurate and clear arguments that you have made, and that I have only added a little sauce to make him understand that he is not to meddle in the affairs of our family. . . . I beg you to delete or add whatever you wish.¹⁷

But Kaunitz was not anxious to delete or add anything. Clearly he was as anxious as Joseph to see the much-needed funds applied to the pressing needs of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The sum that Joseph was ultimately able to transfer to the state treasury exceeded 8,000,000 fl.,¹⁸ and this was to be the core of the cash reserves required to carry out the plan to reduce all state debt payments exceeding 4% to that level. The operation was undertaken by a commission consisting of Hatzfeld, Zinzendorf and the members of the Staatsrat, excepting Daun. As creditors were to be given the option either to cash those credit notes bearing a 6% or 5% interest rate, or to convert them to notes bearing a 4% rate, it was estimated that at least 18,000,000 fl. in cash reserves would be required. Despite Hatzfeld's fears that more money

would be required than could be raised, the commission as a whole adopted a more optimistic outlook. On 29 October Kaunitz was able to report that "the raising of the 18 million is not only to be regarded as possible but also as certain." He therefore regarded the operation as highly feasible and assured the empress that he could raise an additional 5,000,000 fl. if necessary through loans at a 4% interest rate in Italy, the Netherlands and elsewhere.¹⁹ The empress expressed her complete agreement. However she also indicated some concern that the operation might not be accomplished in good time and therefore ordered that Kaunitz receive monthly progress reports and act as a sort of watchdog for "the welfare of the monarchy."²⁰

The basis of the operation was a detailed proposal submitted by Zinzendorf which was examined and debated by Hatzfeld, Stupan and Borié. Two questions in particular remained in debate. The first concerned the question of whether all or only part of the credit notes exceeding 4% should be converted or cashed, and the second whether creditors should be given notice all at once or in stages. All opinions were then given to Kaunitz for comment. Concerning the first question he insisted that no exceptions be made to the 4% rule since exceptions would undermine the usefulness of the operation on the whole. Making an exception, he added, would also weaken the long-range aim of making 4% the normal interest rate of the entire state. With reference to the second question, Kaunitz strongly advised that notice be given the creditors all at once, since notice in stages would permit some of the larger creditors to withdraw their funds from the bank and re-invest them at higher rates of interest.²¹ Both suggestions were accepted, and the operation exceeded all expectations. Only 14,140,000 fl.

were cashed by creditors, and an additional 5,940,000 fl. were re-deposited at 4%, making the total cost of the operation 8,200,000 fl. The capital of the state debt was reduced to 259,697,000 fl.²² and the annual interest payment excluding domestic Estate debts, fell from 8,145,782 fl. and 18 kr. in 1765 to 5,612,736 fl. and 47 kr. in 1766. The annual payments remained at approximately the five and one half million mark throughout the period of the Co-Regency and only began to rise again in 1779, as a result of debts incurred to meet the expenses of the War of the Bavarian Succession.²³ From that point on the situation deteriorated rapidly. In 1780 the state debt was 376 million Gulden;²⁴ by 1809 it was over 727 million; and in 1811 the state was forced to declare bankruptcy.²⁵

That the reduction of interest payments on the state debt was regarded in official circles as the beginning of a new era in the economic life of the monarchy becomes evident from the fact that within two weeks after the interest payment operation was ordered, a State Conference was assembled to discuss the guidelines to be adopted for future economic policy. This State Conference, held on 17 April 1766, was the first assembly of all governmental notables since the death of Emperor Francis and was chaired by the young co-regent himself. The discussions were oral, and Kaunitz was reported to have spoken for over an hour and a half. Mitrofanov has characterized Kaunitz's contribution to the meeting as the sole voice of the new physiocratic ideas in the face of determined mercantilism.²⁶ Precisely how much and in which way Kaunitz was influenced by physiocratic ideas, however, has never been made clear.

Recently it has been demonstrated that Ludwig Zinzendorf's younger

half-brother Karl, who had been sent on various economic missions during 1764-1770 and who had been converted to physiocratic ideology during that time, was one of the earliest and most influential contacts of the Austrian government with the new ideas.²⁷ Karl was in constant correspondence with Ludwig, and the latter was the one man on whom Kaunitz relied for his economic ideas. But Karl did not become an outright physiocrat until 1770, and among the experiences that made him so were his exposure to the "free trade radicalism" in Milan in 1766 and the anti-monopoly lobbies in Belgium in 1770.²⁸ Both Milan and the Austrian Netherlands were, of course, administered by Kaunitz, and the physiocratic ideas that flourished there were clearly known and approved by him. It is further known that Kaunitz was one of the first subscribers to Diderot's Encyclopédie in Austria and undoubtedly was aware of Quesnay's contribution to it.²⁹ Whether or not he possessed a copy of Quesnay's Tableau économique (1758) or the even more influential and widely read L'Ami des Hommes (1756) of Mirabeau is unknown, but that he did keep in close touch with salon developments in Paris is certain.³⁰ Finally, the various physiocratic experiments in the smaller European states such as Tuscany and Baden could not have been unknown to Kaunitz.³¹

At the State Conference of 17 April 1766 Kaunitz certainly echoed laissez-faire ideas when he lamented the excessive strain that was being put on the state through heavy taxation. He pleaded for reductions, especially in those instances where taxation tended to enfeeble commerce, and suggested that the key to a healthy economy was not an obsessive concern with purely fiscal matters and an impatient urge to build up large

cash reserves. What was needed much more, Kaunitz said, was a consensus on policies designed to maximize agricultural, industrial and commercial productivity. He did not doubt that the current system of heavy taxation produced great revenues, but he insisted that people could only be taxed in proportion to their capacity to pay. Under those circumstances the existing system would in the end be self-defeating, leading to the ruination of trade and industry and the total impoverishment of the peasants. Kaunitz also opposed the heavy duties placed on the importation of foreign industrial products. He suggested that experience taught that such prohibitions only encouraged circumvention by smuggling and the subsequent sale of such products at double the price. In the final analysis, Kaunitz noted, it was again the consumer who suffered.³²

These arguments, however, met with little success. Given the fiscal requirements of the state, it was deemed impossible to remove all the additional taxation imposed as a temporary expedient during the Seven Years' War. Nevertheless, Kaunitz's arguments had sufficient effect on the empress that she continued to want the whole question of excessive taxation investigated and therefore asked Kaunitz to submit written proposals to this end some months later. Before Kaunitz was able to respond, however, the empress was struck with smallpox during the epidemic of 1766-1767. It was not until July 1767 that she recovered, and it was thus more than a year after the State Conference of 1766 that Kaunitz submitted his analysis of the taxation system and his recommendations for a reduction of the burdens placed on the subjects of the monarchy.³³

Kaunitz's report was dated 28 July 1767 and began by noting how the

empress' maternal concern for her people "who are so oppressed by such heavy and manifold tax burdens," had expressed itself once more by ordering this report. In a well-balanced economic system, he therefore began, the determination of general levels of taxation depended on four factors:

(1) that the taxes be proportionate to the real wealth of the state and the capacity of its subjects to pay them, (2) that they be justly equal, (3) that they not adversely affect the general standard of living, and (4) that they be collected at the lowest possible cost. Although he did not want to go into the question of whether current taxation levels were, in fact, proportionate to the real wealth of the state at any length, he insisted that there was "no doubt" that the burdens had risen to such a degree that the imposition of a single other tax would court the danger of a "complete weakening and ruination, especially of the peasant." The most desirable course, therefore, would be the abolition of some of the special taxes imposed to meet the urgent requirements of the last war. Given the continued needs of the state, he conceded that this had to be done cautiously, and he therefore recommended a thorough examination of all the new taxes imposed during the war, to find which were actually hindering agricultural, commercial and industrial productivity, which could be replaced by less harmful ones, and how the total tax structure could be simplified in order to guarantee a more efficient and less expensive collection system.³⁴

Self-evident and logical though these recommendations may have sounded, they could not stand in the face of the purely fiscal requirements, particularly the demands of the ever-increasing military establishment. Even the very investigation of the taxes that Kaunitz suggested was

left by the way-side. Other plans of a more purely fiscal nature began to eclipse Kaunitz's emphasis on strengthening the economic fibres of the country and on raising the general level of existence. And Kaunitz's interest in purely fiscal questions, as he himself would often confess,³⁵ was always secondary to other economic concerns, so that on the whole his influence in this area can be said to have declined rather than increased in the period of the Co-Regency. But the serious consequences of this rejection of Kaunitz's recommendations cannot be underestimated. As has been pointed out, the maintenance in peacetime of the special taxes imposed during the Seven Years' War "undermined the effectiveness of the government's entire programme of reforms, and helped to bring about economic catastrophe in Bohemia in the early 1770's and the near collapse of the entire economy during the War of the Bavarian Succession."³⁶

Among the many other plans for economic and especially fiscal reform that were considered during the 1760's, the two most important were those submitted first by Zinzendorf in 1767 and then by Hatzfeld in 1768. Zinzendorf's recommendations called for the creation of a new stock exchange, a new deposit bank and a trading company. The stock exchange was to be given an exchange monopoly, in that all trade in stocks and bonds was to be declared illegal if not transacted through the brokers of the exchange, and governmental institutions would no longer accept bonds in lieu of cash. The cancellation of government securities by creditors would be forbidden, and in its stead the state would set aside certain sums to purchase these securities, thereby maintaining them at their par value. In its efforts the stock exchange was to be assisted by a new deposit bank, which the Estates

were to be invited to guarantee. In addition it would be the task of this bank to maintain public and private credit interest rates at 4%. Against cash deposits the bank would issue paper notes, which would be required payment for up to half of any amount owed to the state. The bank itself, however, would lend only cash, never notes.³⁷

The Zinzendorf proposals were debated at ten different meetings of a special commission consisting of the two finance ministers, several privy councillors involved in economics and the Staatsräte Starhemberg, who was the chairman, Borié, Binder and Stupan. An open split in the commission soon appeared. Hatzfeld, supported by Stupan and Borié, bitterly attacked the Zinzendorf plans as too complicated and expensive; Starhemberg and Binder supported Zinzendorf. Until the empress' recovery from smallpox, Kaunitz's contribution to the debate had been minimal. At the end of July, however, the matter was brought before the Staatsrat alone. In the presence of both Joseph and Maria Theresia, Kaunitz came out strongly in favour of Zinzendorf. The purpose of a stock exchange, he said, was to establish an open marketplace in which competition for the sale of stocks would lead to the ultimate improvements of the products dealt in. Competition among potential buyers would raise the value of the bonds and at the same time increase the cash fund of the exchange. Kaunitz also endorsed the coercive clauses of the Zinzendorf plan because he felt that the original stock exchange established in 1761 failed precisely because it lacked such powers. The bank proposal received Kaunitz's enthusiastic support as well. As long as investors found a lending market which would return an interest exceeding 4%, all attempts to maintain the country's normal interest rate

as well as the state's borrowing rate at that level would be in vain. The Zinzendorf bank would close this avenue. Finally, Kaunitz supported the idea of a trade company because he felt it would stimulate domestic industry.³⁸

The Kaunitz votum proved decisive. The empress accepted part of the Zinzendorf proposals immediately. A bank in accordance with his recommendations was to be set up and Zinzendorf himself was to become its president. Hofkanzlei president Chotek was to forward a request to the Provincial Estates to guarantee the bank. In addition she seemed well disposed to the stock exchange and the trade company proposals as well, though she ordered further deliberations on both points.³⁹ Within a few short weeks, however, a complete volte-face took place. On 20 August 1767 Zinzendorf submitted his recommendations for the locations and personnel of the bank and the stock exchange. The recommendations went uneventfully through the Staatsrat, Kaunitz supporting all of Zinzendorf's suggestions,⁴⁰ but were not resolved by the monarch. Instead instructions were received to "let the matter be" for the moment.⁴¹

Though the empress claimed in a note to Starhemberg on 21 October, in which she finally rejected Zinzendorf's bank proposal, that the reason for the change of heart was because the Estates would not consent to guarantee any such new bank, Hock has correctly perceived the hand of Hatzfeld behind the sudden turn-about.⁴² Hatzfeld, as Hofkammer and Banco president, had had exclusive responsibility for state debt and credit operations, but by 1765 Zinzendorf began to insist that the auditory functions of the Rechenkammer should encompass these operations as well.

Hatzfeld felt that the Rechenkammer was impeding the efficiency of the Hofkammer and began to press for a circumscription of its auditory powers. At the same time both men found it increasingly difficult to come to any agreement on the joint reports they were required to submit, and in time this ministerial rivalry grew into personal enmity. In his opposition to Zinzendorf's economic plans, Hatzfeld at first seemed to have lost his case. But at the critical moment he won over Joseph and soon Maria Theresia as well. Zinzendorf complained bitterly of the "great vexation" which he was forced to undergo because "both sovereigns were opposed" to his plans,⁴³ but Hatzfeld now had the decisive advantage. On 11 November it was he who was ordered by the empress to modify the Zinzendorf plans and to submit recommendations for a "new suitable finance system for the present time of peace and future time of war."⁴⁴

At the same time that Hatzfeld was asked to submit his suggestions for financial reform, Kaunitz was asked for an even greater overview of all the ills of the monarchy. The response was the great reform proposal of 25 January 1768.⁴⁵ The Kaunitz report demonstrates that he had no idea how serious the reverse suffered by Zinzendorf had been. Making reference to the Rechenkammer president's proposals he noted that they had been approved by all the relevant authorities, the Hofkammer, the Staatsrat and the empress herself, and that the approval had been reversed only in anticipation of Hatzfeld's finance system. Though this proposal had not yet been submitted, he continued, from what could be gathered from conversations with Hatzfeld himself, it could be predicted "almost with certainty" that "not only can nothing better be expected from him, but also nothing that

can match the quality of Count Zinzendorf's proposals." Kaunitz therefore held any further delay in the implementation of the Zinzendorf plan to be a waste of time because it had already been accepted in principle and only questions concerning implementation remained.⁴⁶

The other economic proposals of the Kaunitz report indicated that he wished to move on from purely fiscal matters to more general economic problems. Since the interest on the state debt had been reduced to 4% he felt no further savings could be made on this expense. To prevent any expenditures from getting out of hand he proposed the establishment of a specific budget for each governmental department, but especially the military, beyond which expenditures would not be permitted to go except in dire emergencies. If this were not done, he warned, each department head would only strive to secure ever higher budgets for his department at the expense of others, occasioning "discontent, intrigues, cabals [and] internecine strife." But above all, Kaunitz wrote, he was convinced that the economic health of the monarchy was not dependent on "the payment of several millions debt more or less," and that such funds could be better used in fostering other domestic improvements. Of such improvements he specifically singled out improvements in agriculture, which he held to be one of the most important tasks of any state, and the creation of a trade company to stimulate domestic industry. The second proposal he held to be of such importance that if state funding proved necessary to ensure the creation of such a company, then it should be undertaken. He was, however, opposed to direct funding. He wished to see shares in the company offered to the public, and government support to take the form of share purchases by the

state. Kaunitz also lamented the state of tariff regulations in the Habsburg Monarchy, calling for a more efficient and rational approach to the whole problem. He suggested a beginning be made by creating a central excise office (Bureau de Régie) for the entire monarchy.⁴⁷

Kaunitz's scepticism about the efficacy of purely fiscal expedients to solve the economic problems of the monarchy can be seen most clearly in his attitude towards the finance system of Hatzfeld. The proposals solicited from the latter in November 1767 were finally submitted to the empress on 6 June 1768, and their emphasis was clearly on fiscal considerations. In peacetime Hatzfeld was basically interested in securing sufficient funds to balance the annual budget and to work primarily towards the goal of paying off the national debt. In case of war Hatzfeld estimated an annual requirement of forty-five million Gulden. Twenty-eight million of this could be raised through the usual taxation channels, but the remainder he proposed to make up by issuing paper money for ten million and legislating forced loans for another seven million.⁴⁸ The debate in the Staatsrat over Hatzfeld's proposals went on for well over a year. During this period Kaunitz made no contributions, the brunt of the attack on Hatzfeld being carried by Binder. The result was that Hatzfeld's peace-time system was separated from his war-time system and considered separately, and the proposal to issue paper money was given distinct attention as a useful fiscal expedient to be attempted immediately. In addition Hatzfeld was placed on the defensive and as late as 17 September 1769 forced to submit a "detailed explanation" of how his system could even be implemented.

It was only when these explanations came to the Staatsrat in

October that Kaunitz finally entered the fray himself. Even then he temporized, not submitting his votum until 24 February 1770 because, as he put it, the matter required "ripe consideration". So much of a state's "political credit" rested with the type of financial system it adopted, Kaunitz went on, that no measures could be contemplated in this respect without the most exact knowledge of their efficacy. In view of the violent disagreements still generated by Hatzfeld's proposals, both on principle and with respect to the means of their implementation, therefore, he would not "dare to recommend" that the proposed system be adopted. The whole proposal still lacked "the necessary clarity," Kaunitz concluded, and therefore he regarded the maintenance of the status quo as preferable to any "precipitous step."⁴⁹ But the fiscal emphases of Hatzfeld found favour with the empress, and most of his "peacetime system" was given royal approval. The immediate issue of paper currency and the wartime system in general were ordered to be discussed further.⁵⁰

Four more months passed before Hatzfeld submitted his next report, supporting the issuance of paper currency and underscoring the virtues of his wartime system. In the Staatsrat Kaunitz remained extremely sceptical. He noted somewhat bitterly that since Hatzfeld's system had been accepted by the empress the only questions left open concerned implementation. Apparently he was not aware of the reservations the empress still had about Hatzfeld's wartime system, for the tone of his votum clearly anticipated defeat, his critique being for the most part general rather than specific. He did not believe in the principle of forced loans from the Provincial Estates, he said, because the burdens would invariably be placed on those

least able to bear them--the peasants. In addition he labelled the hope that such coercion would only be a wartime expedient abandoned once peace was restored "a mere illusion." Concerning the issuing of paper money Kaunitz wrote:

Above all I believe that although the issuing and circulation of these bank notes could be of good use, I doubt very much that all those effects that Count Hatzfeld expects would result from it, indeed I believe rather the reverse.⁵¹

This time the empress' decision went against Hatzfeld. "There can be no question of a wartime system for now," she resolved, approving only the issuing of paper money and the creation of the Zinzendorf stock exchange as modified by Hatzfeld.⁵² By decree of 1 August 1771, twelve million Gulden paper money were issued in denominations ranging from five to one thousand Gulden.⁵³

By the end of 1771, however, the emphasis in government circles on fiscal expedients was already giving way to other economic questions. Above all the failure of the harvests and the debate over appropriate relief measures during the great famine of 1770-1772 focused attention on commerce in general and the grain trade in particular. During the 1760's the Austrian government, engaged in the post-war era in a vigorous trade war with Prussia which reached its high-point with the radical import prohibitions of 1764, opted for a system that was still strongly mercantilistic. Joseph betrayed strong protectionist leanings in his great reform proposal of 1765,⁵⁴ and Kaunitz's critique of these in his analysis of the memorandum⁵⁵ did not change the situation. Kaunitz's arguments at the State Conference of 17 April 1766, opposing the protectionist system and

emphasizing the necessity of stimulating trade and commerce, therefore also met with little success. In fact, only two days after the meeting, Joseph himself, after "ripe reflection", expressly confirmed all prohibitive measures passed, and ordered this confirmation circulated to all provincial authorities. He did, however, order a Hofkanzlei investigation of any measures that might be inhibiting the economy, and requested extensive local reports.⁵⁶ These investigations led to what has been called the first offensive of free trade, led by the head of the local commerce agency (Commerzconsensus) of Lower Austria, Count Philipp Sinzendorf. Sinzendorf's enthusiastic support of free trade made sufficient impact for the question to be studied by a special commission headed by the emperor personally, but not enough to cause a change of policy. In 1767 these first impulses towards free trade were rejected.⁵⁷

Thereafter Kaunitz adopted an extremely cautious approach to the whole question of the grain trade. Because the harvest of 1767 had been a good one, considerable pressure was applied by the larger land owners on the Hofkanzlei to press for greater freedom in grain exportation. As a result both the Hofkanzlei and the Kommerzienrat suggested that some relaxation of the export prohibitions on grain might be in order for Bohemia and Moravia. In the Staatsrat Kaunitz saw nothing wrong with "the logic" of the argument but seriously questioned its premises. He insisted that the statistics that had been submitted to buttress the argument that heavy grain surpluses would require some relaxation of the export ban, had been gathered at a time when the fruitfulness of the harvest could not be determined with any certainty. Furthermore, he considered the reports of

abundance to be based on hearsay and suggested that a decision on grain export could not be made one way or the other. He recommended the Kommerzienrat be ordered to accumulate more precise data both on the harvest and on domestic consumption.⁵⁸

Joseph, however, ignored the recommendations of Kaunitz. He considered the Hofkanzlei's logic "well conceived" and permitted the drawing up of more detailed proposals designed to relax export prohibitions.⁵⁹

When these came to the Staatsrat in October, Kaunitz again referred to his previous votum and insisted that one could not proceed without reliable information. He expressed considerable concern at the spiraling inflation that bread prices seemed to be undergoing, and this led him to believe that either the chancellery reports on the richness of the harvest were wrong or that there was some serious irregularity in marketing that the Hofkanzlei had not yet discovered. He therefore did not "dare to recommend anything positive for or against the permitting of exportation" until the causes of the inflation and the bread shortages were known. Above all he insisted that it was known with certainty that Upper and Lower Austria, and Vienna in particular, did not produce enough grain to cover consumption and had invariably to resort to imports from Hungary. Under these circumstances he felt that export from these areas definitely should be forbidden.⁶⁰

Joseph accepted the last suggestion, but for the rest he permitted the limited export quota that Silesia enjoyed to be extended to Bohemia and Moravia. At the same time he asked the Chancellery to investigate the effects that duty-free importation of grain from Hungary would have on the Austro-Bohemian lands.⁶¹

Lower Austrian provincial authorities were not pleased with the decision and launched an immediate appeal. Kaunitz's reaction to this appeal is interesting insofar as it puts his "physiocratic" stand at the State Conference of 1766 into its proper context:

No one [he wrote] can be more completely convinced of the great advantage of the permitting and all possible extending of grain exportation into foreign countries. A great influx of money into the hereditary provinces is thereby produced, agriculture is stimulated, and both lord and peasant are placed in a position of being able to bear the great burden they have on them. But every rule has its exception, and even the best thing can have evil consequences if it is overdone.⁶²

Kaunitz found support for his "exception" not in economic theory but in economic practice. He cited the example of England which to his mind had "without doubt the best agriculture and the greatest grain trade" in Europe. He noted that the English strove to keep balanced grain prices--not too low for the producer, not too high for the consumer--by regulating export and import according to need. Kaunitz felt the same should apply to Austria. Repeating his previous emphasis, he reiterated that everything depended on the question of what the cause of the current inflation was. As the Hofkanzlei, the Kommerzienrat and all the other Staatsrat members were convinced that grain exports had nothing to do with it, he indicated he would make no further objections. But he added again that so long as reliable production and consumption statistics were not available, all further comment would be in vain.⁶³

Whether Kaunitz's arguments were instrumental in Joseph's rejection of the Lower Austrian appeal⁶⁴ remains open to question. It is important to remember that not the Hofkanzlei, nor the Kommerzienrat, nor

such Staatsrat members as Gebler, Blümegen and Stupan, nor for that matter the emperor himself had been converted to physiocratic ideas merely because they supported a relaxation of grain export embargoes late in 1767. Rather this move is to be seen as a measure of support for the particular Austro-Bohemian land owning interests who required markets to dispose of surpluses. The defence of these interests took on a more clearly mercantilist complexion when in the subsequent two years the question of fostering industry in Hungary came up. The same people who supported the lifting of grain export prohibitions in 1767 opposed any Hungarian industrial development that might provide unwanted competition for Austro-Bohemian industry. In fact throughout these debates only Binder took a clear and strong stand in support of a laissez-faire approach, becoming the most consistent apostle of more liberal economic ideas in the Austria of the late 1760's.⁶⁵

Binder's isolation, even from his close friend and protector Kaunitz, becomes clear in September 1770 with the arrival in Vienna of Karl Zinzendorf, a recent convert to physiocratic ideas. Binder was quick to caution the younger Zinzendorf not to disclose his free trade principles,⁶⁶ and in view of the attitude adopted even by Kaunitz it is easy to see why. The matter became even more sensitive in the autumn of 1770 as the first effects of the great famine that struck most of Germany and to a lesser extent England and France were beginning to be felt. Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Upper and Lower Austria, the Tyrol and the Vorländer were seriously affected by this crisis, though the lands south of the Alps and the Kingdom of Hungary remained immune. The famine tended to aggravate the already serious post-war inflation, while at the same time depressing salaries and

incomes. The effects were drastic. In a note to the Bohemian gubernium the Hofkammer estimated that the population of Bohemia had decreased by 300,000.⁶⁷ Joseph himself, during a personal tour of the province, estimated that there had been 30,000 deaths, while others cited figures as high as 250,000.⁶⁸

The immediate response to the crisis was to free the grain trade between provinces and to abolish import duties on grain from abroad for the period of one year. When the harvest of 1771 also proved catastrophic these measures were extended for another year. The emphasis, however, remained on forbidding exports rather than encouraging duty-free imports, and a maximum price was set only once during the entire period, in February 1771.⁶⁹ Later in the year a special commission, in which Kressel played a leading role, was set up to supervise and introduce emergency relief measures,⁷⁰ but the broader economic policies to be adopted were even more heatedly debated than before. Karl Zinzendorf, having not heeded Binder's advice to keep quiet about free trade, in fact began a vigorous campaign against prohibitions. One of his earliest converts was Kressel, and during 1771 the two persisted in their determined view that commerce in grains had to be free of restrictions. Zinzendorf insisted that prohibitions against grain exports had caused a decline in foreign markets and a subsequent lower level of domestic production. The profits in good years such as 1767 were therefore insufficient to enable the purchase of the high-price grain sold in bad years.⁷¹

As early as February 1771, however, Joseph had betrayed a much more strongly mercantilist position to Zinzendorf when he insisted that the

shortages were the direct result of the relaxation of the export prohibitions during 1767-1768.⁷² In fact, after Joseph's visit to Bohemia in October 1771 even more draconian prohibitive measures were passed. On 23 November it was officially decreed that all exportations of grain would be punished with the death penalty, although a subsidiary secret instruction ordered the commutation of the penalty in every instance.⁷³ Kaunitz shared the perceptions of the emperor. In a major analysis of the famine crisis, particularly with respect to Bohemia, submitted in the Staatsrat early in February 1772, he too accepted the conclusion that the current lack of grain in Bohemia was partially the result of previous "all too heavy grain exports." Beyond that, however, Kaunitz adopted a more liberal view. He considered heavy taxation and "the multifarious hindrances on industries" the chief long-range causes of the crisis, and he insisted that all duties and taxes detrimental to the development of the latter be eliminated, that all hindrances be "cleared out of the way," and that the state take energetic measures to foster a more vigorous economic life.⁷⁴

In calling for a removal of "hindrances"--in other words a complete reform of the customs policies hitherto in effect--Kaunitz was, of course, breaking no new ground. Internal tariffs in particular had been a subject of heated debate since 1762, and the famine crisis only served to highlight the seriousness of the problem. But even before the famine the impetus for customs reform had come from within the Hofkammer itself. Although Hatzfeld tended to a more conservative view, Kaunitz had managed to place one of his protégés, Count Philip Cobenzl, into the finance ministry shortly after the latter's arrival in Vienna in 1767. Initially a privy councillor, Cobenzl

rose quickly within the ministry to become head of the customs department. At the end of 1769 he submitted a request that he be permitted to work out a complete reform of the internal and external tariff system.⁷⁵ The suggestion was received cautiously in the Staatsrat. Kaunitz noted that fundamental differences of principle would in all likelihood occur among the various departments affected; therefore, until some sort of decision had been reached along what lines such a reform should take place, specific policies could not be discussed.⁷⁶ The empress concurred and set up a special commission under the chairmanship of Starhemberg and consisting of Chotek, Hatzfeld, Ludwig Zinzendorf, Cobenzl and members of the Staatsrat to study the question.⁷⁷

Cobenzl, an enthusiastic supporter of free trade, lent his voice to the growing chorus of economic liberals in the subsequent years, making him, Karl Zinzendorf and Kressel the leaders of the free trade lobby in the Habsburg Empire. But protectionists remained firmly entrenched in the Kommerzienrat, and in the persons of Gebler and Blümegen, also in the Staatsrat. The debates between the two camps were carried on with great bitterness, though the liberals emerged from the ministerial shuffle of 1771 in a more advantageous position. Hatzfeld, who tended towards a middle-of-the-road economic policy, replaced the equally uncommitted Starhemberg as head of the council. But the substitution of the strongly mercantilist Blümegen with Kressel was a clear victory for the liberals. The remaining conservative voice in the body, Gebler, was offset to a large degree by the appointment of Löhr, who was also an enthusiastic free trader.⁷⁸ Within a few months the empress herself began to move towards a more liberal

approach. Although still endorsing prohibitive measures, she ordered the Kommerzienrat by way of a note to the new Hofkammer president, Kollowrat, not to carry them too far because they had in her view perhaps been too extensive in the past. She wanted a complete investigation, she wrote, in which the Kommerzienrat was to consult the provincial authorities, precisely to what extent prohibitions were to be abolished.⁷⁹

Despite pressure from the empress, the serious and irreconcilable differences between the two camps ensured a long and indecisive debate. Only in May 1773 was a report that still favoured protectionism produced. It certainly did not achieve the hoped-for consensus, and the free traders led by such men as Karl Zinzendorf and Philip Cobenzl continued to press their point of view.⁸⁰ The result was that on 20 August 1773 a commission was set up, consisting of representatives of the Hofkammer, the Rechenkammer, the Hofkanzlei and the Kommerzienrat, to address itself once more directly to the question of protectionism versus free trade. But the new discussions produced no new results: Cobenzl remained as adamant about free trade as Blümegen about prohibitive measures.⁸¹ It was in the face of this stalemate that the problem reached the Staatsrat on 4 September 1773.⁸²

Gebler, as expected, raised the mercantilist spectre of the evil consequences that would ensue if prohibitions were lifted. Money would flow out of the country and poverty and unemployment would follow in its wake. Löhr took the opposite point of view, laying the blame for the decline of industry since the end of the war squarely on the coercive and prohibitive measures adopted since then. Kressel agreed. In his view the prohibitive system merely encouraged smuggling and reprisals on the part of other

countries. But an agricultural state such as Austria, Kressel suggested, could not afford to provoke such reprisals because its greatest and most profitable enterprise should be grain export. Hatzfeld took a moderate view, not opposing prohibitions entirely but wishing them confined to "proper limits."⁸³

Then came the turn of Kaunitz. For almost two years he had remained outside the fray, and even now it was not until 20 January 1774 that he submitted his votum. But in the event, his opinion proved decisive. The essence of the economic life of a state, he wrote, consisted of the activity, struggle, competition, circulation and imitative spirit of its inhabitants. "All this," he continued, "is destroyed by coercion and prohibitions." Seconding the arguments of Löhr and Kressel, he suggested that if the purpose of prohibitions was to keep money in the country, that end was not being achieved. The amount of money in a state did not, in his view, depend on the number of factories within it, but on the value of their products. Ten factories keeping half a million Gulden a year in the country were not as important as one bringing in a million. Agriculture could, in this sense, be regarded as a 'factory', for it drew money into the country. The whole matter, furthermore, had to be seen in its proper perspective. Cash influxes were of use to the state only to the extent that they did not hinder the influx of even greater sums. Under those circumstances, Kaunitz concluded, "the direct result" was that all customs measures adopted had to take "freedom as the rule [and] prohibitions as the exception." And in his view there should be "very few cases" in which prohibitions could be considered either "necessary or advisable."⁸⁴

Before Maria Theresia, who had been inclining towards the position outlined by Kaunitz since at least the previous May,⁸⁵ could make her final decision, however, Joseph intervened. In a major memorandum dated 11 February 1774 he outlined his entire economic programme, which continued to adhere to the mercantilist ideal of self-sufficiency. While in favour of abolishing all internal tariffs and tolls and for customs purposes regarding "all hereditary provinces as one," the emperor insisted on the exclusion from the Habsburg Monarchy of all foreign products which could be manufactured domestically. Even if people suffered as a result of prohibitions, Joseph wrote, "the monarchy has always to be regarded as a society of 13 million people" in which "even if 2 or 3 million people are subjected to some burdens, 10 million nevertheless profit." He felt the destitution of "a few mountain regions in Bohemia, [and] 100 industrialists in Vienna" could be borne with equanimity if, as a result, the whole monarchy "stood as one man in protecting itself [and] communally feeding and clothing itself." In addition, he felt that the monarchy was in any case in a disadvantageous position to carry out profitable trade. Austria's neighbours such as Venice and Switzerland, not having to bear the burden of being great powers, did not have to tax their respective inhabitants as heavily, thus making them more productive industrially. Joseph also admitted that grain exports might suffer given a policy of this nature, but since he regarded Austria's neighbours self-sufficient he felt that not too much could be expected from that quarter in the first place. In order to counterbalance any losses of grain markets, the emperor recommended extensive animal husbandry. In his view the demand for meat was not as variable

as that for grain, and a flourishing meat production would have the double effect of ending the inflationary costs of domestic meat consumers while at the same time providing an outlet for surplus grain by way of feed. Finally the emperor subscribed strongly to the aim of increasing population as much as possible.⁸⁶

Joseph's economic programme, though in many respects unclear and contradictory, could not be ignored. As a result, his memo was added to all the previous Staatsrat voti and the whole matter was re-circulated through the council. Gebler enthusiastically supported the emperor, but Löhr and Kressel subjected the programme to searching criticism. Löhr suggested that if the outflux of capital were stopped, the influx would stop as well, killing foreign trade altogether. Kressel insisted that nations that "completely locked themselves up" grew ever poorer and weaker. And Hatzfeld pointed out that fostering animal husbandry usually tended to work against rather than for population increases. Kaunitz, already aware of Maria Theresa's final decision, rested his case on his previous votum. The empress' resolution ensued on 27 April. Basing itself primarily on the votum of Kaunitz, it posited as "the fundamental rule and unyielding guiding principle" the Kaunitzian formula that freedom in trade was to be the rule, and prohibitions the exception.⁸⁷

Having finally determined the governing principles of tariff reform, the empress now turned to the specific programme. Even before officially resolving the Staatsrat debate on free trade versus protectionism, she had been in touch with Kaunitz concerning the whole problem. Late in March she had sent him a draft resolution for comment, which was meant for

the Hofkanzlei and which outlined a programme calling for an end to the restrictionist policies of the past and for the complete abolition of all internal tariffs in the Austrian and Bohemian lands. Up to this point Kaunitz had been uncertain of his success, remarking to the empress in his reply of 30 March that because he had not expected this success, his joy at it had been all the greater. He expressed his complete agreement with the draft, adding only the suggestion that it be made clear that the proposed implementation date of 1 May 1775 was a deadline which should not prevent earlier implementation wherever possible. Kaunitz's support strengthened the will of the empress. "I am now more tranquil because the matter has the prince's approval," she wrote in response, adding the request that he "encourage Cobenzl to endorse the matter."⁸⁸ In response to a further request by the empress, Kaunitz submitted a week later a draft of a resolution abolishing some of the most burdensome import prohibitions.⁸⁹

Despite these decisions, however, Cobenzl's plan for a completely revised tariff ordinance which was subsequently drawn up, continued to encounter obstacles. Above all, Hofkammer president Kollowrat opposed it because he felt the implementation would result in an annual revenue loss of over 3,000,000 fl. while at the same time increasing administrative costs. But these objections merely delayed the issuing of the official patent until 15 July 1775 and did not affect the policy. The Staatsrat unanimously supported the final ordinance that Cobenzl had drawn up, and the empress expressed considerable pleasure that the long wished for goal finally had been reached.⁹⁰

The optimism and high expectations that surrounded the enactment

of this legislation underscore the importance that was placed on commerce by the liberal segments of high governmental circles. That Kaunitz was one of the enthusiastic members of this group is demonstrated above all by the one economic project which seemed to capture his imagination to an unprecedented degree in the final years of the Co-Regency, the creation of an Austrian East Indian Trading Company. It should be recalled that Kaunitz's principal motivation for supporting the establishment of an Austrian navy was to provide a defence for maritime commerce, which he believed was one of the most essential stimuli of a healthy economy; it also should be recalled that he had a highly empirical approach to the problem of the extent of governmental involvements in matters of commerce. Both these attitudes were instrumental in his initial response and subsequent involvement in the East Indian project.

While the history of the Austrian East India company and Kaunitz's role in its creation have received sufficient attention to make repetition unnecessary,⁹¹ it is nevertheless important to point out that Kaunitz's enthusiasm was so great that he hastened to lend his support with an alacrity that bordered on rashness and a determination totally out of proportion to the significance of the enterprise. When the Austrian ambassador in London, Count Ludwig Belgiojoso, first reported to Kaunitz in the autumn of 1774 that a Dutch-born German named William Bolts had approached him with a proposal to undertake East Indian trade under Austrian colours, Kaunitz quickly became the driving force behind the idea within official circles in Vienna. When Bolts arrived in Vienna in May 1775 Kaunitz seemed to be completely taken in by the image of the energetic and successful entrepreneur

that Bolts was trying to create. He was impressed by Bolts' "enthusiasm" and "the frankness of his conduct" and felt the project promised every success.⁹²

Leopold of Tuscany, who had also met Bolts, was much more cautious. He wrote Joseph that Bolts had a gift for covering up the truth and for exaggerating⁹³ and apparently influenced the emperor enough to move from a position of indifference to one of active dislike of Bolts. Joseph, as most other officials in Vienna, was in any case opposed to any notion of a state-sponsored company, believing that if the scheme of Bolts were effected it should be without any governmental support whatsoever.⁹⁴ Bolts, however, asked for a state contract and a line of credit from the treasury amounting to about 350,000 fl., both of which received strong support from Kaunitz. In March 1776 this conflict of opinion between Joseph and Kaunitz led to such a vigorous interchange between the two men that, as Joseph reported, Kaunitz was again prepared to tender his resignation.⁹⁵ In the meantime, Kaunitz discovered that his zeal for Bolts might have been precipitous. Bolts had given the impression that he had grown wealthy as a result of his enterprises, and Kaunitz had accepted this image of success. But in October 1775 Bolts had to declare bankruptcy in England, leading Kaunitz to the sober comment: "If I had known his talents better when he came here, I would have let the whole project drop."⁹⁶

Nevertheless Kaunitz remained an energetic advocate of East Indian trade, and when formal proposals for a state-sponsored company with a temporary monopoly and certain special tariff privileges was proposed in 1780, it again received his support. Joseph's equally adamant opposition

led to a rebuttal by Kaunitz on 22 April 1780 which in many ways summed up his entire attitude to trade and commerce. He defended a short-term monopoly though he did not believe in monopolies as such, as mandatory to get East Indian trade started, and he defended exceptions to a tariff ordinance he himself had helped push through on the grounds that tariff ordinances had to tailor themselves to the needs of trade, not trade to the rigour of tariff ordinances.⁹⁷ There was no doubt that Kaunitz belonged to the liberal camp of economic thought, but he had certainly had not freed himself from all the vestiges of mercantilism. His impulses in this respect were strongly empirical, and the dogmatism of economic theory always took second place to the efficacy of economic practice.

CHAPTER XIII

THE AGRARIAN SECTOR

It would hardly be an exaggeration to suggest that the agrarian problem confronting the so-called enlightened despots represented a micro-cosm of the entire crisis of pre-Revolutionary society, and as such was the single most important challenge facing statesmen of the day. Feudal social structures, and in particular the seigneurial system, were made obsolete by the emerging absolutist state precisely at a time when growing markets for grain led the landed aristocracy to attempts to reverse the general trend towards the emancipation of a formerly servile peasantry and to re-assert their demands for increased peasant labour services (robot). The end of the feudal system on the local level, of course, can be traced back to the fifteenth century when revolutionary developments in military technology led to the increased use of professional armies, which gradually took over all the defence functions previously exercised by the great rural aristocracy. This decline in the public functions of the landed aristocracy was abetted by the increasing assertion of jurists from about the sixteenth century onwards that the plethora of special local privileges and rights exercised by the aristocracy was an irrational legal condition that demanded reform. The gradual bureaucratization of the state from the local level upwards, culminating in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Haugwitzian reforms of 1748, then sealed the fate of seigneurial political power.¹

The convergence of these two long range trends was aggravated by the financial crises of and external threats to the monarchy. To protect

and maintain the peasant, who by virtue of being the chief tax payer, as well as representing the principal pool of manpower for military needs, was clearly the main buttress of the state, the crown insinuated itself between serf and seigneur in the form of the Kreisamt.² In the post-war period it was to be the reports of these local district officers that brought to light the anomalies that the vestiges of feudalism presented to the modern state. At the same time the crving need for agrarian reform was underscored both by the established mercantilist oriented central European cameralists as well as by the physiocrats.³

That a prosperous peasantry was the key to a prosperous state was a position that, as has been seen, Kaunitz reiterated in the context of almost all the reforms he supported: his emphasis on Kreis reform, his opposition to conscription, and his attack on heavy taxation. It was a concern about potential famine in the countryside that made Kaunitz extremely cautious about endorsing grain exports in 1767 even if he approved of free trade in principle, and it was this same concern that made him one of the staunchest advocates of the potato. When an anonymous pamphlet praising the virtues of the potato was brought to his attention by Stupan, he noted that although the planting of this crop was well underway and though the benefits of it were widely recognized, his concern for a harvest failure caused him to recommend that "the planting of potatoes be carried on all the more zealously."⁴ In accordance with this suggestion, the empress issued a public instruction using the very words of Kaunitz.⁵

Kaunitz was also an early opponent of serfdom, which existed to varying degrees throughout the monarchy. His principal objection to such

feudal vestiges to which the peasants were variously subjected was that they were detrimental to an efficient agricultural economy. Because he believed such restrictions to be counter-productive he remained convinced that changes in serf-seigneur relationships on private estates could be affected if the crown set a good example on its own estates. It has often been assumed that agrarian legislation was stimulated by manifestations of peasant malcontent in Silesia, Hungary and Bohemia during 1766-1768, but before the peasant uprisings of 1766 in Silesia were even investigated, much discussion of agrarian reform already was taking place. One of the most important proposals in this connection was made in the autumn of 1766 by a Carinthian industrialist and member of the Kommerzienrat, a certain von Thyss, who suggested that the conversion of peasant tenures into private properties was essential to a thriving rural economy, and that the empress should begin by setting an example on crown estates. When Hatzfeld, upon hearing these proposals, raised objections to specific aspects of the plan, Kaunitz quickly added his voice to the debate in order to save the principle if not the details of Thyss' plan.

In a report dated 3 November 1766 Kaunitz insisted that two questions were really at stake. The first was whether or not the conversion of peasant tenures into private properties in itself was beneficial for the state, and the second was whether the specific experiment proposed for the Carinthian crown estate of Bamberg was advisable. The first question he answered with a resounding yes. Because the wealth of a state depended primarily on its agricultural productivity, Kaunitz noted, the conversion was all the more desirable because, "without mentioning other manifold

benefits," it was clear that a peasant would work his own property more industriously than that which he only held temporarily. Until convincing proof to the contrary existed, furthermore, Kaunitz saw no reason why the specific proposed experiment should not be implemented. He felt that all of Hatzfeld's objections had been anticipated and answered by Thyss' original proposal, and suggested that if difficulties were still perceived the matter be submitted to the Staatsrat.⁶ This proved unnecessary. Thyss himself was commissioned to undertake negotiations with tenant farmers, and was still engaged in this task ten months later when he was called to Vienna in consultation over Zinzendorf's proposed trade company. How important Thyss' mission in Carinthia was seen to be in Vienna becomes clear when he asked for a postponement of his required presence in Vienna because he had not finished all conversion negotiations yet. Kaunitz advised Maria Theresia that, though he wished the discussions with Thyss over the proposed trade company to take place as soon as possible, the tenure question was so important, especially as it was to serve as a royal example, that Thyss should be permitted to delay his departure until he had completed his original task. The empress concurred: "He is to be left the time because I believe the matter to be too important to be rushed."⁷

The success of the Thyss experiment in Carinthia left Kaunitz convinced that "useful improvements" which would result in greater agricultural productivity should be initiated in other crown-controlled estates. He remained certain that this would provide private landowners with "forceful examples and an inspiration to follow," and in his great reform plan of 25 January 1768, he therefore included recommendations on improvements that

could be made in the agrarian sector "without any special danger and vain expenses," and which would "procure the entire state uncommonly considerable benefits." These included the abolition of the common pasture (Hutweide), the commutation of robot into money payments, the transformation of large bailiwicks (Meierhöfe) into villages, and the conversion of tenure holdings into private properties.⁸ In brief, Kaunitz was one of the earliest exponents of experimenting with wholesale agrarian reform on crown-controlled estates and, in the main, fully outlined a programme that was later to be proposed and implemented during 1777-1785 by agrarian reformers such as Franz Anton von Raab, Johann Paul von Hoyer and Anton Valerian Freiherr von Kaschnitz.⁹

The one obligation most hated by the peasants was the robot. These labour services demanded by the lord consisted not only of labour in the fields, but also of such functions as running errands, driving coaches, hunting or fishing for the lord, working in his vineyard, or even spinning for him. Very often the lords made such exorbitant demands on the peasant for robot services that the peasant had very little time or energy left to cultivate his own fields.¹⁰ Not surprisingly, therefore, this became the chief focus of peasant discontent. In 1767 one hundred and thirty-seven communities in Austrian Silesia revolted against their obligations. Meeting secretly at night the peasants sent appeals directly to Vienna, and it was in response to these that the royal bailiff (Amtsrat), Ernst Freiherr von Locella, was appointed to investigate peasant grievances. Locella came to the conclusion that it was not the alleviation of specific grievances that was required so much as a whole new agrarian order for the entire province.

In accordance with Locella's suggestions Maria Theresia created in February 1768 an agrarian commission (Urbarialkommission), headed by Locella himself, to regulate the whole system of labour obligations in all of Austrian Silesia.¹¹

While discussions culminating in a patent for Silesia regulating the amount of robot that could be required from the peasant (Robotregulierungs-patent) were being carried on, a whole series of anonymous memoranda began to appear in Vienna. These memoranda painted a bleak picture of peasant-lord relationships, particularly in Bohemia, and usually tended to recommend reform in a vein similar to those made by Kaunitz in his proposals of January 1768. The most significant of these memoranda was one submitted in August 1768 by a Bohemian Kreisamt adjunct, Ernst Baron von Unwerth, who catalogued a series of abuses on specific estates, particularly the estate of Prince Mannsfeld at Dobris. Unwerth's report went both to the Hofkanzlei and the Staatsrat for comment. Hofkanzler Chotek insisted that no reforms were necessary, suggesting that if the peasants were overburdened it was with state taxes not with robot services, but the Staatsrat, including Kaunitz, expressed greater concern.¹² As a result, an investigation was ordered at Dobris. When the local Kreisamt official proved too deferential to Prince Mannsfeld he was replaced. The oppressions of the peasants could not possibly have remained hidden from the local official, Maria Theresia concluded, so his failure to report had to be the result of "self-interest or human fear."¹³

The investigation of Dobris soon found that all the worst of Bohemian serfdom was exemplified on the Mannsfeld estate, and the crown

moved quickly to make an example of the prince. The appropriate punishment was discussed in the Staatsrat in the spring of 1770. Mannsfeld's bailiffs were to be arrested and the administration of his estates taken away from him for a period of several years. The question of a fine for Mannsfeld himself and some sort of compensation for his peasants remained contentious, Blümegen suggesting that indemnification of the peasants was an excessive measure. Kaunitz did not share this view. He felt that a justification for indemnification found its basis in "natural fairness" and suggested it be "expressly commanded." With regard to the personal fine on Prince Mannsfeld Kaunitz endorsed the sum of 3,000 fl. even though he felt Mannsfeld deserved "a much sharper penalty."¹⁴ The empress accepted these penalties and even rewarded the investigating district officer with a special gift of one hundred ducats.¹⁵

At the same time a series of measures were promulgated designed to prevent the recurrence of the types of abuses discovered on the Mannsfeld estate. The peasants could no longer be forced to purchase goods and services from the lords at inflated prices or be compelled to sell their own at low ones, the forced labour of children was forbidden, peasants were permitted to hire themselves out to estates other than their own, and arbitrary penalties imposed on peasants by their lords were required to cease.¹⁶ Moved by the "harsh and manifold oppressions of the peasants," the empress further issued an instruction to Chotek on 12 July ordering a general Kreisamt level investigation of peasant complaints all over Bohemia, giving precise instructions on which abuses were to be reported.¹⁷ Two days later a formal decree to this effect was issued.¹⁸

Meanwhile the central problem of labour obligations continued to be discussed. In the Staatsrat there was unanimous opposition to the robot as such, but while Binder and Borié favoured the commutation of labour services into payments in kind, Blümegen and Kaunitz favoured payments in cash. Kaunitz in his votum of 4 August insisted that the commutation of robot into cash payments was both "generally beneficial and highly desirable for the state," but thought a royal decree to this effect would encounter too much resistance if it were introduced on a national scale. He therefore recommended that trial commutations be ordered on some more crown estates to test the efficacy of the measure.¹⁹ This suggestion was adopted,²⁰ but while the experiments were being conducted on crown estates the discussions on the matter continued. In the autumn of the year, as the famine was beginning to be felt seriously, the question arose whether peasants who were unable to find enough to eat on the estates of their lords should still be required to perform labour services and be forbidden to leave the manor. Kaunitz conceded that strictly speaking the lords had a legal case, but added that the robot was in theory after all a payment for drawing nourishment from the lord's land. If the land was unable to provide such support, the robot should also fall away. "Not to give peasants who cannot find bread on their own manor the liberty to seek it elsewhere," Kaunitz concluded, "would be cruel, and is not to be permitted the lords under any circumstances."²¹ Thus, release from the legal bonds of serfdom was also granted, even if only as a temporary relief measure in the famine crisis.²² And though the resolution did not have a revolutionary impact, it nevertheless set an important precedent for Joseph's formal abolition of serfdom on

1 November 1781.

The inadequacy of all the measures hitherto taken tended to be highlighted as bad weather ruined the crops of 1771 and intensified the already serious famine crisis. In October of that year the empress created a special agrarian commission headed by Count Franz Khevenhüller and including the district officer of the Dobris investigation and one of the most radical members of the Silesian commission of 1768, Franz Anton von Blanc. Its task was to set guidelines within which the entire robot problem could be regulated. But Maria Theresia's firm determination to bring a new order to the robot system, particularly in Bohemia, was met with equally determined opposition. After a debate lasting over a year, nothing was accomplished but that the whole nature of the contemplated reform was thrown into doubt. In December 1772 the empress had to order new commission deliberations with the explicit order not to discuss whether or not a robot regulation should be implemented but merely how it should be done.²³

During this time Kaunitz continued to believe that lords and peasants could reach mutually acceptable agreements regulating robot services, and advised royal encouragement of voluntary agreements but not royal interference. When, for example, the prelate of the abbey of Kloster-Bruck near Znaim in Moravia concluded voluntary agreements on robot regulation with the peasants on the lands of the abbey, Kaunitz recommended to the empress that she bestow the knight's cross of the Order of St. Stephen on the abbot and a medal on all the monks of the abbey as a special sign of royal approval and as an incentive for others to take similar actions. Though the empress replied to Kaunitz's suggestion that the prelate deserved

even more than that, no actions seem to have been taken at all. Furthermore seigneurial opposition to any robot regulation remained so obstinate that only one land-owner, Count Franz Norbert Trauttmansdorff, followed the royal example of reaching voluntary agreements with his peasants.²⁴ As a result the debates continued. On 7 January 1773 Joseph reported to his brother that though there were plenty of discussions on robot regulation, "a number of difficulties" stood in the way of executing any of the proposals.²⁵

These difficulties amounted to continued violent disagreements among all the major advisers of the crown in the matter of agrarian policy. A party led by Blanc wanted the robot regulated within a maximum labour obligation of three days a week, according to the size of the peasant holding. Borié insisted more firmly that since the land was the lord's, the latter had a right to receive labour services. These services, Borié felt, could be precisely evaluated; and, if in this evaluation, the peasant holding amounted to more than what could be paid by the equivalent of three days' work, then that extra time had to be rendered. A third point of view, represented most energetically by Kressel, remained totally opposed to any general all-inclusive regulation on the grounds that conditions varied too much from estate to estate. Gebler and Kaunitz supported Blanc, insisting that the Austrian peasant was "not a slave in the Roman or Turkish sense," and suggesting that all fears and political objections to relieving the burden of the peasants too much were completely unfounded.²⁶

In the face of this continued disagreement the empress felt it impossible to issue any precise resolution on the agrarian problem. But

her concern for the welfare of the peasants remained unabated. If she could not yet issue a final resolution, she wrote to Hofkanzler Blümegen on 4 June 1773, it was nevertheless her "earnest will that the oppressed Bohemian subject be aided effectively without delay by at least a provisional patent."²⁷ In response the Hofkanzlei insisted that a provisional patent would not dispel any of the uncertainty surrounding proposed agrarian legislation and should therefore be avoided. Uncertain on how to respond to these objections, Maria Theresa again turned to Kaunitz for advice. In his report of 18 June Kaunitz agreed that a provisional patent was not advisable and suggested instead that the empress issue a decisive resolution in order to lay all doubts to rest. Maria Theresa remained reluctant to make a final decision in the face of so much disagreement, but after a conversation with Blanc, who had assumed a role of primary importance in agrarian matters, she decided that the two men should arrive at a decision on a decisive instruction on robot regulations to be issued.²⁸ Under those circumstances and with the last-minute support of Hatzfeld, Blanc's position was adopted and issued in September as the official guideline within which the robot was to be regulated.²⁹

The release of the official crown guidelines galvanized the Estates into action. In a representation of 27 October 1773 they attempted to prevent any and all state interference in robot matters.³⁰ This attempt, however, ran aground on the determination of Maria Theresa so aptly summarized in a comment she made to Count Palffy: "For the sake of a few magnates and nobles I do not intend to risk eternal damnation."³¹ Having failed to prevent crown interference on the manor, the Estates attempted

at least to regulate this intervention by submitting new counter-proposals on 27 December. They agreed that lords and serfs should reach new agreements, but where no agreement was reached the county official was to decide on the basis of custom and local usage. They desired all individual agreements to be held secret until they could all be published simultaneously. They continued to insist on relatively heavy robot services, and they requested that a deputy from each Provincial Estate be added to the agrarian commission.³²

These counter-proposals, however, were subjected to a devastating critique by Blanc in a report of 24 January 1774. Blanc correctly perceived that the seigneurial proposals would render all regulatory decrees meaningless. If the serf did not come to an agreement on the lord's terms, the lord could invoke the arbitration of the county official who would then be required to regulate on the basis of custom and local usage--i. e., the status quo. Furthermore, if a deputy from each Estate were added to the agrarian commission, that body would be transformed into an organ of the Estates rather than be an agent of the crown. Blanc therefore termed the proposals totally unacceptable and urged the retention of the guidelines set out by the instruction of September 1773.³³ The Staatsrat accepted Blanc's assessment of the Estate proposals, Hatzfeld leading the opposition to them and Kaunitz expressing his "complete agreement." Either hard and fast limits to robot requirements should be issued immediately, or no further decrees should be issued until it was certain that voluntary agreements had failed.³⁴

Before the empress made her decision, however, Joseph intervened.

In a long and careful memorandum to his mother on 23 February 1774 he took a relatively conservative position, attempting to steer a middle course between the assertion of reformers such as Blanc that the country would be ruined if the robot were not limited and the seigneurial insistence that the lords would be ruined if it were. He rejected any all-encompassing agrarian systems and advocated that each lord individually arrive at voluntary agreements with his serfs. Where this did not occur within six months, the decision was to be left to the Kriesamt.³⁵ The empress made no resistance to this proposal, leaving the entire decision to her son. Accordingly on 7 April Joseph issued an instruction (Unterricht) in which he set a limit of three days per week on the robot, the amount due in each case to be based on the land tax paid by the peasant. He allowed six months for the parties to reach agreement. When the lords asked for a public notice that "free" agreements could exceed the three-day maximum, they were granted it.³⁶

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the peasants were not willing to negotiate, and the six-month limit given by the Unterricht thus ended without results in November. Under the impact of this failure the empress decided on the creation of a new extraordinary agrarian commission to study the problem of a robot regulation. The commission report of 28 January 1775 recommended that no increase in obligations should take place and that a weekly three-day maximum be decreed officially. These recommendations were accepted by Maria Theresia and officially publicized on 28 February.³⁷ In the meantime, however, the peasants, driven to extremes, rose in revolt, and in the face of this

uprising the Estates insisted that the empress rescind her resolution. The peasant uprising shocked Maria Theresia, and she immediately turned to Kaunitz with the words: "I would like the prince to give me his opinion either in written or oral form, because this banding together [of the peasants] is going too far."³⁸

The reply of Kaunitz is not extant, but given his cautious advice to Joseph several months later not to publish a robot-regulating patent until complete order had been restored, it is safe to assume that he advised a delay in any action. In August 1775 Kaunitz was to suggest that it was an affront to the dignity of the sovereign to appear to be giving in to subjects who had dared to rebel, and that it could lead to a widespread suspicion that "a well founded weakness" existed at the center of government. But it would be a mistake to assume that Kaunitz was only concerned with maintaining the absolutist image of the crown. He did not object to a robot patent as such, but wished to be certain that the circumstances of its issue befitted the importance of the legislation, "with all the display of majesty and all the solemnity possible."³⁹

The attitude of Kaunitz at this juncture is put into even sharper perspective by his comment of 1770 about the Hungarian robot patent that had been implemented in 1768. Because the Hungarian patent had encountered so much resistance from the land owners, the issue had become so contentious that it had to be submitted to the Staatsrat. There Kaunitz insisted as a premise to the whole discussion that because the legislation had as its aim lightening the burdens of the peasant, there could not possibly be any reasonable objections to it. But he did concede that practical

difficulties could make it a wise decision to postpone decisive action. In "such an important and fundamental reform" Kaunitz concluded, ". . . much more depends on it being done well and thoroughly than somewhat sooner or later."⁴⁰

There remains another important reason why Kaunitz adopted such a cautious approach to agrarian measures in 1775. For him the robot question was quite simply only part of a much larger problem: the unproportionate and excessive burdens placed on the common people of the monarchy. In his great reform plan of 1773 Kaunitz had noted that in the opinion of many people the real problem besetting the peasants was excessive taxation demands by the state, in the opinion of others the central problem was excessive military demands, and others felt it was the excessive robot demands on the part of the lords. He himself, however, was reluctant to hold any one cause more responsible for peasant destitution than another and frankly insisted that "all three at once" were at fault.⁴¹ Kaunitz was thus unable to share the faith of men like Blanc for whom a robot regulation was a panacea for all the problems that the peasants faced, and in view of the difficulties with which he was confronted in proposing the decrease of taxation and military burdens, it became only all the more important that robot regulations were not hurried responses to specific crises but a fundamental social reform.

Whether it was due to oral advice given by Kaunitz or not, the spring of 1775 passed without action being taken on the robot problem. Already on 3 April Joseph was able to report to Leopold that the rebellion had been crushed by the army. Many prisoners had been taken, and eighteen

of "these brigands" had lost their lives.⁴² By June Blanc saw the time ripe for taking up the robot problem again and submitted a lengthy analysis of the commission report of January, pressing for as liberal an interpretation of it as possible.⁴³ This time he found support from Joseph who began to press for as rapid a conclusion to the affair as could be affected. But again the empress would not take the final step without consulting Kaunitz. She instructed Blanc to send Kaunitz all the relevant documents including a draft patent, and to ask for his comments.⁴⁴

Kaunitz, as noted, continued to advise a postponement of definitive legislation until all was quiet, but Joseph became convinced that only the release of a robot patent would create the desired tranquility.⁴⁵ His conviction thereupon took on the tone of urgency so typical of him, and as usual his brother Leopold received a flood of complaints. In July he lamented that agrarian affairs were "still swimming in incertitude."⁴⁶ On 3 August he noted bitterly that things were "worse than ever," and that "such confusion" was put into the head of the empress that bureaucratic obedience was lost entirely. "My dear brother," Joseph concluded, "you can believe me when I tell you it is unbelievable and I am really sick of the things I see happening every day."⁴⁷ And only four days before the actual publication of the patent, he again wrote Leopold, asking rhetorically, "Do you think that the empress has yet come to a decision in this damned agrarian matter?"⁴⁸

The robot regulation patents were finally released for Bohemia on 13 August and for Moravia on 7 September. The decrees eliminated the worst robot abuses, setting a yearly maximum of twenty-six days and a

weekly one of three. They forbade robot on Sundays and holy days and limited the daily winter work to eight hours and the summer to twelve; and, though they permitted serfs to be worked on other lands, they calculated travel time as part of the day's work.⁴⁹ The execution of the patent, however, was replete with difficulties. In Joseph's opinion, "it did not have the effect that one expected of it because it was written in an incredibly bungling and nearly unintelligible manner."⁵⁰ Maria Theresia on the other hand became convinced that the peasants were pushed to the extreme by the excesses of the lords," and that it was the land owners who were subverting the patent.⁵¹ The perception of the empress was closer to reality. In many places the lords did not even let their serfs know about the patent, and where it was known, often it was not enforced.⁵² At the same time the expectations of the peasants to be released from the formal bonds of serfdom and to have the robot abolished entirely also were not satisfied, and reports of ongoing restlessness continued to reach Vienna throughout 1776.⁵³

By November 1776 the empress again turned to Kaunitz for advice in the agrarian matter. In his reply, however, he maintained that he had no idea of what had happened on the local level since the release of the patents in 1775 and therefore declined to offer any recommendations.⁵⁴ This was insufficient for Maria Theresia, and after providing the chancellor with detailed information on the continued difficulties robot regulations were encountering, she solicited his comments again. This time Kaunitz pointed to the improper use of the army in enforcing robot regulation as the primary difficulty. He felt the sole function of the army should be

to keep the peace and not to act as arbiters in serf-seigneur disputes.⁵⁵ But this too was insufficient for the empress and she turned from Kaunitz to Blanc for further advice. Blanc, in a memorandum submitted on the last day of December 1776, quite simply considered a reconciliation between lord and peasant impossible as long as serfdom, "this despised bond of humanity," harsh robot demands, arbitrary taxation, and "thousands of misuses and demands that crept in earlier pitch-dark times and that were sanctified by merely existing a long time" continued to undermine the peasants.⁵⁶

The response that Blanc's comments generated can be gauged from the comment of Hatzfeld who felt that Blanc's "enthusiasm" for the peasants had gone too far and that it would therefore be just as well if he were excluded from all further agrarian deliberations.⁵⁷ The effect on the empress was the reverse. On 6 January 1777 she informed Hatzfeld that not only did she wish robot obligations to be severely limited, she wanted every other peasant complaint investigated and alleviated.⁵⁸ Under the influence of Blanc this determination soon reached revolutionary proportions. On 16 January Joseph reported to Leopold that the empress was "troubled in a way I have never seen before." She was contemplating a "bouleversement general," and was convinced that everyone was against her.

It is nearly impossible [the emperor continued] to go to the empress with a quiet heart. The laments, the irrationalities joined with reproaches and very sharp suspicions recur each time, for she says that I have abandoned her . . . [and] have let myself be won and seduced against her. God knows, she even thinks that my friends and servants have influenced me. . . . In short, the empress wanted to upset the whole robot patent which was published a year ago. With all possible solemnities she wanted to abolish service obligations, regulate arbitrarily contracts and rents the peasants, to whom one has rented the land,

have paid to their lords for centuries. She wanted to change the whole rural economy and system of ownership. Finally she wanted to alleviate the debts and obligations of the serfs without having the slightest regard for the lords, putting the latter into the position of losing at least half their revenues and as a consequence deflating all prices and causing many bankruptcies.⁵⁹

There is no doubt that the reforms that Maria Theresia now contemplated would have a revolutionary impact on the entire society. The formal abolition of serfdom in itself, though symbolically perhaps the most spectacular, would have been less laden with potential social disorder than the attempt to abolish labour services by royal fiat. Forced commutation of robot to cash payments at arbitrarily determined values and the transfer of all peasant tenures to private property at one fell swoop would in fact have constituted a greater social revolution than the land and tax reform Joseph was to attempt in 1789. These were not aims with which either Joseph or Kaunitz disagreed in principle, but both men were convinced that such reforms had to be introduced in stages. Joseph emphasized this point in a note to his mother on 18 January. In his view such a radical departure from only recently issued legislation would undermine the crown's credibility and could have little but detrimental consequences. He therefore felt that a patent merely commanding strict observance of the decrees of 1775 was in order for the moment. Only when this legislation had taken root and the government could "count on the observance of its issued commands with more certainty" did he feel that other matters, "especially certain inconvenient and harsh aspects of serfdom," could be regulated.⁶⁰

Kaunitz emphasized an even subtler point. Brought into the fray at the request of both Joseph and Maria Theresia, Kaunitz posited several

important theses in a series of reports and draft patents submitted between 31 January and 6 February. The most fundamental of these was that sovereignty must entail a respect for the laws of private property. For Kaunitz it was a measure of a civilized people that the disposition of private property was not subject to authoritarian dictates on the part of the state so long as that disposition did not contravene the law. In short, Kaunitz insisted that the sovereign was not above the law, that despotism was in the phrase of Mercier de la Rivière, "legal" not arbitrary. For this reason Kaunitz could only support the commutation of robot to cash payments on a voluntary basis. Nevertheless he continued to believe firmly in the concept of commutation, thinking it to be mutually beneficial to both lord and peasant. However he felt it should be done out of a conviction of its efficacy and profitability rather than as a result of compulsion. But conviction was something Kaunitz insisted could only come through example. Thus, he had supported the commutation of robot to cash payments initiated on crown estates by such men as Raab; and for similar reasons he now recommended that Raab be commissioned to answer in writing any and all doubts and questions that arose during the discussions on agrarian reform about commutation. At the root of this recommendation lay the classic Enlightenment assumption that if inherent contradictions could be empirically demonstrated, if the logic of counter-productivity or inutility could be laid bare, then reform--or better still--'rationalization' had to follow by necessity.⁶¹

In practical terms, therefore, Kaunitz fully supported Joseph in the insistence that only a patent commanding the precise observation of

the legislation of 1775 be issued. At the request of Joseph he personally submitted no less than five drafts for such a patent in which, as he wrote in his accompanying reports, he pursued two aims: the first was to ensure rural tranquility without having recourse to arms and the second was to lay the groundwork which would lend the ideas of the abolition of the robot and of serfdom eventual success. The tone of Kaunitz's initial drafts tended to be generous and paternalistic, officially ascribing seigneurial resistance or peasant disobedience "less to ingratitude and ill will than to ignorance," but at the behest of Joseph each successive draft was progressively shortened and made more succinct. The final draft underlined the rights inherent in private property, endorsed the notion of voluntary robot commutation agreements between lord and peasant, and commanded strict obedience of the patents of 1775.⁶²

Joseph must have had considerable faith in the ability of Kaunitz to sway the empress. The day after Kaunitz submitted his fifth and final patent draft, the emperor wrote Leopold that the whole affair was "in its final stage." He was convinced that the empress' resistance had to break and that a final decision was imminent.⁶³ But a week later, on 13 February, he was forced to report that "the same irresolution" continued and that nothing had been decided. He observed that "Her Majesty is tormented and angered in the most incredible fashion," adding: "I have had to bear the most cruel debates and I swear to you that I have never seen anything like it in my whole life." Indeed, if anything, the matter had taken a turn for the worse. According to Joseph, Blanc--who was the soul of Maria Theresia's agrarian radicalism--was spreading rumours that the emperor did

not really believe what he had written and that the attempt was about to be made to win over Kaunitz with this "lie."⁶⁴

That the empress was indeed deeply affected by the whole crisis is beyond doubt. Her letters to her younger son, Ferdinand, reflect a dejection and depression that reveal precisely what an emotional issue the agrarian problem had become for her. She insisted that her son had been raised against her by the nobility and that this obstinate refusal to endorse her revolutionary measures enabled them to succeed "in annihilating the work of two years in the wink of an eye." She expressed severe doubts that the existing legislation was enough to maintain peace in the countryside because, as she put it, "people without hope have nothing to lose," adding epigrammatically, "need knows no law."⁶⁵

That the attempt was made to sway Kaunitz is also beyond doubt. Whether it was from the hands of Blanc or from those of the empress herself, Kaunitz received all the documents germane to the problem once more with instructions to reconsider the whole question. On 28 February he replied that he remained in complete agreement with the emperor and strongly advised the empress to accept the draft patent he enclosed.⁶⁶ Privately, he must also have assured the empress that her fears were unrealistic, for she replied later in the day that she was glad that the whole "sad affair" was over. At the end of the note she added: "It is one of the greatest services the ministry of the prince has rendered me. Without him I would not have come out of this; I put my entire trust in him and his help."⁶⁷ The next day, on 1 March 1777, the patent recommended by Kaunitz was published.⁶⁸ Maria Theresia's agrarian revolution had come to an end.

CHAPTER XIV

EUDAEMONISM TRIUMPHANT

In preparing his famous reform plan of April 1773, Kaunitz had recourse to a similar plan submitted in December of the previous year by the man who was to become Maria Theresia's principal adviser in agrarian matters, Franz Anton von Blanc. Blanc posited the thesis that the basis and aim of the social contract was to guarantee the happiness of its members, and that the main function of government was therefore "to unite in the sovereign the effective will of all citizens to achieve lasting happiness."¹ In this clear statement of eudaemonism Blanc echoed one of the pillars of Enlightenment political thought. Indeed, Cassirer has suggested that not only were all the major thinkers of the Enlightenment with the exception of Rousseau eudaemonists but that this was the key that permitted men demanding freedom to become enthusiastic advocates of enlightened absolutism. In Cassirer's view this demand on the part of the philosophes of the Enlightenment translated directly into a demand for the modern welfare state.² That this was an important ideological underpinning of social policy in the Habsburg Monarchy of the post-war era is beyond doubt, but, as has been pointed out, it would be an error to regard the social reforms of Maria Theresia from the perspective of the modern welfare state.³

In practice, eudaemonist social policies cannot be analyzed under rubrics determined by an industrialized society, and to conjure up the image of a welfare state in the modern sense would be highly misleading.

It is therefore necessary to consider governmental action motivated by eudaemonism in a much more limited sense than the formal definition of the concept would suggest. It could perhaps be most profitably understood if the emphasis were placed not on detailed legislation guaranteeing specific social benefits but rather on what could be called the quality of social interaction. In this context, it becomes less important to stress such things as, for example, Kaunitz's insistence on effective relief measures in the face of natural disasters,⁴ his plans to counteract a severe housing shortage in the face of a rapidly expanding population,⁵ or his endorsement of the state's upkeep of orphanages.⁶ Rather, analysis must center around two areas that were subject to major reform efforts in the period of the Co-Regency, and from which Kaunitz's attitude to the tone of the society or the quality of life can be extrapolated most effectively--justice and education.

There is, nevertheless, a preliminary social consideration which cannot be ignored because, as Otruba has noted, it provided the fundamental premise from which all other social policy proceeded: the state's concern about levels of population--what the Germans call Bevölkerungspolitik.⁷ One of the most fundamental tenets of mercantilism, and particularly of its central European form, cameralism, was the notion that people are the basic asset of the state, and therefore an increase in population means an increase in power, security, wealth and cultural progress. This so-called populationist theory articulated by such influential cameralists as Johann Heinrich von Justi (1705-1771) and Joseph von Sonnenfels (1733-1817),⁸ was fully accepted by Kaunitz. In his assessment of Joseph's great memorandum

of 1765 he insisted that nothing the emperor had said was more important than his emphasis on finding ways and means to enlarge the population of the monarchy. In Kaunitz's view the population of the Austrian Monarchy was insufficient and it was not merely important to prevent depopulation but also to "augment as much as possible the one that exists."⁹

By 1766 this was not a new idea. Maria Theresia herself had fully accepted the populationist theories of the cameralists and had introduced a colonization programme in southern Hungary after the War of the Austrian Succession. The toll in manpower of the Seven Years' War then led directly to a second wave of systematic government-sponsored immigration to the less populated areas of the monarchy such as the Banat, southern Hungary and Transylvania. The importance the empress placed on this programme cannot be more graphically illustrated than by the fact that even protestants were encouraged to settle in these areas by receiving a guarantee of the free exercise of their religion. The colonization programme was guided by a series of so-called population commissions (Impopulationskommissionen) which sought to induce immigration particularly from southwestern Germany. These commissions faced numerous problems. Many smaller German states were extremely reluctant to allow emigration, and in addition the bidding for immigrants was highly competitive. Russia in particular dispatched numerous propagandists and recruiters to Germany in an attempt to induce immigration, and naturally the colonization programme of Austria therefore involved foreign policy considerations as well.¹⁰

Kaunitz felt that the population commissions were "the best that has happened in the colonization business,"¹¹ and he therefore enthusiastically

endorsed the work of these bodies. When, for example, one commission recommended in a protocol of 15 January 1767 that all immigrants be offered both a free draft and milking animal, Kaunitz thought the idea highly praiseworthy and added that since the Hungarian Treasury was likely to balk at the measure, regular inspections to guarantee that the animals had been delivered to the colonists should be ordered.¹² The empress accepted both suggestions.¹³

But as foreign minister Kaunitz also advised caution. He felt that colonization should not be overdone and that the Habsburg Monarchy should be content if one thousand German families a year were settled in the depopulated areas of Austria.¹⁴ He was concerned to avoid causing any "great sensation," particularly in the face of retaliatory measures adopted by some smaller German princes such as forbidding emigration under pain of confiscation of all the emigrant's property.¹⁵ In his view "open emigration inducements" publicized in neighbouring states "invariably [had] an odious character," and he therefore recommended such recruitments be undertaken with all possible care and circumspection.¹⁶ The empress recognized this necessity and adopted the policy laid out by Kaunitz.¹⁷

If there was thus a consensus on the populationist premises upon which society was to be based and Kaunitz's role amounted to little more than defining the modality of this premise, the same cannot be said of the problem of the all-important social complexion rendered a state by its judicial system. Judicial reform in the Habsburg Monarchy was a direct product of the Haugwitzian administrative reforms of 1749 in which a complete separation of the administrative and judicial functions of government

were undertaken. Thereafter, in the interests of efficiency, it soon became apparent that the extreme judicial particularism that had characterized the legal system of the various provinces of the monarchy would have to be streamlined. At the same time the creation of more unitary laws within the monarchy was imperative to guarantee the success of the other reforms undertaken. Under these circumstances both the codification of civil law and the rationalization of penal law became objects Maria Theresa was required to pursue.¹⁸

The codification of civil law was ordered in 1753 and after extensive debate resulted in the presentation of a draft of a new civil code --the Codex Theresianus--to the empress in 1766. The Codex was a compromise document. While pursuing the aim of casting a new unitary system of laws for the monarchy it in fact preserved as much of the traditional law as possible. It tampered as little as it could with well-established personal rights, and took a clearly conservative approach to such things as, for example, laws governing inheritance or serf-seigneur relationships. This compromise satisfied neither reformers nor conservatives. In the view of the former the Codex was inadequate, while in view of the latter it had already gone too far in imposing a new statist uniformity on the traditional rights of the provinces.¹⁹ The assault on the code was begun by the reformers,²⁰ the foremost of them being Kaunitz. On 22 December 1766 the problem came before the Staatsrat, and the shortcomings of the Codex were immediately pointed out. If the many conflicting civil laws of the different provinces were rationalized, then it was felt that a rationalization of the courts, criminal law and tax law had to be an integral part of

the process. Kaunitz in particular insisted that a penal regulation had to constitute "an essential part of the new code" if the whole enterprise was not to be left incomplete.²¹

The attitude of Kaunitz towards the draft Codex is amplified by the approach he took to the problem of legal reform in Transylvania. Here he again insisted that criminal law had to be "a principal part" of any new law code, and that any codification depended primarily on "a fundamental connection and harmony amongst the laws." He therefore suggested that all piecemeal legal reform was to be avoided and that the emphasis should be on a fundamental new order.²² It was because these recommendations met with the approval of the empress that the draft Codex was not accepted. A rationalization of the courts was specifically ordered, and the Lower Austrian representative on the original commission drawing up the Codex, Hogler, was instructed to begin the drafting of a new code of criminal law. In addition the empress also commanded an investigation into the problem of introducing greater uniformity into the various provincial tax laws.²³ While these amendments were therefore to be investigated, it is no surprise that Waldstätten, another member of the Codex commission, was also charged with rendering an assessment of the work already completed.²⁴

The critical appraisal of the draft Codex that Waldstätten produced by early 1769 was repudiated by the commission in a report of 23 May, and the resultant discourse was then left to the Staatsrat for deliberation. Binder, following closely the direction already mapped out by Kaunitz, insisted that the Codex was insufficient and that a "full code of laws" ranging from penal to commercial law should be drawn up. Binder also went

so far as to suggest that the new code should be applied to the entire monarchy including Milan and Belgium. This position was severely criticized by Blümegen who advocated acceptance of the draft. He noted that the crown was powerless to introduce such a uniform code in Hungary and suggested the Binder's centralism went too far. Stupan would not go as far as Binder, but he too rejected the draft Codex.²⁵ Kaunitz himself, in a votum that ran to sixteen pages, again attacked the Codex as an inadequate document. He felt that the final aim of drawing up a code was "to abrogate the Roman law and all the previous confused, partly dark, partly mutually contradictory laws and to introduce in their stead a general and uniform law." This aim, Kaunitz said, had not been achieved by the Codex. Indeed, in revealing a dependence on concepts and definitions derived from a Roman law that was daily growing more obsolete, the Codex was dooming itself to unintelligibility by future jurists. In addition, since the Codex did not necessarily rescind all existing provincial laws but merely those in which a direct conflict existed, Austrian jurisprudence largely retained "the prolixity, [and] unconnected and self-contradictory chaos" of the existing legal system which itself was already "a load of many camels' backs (multorum camelorum onus)." Under the circumstances Kaunitz recommended the drafting of "a systematic plan" for the revision of the entire work.²⁶

The votum of Kaunitz proved decisive. The Codex draft was deemed inadequate and the personal aide of Binder, the Konzipist Horten, was commissioned to outline a full revision of it. Horten's plan was subject to much criticism and resulted in the drafting of a revised plan, to that it was not until 4 August 1772 that a decree was issued officially ordering

the revision of the code. In the meanwhile the appointment of Hatzfeld to the Staatsrat added new strength to the conservative critics of the Codex. Hatzfeld's opposition to Horten and his revised code was so strong that Kaunitz appealed to the empress personally to order the Staatsrat to speed up its deliberations on the Codex.²⁷ When the empress agreed and asked Kaunitz himself to draft the appropriate order to Hatzfeld, he submitted a note which commanded every means to be exhausted so that the revised Codex could be finished within at the very most two years. On the same day, 26 February 1773, the empress signed and dispatched the note.²⁸

But the fond hopes of Maria Theresia and Kaunitz were to be disappointed. Rather than witnessing an accelerated pace of work on the revised Codex, the activities of the committee of compilation virtually ceased. By 1780 the Oberste Justizstelle, the vanguard of judicial conservatism, even felt the time right to request that the whole idea of a civil code be abandoned. It deprecated the tendency towards "universal laws" and energetically supported the old practice of issuing decrees province by province. Though this request was rejected by the empress, work on the civil code proceeded only in spurts in the subsequent decades, and it was not until 1811, seventeen years after the death of Kaunitz, that the Austrian Civil Law Code was finally published.²⁹ The reformers and conservatives thus arrived at a stalemate during the period of the Co-Regency on the question of the introduction of a unitary civil code, and Kaunitz at best only achieved a negative success.

However this was not to be the case with the draft penal code--the Nemesis Theresiana--which, having been ordered in 1766, was presented to

the empress on 16 February 1769. The Nemesis too was in many ways a compromise document. It was considerably more progressive than the old code of Charles VI, but it retained provisions for such cruel forms of capital punishment as being burned alive or drawn and quartered, and it sanctioned the judicial torture of suspects in capital crimes. In practice the Nemesis was not as brutal as in theory, as judges were instructed to exercise mercy and as the empress personally reviewed all capital cases to see if clemency was in order.³⁰ But for a man like Kaunitz the very existence of such legal provisions as the Nemesis posited was a medieval anachronism. In this case the influence on Kaunitz of the main Enlightenment spokesman demanding a mitigation of the cruelties of criminal procedure, Cesare Bonesana, Marchese di Beccaria, is quite direct.

Beccaria's spectacularly successful Dei delitti e delle pene (An Essay on Crimes and Punishments) of 1764, which insisted that the punishment must fit the crime and that torture had to be abolished, had made a great impression on Kaunitz. When Beccaria, who was a native of the Duchy of Milan, was invited by Empress Catherine II of Russia to come to St. Petersburg and assist in the legal reforms she was then undertaking, Kaunitz made every effort to keep him in Milan. He wrote his governor, Firmian, on 27 April 1767 that it would be very desirable not to lose such an educated, and as was evident from the Essay, perspicacious and independent thinker.³¹ He strongly endorsed Firmian's suggestion that Beccaria be offered a law chair in Milan. When the Essay was condemned by the Vatican, Kaunitz continued to lend it and Beccaria personally his fullest support. In 1769 Beccaria officially received a chair of political

economy, and when the Studienhofkommission (Court Education Commission) recommended an annual salary of 2,000 Lire, Kaunitz used his influence with the empress to have the sum raised to 3,000.³²

It was in the spirit of Beccaria's Essay that Kaunitz submitted a memorandum to Maria Theresia on 20 February 1769, only two days after the Nemesis had been accepted. In his view not only did the new penal code lack precision and clarity, it prescribed cruel and unusual punishments that sullied the name of the empress. Kaunitz noted that the draft code still made references to witchcraft and other superstitions which he considered "laughable" in these "enlightened times;" he angrily attacked the practice of branding criminals, since it marked a man for life and undermined rehabilitation; and finally he totally opposed the retention of judicial torture, being particularly offended by the graphic illustrations of torture methods in the code.³³ The compilers of the Nemesis evaded this criticism by indicating that they had not been commissioned to draw up a new code but merely unify and rationalize existing laws. Kaunitz accepted this criticism and withdrew his own, endorsing what had been done within the limits prescribed.³⁴ Kaunitz preferred a new liberal unitary penal code, but both its unitary and liberal nature were equally important to him. Thus, while a conservative unitary code remained unsatisfactory to him, it was nevertheless a step in the right direction. For the moment Kaunitz settled for this limited progress.

Others, however, remained more vociferous in the demand for a liberalization of the penal laws of the monarchy. Foremost amongst these were the professors of law and political economy at the University of

Vienna, Karl Anton Martini and Joseph von Sonnenfels. Martini and Sonnenfels in fact launched such a devastating attack on the use of torture that on 19 November 1773 the empress specifically ordered an investigation into the problem of whether torture should be restricted or eliminated altogether. The retentionists proved by no means to be a feeble force. The justice ministry tended uniformly to adopt the conservative position, and in the Staatsrat both Stupan and Hatzfeld energetically defended this stand. As a result the debate dragged on for over two years. Only in August 1775 was it given decisive direction by the intervention of Joseph, who expressed the conviction that the abolition of torture would not only be "a just and harmless" but also a necessary measure. The empress, pleading ignorance of legal matters, left the decision to her son. Joseph, in turn, ordered new deliberations, receiving such energetic support for the position that he had articulated from Blümegen that he resolved to attempt to persuade his mother to add her voice to his own.³⁵ Again the empress would not make up her mind on the abolition resolution that Joseph had drafted without first consulting Kaunitz.

Kaunitz for his part attempted to ease Maria Theresia's mind in his reply of 31 December 1775. He acknowledged that the conservatives had made some very sound arguments, though he did not name them, but said he still firmly supported those opinions recommending an abolition of torture. His only concern was that the new penal laws not be introduced into Belgium and Milan without the prior consent of those provinces.³⁶ With this Maria Theresia joined the abolitionist camp, and the official decree abolishing torture in Austria, Bohemia, Galicia and the Banat was issued on 2 January

1776. On the same day Kaunitz was asked to undertake negotiations with the Gubernii of the Austrian Netherlands and the Duchy of Milan for the extension of the reform to those provinces.³⁷

Another quasi-legal problem that indirectly touched on education as well was that of censorship. The battle to wrest control of the censorship board from the hands of the Jesuits in favour of a more secular and statist committee had already been won for the empress by Gerard van Swieten in 1759, and by the era of the Co-Regency the state's control of censorship was already firmly established.³⁸ But a liberal or conservative exercise of the censorship functions remained the subject of ongoing debate, which after the creation of the Staatsrat often concerned that body. In his capacity as a member of the council Kaunitz was thus able to use his influence to lend direction to the tone of state censorship.

The direction that Kaunitz laid down was uncompromisingly liberal. He insisted that "an excessive censorship of books would lead us back into the old barbarism" of previous times, and he expressed his particular concern at censorship of books addressed primarily to professionals.³⁹ In a case in which a legal study of the validity of sworn statements was attacked by the Hofkanzlei as undermining morality, Kaunitz again emphasized that harsh censorship was an over-reaction. He could not endorse the principle whereby a whole valuable book was rejected merely because some of its passages had been deemed offensive, and he warned that this sort of approach to censorship could have seriously detrimental effects on the development of knowledge in general.⁴⁰ Above all he remained firmly opposed to any suggestion that the clergy should have any hand in the censorship process.

When the Bishop of Olmütz complained in the summer of 1767 that superstition and free-thinking were rife in the land and suggested a re-introduction of ecclesiastical censorship to combat the trend, Kaunitz violently opposed the idea and affirmed the existing policy of keeping censorship "out of the hands of the clergy as much as possible."⁴¹

Kaunitz also was opposed to any attempts to stifle criticism in the arts. When Maria Theresia wished to exile the poet Raniero Calzabigi on the pretext that he had meddled in the affairs of the theatre in Vienna, Kaunitz came to the poet's defence with the argument that every theatre patron had the right "to express what he thinks of it, either orally or in writing." A man of letters, Kaunitz insisted, in fact rendered "an essential service to society in communicating to it the fruits of his meditations." Indeed in his view it was only by permitting such debates to go on that the mind of the most enlightened nations in Europe were formed, and the right of a man of letters to call into question policies affecting the arts was therefore not to be tampered with.⁴²

But perhaps the best example of Kaunitz's influence in lending a liberal direction to censorship came in his defence of the writings of Joseph von Sonnenfels during 1767. Sonnenfels, who had been a professor of political economy at the University of Vienna since 1763, rapidly developed a reputation as one of the most vociferous and influential spokesmen of new reform ideas in Austria.⁴³ His lectures, books and weekly journal begun in 1765, Der Mann Ohne Vorurteil (The Man Without Prejudice), soon made him the focus of conservative criticism. The attempt to silence Sonnenfels began early in 1767 when the Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal

Migazzi, launched an attack on the publications of Sonnenfels for undermining the authority of the church.⁴⁴ In the Staatsrat there was general agreement that some issues of Der Mann Ohne Vorurteil had perhaps overstepped acceptable bounds, but Kaunitz did not agree that Sonnenfels should be punished for any of this. He felt that the professor should merely be informed privately that there had to be certain limits to free expression, and strongly advised against a public reprimand.⁴⁵ This suggestion was accepted by the empress on 23 January, particularly after van Swieten had threatened to resign if it was not,⁴⁶ but the censorship board was nevertheless instructed to keep a sharp eye on any further potential improprieties on the part of Sonnenfels.⁴⁷

It was not long before Sonnenfels was again the object of attack. In May a doctoral disputation at the university at which a certain Franz Georg von Keess publicly defended sixty-five principles of Sonnenfelsian political economy, including the populationist theory and the idea of the abolition of torture and the death penalty, not only provoked the ire of Migazzi but brought Hofkanzler Chotek into the fray as well. Migazzi and Chotek warned that Sonnenfels could become dangerous if he were permitted to continue to talk about and publish ideas which challenged existing legislation and institutions.⁴⁸ In the Staatsrat Starhemberg and Stupan supported Migazzi and Chotek, but Blümegen and Kaunitz came out strongly in favour of Sonnenfels. In his votum of 1 July 1767 Kaunitz did not think that Sonnenfels' ideas were of such a nature as to deserve the "critical and harsh rebukes of the chancellery." The whole point of Sonnenfels' academic post, Kaunitz insisted, was to help improve the laws

and constitution of the monarchy, and what was being done was not an open attack on the state but the positing of political theses for dispute. Under the circumstances Kaunitz expressed the suspicion that Chotek's attack on Sonnenfels was less the product of the Hofkanzler's devotion to his duty than a personal vendetta against Sonnenfels "and perhaps even against his very academic chair."⁴⁹

As Kann has pointed out, this was the critical moment in Sonnenfels' career.⁵⁰ On the decision that the empress would take in this matter hinged the whole future of the intellectual climate of the Habsburg Monarchy. It was clear that the empress, too, was aware of the importance of the matter. Because there had been disagreement among Staatsrat members she decided to re-circulate the whole matter again on 4 July before coming to a final decision. In the second debate Stupan and Starhemberg gave ground while Blümegen continued to express his complete agreement with Kaunitz. The empress' final decision ensued on 20 July. The censorship board was to examine everything Sonnenfels wrote, but he was to be permitted to continue to write and teach according to his principles, as this was part of his job as professor of political economy.⁵¹

With this decision, however, the victory had not been totally won. In the subsequent months the censorship board began a detailed examination of everything Sonnenfels had written, submitting a report in November 1767. This report, too, went to the Staatsrat where Kaunitz agreed with his colleagues that Sonnenfels had to be kept "within the proper bounds" but added that "he must also be granted the necessary freedom in writing in that one would otherwise completely fail to achieve the purpose of combating

ignorance and abounding prejudice."⁵² It was only when the empress issued instructions in this vein on 17 November⁵³ that the full parameters of the censorship of Sonnenfels were delineated.

If Kaunitz's main argument against excessive censorship was thus that it retarded the progress of knowledge, it was an argument that proceeded from the premise that education was a vital concern of a modern society. Kaunitz, as Osterloh had noted, was not merely interested in reforms per se, but also in the creation of an enlightened bureaucracy with a well-developed and independent critical capacity.⁵⁴ This approach resulted not only in the vigorous support lent Sonnenfels but also in his advocacy of educational reform in general. His actual role in education reform, however, was by no means central. Indeed during the vital reforms of the University of Vienna during 1752-1753 which first emphasized the necessity of improving standards of education and which set the tone for all future reforms of the lower levels of education, Kaunitz was not even in Austria. These reforms were primarily the responsibility of the empress' personal physician, Gerard van Swieten, and it was largely he that began gradually to undermine the prevalent notion that education was rightly the terrain of religious institutions.⁵⁵ Despite her personal piety and despite the fact that popular education remained for the most part in the hands of the religious orders, especially the Jesuits, Maria Theresia nonetheless posited an important governmental maxim from which she never departed: "Education . . . is and always remains a political matter."⁵⁶

That Kaunitz, therefore, merely joined a chorus of voices demanding the creation of better schools is evident from the first major

educational debate in the period of the Co-Regency. In 1769 Maria Theresia received a memorandum from the Prince-Bishop of Passau which emphasized the necessity of improving educational institutions. The empress felt that the ideas contained in the bishop's memo might be useful points of debate for a reform of education in Upper and Lower Austria and transmitted them to the Hofkanzlei for discussion. When the Hofkanzlei responded with an extremely cautious and conservative report on 9 March 1770, the matter was forwarded to the Staatsrat. Here the most vigorous voices advocating reform were Gebler, Stupan and Blümegen, all placing great faith in education as an instrument of human progress and advocating a whole new order in popular education. Kaunitz on the other hand did not enter into the matter at length and merely declared himself in complete agreement "with the well-founded suggestions" of his colleagues.⁵⁷

In fact, the only major involvement of Kaunitz in the debate over education reform came as a result of the initiative of his second-in-command in the Staatskanzlei, Count Anton Pergen. In 1769 Pergen had been given the job of overseeing the ministry's foreign language school, the so-called 'Oriental Academy', which had been founded by Kaunitz in 1754 as a language training facility for the diplomatic corps. From its foundation the Academy was headed by a Jesuit named Joseph Franz. Franz lacked administrative capacities and under him the Academy soon fell into such a great debt that its house and garden had to be sold and the school transferred to the Convent of St. Barbara. In 1769 Franz was dismissed. The vice-director, Father Johann de Deo Negrep, took his place and Pergen was given supervisory control from the Staatskanzlei. Pergen was a man of great

ambition. He had been charged by the empress to submit a quarterly report on the progress of the Academy under Negrep, and being dissatisfied with the latter, he soon parlayed this commission into a general plan for the reform of the entire educational system of the monarchy.⁵⁸

The Pergen memorandum of 26 August 1770 was one of the most far-ranging and systematic plans for education reform ever to be submitted to Maria Theresa. Pergen's proposals fall into three main sections. The first called for the working out of a complete new educational system geared to the needs and abilities of the different classes of society, fostering "uniformity in the general way of thinking." The second insisted that all supervision and control of the entire school system had to be assumed by the state. The third, coming out of the second, recommended the complete exclusion of all religious orders from the educational process, and the abandonment of Latin in all disciplines but medicine.⁵⁹ These proposals were brought before the Staatsrat on 18 January 1771 and were enthusiastically received by all its members. All agreed that valuable suggestions had been made and that Pergen should be encouraged to submit a brief proposal on how these plans could be implemented. For Kaunitz educational reform was "one of the most important and most necessary" tasks of good government. After the other Staatsräte had submitted their vota he kept the documents for an additional seven weeks in order, as he explained, to give the proposals the attention they deserved. After "ripe reflection" he endorsed the recommendations of his colleagues. But because Blümegen had taken issue with Pergen's third point on the grounds that the exclusion of the religious orders was a practical impossibility, Kaunitz suggested

Pergen be especially asked to respond to this critique.⁶⁰

Before making a decision the empress passed the Pergen plan and Staatsrat comments on to her son. In a brief note of 15 April, however, Joseph indicated that he had nothing to add and that he agreed entirely with Gebler, Binder and Kaunitz.⁶¹ Accordingly on the next day the empress decided that Pergen was to be commissioned to submit a shorter plan on the means of implementation, and ordered to make further comments on the critiques of Blümegen.⁶² Three months later Pergen submitted his reply. He did not regard financing as a serious problem, but admitted that there were not a sufficient number of qualified teachers to fill the needs of the monarchy. Precisely for this reason therefore, he recommended the establishment of the teachers' college he had originally suggested as quickly as possible. On the issue of the religious orders, however, he remained totally inflexible, regarding the whole issue as a simple either/or proposition.⁶³

The Staatsrat unanimously endorsed Pergen's reform plan on principle, and Kaunitz suggested that a start be made by creating the state education directorate (Schulen Ober Directorium) that Pergen had originally proposed.⁶⁴ But the issue of the religious orders remained a thorn in the debate. Ignored entirely by Kaunitz, it remained the central concern of Blümegen. For the moment the empress' resolution of 6 September passed the issue by. It followed Kaunitz's recommendation and asked Pergen to nominate a director.⁶⁵ At first Pergen recommended van Swieten, but his age and health made that impossible. The next candidate was Martini, and failing him, Pergen suggested that some foreign expert be invited to come to Austria for the job. But in the Staatsrat the unanimous choice fell on Pergen

himself, Kaunitz insisting that "no better choice could be made for the purpose." Kaunitz also approved of Pergen's plan to bring in foreign educational experts, even if these were Protestant, though this notion met with considerable resistance from Stupan, Binder, and of course Blümegen.⁶⁶ The empress compromised. She would permit the recruiting of a Protestant so long as he came merely as an adviser, not a teacher. The presidency of the Directorium was offered to Pergen, though his suggestion concerning religious orders was ordered to be left untouched for the moment.⁶⁷

This Pergen could not accept. For him the whole plan was contingent on the exclusion of all religious orders from education, and in his reply to the empress on 22 November he therefore rejected the presidency of the Directorium.⁶⁸ For Kaunitz this was the beginning of his disenchantment with Pergen. He analyzed Pergen's rigidity with nothing short of exasperation. Pergen admitted there were not enough lay teachers in the monarchy to replace all monastic orders and therefore it was "impossible for him to insist on the dismissal of the present ecclesiastical teachers."⁶⁹ It was the type of stubborn mentality that Kaunitz could not appreciate. In the ministerial shuffle that followed within a week, Pergen was not only removed from any educational posts but from the Staatskanzlei as well, and two years later it led Kaunitz to insist that Pergen was not a suitable candidate for governor of Galicia.⁷⁰

After the ministerial shuffle of December 1771 the strongest voice demanding education reform was Kressel. Kressel's critique of Pergen and his own proposals for piecemeal reform now set the tone of educational

policy in Austria. Pergen noted bitterly in January 1772 that he was the only one who dared to insist on the truth in front of the empress and he urged her not to be satisfied with reform by phases.⁷¹ But with Kaunitz no longer lending his support to Pergen, and with Kressel dominating the Staatsrat debates on the issue, Pergen gradually faded from the picture. Kressel's influence in turn grew. Having impressed both Maria Theresia and Joseph with his work on the commission created to implement relief measures during the famine crisis of 1771-1772, Kressel became head of the Jesuit commission in 1773. The abolition of the Jesuit order, which had controlled so much of Austria's education in turn led directly to more debates on education reform which Kressel now completely dominated. On 1 December 1773 Kressel presented a plan for a uniform system of education throughout the Austro-Bohemian lands, supervised by a central education commission (Studienhofkommission).⁷²

The Kressel-Martini plan fared better than that of Pergen. Kaunitz, in what was to be his last votum on education in the period of the Co-Regency, lauded the plan as so clear and systematic that nothing should prevent its implementation. He cautioned that education reform was not merely a question of implementation, however, but added that much depended on the continued attention given it. For this reason central direction was all important, and Kaunitz therefore lent his warmest support to the creation of an autonomous Studienhofkommission within the preserve of the Hofkanzlei.⁷³ On 12 February 1774 the education commission was officially established, and Kressel was named its head.⁷⁴ His task was not to be an easy one. The Studienhofkommission soon found itself in constant conflict with local

school systems in its attempt to blaze a liberal direction in education. But Kressel was persistent, and Kaunitz felt his involvement was therefore unnecessary. The battle that was now only to begin for Kressel was over for Kaunitz.

CONCLUSION

A recent analysis of the theory of enlightened despotism has addressed itself primarily to the question of what kind of truth the idea of enlightened despotism had for those eighteenth-century thinkers who explicitly accorded it any truth at all.¹ This line of investigation is the natural result of the tendency of modern historiography to undermine the very concept of enlightened despotism as a valid description of that critical phase in modern European history when the traditional corporate society of the medieval and early modern period was being displaced by the emerging modern centralist unitary state.² The hollowness of the enlightenment of the most famous enlightened despot of all, Frederick II of Prussia, has helped lead historians to the conclusion that the raison d'être of enlightened despotism on the whole was merely the creation of a new absolutist state within the traditional social order.³ If this was not an ideal to which the intellectuals of the Enlightenment could have subscribed, it is important to point out that this was also an ideal to which many practical statesmen refused to adhere. The question that therefore presents itself is less what kind of truth the idea of enlightened despotism had for eighteenth-century thinkers, but what kind of truth it had for eighteenth-century statesmen.

The most significant of these statesmen in the Europe of the Enlightenment was Prince Wenzel Anton Kaunitz of the Habsburg Monarchy. With the exception of the monarchs themselves, no political figure of the day could boast the breadth of his activities, the extent of his influence, and the length of his uninterrupted tenure of the highest office of one of

the great powers of Europe. His conception of government, therefore, must be regarded as one of the single most important contributions to the theory of enlightened despotism, and the extent of his success in implementing it must go a long way to aid in the determination of both the validity of the concept and the viability of the practice of enlightened despotism in the historical context of the late eighteenth century.

Kaunitz was a man of the Enlightenment. He once called himself a "philosophe" who was interested in "public enlightenment and the abolition of harmful prejudices for the sake of humanity."⁴ He shared the Enlightenment's hatred of obscurantism and its faith, articulated so well by Kant, that while the age might not be an enlightened one, it was nevertheless one of enlightenment. In the view of Kaunitz the process of enlightenment was a continuous struggle and its success was by no means certain. To affect the aims of the Enlightenment as he saw them, therefore, his principal instrument was the state. The state had to be the repository of all sovereign power, for only in this way could it fulfill its purpose of bringing enlightenment and beneficial reform to all its members. This was the outcome of the conviction that only the state could provide social direction that was interest-free, which in turn was the result of an empirical perception that all corporate institutions within the state, from Provincial Estates to the Catholic Church, were motivated solely by self-interest. But while Kaunitz believed in the unitary state, his conception of it was completely different from that of Joseph. He emphasized the importance of the central government but did not advocate the kind of centralism that attempted to obscure the very real differences among the various provinces.

What Kaunitz did advocate was the equality of all provinces before the crown in justice, administration and taxation, the effective exercise of the crown's authority on the local level, and the total elimination of the political power of particularist interests.

The faith in the unitary state of course was based on the assumption that it could provide guidelines for social development that had no basis but the reality of the human condition. This assumption proceeded from the classic Enlightenment premise that the "science of man" could determine with mathematical certainty the needs of a society. The naiveté of this assumption was not totally lost on Kaunitz. If all sovereign power were invested in the state and the state recognized no independent spheres of dominion besides itself, the line between absolute and arbitrary government was a thin one. Because the argument that the state was not above the law was obviated to some extent by the fact that it remained the only authority with the right to interpret the common weal,⁵ the evolution of what Rosenberg has called an "irresponsible central executive"⁶ could easily turn enlightened despotism into a sham.

Kaunitz's conception of the unitary state was therefore hedged about with safeguards. The most fundamental of these owes much to Montesquieu's concept of the separation of powers. In the Haugwitzian reforms of 1749 the separation of the political and economic administration from the administration of justice was less motivated by notions of a separation of powers than by practical considerations. Kaunitz's attack on Haugwitz's Directorium, however, must be regarded as an attempt to check the potential evolution of a Prussian-style Directory and at the same time

institute a system of checks and balances within the absolute state.⁷ With the administration of justice completely removed from the hands of the local aristocracy, one part of this programme was fulfilled. But the separation of the executive and legislative branches of government could not be affected without undermining the whole nature and essence of the absolutist unitary state.

The compromise that Kaunitz posited to meet this dilemma was the Staatsrat. The Staatsrat had no executive power but was the funnel through which all important legislative proposals went. It was in a sense the main legislative organ of the monarchy, even though legislation for the most part originated from the organs of the executive branch. Kaunitz did not want the Staatsrat to be a ministerial council precisely because it would then no longer serve as a purely legislative forum. It was to be a conference in which all proposed measures were to be subject to the dialectic of debate, a council which would make all the options clear to the monarch, a body whose consensus would in a wider sense reflect a consensus of the entire society.

In order to fulfill this function, however, the Staatsrat could not be a mere rubber stamp. Only through genuine and thorough critiques of the various possible perceptions of a problem could any accord which could even pretend to universality be reached. Here Kaunitz did not believe that he had a monopoly on truth, and for this reason nominated men such as Haugwitz, with whom he was in violent personal disagreement, for the council from the very beginning.⁸ Nevertheless there was a limit to the type of disagreement permissible within the Staatsrat. All its members, whether

conservative or liberal, had to be men of the crown sharing the same basic statist premises. In this sense therefore the question of whether or not enlightened reform was necessary was never open; the only problems that were debated were the greater or lesser utility and practical applicability of specific measures.

The weakness of the Staatsrat was that its consensus did not bind the monarch. Kaunitz often availed himself of the dubious device of equating unanimity with objective reality as for example when trying to convince Maria Theresa that religious toleration was desirable. He expected, in a word, the monarch to be "reasonable", to recognize because of its inherent logic the efficacy of any given measure. When a monarch like Joseph refused to do so, Kaunitz regarded it as an act of stubborn and wilful despotism whose dire consequences for the entire social organism could not be underestimated.⁹ But Joseph was in many ways more consistent than Kaunitz, carrying the unitarian and utilitarian concepts of the state to their logical conclusion.

Kaunitz shared the ideology of Joseph but the methodology of Maria Theresa. This meant that the rationalist analysis of the usefulness of any given measure could always be modified by empirical considerations of practical need. Indeed, pragmatism may be regarded as the hallmark of Kaunitz's conception of enlightened despotism. He believed that Hungary should be deprived of its special status within the monarchy but cautioned that overt and precipitous attempts to do so could back-fire, as in the event they did on Joseph. He believed in free trade and took a liberal approach to economics though he would endorse restrictive practices or

temporary monopolies if he felt the circumstances warranted it. He believed in peasant emancipation and the abolition of labour services but he supported Joseph's opposition to Maria Theresia's planned agrarian revolution, not because he did not agree with the principle but because it was not practicable.

In addition to being practical and realistic, Kaunitz also believed that the exercise of authority had to be humane. He felt strongly that the state should not interfere in the petty details of men's lives, opposed the puritan ethos that men must be forced to be good, and believed that human energies should be liberated to serve the state indirectly by the competitive drive of self-interest. He held intellectual debate to be vital for the development of knowledge and considered artistic creativity one of the most important dimensions of a civilized society. He believed that the state or crown was not above the law and that the law had to enshrine respect for the rights of the person and property of each citizen. He deprecated superstition and advocated religious tolerance. In short, Kaunitz did not merely wish to graft a modern absolutist state on an old social order, he favoured the creation or at least the orderly and contrived evolution of an entirely new social order.

Indeed, this humanist dimension of Kaunitz's conception of good government sheds important light on a point that is too often neglected. Already one hundred years ago Arneth, in his monumental biography of Maria Theresia, singled out Kaunitz as the leading figure in the so-called "Enlightenment party" in Austria.¹⁰ This conception has been reinforced by Maass' pyrogenic attack on Kaunitz which identified the phenomenon of

Josephinism with the rationalist Enlightenment's assertions against the church and attempted to make Kaunitz's name synonymous with it. But as Zöllner has already noted, not all Josephinists were Enlightenment figures and not all Enlightenment enthusiasts were Josephinists.¹¹ In fact both the Enlightenment party and the Josephinists were extremely heterogeneous groups.

Kaunitz was both an apostle of the Enlightenment and a Josephinist. His important contribution to Josephinism was not to create it but to deflect it from its neo-Jansenist orientation towards a more humanistic approach. His important contribution to the Enlightenment party was, as Krieger has pointed out, the proportion of realism and system he brought to the two Enlightenment passions of "perceiving the facts as they were, free of any obscuring associations," and of "associating these facts in patterns manageable by reason." With specific reference to foreign policy this approach has been called "synthetic" and has been deemed superior to Frederick II's "analytic" one, which separated complex problems into its components in order to cope with the most vital before it affected the whole, precisely because of its comprehensive nature.¹² This was true of Kaunitz's approach to domestic policy as well. All policies were constantly seen within the context of the whole, and his repeated emphasis on "fundamental principles" betrayed a view of the state which perceived an integral connection between all policies. It is this that accounts for the fact that Kaunitz took an interest in every sphere of governmental action.

Krieger's comparison of Frederick II and Kaunitz as classic representatives of different Enlightenment approaches to problems can also

serve for a useful personal comparison. Not only was Kaunitz Frederick's greatest and most sophisticated diplomatic opponent, he was in many ways a paradigm of everything Frederick was not. In contrast to the superficial dilettantism of the latter in the arts, Kaunitz was a sophisticated connoisseur. In contrast to Frederick's aristocratic elitism, Kaunitz disdained his class and emphasized merit. Against Frederick's militarism, Kaunitz held war to be an "illness" and insisted on a complete separation of military and civilian life. Unlike the stoic puritanism of Frederick, Kaunitz exuded epicurean laxity. In short, despite their shared scepticism about religion, they remained models of their respective religious traditions: Calvinist determinism and Catholic humanism.

In view of the particular complexion of Kaunitz's policies, methodology and personality, therefore, it is no surprise that his relations with Maria Theresia were more congenial than those with Joseph, even if his ideology was intellectually closer to that of the emperor. The empress' maternalistic conception of her role permitted a more flexible and therefore more comprehensive approach to government than the ideological school-master attitudes of her son. With the empress Kaunitz enjoyed more manoeuvrability and he consequently depended on her for a great deal of his influence in determining the direction of reform. After the death of her husband and some of her closest friends in the mid-1760's she also depended more on Kaunitz. The direction of policy that he set out did not always succeed, but the failure of his type of enlightened despotism was by no means a foregone conclusion. Its high-water mark was the era of the Co-Regency. More than any other time in his life, this was the age of Kaunitz.

FOOTNOTES

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-------|
| Vienna: Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv | HHStA |
| (i) Staatskanzlei | StK |
| (ii) Familienarchiv | FA |
| (iii) Kabinettsarchiv | KA |
| (iv) Sonstige Sammlungen | SS |
| (v) Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv | VA |

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| Vienna: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek | ONB |
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| Vienna: Archiv der Akademie der Bildenden Künste | AABK |
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Journals:

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| <u>Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte</u> | <u>AOG</u> |
| <u>Österreich in Geschichte und Literatur</u> | <u>OGL</u> |
| <u>Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs</u> | <u>MOSTA</u> |
| <u>Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Instituts für Geschichtsforschung</u> | <u>MIOG</u> |
| <u>Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte</u> | <u>WSWG</u> |

Archival Designations:

Karton 145, Part B, folios 27 to 36, rendered thus: 145/B/27-36.

INTRODUCTION

¹Helen P. Liebel, "Enlightened Despotism and the Crisis of Society in Germany," Enlightenment Essays I (1970), 151-168. An expanded version of this article has appeared in German under the title "Der aufgeklärte Absolutismus und die Gesellschaftskrise in Deutschland im 18. Jahrhundert," in W. Hubatsch, ed., Absolutismus (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973), pp. 488-544.

²Grete Klingenstein, Staatsverwaltung und Kirchliche Autorität im 18. Jahrhundert: Das Problem der Zensur in der thesesianischen Reform (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1970), pp. 56-63, Henry E. Strakosch, State Absolutism and the Rule of Law: The Struggle for the Codification of Civil Law in Austria, 1753-1811 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1967), pp. 17-28.

³Joseph Kallbrunner, ed., Kaiserin Maria Theresias Politisches Testament (Munich: Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1952), p. 107.

⁴His full name according to the baptismal record was Wenceslaus Antonius Josephus Maria Blasius Kaunitz-Rietberg. Cf. Geburtenvermerk der Abteikirche Unsere Liebe Frau zu den Schotten on the Freyung in Vienna, Tom 24, fol. 37: 3 February 1711. Born a count, Kaunitz was created a prince of the Holy Roman Empire (Reichsfürst) in 1764 and a prince of the hereditary provinces (Erbländischer Fürst) in 1776. During most of the period of the co-regency he signed himself Kaunitz-Rittberg but gradually began to revert to the more correct form of his maternal name after 1775.

⁵The most recent work on the early life of Kaunitz is Grete Klingenstein, Der Aufstieg des Hauses Kaunitz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975). This work was not available at the time of writing, but Professor Klingenstein was kind enough to discuss various relevant problems with me from her manuscript. See also Alfred Ritter von Arneth, "Biographie des Fürsten Kaunitz: Ein Fragment," AOG LXXXVIII (1900), 1-201. On Kaunitz's early diplomatic career see William J. McGill, "The Political Education of Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rittberg" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1961), some of whose findings on Kaunitz in Italy and the Netherlands have been published: "The Roots of Policy: Kaunitz in Italy and the Netherlands, 1742-1746," Central European History I (1968), 131-149, and "Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rittberg and the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748," Duquesne Review XIV (1969), 154-167.

⁶On the events leading to the diplomatic revolution see Adolf Beer, "Zur Geschichte des Friedens von Aachen im Jahre 1748," AOG XLVII (1871), 72-93, William J. McGill, "The Roots of Policy: Kaunitz in Vienna and

Versailles, 1749-1753," Journal of Modern History XLIII (1971), 228-244, Reed Browning, "The British Orientation of Austrian Foreign Policy," Central European History I (1968), 299-323. The only analysis specifically devoted to Kaunitz remains the hostile and brief Georg Kuntzel, Fürst Kaunitz-Rittberg als Staatsman (Frankfurt a/M: Verlag von Moritz Diesterweg, 1923). Alexander Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz als Geistige Persönlichkeit (Vienna: Verlag Brüder Hollinek, 1947), is, as the title indicates, a study in intellectual history. The only study ever devoted to Kaunitz's domestic policies has been Leon Posaner, "Die Rolle des Staatskanzlers Fürsten Kaunitz in den Reformen der inneren Verwaltung Oesterreichs" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 1923). It is an extremely sparse (74 pgs.) analysis based almost exclusively on the Staatsratakten and the then published sources. It covers Kaunitz's entire career.

⁷ Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918 (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), p. 158.

⁸ Alfred Ritter von Arneth, Geschichte Maria Theresia's (10 vols., Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1863-1879), IX, 322-323. Henceforth referred to as MT.

⁹ Friedrich Walter, "Kaunitz' Eintritt in die innere Politik. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der österreichischen Innenpolitik in den Jahren 1760/61," MOIG XLVI (1932), 37-42.

¹⁰ I am indebted to Professor Klingenstein for her most fascinating analysis of this problem, and for the valuable insights that she provided in discussing the issue with me.

¹¹ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/C/92-95, Joseph to Kaunitz, 23 March 1768.

¹² Alexander Novotny, "Staatskanzler Wenzel Fürst Kaunitz," Gestalter der Geschichte Österreichs ed. by Hugo Hantsch (Innsbruck: Tyrolia Verlag, 1962), p. 256.

¹³ Rudolph Graf von Khevenhüller-Metsch and Hanns Schlitter, eds., Aus der Zeit Maria Theresias: Tagebuch des Fürsten Johann Joseph Khevenhüller-Metsch, Kaiserlichen Obersthofmeister, 1742-1776 (10 vols.; Vienna: Verlag Adolf Holzhausens, 1907-1925), IV, 70-71.

¹⁴ Carl Hinrichs, ed., Friedrich der Grosse und Maria Theresia. Diplomatische Berichte von Otto Christoph Graf v. Podewils, königlicher Preussischer Gesandter am österreichischen Hofe in Wien (Berlin: R. V. Decker's Verlag, 1937), pp. 143-144.

¹⁵ HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/E/19-20, Joseph to Leopold, 16 January 1772.

¹⁶ Kurt Pflister, Maria Theresia: Mensch, Staat und Kultur der Spätbarocken Welt (Munich: Münchner Verlag, 1949), p. 111.

¹⁷ Hanns L. Mikoletzky, Österreich: Das Grosse 18. Jahrhundert (Vienna: Austria Edition, 1967), p. 267.

¹⁸ One of his "eccentric" innovations with respect to hygiene was his habit of carrying a small brush with him for the purpose of cleaning his teeth after meals. A choice anecdote for his contemporaries, readers might find this habit less amusing today. That the act of brushing his teeth was sometimes performed at the table immediately after a meal might, of course, be viewed with more misgivings, but could be explained by the fact that the etiquette governing dental hygiene, as indeed the very notion of preventative dental care, was in its infancy. Cf. Ibid., p. 267.

¹⁹ Quoted in Constant von Wurzbach, Biographischen Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich (60 vols.; Vienna: Verlag der Universitäts-Buchdruckerei, 1856-1891) XI, 81-85.

²⁰ HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/C/95, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d.

²¹ Theodore Besterman, ed., Voltaire's Correspondence (75 vols.; Geneva: Institut et Musée Voltaire Les Délices, 1957) XXX, 166-167, No. 6334.

²² Ibid. XXIX, 205, No. 6187.

²³ One anecdote Platner does bear out is Kaunitz's habit of brushing his teeth after meals at the dinner table. Since he would brook no interruption while lecturing his noble guests, and since most had favours they wanted of him, his dental care time was the moment they waited for. "It is interesting to see," Platner wrote, "how precisely at this moment people of the first rank rush up and jostle each other behind his chair, because this was the best opportunity to say a few words to him." HHStA, StK, Wissenschaft und Kunst I/2 (Philologie), 42-45, Platner to (?), 29 May 1787.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, pp. 74-75.

²⁷Ibid., p. 45.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 65-68, Mikoletzky, Österreich, p. 268.

²⁹HHStA, StK, Wissenschaft und Kunst I/2/42-45, Platner to (?), 29 May 1787.

³⁰Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, p. 97.

³¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 105/B/28-29, Maria Theresia's Resolution on Kaunitz's Vortrag of 13 March 1770.

³²Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, p. 97.

³³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 106/B Speciale/1-142, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d.

³⁴Arneth, MT IX, 324.

³⁵HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/E/19-20, Joseph to Leopold, 16 January 1772, and HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 15/No. 3, Leopold Geheimschrift of 1778. I am indebted to Professor Adam Wandruszka for guiding me to and through these secret Italian analyses of Leopold.

³⁶Some good examples of this can be found in the early letters of Joseph to Kaunitz, HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/H/14-18, 19-20, 23-24, 31-32, Joseph to Kaunitz, 10 September, 9 and 11 October, 6 November 1765.

³⁷Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin, "Höhepunkt und Krise des Deutschen Fürstenbunds: Die Wahl Dalbergs zum Coadjutor von Mainz," Historische Zeitschrift CXCVI (1963), 73, Friedrich Walter, Die Paladine der Kaiserin: Ein Maria-Theresien-Buch (Vienna: Bergland Verlag, 1959), p. 53. For Joseph's mocking of Kaunitz, see the report of Leopold in Adam Wandruszka, Leopold II: Erzherzog von Österreich, Grossherzog von Toskana, König von Ungarn und Böhmen, Römischer Kaiser, (2 vols.; Vienna & Munich: Verlag Herold, 1963-1965) I, 346.

³⁸Arneth, MT IX, 330.

³⁹HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/H/196-202, Joseph to Kaunitz, 28 November, 29 November 9:15 P. M. and 10:00 P. M., 1780, partially quoted in Adolf Beer, ed., Joseph II., Leopold II., und Kaunitz: Ihr Briefwechsel (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1873), pp. 20-21.

⁴⁰Franz Rudolf Grossing, ed., Briefe von Joseph dem Zweyten (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1821), pp. 40-41.

CHAPTER I: THE ERA OF TRANSITION

¹Walter, "Eintritt . . .," pp. 37-79, and "Der letzte grosse Versuch einer Verwaltungsreform unter Maria Theresia (1764/65)," MOIG XLVII (1933), 427-469. Walter's Die österreichische Zentralverwaltung, Part II, Volume 1, Section i, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs, Vol. 26 (Vienna: Adolph Holzhausens Nachfolger, 1934-1950) [henceforth referred to as OZV] repeats, in a number of cases verbatim, the above two articles. Walter has also edited the corresponding volume of documents, OZV II/3. Since then most of the archival material on the subject, particularly the valuable Staatsratakanen, has been lost. Cf. Anna Coreth, "Das Schicksal des k. und k. Kabinettsarchives seit 1945," MOSTA XI (1958), 514-525.

²Count Friedrich Wilhelm Haugwitz (1700-1765), son of a Saxon general whose estates were in Silesia, entered Austrian service by joining the Silesian provincial government in 1725. His talents and industry soon brought him to the attention of the emperor who commissioned him to draft a reform plan for Silesia's provincial structure. He was in the process of doing so when Charles VI died and the province was invaded by Frederick II of Prussia. Haugwitz moved to Vienna despite the fact that all his estates were in Prussian occupied territory, where, though penniless, he came to the attention of Maria Theresia. He was made head of the provincial administration of the fragment of Silesia left Austria in 1742, in 1743 he became a Hofrat. He introduced model fiscal reform into Silesia and convinced the empress that similar changes were needed in the entire monarchy. Under his leadership, the great reform of 1749-50 was undertaken, whereupon he became the president of the Directorium in publicis et cameralibus. He retained this post until 1761 when the Directorium was dismantled. Thereupon he was appointed to the newly-created Staatsrat, in which capacity he served until his death. Wurzbach VIII, 68-69.

³On the reform of 1749 see OZV II/1/i, 92-193. Walter's Die Theresianische Staatsreform von 1749 in the "Österreich Archiv" series (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1958) is essentially a summary of the above. See also Arneth, MT IV, 1-37, Ignaz Beitel, Geschichte der österreichischen Staatsverwaltung, 1740-1848 (2 vols.; Innsbruck: Verlag Wagner, 1896-98) I, 24-58, J. Kallbrunner, "Zur Neuordnung Österreichs unter Maria Theresia. F. W. Haugwitz und die Reform von 1749," Österreich (1918-19), 115-133.

⁴OZV II/1/i, 255, 117.

⁵Ibid., pp. 194-254.

⁶As does Walter, "Eintritt . . .", pp. 40-41.

⁷OZV II/3, 3-10.

⁸Schünemann, p. 16.

⁹OZV II/3, 125.

¹⁰For the intellectual background of Haugwitz see, Friedrich Walter, "Die ideellen Grundlagen der österreichischen Staatsreform von 1749," Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht XVII (1937), 195-226. For that of Kaunitz see Klingenstein, Aufstieg des Hauses Kaunitz. Cf. OZV II/2, 131.

¹¹Ibid., II/3, 101-121.

¹²The Chancellery was therefore technically known as "The United Bohemian-Austrian Court Chancellery (Vereinigte böhmisch-österreichische Hofkanzlei).\" The offices of the chancellery were located on the Judenplatz in the building conceived by Johann Bernard Fischer von Erlach in 1708-1714 and expanded by Matthias Gerl in 1750-1754. There was also a Hungarian chancellery and a Transylvanian one.

¹³OZV II/1/i, 314-320, 358-363.

¹⁴Count Ludwig von Zinzendorf (1721-1780), a nephew of the famous pietist of the same name, was born in Nürnberg. He converted to Catholicism in 1739 and soon thereafter entered Austrian service. He attended university at Leipzig during 1746-47, and undertook a European tour to study economics thereafter. In 1750-1752 he was in Paris where he met and impressed Kaunitz. Upon his return to Vienna, he was made a privy councillor

in the Directorium. He became president of the Rechenkammer after the reform of 1760-61, and retained the post until the demise of the ministry. He died after a long illness in Vienna. Cf. Gaston von Pettenegg, ed., Ludwig und Karl, Grafen und Herren von Zinzendorf: Ihre Selbstbiographien (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1879), 1-164.

¹⁵ OZV II/3, 167-171.

¹⁶ Mikoletzky, p. 213.

¹⁷ OZV II/3, 255-257. The Netherlands and Milan retained their own Camerae and the Camerae of Hungary and Transylvania were also nominally independent, though in practice only sections of the central Hofkammer.

¹⁸ Friedrich Walter, "Die Wiener Stadtbank," Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie VIII (1937), 444. See also H. Ignaz Bidermann, "Die Wiener Stadt-bank, ihre Entstehung, ihre Eintheilung und Wirksamkeit, ihre Schicksale," AOG XX (1858), 341-445, and Friedrich Mensi, Die Finanzen Österreichs von 1701 bis 1740 (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1890).

¹⁹ OZV II/3, 221.

²⁰ Adolf Beer, ed., "Denkschriften des Fürsten Kaunitz," AOG XLVIII (1872), 119-120.

²¹ OZV II/1/i, 401.

²² Ibid., pp. 287, 301, 321.

²³ Ibid., p. 257.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 358-359.

²⁵ Arneth, MT VII, 30-31. Carl Freiherr von Hock and Herm. Ignaz Bidermann, Der österreichische Staatsrath, (1760-1848) (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1879), p. 19 and OZV II/1/i, 360-361.

²⁶ OZV II/1/i, 181.

²⁷ Ibid., 323.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 359.

²⁹Ibid., p. 361.

³⁰That is men of the crown not members of the 'aristocratic republic' that characterized a state like Poland. Cf. Ibid., p. 361.

³¹Ibid., II/3, 221.

³²See below, Chapter XII.

³³Alfred Ritter von Arneth, ed., Maria Theresia und Joseph II.: Ihre Correspondenz sammt Briefen Joseph's an seinen Bruder Leopold (3 vols.; Vienna: Verlag von Carl Gerold's Sohn, 1867-1868), III, 336.

³⁴Ibid., I, 1, No. 1.

³⁵Joseph noted sarcastically that he had expected to find himself among Solons and Lycurges and to hear nothing but oracles in the councils of the empress!

³⁶Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. III, 335-361.

³⁷Beer, "Denkschriften . . .", pp. 98-158.

³⁸Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. III, 340-342.

³⁹Beer, "Denkschriften . . .", pp. 124, 140-143. Walter's contention (OZV II/1/i, 270) that Kaunitz turned down any ideas of a prime ministership for himself because he was too lazy and could in any case get the same kind of power without the title or the responsibility through the Staatsrat is not only belied by the initiative, energy and enthusiasm with which Kaunitz pursued goals in which he believed, but also misses Kaunitz's essential point.

⁴⁰Beer, "Denkschriften . . .", pp. 141-142.

⁴¹Franz-Lorenz von Thadden, Feldmarschall Daun: Maria Theresias größter Feldherr (Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1967), pp. 450-451.

⁴²OZV II/1/i, 274, 349. See also Oskar Regele, "Der österreichische Hofkriegsrat, 1556-1848," MOStA Ergänzungsband I (1949), 23-24, 76.

⁴³Count Franz Moriz von Lacy (1725-1801), whose ancestors were part of the Norman invasion of England, settling in Ireland under Henry II, and whose father was a Jacobite who left England in 1691 to join the Russian service, was educated in Vienna and entered the imperial army in 1743. He distinguished himself in the Italian and Prussian campaigns of 1744-1748, rising to the rank of captain at the age of twenty and major at twenty-one. Wounded several times during the two great wars of Maria Theresia, he won the battles of Hochkirch and Maxen in 1758. In 1760 after the victory of Torgau he was offered the field-marshal's baton but rejected it in favour of a superior. In 1763 he joined the Hofkriegsrat, in 1765 he was made Inspector-General of the army, and the subsequent year a Field Marshal. In 1766 he became president of the Hodkriegsrat, resigning in 1774 to join the Staatsrat. In 1778 he returned to his Hofkriegsrat presidency and distinguished himself in the War of the Bavarian Succession. During the Turkish War of 1788-1791 he was the personal adjunct of the emperor travelling at his side at all times. At the death of Joseph, Lacy retired, taking no part in the French Revolutionary Wars. Wurzbach, XIII, 464-469.

⁴⁴Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 2 December 1765, HHStA, StK, Vorträge, 96/C/103-110. For a discussion of this memorandum and Kaunitz's general involvement in military matters see below, Chapter XI.

⁴⁵Beer, "Denkschriften . . .," p. 144.

⁴⁶Edith Kotasek, Feldmarschall Graf Lacy: Ein Leben für Österreichs Heer (Horn, Lower Austria: Verlag Ferdinand Berger, 1956), p. 71.

⁴⁷OZV II/1/i, 429, Arneth, MT IX, 293.

⁴⁸Arneth, MT IX, 294-295.

⁴⁹OZV II/1/i, 425-427.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 427.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 428.

⁵²Wurzbach gives the date as 11 September and Arneth, MT VI, 180, concurs, but the entry in Khevenhüller's diary is 30 August, a date which Walter has accepted, OZV II/1/i, 429.

⁵³Arneth, MT VII, 289, 541.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 289.

⁵⁵HHStA, StK, Vorträge 97/A/25-26, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 14 January 1766. Cf. Arneth, MT VII, 289. By not making reference to K.'s report of 14 January and the fact that the crucial marginalia was written by the empress on that report, Arneth gives the impression that Maria Theresia informed Kaunitz of her decision without prior discussion.

⁵⁶Arneth, MT VII, 540-541.

⁵⁷Although the Order of Maria Theresia was a military order, Kaunitz was chancellor of the order. The 20,000 fl. value of the gift should be compared with Kaunitz's annual salary, which was almost the highest in the land, of 30,000 fl. The whole annual budget of the Staatskanzlei was 70,000 fl. The occasion of the presentation was the marriage of Archduchess Maria Christina to Prince Albert of Saxe-Teschen. Ibid., p. 542.

⁵⁸Friedrich Binder, Freiherr von Kriegelstein (1708-1782) studied law at Giessen and entered Austrian service as a legation secretary in Rome. He was assigned to Kaunitz during the latter's trip to Rome in 1741 and thereafter accompanied him on his various missions, soon winning his complete confidence, trust and personal friendship. In 1753, when Kaunitz re-organized the Staatskanzlei, Binder became Referendar for foreign affairs, a post which he held variously--sometimes officially and sometimes unofficially until his retirement in 1778. In 1769 he was made a member of the Staatsrat, but removed from that post again in 1772, becoming director of the Court Archives and Secret Privy Councillor. Wurzbach I, 399.

⁵⁹HHStA, FA, Sammelbände, 70/A/5-6, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d. (April 1766).

⁶⁰HHStA, StK, Vorträge, 97/B/46-47, Kaunitz to Joseph, with a resolution by Joseph, 4 April 1766.

⁶¹Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 199-204, No. 84.

⁶²Arneth, MT VII, 223.

⁶³Ibid., p. 295.

⁶⁴Beer, ed., Briefwechsel, pp. 489-500.

⁶⁵Khevenhüller-Metsch V, 196. Cf. Arneth, Eichenwalder, et al.

⁶⁶Beer, Briefwechsel, p. 490.

⁶⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 97/C/119-122, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d. (1766). Cf. Beer, Briefwechsel, pp. 501-503.

⁶⁸Beer, Briefwechsel, pp. 503-506.

⁶⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 97/D/120-133. Cf. Arneth, MT VII, 305.

⁷⁰Alfred Ritter von Arneth, ed., Briefe der Kaiserin Maria Theresia an Ihre Kinder und Freunde (4 vols.; Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1881), IV, 256.

⁷¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 97/C/178-196, Kaunitz to Joseph, 13 June 1766.

⁷²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 97/D/5, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 14 June 1766.

⁷³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 97/D/10-11, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 14 June 1766.

⁷⁴Beer, ed., Briefwechsel, pp. 507-508.

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 508-512.

⁷⁶Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 183, No. 76.

⁷⁷Ibid., I, 184, No. 77. It is doubtful that Kaunitz's opinion alone swayed Joseph. Lacy, usually an opponent of Kaunitz and also a close personal friend of the emperor, was also opposed to the meeting. This latter opinion probably had more effect on Joseph, but it conveniently coincided with domestic political expediency and could not help but be useful when Joseph met Kaunitz in July. Cf. Alfred H. Loeb1, "Österreich und Preussen. 1766-1768," AOG XCII (1903), 400.

⁷⁸Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 190, No. 80.

⁷⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 98/A/191-192, Ohnmassgebliche Gedanken über die künftige bessere Einrichtung meiner 3. Departments, n. d. (summer 1766).

⁸⁰Arneth, MT VII, 308-310.

⁸¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 98/A/13-16, 33-34, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 5 August 1766.

⁸²Beer, Briefwechsel, pp. 512-513.

⁸³The prolonged exchanges on this matter between Maria Theresia, Kaunitz and Joseph are in HHStA, StK, Vorträge 98/A/82-142. Cf. Beer, Briefwechsel, pp. 513-516.

⁸⁴HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/C/86, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d. (1766).

⁸⁵HHStA, StK Vorträge 98/B/146-153, Kaunitz to the Staatskanzlei staff, 20 October 1766.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Arneth, MT VII, 315-316.

⁸⁸After less than four years in the Staatsrat, Starhemberg was sent to Brussels as principal minister in the Austrian Netherlands. He returned to Vienna in 1783 to take up the post of Lord Chamberlin (Obersthofmeister) and remained without political influence of the rest of his life. He died in 1807. Richard Eichwalder, "Georg Adam Fürst Starhemberg (1724-1807): Diplomat, Staatsman und Grundherr," OGL XV (April, 1971), 199-201.

⁸⁹Arneth, MT VII, 542-543, n. 419.

⁹⁰Eichwalder, p. 199. Cf. Heinrich Benedikt, Als Belgien Österreich war (Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1965), p. 130.

⁹¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 98/B/146-153, Kaunitz to Staatskanzlei staff, 20 October 1766.

⁹²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 98/C/43-49, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 14 November 1766.

⁹³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 98/C/5-20, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 3 November 1766.

⁹⁴Arneth, MT VII, 318.

CHAPTER II: THE REFORMS OF 1768

¹Eichwalder, p. 199.

²See below, Chapter XI.

³See below, Chapter XII.

⁴HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/C/84, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d. (1767).

⁵HHStA, StK, Vorträge 100/C/30-37, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 11 November 1767.

⁶Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, resolution on the above.

⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/A/97-146, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 25 January 1768. Appendix: Einige Beyspiele zur Erläuterung des **S** vi 9vi meines allerunterthänigsten Vortrags vom 25. Jänner 1768, Vorträge 101/B/1-8, 32-67, including a financial statement dated 10 February 1768.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴OZV II/1/i, 477.

¹⁵Vortrag as above, Sections 52-57.

¹⁶Ibid., Sections 62, 64, 68.

¹⁷Ibid., Sections 80-81.

¹⁸OZV II/3, 34, 257-276, 301, 317.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 35. The specific Staatsrat protocol has been lost.

²⁰Kaunitz's one votum in the Staatsrat on the subject, dated 13 March 1768, merely expressed agreement with Starhemberg whose votum in turn is lost. HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, unnumbered.

²¹The commission's report is dated 9 August 1768 and is quoted in part in OZV II/3, 302-303 (these parts concern the debate on the Hofkammer). Starhemberg's report is not quoted, merely referred to, in OZV II/3, 35. It too has since been lost. The commission, chaired by Starhemberg, consisted of Blümegen, Borié, Binder, Stupan, Gebler and Hofrat Koller.

²²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 102/A/212-213, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 29 August 1768.

²³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 102/C/64-65, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 29 November 1768.

²⁴OZV II/1/i, 432, II/3, 35.

²⁵Ibid., II/3, 35-39.

²⁶Ibid., II/3, 39-41, II/1/i, 433-434.

²⁷"This proposal," Borié noted, "is more suited for a ruler and a despot than a high-level civil servant." Ibid., II/3, 40.

²⁸Ibid., II/3, 40-41.

²⁹Ibid., p. 277.

³⁰Arneth, MT IX, 336.

³¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 97/A/10-13, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 9 January 1766.

³²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 97/A/16-20, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 13 January 1766.

³³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 97/A/39-46, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 22 January 1766.

³⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 104/B/36-45, Kaunitz to Joseph, 9 August 1769.

³⁵Joseph's resolution on the above. /

³⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 107/A/230-231, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 30 January 1771.

³⁷OZV II/3, 277.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 277-279.

³⁹Ibid., p. 280.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 280-286. Gustav Otruba, Die Wirtschaftspolitik Maria Theresias (Vienna: Bergland Verlag, 1963), p. 11 suggests that the Staatswirtschaftsdeputation was created in 1767. There are no references given for this contention.

⁴¹OZV II/3, 290.

⁴²Margarethe Picha, "Der Aufstieg des Grafen Karl Friedrich Hatzfeld zu Gleichen bis zu seinem missglückten Versuch ein Premierministerium in internis zu gründen (1771)" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 1940), pp. 70-73, 87-89.

⁴³OZV II/3, 302-303. Cf. Adolf Beer, "Die Finanzverwaltung Österreichs, 1749-1816," MIOG XV (1894), 237-366.

⁴⁴OZV II/3, 302-303.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 303-307.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 308-313.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 318.

⁴⁸Ibid. II/1/i, 483-484.

⁴⁹Ibid. II/3, 319.

⁵⁰HHStA, StK, Vorträge 104/C/115-116, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 29 September 1769.

⁵¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 104/C/126, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 23 October 1769.

CHAPTER III: THE MINISTERIAL SHUFFLE OF 1771

¹Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 233-234, No. 94.

²HHStA, KA, Varia der Kabinettskanzlei, 20A/b/1-10, Zwei Memoires von Gr. Reischach an I. M. die Kaiserin von 1769 über die Anstände so S. M. der Kayser gemacht als Corregent nicht unterschreiben zu wollen, 28 and 31 January 1769.

³Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 234-241, Nos. 100, 102, 103 and 105.

⁴HHStA, KA, Varia der Kabinettskanzlei 20A/b/2,9, Reischach to Maria Theresia, 31 January 1769.

⁵ Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 237, No. 103.

⁶ Eichwalder, p. 199. Cf. Arneth, MT X, 211-212.

⁷ OZV II/1/i, 434.

⁸ Tobias Philip Freiherr von Gebler (1726-1786) was born at Zeulenroda in the principality of Reuss. He studied at Jena, Göttingen and Halle, and in 1748 became a secretary in the Dutch embassy in Berlin. He became noted for his resistance to bribery attempts by Frederick II and was able to enter Austrian service in 1753 as a court secretary in the Kommerziendirektorium. He converted to Catholicism and rose rapidly in the imperial service. In 1758 he became Referendar of the montanistici board of the Directorium, in 1762 privy councillor in the Hofkanzlei, and in 1768 a member of the Staatsrat. He was a noted leader of the Enlightenment party in Austria, took a lively interest in the arts, and played a central role in the education reforms of Maria Theresia. He died as vice-chancellor of the Hofkanzlei.

⁹ Khevenhüller-Metsch X, 106.

¹⁰ Konrad Schünemann, "Die Wirtschaftspolitik Josephs II. in der Zeit seiner Mitregentschaft," MIOG XLVII (1933), pp. 37-38.

¹¹ Arneth MT IX, 296-297, OZV II/1/i, 435-436.

¹² The imperial resolution is not extant and was probably lost with the Staatsratakten, but its contents can be deduced from Joseph's letter to Leopold.

¹³ Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 335-336, No. 140.

¹⁴ HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/D/214-215, Joseph to Leopold, 19 September 1771.

¹⁵ OZV II/3, 42-43.

¹⁶ Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 350-352, No. 151.

¹⁷ Beer, "Finanzverwaltung . . .", p. 257.

¹⁸ OZV II/3, 315. Hatzfeld's reports are dated 5 and 25 February, 5 May and 2 August.

¹⁹Picha, p. 89.

²⁰Khevenhüller-Metsch X, 81.

²¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 2745 of 1771, StR Voti, 31 August - 4 September, 1771.

²²Franz Karl Freiherr von Kressel (1720-1801) came from an old Bohemian noble family. He studied law and became the director of the Faculty of Law at the University of Prague in 1760. Decorated with the Order of St. Stephen and raised to the rank of Freiherr, he became a privy councillor in the Hofkanzlei. In 1771 he was made a member of the Staatsrat, and from February 1789 until 1792 was second chancellor of the Hofkanzlei. Wurzbach XIII, 201-203, Hock-Bidermann, p. 106.

²³Paul von Festetics von Tolna was a privy councillor in the Hofkammer.

²⁴Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 352-356, No. 152. Joseph's economic motives for the shuffle are analyzed in Schünemann, pp. 37-39.

²⁵HHStA, StK, Vorträge 108/C/161-168, Geheimes Gutachten des Kaisers . . ., December 1771.

²⁶Ibid. This copy of the order to Hatzfeld is dated 30 November 1771. It is possible that this was in fact a draft drawn up by Kaunitz and dated at that time. Both Walter and Arneth have accepted 30 November as the actual date of the order's expedition. Three things, however, call this date into question. First of all Joseph was still able to write his brother on 12 December 1772: "Vous y [in the enclosed papers] verrez les différents projects d'arrangements internes, qui par ma proposition ci-jointe ont été dérangés. S. M. actuellement ne s'est pas encore décidée, ayant consulté les comtes de Hatzfeld et Blümegen, et tous deux variant dans leurs opinions. J'espère que sous peu de jours elle se décidera." Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 358, No. 154. The same day Khevenhüller, in describing all the rumours circulating about the ministerial shuffle, noted in his diary: ". . . mithin blibe das ganze Geschäft biss Samstag fruh in der vorigen Indécision." Khevenhüller-Metsch, X, 106. Finally, Kaunitz filed the Joseph memorandum and the Hatzfeld order with the date "im Decemb. 1771." HHStA, StK, Vorträge 108/C/161.

²⁷Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 358, No. 154, Khevenhüller-Metsch X, 105-106.

²⁸ Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 357-358, No. 103.

²⁹ Arneth, MT IX, 301-302.

³⁰ See below, Chapter XIV.

³¹ Joseph Alexander von Helfert, Die Gründung der österreichischen Volksschule durch Maria Theresia (Prague: Verlag von Friedrich Tempsky, 1860), p. 194.

³² HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 406/D/8-11, Pergen to Kaunitz, n. d. (Winter 1771).

³³ Cf. below, Chapter XIV.

³⁴ Arneth, ed., Briefe an Kinder u. Freunde IV, 291.

³⁵ The title is to be distinguished from that of an ordinary privy councillor (Hofrat). It was meant to be a high honour, and was still rarely awarded during this time.

³⁶ Johann Friedrich Freiherr von Löhr (1734-1795) was the son of a privy councillor of the Elector of Mainz. He entered Austrian service and made his reputation in the Vorlande with a series of important memoranda on local conditions. Before being appointed to the Staatsrat he had been a privy councillor with the Oberest Justizstelle and a Referendar in the Hofkanzlei. He was created a Freiherr in 1772, and died as president of the Lower Austrian Court of Appeal. Wurzbach XV, 396-397, Hock-Bidermann, p. 106.

³⁷ OZV II/3, 315-316, Khevenhüller-Metsch X, 106-107, 407-408.

³⁸ Khevenhüller-Metsch X, 107-108.

³⁹ T. Barath, "L'absolutisme éclairé en Hongrie (1761-1795)," Bulletin of the International Committee of Historical Sciences IX (1937), 69.

⁴⁰ Also called the Posse Comitatus. Béla K. Kiraly, Hungary in the late Eighteenth Century: The Decline of Enlightened Despotism (N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 261.

⁴¹Arneth, MT VII, 120-132.

⁴²Ferdinand Maass, ed., Der Josephinismus: Quellen zur seiner Geschichte in Österreich, 1760-1790 (3 vols.; Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1951-1956), I, 40-46.

⁴³Arneth, MT VII, 117.

⁴⁴Maass I, 206-208, No. 85.

⁴⁵Arneth, MT VII, 118-122.

⁴⁶OZV II/3, 44-45, n. 2.

⁴⁷Arneth, MT IX, 294. Posaner, p. 12 has suggested that in not proposing at the outset that the Staatsrat have official authorization over Hungary, Kaunitz set the Habsburg Monarchy on the road to Dualism. Certainly nothing was further from Kaunitz's mind.

⁴⁸HHStA, StK, Vorträge 96/C/41-42, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 1 December 1765, Vorträge 96/C/87-94, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 8 November 1765.

⁴⁹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 370 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 26 April 1767.

⁵⁰HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 24, No. 370, Maria Theresia to Bruckenthal, 10 May 1767.

⁵¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 825 of 1768, Kaunitz StR Votum, 24 April 1768.

⁵²HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 27, No. 825, Maria Theresia Resolution, 26 April 1768.

⁵³HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1694 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 4 August 1767.

⁵⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2487 of 1769, Kaunitz StR Votum, 23 July 1769.

⁵⁵HHStA, StK, Vorträge 119/B/79-86, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 28 October 1775.

⁵⁶HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten III, No. 8 of 1778, Kaunitz StR Votum, 30 January 1778.

⁵⁷HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 63, No. 8, Maria Theresia Resolution, n. d. (February 1778).

⁵⁸Arneth, MT VII, 134.

⁵⁹This office, which was formally abolished in 1848 never went to an Hungarian again. Joseph followed his mother's example and left the office vacant. Leopold II revived the post in 1790, but appointed his son, Alexander Leopold (1772-1795) to it. It remained in the hands of younger archdukes from that point on. Cf. Kiraly, p. 259.

⁶⁰Kiraly, p. 237.

⁶¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1593 of 1768, Kaunitz StR Votum, 24 July 1768. It is important to mention this economic policy in the administrative context because Kaunitz's endorsement of keeping the Hungarian economy agrarian did not mean that he had been won over by the mercantilist arguments of the Kommerzienrat (which wanted to protect industry in Bohemia and Austria from competition), but only that he regarded it a convenient lever to wring political concessions from the Hungarian Diet. Cf. below, Chapter XII.

⁶²HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1694 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 4 August 1767.

⁶³Khevenhüller-Metsch X, 110.

⁶⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 2745 of 1771, Gebler, Stupan and Blümegen StR Voti, 31 August - 4 September 1771.

⁶⁵OZV II/3, 327-328.

⁶⁶Joseph wrote to Leopold on 9 July 1772: "La chambre des comptes est actuellement dans des furieuses transes; sa perte paraît jurée, et inauditus, je crains, Zinzendorf avec tous ses doublistes sera condamné." Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 372-373, No. 167.

⁶⁷OZV II/1/i, 487-489, II/3 328-340.

⁶⁸Pettenegg, pp. 138-139.

⁶⁹OZV II/1/i, 489-490.

CHAPTER IV: THE CONFLICT WITH JOSEPH

¹Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 344, No. 147.

²Schünemann, p. 40.

³Arneth, MT IX, 305.

⁴That Kaunitz's patience and apparent inactivity from February to August 1772 was the key factor that permitted him to outmanoeuvre completely Frederick of Prussia and Panin, the Russian foreign minister, and seize the lion's share in the partition has been demonstrated by Herbert H. Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland (N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 166-173, 183.

⁵HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/D/214-215, Joseph to Leopold, 19 September 1771.

⁶HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/E/19-20, Joseph to Leopold, 16 January 1772.

⁷HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/C/72-73, Joseph to Leopold, 11 May 1772.

⁸HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/C/80-81, Joseph to Leopold, 25 May 1772.

⁹HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/C/89, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d. (Spring 1772).

- 1772.
- ¹⁰HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/C/82-83, Joseph to Leopold, 11 June 1772.
- ¹¹Schünemann, pp. 41-43.
- ¹²OZV II/1/i, 443, Cf. Schünemann, p. 43.
- XIII.
- ¹³Franz Anton von Blanc, an agrarian adviser, see below, Chapter XIII.
- ¹⁴HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/C/90, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d. (June 1772).
- ¹⁵Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 370-371, No. 165.
- ¹⁶Ibid., pp. 372-373, No. 167.
- ¹⁷Ibid., pp. 375-378, No. 169.
- ¹⁸Arneth, MT VIII, 321-394.
- ¹⁹Ibid., pp. 414-415.
- 1772.
- ²⁰HHStA, StK, Vorträge 110/B/60-65, Kaunitz to Binder, 14 September 1772.
- ²¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 110/B/43-43a, Maria Theresia to Binder, 11 September 1772. Cf. Arneth, MT VIII, 415-416.
- ²²Binder's letter is not extant, but his temper can be deduced from the letters of Maria Theresia and Kaunitz.
- ²³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 110/B/60-65, Kaunitz to Binder, 14 September 1772. Cf. Arneth, MT VIII, 608.
- ²⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 110/B/165-170, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 9 October 1772.
- ²⁵Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, resolution on the above. Cf. OZV II/3, 296, Arneth, MT VIII, 416-417.

²⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 110/B/201-202, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 14 October 1772.

²⁷HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/F/14-16, Maria Theresia to Joseph, 6 October 1772.

²⁸Joseph to Maria Theresia, 6 October 1772, "nota" on the above.

²⁹Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 383, No. 174.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 384-385, No. 175.

³¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 110/D/46-56, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, n. d. (end of 1772).

³²Arneth, MT IX, 306.

³³Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 5, No. 179.

³⁴Allergnädigst anbefohlenes Gutachten über die Verbesserung des Systematis in Internis. The final bound copy, complete with imperial resolution is dated 1 May 1773, HHStA, StK, Vorträge 112/A. This section of Karton 112 also contains the preliminary 251-page draft changed according to Joseph's instructions. Since this is the most extensive version of the report, subsequent page references refer to its pagination. Binder's draft, a secretarial copy of it and Joseph's annotations are in Section C of Karton 111.

³⁵Kaunitz's views on taxation are discussed below, Chapter XII.

³⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 111/D/123-124, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 1 May 1773, HHStA, StK, Vorträge, 111/C/1-5, 6-15, Joseph to Kaunitz, 20 April 1773.

³⁷Gutachten, pp. 85-86.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 87-109.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 140-154.

⁴⁰OZV II/1/i, 444, II/3, 73.

⁴¹Schünemann, p. 15.

⁴²"Auf halben Wegen und zu halber Tat/Mit halben Mitteln zauderhaft zu streben." Ein Bruderzwist in Habsburg II, 922-923.

⁴³Gutachten, pp. 85-86.

⁴⁴See above, pp. 92-93.

⁴⁵Gutachten, pp. 174-182.

⁴⁶Ibid., 182-183.

⁴⁷Karl Grünberg, Die Bauernbefreiung und die Auflösung des gutherrlich-bäuerlichen Verhältnisses in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien (2 vols., Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humbolt, 1894), I, 146, II, 61. Cf. Beidtel, I, 30-34, OZV II/1/i, 160-161, II/2, 210 ff., Arneth MT IV, 38-41, Eugen Guglia, Maria Theresia, ihr Leben und ihre Regierung (2 vols.; Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1917), II, 34-38.

⁴⁸Arneth, MT IX, 338.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 593, fn. 540.

⁵⁰HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 2140 of 1771, Kaunitz StR Votum, 6 July 1771.

⁵¹Gutachten, pp. 45-48, 184-187.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 188-189, Helen P. Liebel, "Administrative Reform and Enlightened Despotism in Eighteenth-Century Germany," Fondazione Italiana per la Storia Amministrativa, Annale V, VI, in press, pp. 80-81 in MS.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 189-192.

⁵⁴HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/A/7, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d. (April 1773).

⁵⁵Arneth, MT IX, 588.

⁵⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 111/C/6-15, Joseph to Kaunitz, 20 April 1773.

⁵⁷ Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 6-7, No. 180.

⁵⁸ OZV II/3, 48-53, Cf. Hock-Bidermann, pp. 28-32.

⁵⁹ Joseph to Leopold, 8 August 1771, HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/D/190-191.

⁶⁰ OZV II/3, 53-60, 51.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 69-73.

⁶² Ibid., pp. 60-69.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 73, n. 2.

⁶⁴ Hock-Bidermann, p. 32.

⁶⁵ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 111/D/137-138, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 17 May 1773.

⁶⁶ OZV II/3, 73-74.

⁶⁷ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 112/C/123-128, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 23 July 1773.

⁶⁸ Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, resolution on the above.

⁶⁹ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 112/C/119-122, Maria Theresia to Binder, et al., 27 July 1773.

⁷⁰ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 112/C/129-130, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 29 July 1773.

⁷¹ Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 9-11, No. 182.

⁷² HHStA, StK, Vorträge 112/B/71-72, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 20 June 1773.

⁷³ HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 406/D/16-19, Kaunitz to Perglen, 12 July 1773.

⁷⁴ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 112/B/123-124, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, June 1773.

⁷⁵ See for example Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 13-15, No. 184, or his "Nota" of 5 August 1773 in which under thirteen different headings he lists over fifty questions he needs immediate answer to. HHStA, StK, Vorträge 112/C/163-174. Printed in part in Arneth, MT VIII, 418-421.

⁷⁶ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 113/A/2, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 2 September 1773.

⁷⁷ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 113/A/3-6, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 2 September 1773.

⁷⁸ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 113/A/2, 7, 38-83, Kaunitz to Joseph, 2 September 1773. The answers took 286 pages and are to be found in a separate section of Vorträge 113/A.

⁷⁹ Arneth, MT VIII, 419-422.

⁸⁰ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 113/A/51-52, Kaunitz to Joseph, 10 September 1773.

⁸¹ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 113/B/136-139, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 16 November 1773.

⁸² Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 16 November 1773, resolution on the above.

⁸³ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 113/B/140-141, Binder to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 16 November 1773.

⁸⁴ Adolf Beer, Die Erste Theilung Polens 2 vols., (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1880), II, 64-68.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 69-72.

⁸⁶ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 113/C/8-13, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 7 December 1773. Printed in part in Arneth, MT VIII, 617.

⁸⁷ Arneth, MT VIII, 617-618.

⁸⁸Th. G. von Karajan, Maria Theresia und Joseph II. während der Mitregentschaft (Vienna: K. K. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1865), pp. 28-31.

⁸⁹Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 27-29, No. 191.

CHAPTER V: RECONCILIATION AND VICTORY

¹Arneth, MT VIII, 618.

²Ibid., and in Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 22.

³Arneth, MT VIII, 495-531.

⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 2452 of 1773, Kaunitz StR Votum, 28 November 1773.

⁵OZV II/3, 296-298.

⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 114/A/57-58, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 14 January 1774.

⁷OZV II/3, 298-299.

⁸HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/E/238-239, Joseph to Leopold, 24 May 1774.

⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 120/D/98-101, OZV II/3, 300-301, Joseph to Maria Theresia, 21 April 1776.

¹⁰See above pp. 104-105.

¹¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 112/C/163-174, Joseph "Nota", 5 August 1773.

¹²Gutachten, pp. 208, 248.

¹³As late as 1780, for instance, he urged the use of local nobles in the Galician provincial administration, Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. III, 243.

¹⁴Schünemann, p. 45.

¹⁵Hock-Bidermann, pp. 32-36. Cf. OZV II/1/i, 455-456.

¹⁶HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/E/208-209, Joseph to Leopold, November 1773.

¹⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 114/B/189-249, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 20 February 1774.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³OZV II/3, 76.

²⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 114/C/73-76, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 10 March 1774.

²⁵Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, resolution on the above.

²⁶Karajan, pp. 31-32, Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 32-33, No. 144, OZV II/3, 77-78.

²⁷OZV II/3, 79-80.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 81-84.

²⁹The accounting system set up by the Staatsrat to handle this audit was abolished within a few months on the grounds that it was superfluous. Hock-Bidermann, p. 41.

³⁰HHStA, StK, Vorträge 120/D/98-101, Joseph to Maria Theresia, 21 April 1776.

³¹Hock-Bidermann, p. 41.

³²Ibid.

³³Arneth, MT IX, 531-533.

³⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 125/A/254-255, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, n. d. (January-February 1778).

³⁵HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 2633 of 1773, Kaunitz StR Votum, 4 December 1773.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Liebel, "Administrative Reform . . .," p. 81 in MS.

³⁸Maria Theresia's request can be deduced from Kaunitz's answer.

³⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 122/B/117-120, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 22 March 1777.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Beidtel I, 176-177, Liebel, "Administrative Reform . . .," p. 82 in MS.

⁴²HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten III, No. 692 of 1777, Kaunitz StR Votum, 19 April 1777.

⁴³Schünemann, pp. 51-52. For full details, see below, Chapter XII.

⁴⁴See above, pp. 16, 48.

⁴⁵OZV II/3, 290-294, 360.

⁴⁶ Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 108-109, No. 240. See below Chapter XII.

⁴⁷ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 120/D/98-101, Joseph to Maria Theresia, 21 April 1776.

⁴⁸ Arneth, MT X, 522. Cf. Paul B. Bernard, Joseph II and Bavaria: Two Eighteenth Century Attempts to German Unification (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965).

⁴⁹ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 102/B/21-25, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 8 September 1768.

⁵⁰ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 109/C/171-172, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 15 April 1772.

⁵¹ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 131/B/134-137, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 24 February 1780.

⁵² HHStA, StK, Vorträge 107/A/47-79, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 11 January 1771.

⁵³ HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 15/Allegato di No. 3 (Not published by Wandruszka), Impiegati Principali a Vienna e nello Stato secondo i rispettivi Dipartimenti e carattere loro, n. d. (1778-1779).

⁵⁴ Wandruszka, Leopold I, 354.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 329.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 346.

⁵⁷ The conversation was summarized by Kaunitz in his subsequent formal request.

⁵⁸ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 129/A/31-46, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 21 May 1779.

⁵⁹ Arneth, MT X, 643-644.

⁶⁰ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 129/A/31-46, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 21 May 1779.

⁶¹Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, resolution on the above.

⁶²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 129/A/48-67, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 21-22 May 1779.

⁶³HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 406/A/1, Cobenzl to Kaunitz, 28 May 1779.

⁶⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 129/A/97-99, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 29 May 1779.

⁶⁵HHStA, StK, Vorträge 129/A/100, Kaunitz to Cobenzl, 31 May 1779.

⁶⁶HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 406/A/8, Kaunitz to Cobenzl, 14 July 1779.

⁶⁷Grossing, pp. 40-41.

⁶⁸Wandruszka, Leopold II, 88-89.

CHAPTER VI: KAUNITZ AND JOSEPHINISM

¹Ferdinand Maass, ed., Der Josephinismus: Quellen zur seiner Geschichte in Österreich, 1760-1790, Vol. I: Ursprung und Wesen des Josephinismus, 1760-1769, Vol. II: Entfaltung und Krise des Josephinismus, 1770-1790, Vol. III: Das Werk des Hofrats Heinke, 1768-1790, Fontes Rerum Austriacarum II/71-73 (Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1951-1956).

²Anton Ellemunter, Antonio Eugenio Visconti und die Anfänge des Josephinismus: Eine Untersuchung über das thesesianische Staatskirchentum unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Nuntiarberichte, 1767-1774 (Graz: H. Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1963), p. 179. Herbert Rieser, also a student of Maass as well as a Jesuit, closely follows Maass' thesis in Der Geist des Josephinismus und sein Fortleben. Der Kampf der Kirche um ihre Freiheit (Vienna: Herder Verlag, 1963).

³Eduard Winter, Barock, Absolutismus und Aufklärung in der Donaumonarchie (Vienna: Europa Verlag, 1971), p. 164.

⁴ Winter first posited this thesis in Der Josephinismus und seine Geschichte: Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Österreichs, 1740-1848. (Brno; Munich and Vienna: Verlag Rudolf M. Rohrer, 1943). The sharper anti-Maass polemics appeared in the second revised edition of the work, Der Josephinismus Die Geschichte des österreichischen Reformkatholizismus, 1740-1848 (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1962). All subsequent quotations refer to this edition. See also, Heinrich Benedikt, "Der Josephinismus vor Joseph II," Österreich und Europa: Festgabe für Hugo Hantsch zum 70. Geburtstag (Graz, Vienna, Cologne: Verlag Styria, 1965), pp. 183-201.

⁵ Maass insisted that Josephinism contained elements of theological rationalism and added, "daher kann man den Josephinismus nicht einfach als Staatskirchentum bezeichnen." Josephinismus III, ix. Winter, despite the title of the second edition of his work, also covered his flank with the admission, "Josephinismus ist freilich mehr als Reformkatholizismus." p. 361.

⁶ Grete Klingenstein, Staatsverwaltung entitles her fourth chapter: "Reformkatholizismus oder Staatskirchentum?"

⁷ Fritz Valjavec, Der Josephinismus: Zur geistigen Entwicklung Österreichs im achtzehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhundert (2nd ed.; Munich: Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1945).

⁸ Erich Zöllner, "Bemerkungen zum Problem der Beziehung zwischen Aufklärung und Josephinismus," Österreich und Europa, p. 206.

⁹ Paul P. Bernard, "The Origins of Josephinism: Two Studies," Colorado College Studies VII (1964), R. Reinhardt, "Zur Kirchenreform in Österreich unter Maria Theresia," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte LXXVII (1966), 105-119, Klingenstein, Staatsverwaltung, p. 130.

¹⁰ Zöllner, "Bemerkungen . . .", p. 216.

¹¹ Klingenstein, Staatsverwaltung, pp. 85-86.

¹² Gerard van Swieten (1700-1772) was born in Leyden and studied medicine there under the famous Boerhaave. After his teacher's death Swieten published a commentary on his mentor's medical books which brought him to the attention of Austrian authorities, including Kaunitz, who was then in Brussels. When Maria Theresia's sister, Maria Anna, the regent of the Austrian Netherlands, fell ill, Swieten was called to Brussels. His arts proved in vain and the archduchess died soon thereafter. But Maria Theresia was sufficiently impressed to call van Swieten to Vienna to become her personal physician. He arrived in 1745 and soon became one of the empress'

closest advisers. His initial task of reforming the medical faculty at the University of Vienna, soon grew into educational reform in general. Van Swieten also became chairman of the Censorship board. Frank T. Brechka, Gerard van Swieten and his World, 1700-1772 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970). See also August Fournier, "Gerhard van Swieten als Censor," Sitzungsberichte der phil.-hist. Classe der k. k. Akademie der Wissenschaften LXXXIV (1876), 387-466, and Wilibald Müller, Gerhard van Swieten: Biographischer Beitrag zur Geschichte der Aufklärung in Österreich (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1883).

¹³Ferdinand Maass, "Der Frühjosephinismus," Forschungen zur Kirchengeschichte Österreichs (Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1969). See also Ernst Tomek, Kirchengeschichte Österreichs (3 vols.; Innsbruck, Vienna, Munich: Tyrolia Verlag, 1959), III, 213-250, Winter, pp. 22-34. Klingenstein, Staatsverwaltung, p. 101 calls the decade of the 1750's the decisive time of reform catholicism.

¹⁴Enrico Dammig, Il movimento giansenista a Roma nella seconda metà del secolo XVIII (Vatican City: Biblioteca Vaticana, 1945).

¹⁵Klingenstein, Staatsverwaltung, p. 123.

¹⁶Hans Wagner, "Der Einfluss von Gallikanismus und Jansenismus auf die Kirche und den Staat der Aufklärung in Österreich," OGL XI (1967), 521-534, Peter Hersche, "War Maria Theresia eine Jansenistin?" OGL XV (1971), 14-25.

¹⁷Maass, Josephinismus I, 20-24 demonstrated that Kaunitz's actions in his first seven years in office, 1753-1760, revealed no animosity towards the church, and indeed, maintained a strictly correct relationship with the Vatican.

¹⁸Tomek, III, 221, Arneth, MT IV, 51-55.

¹⁹Maass, Josephinismus I, 128-129, Nos. 20 & 21.

²⁰Winter, p. 36.

²¹Ludwig Freiherr von Pastor, The History of the Popes from the close of the Middle Ages, trans., E. F. Peeler, et al. (40 vols.; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1923-1953), XXXVI, 143-167. Cf. Arneth, MT IX, 7.

²²Maass, Josephinismus I, 113-115, Nos. 4 & 6.

²³Ibid., 33-37, 137-155, Nos. 31, 33-37, 39, 40, 42, 46, 49, 51.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 25-32, Ferdinand Maass, "Vorbereitung und Anfänge des Josephinismus im amtlichen Schriftverkehr des Staatskanzlers Fürsten von Kaunitz-Rietberg mit seinem bevollmächtigten Minister beim Governo generale der österreichischen Lombardei, Karl Grafen von Firmian, 1763-1770," MOSTA I (1948), 303-355.

²⁵Maass, Josephinismus I, 37-39, Maass, "Vorbereitung . . .", pp. 354-355.

²⁶Maass, Josephinismus I, 29.

²⁷Ibid., I, 158-159, No. 53b.

²⁸Ibid., I, 158, No. 53a.

²⁹HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 405/B/67-68, Kaunitz to Andreas Krufft, 26 January 1779.

³⁰See above p. 131.

³¹Maass, Josephinismus I, 30.

³²Maass, "Vorbereitung . . .", p. 354, No. 43.

³³Ibid., p. 390, No. 74.

³⁴Maass, Josephinismus I, 38.

³⁵Maass, Josephinismus I, 29.

³⁶Maass argues precisely the reverse, Ibid. I, 31-32.

³⁷Count Karl von Firmian (1718-1782) was born in Deutschmetz in the Tyrol and was educated at the Benedictine university at Salzburg as well as the University of Leyden. Influenced by Jansenism in Holland and by the Enlightenment in Paris, he was made a privy councillor for affairs of the Empire (Reichshofrat) in 1746. At the request of Kaunitz who recognized his diplomatic talents, he was appointed ambassador to Naples in 1753 where he diligently worked for the reversal of alliances that Kaunitz initiated. In 1758 he was recalled from Naples and appointed authorized

minister in Milan. He retained his post until his death. Cf. Adam Wandruszka, Osterreich und Italien im 18. Jahrhundert (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1963), pp. 61-63, and Heinrich Benedikt, Kaiseradler über dem Apennin: Die Österreicher in Italien 1700 bis 1866 (Vienna: Verlag Herold, 1964), p. 72.

³⁸Maass, "Vorbereitung . . .", pp. 355-444.

³⁹Ibid. Cf., Maass, Josephinismus I, 47-68.

⁴⁰No Kaunitz vota exist prior to 1767, but there is no reason to believe that a pattern consistent in 1767 is not indicative of the pattern prior to 1767.

⁴¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1002 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 29 May 1767.

⁴²HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 25, No. 1002, Imperial resolution, 3 June 1767.

⁴³HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 131 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 20 February 1767.

⁴⁴HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 24, No. 131, Imperial resolution, 11 March 1767.

⁴⁵HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1941 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 31 August 1767.

⁴⁶HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 25, No. 1941, Imperial resolution, 16 September 1767.

⁴⁷HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1890 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 25 August 1767.

⁴⁸HHStA, KA, Staatsratakan I, No. 1298, StR Vota, 27 May 1767.

⁴⁹HHStA, KA, Staatsratakan I, No. 1694, Kaunitz StR Votum, 9 May, 1767. This is the one carton of the Staatsratakan that survived the Second World War.

⁵⁰Maass, Josephinismus I, 58-60, 231-234, No. 98.

⁵¹Ibid. I, 234-235, No. 99.

⁵²See above pp. 63-64.

⁵³Franz Joseph Ritter von Heinke (1726-1803), the son of an imperial customs officer, was born in Maltzsch, Lower Silesia. He studied law at Halle and Prague, receiving his doctorate in 1748. His legal apprenticeship with the provincial authorities in Bohemia soon brought him to the attention of the authorities and in 1751 he was made a privy councillor with the Court of Appeal in Prague. Although offered a post with the Oberste Justizstelle in 1756 and again in 1761, he could not accept the offers for family reasons. In 1764 he was made director of the Faculty of Law at Prague where his predecessor had been Kressel. His academic reforms brought him to the attention of van Swieten, and in 1767 he was made a privy councillor and Referent of the Hofkanzlei. In 1769 he was appointed to the consensus in publico-ecclesiasticis which spearheaded the confrontation with the church. In 1781 this commission became a full-fledged ministry (Geistliche Hofkommission), and Heinke was made its head. He retired in 1792 but continued to advise Emperor Francis II on ecclesiastical matters until his death. Maass, Josephinismus III.

⁵⁴A combination of authentic and forged papal decrees attributed to Isidorus Mercator, and produced (c. 850 A. D.) by a Frankish cleric. They aimed to establish the authority and power of the bishops and the position of the pope as supreme lawgiver and judge, and to make him supreme over councils. They were used by the Tusculan popes in the first half of the eleventh century in an effort to restore the central authority of the church.

⁵⁵Maass, Josephinismus I, 248-250, No. 106, III, 8-9.

⁵⁶Ibid. I, 236, No. 102.

⁵⁷Ibid. I, 252, No. 109.

⁵⁸Ibid. I, 264-266, No. 120.

⁵⁹Ibid. I, 72.

⁶⁰Pastor XXXVI, 294-504, XXXVII, 1-361.

⁶¹Maass, Josephinismus I, 255, No. 113.

⁶²See above pp. 48-53.

⁶³ All the sections of the report pertaining to the religious issue have been published by Maass, Josephinismus I, 256-257, No. 114

⁶⁴ Pastor XXXVII, 327.

⁶⁵ Maass, Josephinismus I, 251-252, No. 108.

⁶⁶ Pastor XXXVII, 230-236, 268.

⁶⁷ Maass, Josephinismus I, 262-264, No. 119.

⁶⁸ Ibid. I, 259-260, No. 116.

⁶⁹ Arneth, MT IX, 4-5.

⁷⁰ Maass, Josephinismus I, 250, No. 107. On Albani see Christa Donner, "Österreich und der Kirchenstaat unter dem Pontifikat Klemens XIII, 1758-1769" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 1966) who argues that the problem was not that Albani was a poor representative of Austrian state interests but that his post of Cardinal-Protector of German national interests lost its significance at the Vatican during this time.

⁷¹ Maass, Josephinismus I, 260-261, No. 117.

⁷² Arneth, MT IX, 19.

⁷³ Ibid. IX, 22.

⁷⁴ Maass, Josephinismus I, 267-274, No. 121.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Arneth, MT IX, 23.

⁷⁷ HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/h/68-69, Joseph to Kaunitz, 11 July 1768.

⁷⁸ Pastor XXXVIII.

⁷⁹ Ibid. XXXIX, 156, 319-321.

⁸⁰Maass, Josephinismus III, 10.

⁸¹Ibid. I, 81, Arneth, MT IX, 79-80.

⁸²HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 27, No. 126, StR Record, 27 January 1768.

⁸³HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 126 of 1768, Kaunitz StR Votum, 25 March 1768.

⁸⁴HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 27, No. 126, Imperial resolution, 2 April 1768.

⁸⁵Arneth, MT IX, 561-563, n. 128.

⁸⁶Maass, Josephinismus I, 81, 84.

⁸⁷HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 27, No. 953, StR Record, 21 April 1768.

⁸⁸HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 953 of 1768, Kaunitz StR Votum, 9 May 1768.

⁸⁹Maass, Josephinismus I, 287, No. 129.

⁹⁰HHStA, StK, Vorträge 104/C/55-56, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 5 October 1769.

⁹¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 104/C/61-62, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 7 October 1769.

⁹²Joseph's resolution on the above.

⁹³Maass, Josephinismus I, 92.

⁹⁴Hersche, pp. 14-22.

⁹⁵Barely passing reference is accorded Joseph before 1780 by Maass.

⁹⁶Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. III, 348-352.

⁹⁷Beer, "Denkschriften . . .," pp. 107-109.

⁹⁸Arneth, MT IX, 550-551, n. 48.

⁹⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/C/92-95, Joseph to Kaunitz, 23 March 1768.

¹⁰⁰Maass, Josephinismus III, 10.

¹⁰¹Ibid. I, 291, No. 132.

¹⁰²Ibid. I, 288-290, No. 130a.

¹⁰³Ibid. I, 84.

¹⁰⁴Ibid. I, 299-302, No. 135.

¹⁰⁵Ibid. I, 306-309, Nos. 137 & 138.

¹⁰⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/E/15-20, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 3 June 1768.

¹⁰⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/E/31-32, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, Maria Theresia to the Hungarian Chancellery, 7 June 1768.

¹⁰⁸Maass, Josephinismus I, 313-315, No. 141.

¹⁰⁹Ibid. I, 315-316, No. 142.

¹¹⁰Ibid. I, 319-322, No. 146.

¹¹¹Ibid. I, 322-323, No. 147. It seems unlikely that these were in fact circulated. They seem to have been kept for particular cases only. For example when Gerard van Swieten's son, Gottfried, was for a while considered as a replacement for Albani, his instructions included a copy of the "Principles". Cf. Ibid. II, 130-131, Nos. 3 & 3a.

¹¹²Ibid. I, 323-324, No. 148.

CHAPTER VII; CHURCH AND STATE

¹Ibid. III, 141-154, No. 1.

²Winter makes only three passing references to Heinke.

³Maass, Josephinismus III, ix-x.

⁴Cf. Maria Theresia's comment to Orsini-Rosenberg on 18 August 1767: "One has always to distinguish between the head of the church and the sovereign of Rome, and if the latter seems to be an insignificant creature and even occasions dissatisfaction with us, one still cannot forget one's duties to the common father of the faith." Wandruszka, Leopold I, 240.

⁵Maass, Josephinismus I, 312-313, No. 140b.

⁶Ibid. I, 310-313, Nos. 140, 140a & 140b.

⁷Ibid. I, 310, No. 140.

⁸Maass, Josephinismus I, 331, No. 155.

⁹These have been collected in Ibid. I, 335-366, No. 158/1-35.

¹⁰Ibid. I, 368-384, No. 158/36.

¹¹Ibid. III, 154-207, No. 2.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid. I, 368-384, No. 158/36, Vorbericht.

¹⁴Ibid. Ad 2. dum Oberherrliche Macht.

¹⁵Ibid. Ad 3. tium to Ad 13. tium Aus dem zweyten Satz.

¹⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/E/236-239, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 28 June 1768.

¹⁷Klingenstein, Staatsverwaltung, p. 217.

¹⁸HHStA, KA, Staatsratakten I, No. 1335, StR Vota and imperial resolution, 10-12 June 1767,

¹⁹HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/347-348, Kaunitz to Johann Kohary, 17 July 1770.

²⁰HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 405/B/15-16, Kaunitz to Raniero Calzabigi, 18 September 1775.

²¹Arneth, MT IX, 557-559.

²²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 103/A/187, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 12 February 1769.

²³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 103/A/196-198, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 16 February 1769.

²⁴Augustin Theiner, Histoire du pontificat de Clement XIV d'après des documents inédits des archives secrètes du Vatican, trans. by Paul de Geslin (2 vols.; Paris: Firmin Didot frères, 1852) I, 186-187.

²⁵Ibid. I, 204-205.

²⁶Pastor XXXVIII, 1-82.

²⁷Arneth, MT IX, 41-42.

²⁸Wandruszka, Leopold I, 227-243.

²⁹Maass, Josephinismus I, 384-385, Nos. 159 & 159a.

³⁰Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 271-276, No. 118.

³¹Arneth, MT IX, 42.

³²Maass, Josephinismus I, 386, No. 160. Maass mistakenly reads the order to Chotek as an instruction to form an autonomous department (the consensus in publico-ecclesiasticis) modelled after the Giutna Economale of Milan. Ibid. I, 105.

³³Maass, Ibid. I, 105, claims that Heinke was made the head of the consessus, while Hock-Bidermann, p. 53, insists it was Kressel. Arneth, MT IX, 57, lists the full membership of the commission and places Chotek at its head. This last contention is not only the most likely but is borne out by the fact that all protocols of the consessus were submitted under Chotek's name.

³⁴Arneth, MT IX, 57. Maass, Josephinismus I, 105, contends that the consessus as set up in 1769 was a separate department of the Hofkanzlei deliberately modelled after the Giunta Economale of Milan. The consessus, however, was not raised to an autonomous administrative department until Joseph created the court Ecclesiastical Commission (Geistliche Hofkommission) in 1782. Only then was the Giunta Economale specifically proposed as a model. Cf. OZV II/4, 71-110. That this was certainly not the case in 1769 is borne out by the fact that Joseph in his ecclesiastical reform proposals of 24 April 1771 pressed for the creation of a Giunta Economale on the Milanese model for Austria. HHStA, StK, Vorträge 107/D/161-166, Joseph to Maria Theresia, 24 April 1771. Maass' further contention that the consessus was run by Heinke alone, Josephinismus III, 81, is the result of Heinke's claim in 1781 that he had done all the work of the consessus for twelve years (Ibid. III, 251-300, No. 5, especially p. 255). In fact the first protocol of the consessus submitted by Chotek and subsequently discussed by the Staatsrat, specifically referred to the mixed membership of the commission. HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 35, No. 954, Protocol record, 20 March 1770.

³⁵Arneth, MT IX, 555-556, n. 79.

³⁶Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 277-278, enclosure in No. 119. On the similarities of Joseph's and Maria Theresia's view of the church see Ernst Wangermann, The Austrian Achievement, 1700-1800 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), p. 99, who correctly underscores the "Jansenist-Muratorian character" of Joseph's views.

³⁷Arneth, MT IX, 44.

³⁸HHStA, StK, Vorträge 104/C/85-86, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 9 October 1769.

³⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 104/C/176-177, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 7 November 1769.

⁴⁰Maass, Josephinismus II, 129, No. 1.

⁴¹Ibid. II, 129-130, No. 2.

⁴²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 104/C/168-175, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 5 November 1769.

⁴³Maass, Josephinismus II, 136, No. 5a.

⁴⁴Ibid. II, 134-135, No. 5.

⁴⁵Arneth, MT IX, 82.

⁴⁶Maass, Josephinismus II, 147-148, Nos. 7 & 7a.

⁴⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 105/C/58-59, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 12 May 1770.

⁴⁸Arneth, MT IX, 85-88.

⁴⁹Ibid. IX, 51-52, Maass, Josephinismus II, 32-33.

⁵⁰Wandruszka, Leopold I, 115.

⁵¹Ibid. I, 242. Cf. p. 193, above.

⁵²This would certainly explain Rosenberg's subsequent involvement in the matter, as well as Kaunitz's confusion about the asylum decree.

⁵³Arneth, MT IX, 50-51. Arneth suggests that the empress was moved to this action by Kaunitz's report of February 1768. No report of this nature could be found in the Vorträge, however, and it is possible that Arneth meant the famous report of February 1769 which postdated Maria Theresia's inquiry to Chotek.

⁵⁴Ibid. IX, 51-54.

⁵⁵This becomes clear from the content of Kaunitz's subsequent report.

⁵⁶Maass, Josephinismus II, 132-133, No. 4.

⁵⁷Wandruszka, Leopold I, 247.

⁵⁸Kaunitz points this out in his subsequent report.

⁵⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 110/D/167-170, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 20 December 1772.

⁶⁰Arneth, MT IX, 55.

⁶¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 118/A/5-6, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 2 June 1775.

⁶²Maass, Josephinismus II, 208-209, No. 44.

⁶³Arneth, MT IX, 55.

⁶⁴Ibid. IV, 56-60.

⁶⁵Ibid. IX, 58-62.

⁶⁶HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 35, No. 954, StR record, 20 March 1770.

⁶⁷HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 954 of 1770, Kaunitz StR Votum, 27 May 1770.

⁶⁸HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 35, No. 954, imperial resolution, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 1 June 1770.

⁶⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 105/E/72-73, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 14 July 1770.

⁷⁰HHStA, StK, Vorträge 106/A/110-111, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 21 August 1770.

⁷¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 106/C/165-166, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 17 October 1770.

⁷²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 106/D/174-175, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 26 November 1770.

⁷³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 106/E/18-25, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 5 December 1770.

⁷⁴Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, on the above but with the note: "This report and letter have remained with me so long due to an error."

⁷⁵HHStA, StK, Vorträge 107/A/21-26, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 9 January 1771.

⁷⁶Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, on the above.

⁷⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 108/B/33-34, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 6 August 1771.

⁷⁸HHStA, StK, Vorträge 109/B/121-124, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, and draft order, 16 February 1772.

⁷⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 114/D/33-34, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 13 May 1774.

⁸⁰HHStA, StK, Vorträge 104/C/244-245, 257-258, 263-269, Maria Theresia-Kaunitz exchanges, June-December 1769.

⁸¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 280 of 1771, Kaunitz StR Votum, 30 January 1771.

⁸²HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 38, No. 280, imperial resolution, 7 February 1771.

⁸³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 105/B/36-37, Joseph to Kaunitz, 15 March 1770.

⁸⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 105/B/60-63, Kaunitz to Joseph, 20 March 1770.

⁸⁵HHStA, StK, Vorträge 105/B/100-101, Joseph to Kaunitz, 29 March 1770.

⁸⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 105/C/92-125, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 19 May 1770.

⁸⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 105/D/21-22, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 9 June 1770.

⁸⁸HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 57, No. 371, protocol record of the Hungarian Chancellery report, 5 February 1776.

⁸⁹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 371 of 1776, Kaunitz StR Votum, 19 February 1776.

⁹⁰HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 57, No. 371, imperial resolution, 24 February 1776.

⁹¹HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 59, No. 2149, imperial resolution, 26 September 1776.

⁹²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 114/A/104-107, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 12 January 1774.

⁹³Volodymyr Kubijovyč, ed., Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia (2 vols.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971) II, 185-186.

⁹⁴See above p. 123.

⁹⁵The chancellery report, dated 31 March 1769, was submitted to the Staatsrat on 4 April. HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 31, No. 1272, StR record.

⁹⁶This recommendation was, of course, made before holy days themselves were reduced.

⁹⁷HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1272 of 1769, Kaunitz StR Votum, 19 May 1769.

⁹⁸HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 31, No. 1272, imperial resolution, 4 December 1769.

⁹⁹HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 36, No. 2459, imperial resolution, 23 August 1770. It should be pointed out, however, that Mariazell was and remains to this day the most popular shrine in Austria and that therefore a circumscription of the numbers of pilgrimages to it was by no means a negligible prohibition.

CHAPTER VIII: MONKS, NUNS AND JESUITS

¹Maass, Josephinismus I, 368-384, No. 158/36, Ad 9. num Ordines regulares oder das Mönchwesen.

²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 114/A/104-107, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 12 January 1774.

³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 108/C/116-125, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 6 November 1771.

⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 108/C/208-209, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 29 November 1771.

⁵Maass, Josephinismus II, 139-142, No. 6a.

⁶Ibid. II, 142-144, No. 6b.

⁷Hock-Bidermann, p. 53.

⁸Ibid., pp. 53-54.

⁹Maass, Josephinismus II, 144-147, No. 6c.

¹⁰Ibid. II, 141-142, No. 6a.

¹¹See above p. 135.

¹²Maass, Josephinismus II, 139, No. 6.

¹³HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 35, No. 1936, imperial resolution, 18 August 1770, Cf. Hock-Bidermann, p. 55.

¹⁴Arneth, MT IX, 72-73.

¹⁵HHStA, StK, Vorträge 106/C/203-216, Blümegen to Joseph, 19 October 1770.

¹⁶HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 4246 of 1770, Kaunitz StR Votum, 23 December 1770.

¹⁷HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 37, No. 4246, secretarial note, n. d. (December 1770).

¹⁸HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 38, No. 229, imperial resolution, n. d. (January 1771).

¹⁹Arneth, MT IX, 73, 560, n. 115.

²⁰Maass, Josephinismus II, 148-151, Nos. 8 & 9.

²¹Maass, Josephinismus II, 152, No. 10.

²²HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 938 of 1771, Kaunitz StR Votum, 20 March 1771.

²³Hock-Bidermann, p. 55.

²⁴HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 39, No. 938, no imperial resolution resulted from the debate, StR record, March 1771.

²⁵Maass, Josephinismus II, 13, maintains that Kaunitz deliberately let over two months pass without a word on the subject because "Only time could to some extent erase the deep impression that the papal admonition had made on the conscience of the monarch." In fact the drafts were merely held over until the completion of the Staatsrat debate on the matter.

²⁶Ibid. II, 153-155, Nos. 11 & 11a.

²⁷Ibid. II, 155-159, Nos. 12, 12a & 12b.

²⁸HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 4060 of 1770, Kaunitz StR Votum, 23 December 1770.

²⁹HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 37, No. 4060, imperial resolution, 16 January 1771.

³⁰Hock-Bidermann, p. 56.

³¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 107/D/161-166, Joseph Memorandum, 24 April 1771.

³²Maass, Josephinismus II, 18-20, Hock-Bidermann, pp. 56-57.

³³Maass, Josephinismus II, 21-25, 160-166, Nos. 13 & 14.

³⁴On the Jesuits of the Holy Roman Empire in the eighteenth century see Bernhard Duhr, Geschichte der Jesuiten in den Ländern deutscher Zunge 4 Vols. (Freiburg: Herdersche Verlagshandlung, 1907-1928) IV.

³⁵Maass, Josephinismus I, 257, n. 1.

³⁶Arneth, MT IX, 550-551, n. 48.

³⁷Saul K. Padover, The Revolutionary Emperor: Joseph II of Austria (2nd ed., London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1967), p. 41. The phrase about effecting everything with the empress is also quoted by Maass who supplies the exact date, Josephinismus I, 97, n. 18.

³⁸Bernhard Duhr, "Die Kaiserin Maria Theresia und die Aufhebung der Gesellschaft Jesu," Stimmen der Zeit CX (1925/26), 209.

³⁹HHStA, KA, Kaiser Franz Akten 73/B/2-5, Kaunitz to Choiseul, n. d. (1770).

⁴⁰Bernhard Duhr, Jesuiten-Fabeln: Ein Beitrag zur Culturgeschichte (Freiburg: Herder'sche Verlagshandlung, 1899), pp. 34-37. For a standard anti-Jesuit polemic see Caspar Riffel, Die Aufhebung des Jesuiten-Ordens (Mainz: Kirchheim und Schott, 1848).

⁴¹Arneth, MT IX, 564, n. 157, Duhr, "Aufhebung . . .," p. 210.

⁴²Duhr, "Aufhebung . . .," p. 210.

⁴³Arneth, MT IX, 564-565, n. 158.

⁴⁴Cf. Joseph's report to Leopold in March 1768: "L'abolition de l'ordre des Jesuits, que les Puissances, qui les ont expulsés, ont tant a coeur qu'elles ont même voulu que nous faissions cause commune avec Elle à la Cour de Rome, fera bien sûrement une des conditions sine qua non à l'Election d'un nouveau Pape." Ibid. IX, 551.

⁴⁵Maass, Josephinismus II, 171-172, No. 19.

⁴⁶HHStA, StK. Vorträge 111/D/29-38, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 3 April 1773.

⁴⁷HHStA, KA, Kaiser Franz Akten 73/B/347-350, Joseph to Maria Theresia, 3 April 1773.

⁴⁸HHStA, StK, Vorträge 111/D/50, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d. (4 April 1773).

⁴⁹Maass, Josephinismus II, 172-177, No. 20.

⁵⁰HHStA, KA, Kaiser Franz Akten 73/B/300-303, Kressel to Maria Theresia, n. d. (April 1773).

⁵¹HHStA, KA, Kaiser Franz Akten 73/B/296-299, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 29 April 1773.

⁵²HHStA, KA, Kaiser Franz Akten 72/E/71, commission membership list.

⁵³Arneth, MT IX, 104.

⁵⁴Duhr, "Aufhebung . . .," p. 220. Cf. Winter, p. 74.

⁵⁵HHStA, KA, Kaiser Franz Akten 72/C/229-232, Maria Theresia to Kressel, 17 May 1773.

⁵⁶Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 6-7, No. 180.

⁵⁷Arneth, MT IX, 566-567, n. 166. For the transfer of Jesuit property to the state see Ibid. IX, 96-124, Maass, Josephinismus II, 25-31, Mikoletzky, Österreich, pp. 245-251.

⁵⁸The instructions to Kressel of 17 May affirmed that "the property of this order indisputably reverts to the control of the sovereign." See M. T. to Kressel as above.

⁵⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 112/B/55-58, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 18 June 1773.

⁶⁰Maass, Josephinismus II, 183-185, No. 24.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid. II, 185-187, No. 24a.

⁶³Ibid. II, 187-191, No. 25.

⁶⁴Ibid. II, 191-192, No. 26.

⁶⁵ HHStA, KA, Kaiser Franz Akten 74/C/1-366, Jesuit Commission Protocols, 1773-1774.

⁶⁶ Arneth, MT IX, 118-119.

⁶⁷ Ibid. IX, 108.

⁶⁸ W. Latzke, "Die Klosterarchive," Gesamtinventar des Wiener Haus-
Hof- und Staatsarchivs L. Bittner, ed., 5 vols. (Vienna: Adolf Holzhausens
Nachfolger, 1936-1940) III, 330-332.

⁶⁹ Maass, Josephinismus II, 30.

⁷⁰ Hersche, pp. 14-25.

CHAPTER IX: TOLERATION

¹ Cf. Arneth, MT X, 60-75, Maass, Josephinismus II, 46-61.

² HHStA, StK, Vorträge 117/E/105-106, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz,
17 May 1775.

³ Arneth, MT X, 60.

⁴ Ibid. IX, 138.

⁵ Wangermann, Austrian Achievement, p. 96.

⁶ Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. III, 352.

⁷ HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 375 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum,
13 March 1767.

⁸ HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 24, No. 375, imperial
resolution, Maria Theresia to Esterhazy, 22 April 1767.

⁹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 451 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 25 March 1767.

¹⁰HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 24, No. 451, imperial resolution, 20 April 1767.

¹¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 962 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 30 May 1767.

¹²HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 25, No. 962, imperial resolution, 3 June 1767.

¹³HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2124 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 27 September 1767.

¹⁴HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 26, No. 2124, imperial resolution, 2 October 1767.

¹⁵HHStA, StK, Vorträge 106/C/191-194, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 18 October 1770.

¹⁶Imperial resolution on the above.

¹⁷Maass, Josephinismus II, 217-219, No. 49.

¹⁸Arneth, MT X, 61-62.

¹⁹Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 140-441, No. 259.

²⁰Ibid. II, 141-142, No. 260.

²¹Ibid. II, 146-147, No. 262.

²²Ibid. II, 150-153, No. 264.

²³Ibid. II, 157-159, No. 266.

²⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 123/A/28, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 8 June 1777.

²⁵Arneth, MT X, 63-65.

²⁶ Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 160-161, No. 268.

²⁷ Ibid. II, 162, No. 269.

²⁸ Ibid. II, 163-164, No. 270.

²⁹ Ibid. II, 165, No. 271.

³⁰ Ibid. II, 165, No. 272.

³¹ Ibid. II, 166-167, No. 273.

³² HHStA, StK, Vorträge 124/A/112-124, Kaunitz pencil note on report of 13 October 1777.

³³ The first report is dated 13 October and is published by Beer, "Denkschriften . . .," pp. 158-162. Kaunitz's pencil notes were not published.

³⁴ Maass, Josephinismus II, 219-223, No. 50.

³⁵ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 124/A/179-188, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 21 October 1777.

³⁶ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 124/A/189-196, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 28 October 1777.

³⁷ Maass, Josephinismus II, 224-225, No. 51.

³⁸ Ibid. II, 226-228, No. 53.

³⁹ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 124/B/255, 257-259, Kaunitz StR Votum, copy, n. d. (1777).

⁴⁰ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 124/B/256, Kaunitz pencil note in the above.

⁴¹ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 124/B/247-254, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 12 November 1777.

⁴² HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/F/312-316, Maria Theresia to Hofkanzlei, 14 November 1777. Cf. Arneth, MT X, 71-72.

⁴³HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/F/311-318, Joseph to Leopold, 20 November 1777.

⁴⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten III, No. 2202 of 1777, Kaunitz StR Votum, early December 1777.

⁴⁵HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 62, No. 2202, imperial resolution, 12 December 1777.

⁴⁶HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten III, No. 160 of 1778, Kaunitz StR Votum, 2 February 1778.

⁴⁷HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 63, No. 160, imperial resolution, 9 February 1778.

⁴⁸Arneth, MT X, 73. Although Arneth dates renewed Protestant discontent from January 1780, the chancellery reported discontent to the empress as early as October 1779 in a memo dated 17 December 1779. HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 63, No. 1893, StR record.

⁴⁹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten III, No. 1893 of 1779, Kaunitz StR Votum, 7 January 1780.

⁵⁰HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 68, No. 1893, StR record: Chancellery report of 17 December, circulated 27 December 1779, re-circulated 8 January 1780. Chancellery report of 30 December 1779, circulated 8 January 1780, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 69, No. 61.

⁵¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten III, No. 61 of 1780, Kaunitz StR Votum, 12 January 1780.

⁵²Maass, Josephinismus II, 240-244, Nos. 66 & 66a.

⁵³HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/A/58-60, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 9 February 1780. Kaunitz's note is published by Maass, Josephinismus II, 244-245, No. 67, but not Maria Theresia's reply.

⁵⁴Maass, Josephinismus II, 248, No. 68a.

⁵⁵Ibid. II, 249, No. 68b.

⁵⁶Ibid. II, 245-247, No. 68, 249-250, No. 68c.

⁵⁷Ibid. II, 250-251, No. 69.

⁵⁸Ibid. II, 251, No. 70.

⁵⁹Ibid. II, 251-252, No. 71.

⁶⁰Ibid. II, 252, No. 72.

⁶¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 131/B/127-128, imperial resolution, n. d. (28 February 1780).

⁶²Maass, Josephinismus II, 253, No. 73.

⁶³Arneth, MT X, 74-75.

⁶⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 131/E/153-154, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 27 May 1780.

⁶⁵HHStA, StK, Vorträge 132/A/44-45, Binder to Maria Theresia, 27 May 1780. 22 June, Vorträge 132/A/66-67, 30 September, Vorträge 132/B/199-200, 2 October, Vorträge 132/C/11-12, 24 October, Vorträge 132/C/45-46, 30 October, Vorträge 132/C/67-68.

CHAPTER X: THE CULTURAL DIMENSION

¹Klingenstein, Staatsverwaltung, p. 100.

²Quoted in Peter Gav, Voltaire's Politics: The Poet as Realist (N. Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 171.

³John B. Wolf, Louis XIV (N. Y.: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 357-378.

⁴HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 405/B/10-12, Kaunitz to the Duke of Braganza, 7 October 1781.

⁵HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 405/B/15-16, Kaunitz to Raniero Calzabigi, 18 September 1775.

⁶HHStA, StK, Wissenschaft und Kunst, Kartons 1-14, passim. The Staatskanzlei's "Wissenschaft und Kunst" section contains 14 cartons of documents, many of which are appeals to Kaunitz for patronage or protection. Some are receipts for moneys paid out to artists.

⁷Jacques Casanova, Histoire de ma Vie 12 Vols. (Wiesbaden: F. A. Brockhaus, 1962) X, 244-248.

⁸Ibid., XII, 321.

⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 114/C/63-66, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 9 March 1774.

¹⁰HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/367-392, 414-433, Kaunitz to various actors, 1770-1775. Cf. Arneth, MT IX, 276.

¹¹HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 405/B/10-12, Kaunitz to the Duke of Braganza, 7 October 1781.

¹²Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, p. 123.

¹³Ibid., pp. 123-125.

¹⁴Arneth, "Biographie . . .," p. 22. At that time Kaunitz said of Rubens: "Je ne crois pas que l'art puisse faire quelque chose du plus accompli; pour moi, je n'ai pu me lasser de l'admirer."

¹⁵Several Rubens paintings appear on the auction lists and some were left to the Art Academy where they still hang to this day.

¹⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 112/A/209-213, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 15 January 1777.

¹⁷In his letter to the Duke of Braganza he said that his taste was "tout dans le grand."

¹⁸Portrait in oil by Johann Nepomuk Steiner, location unknown.

¹⁹Medal by Martin Krafft, 1773, Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum.

²⁰Engraving by Jakob Schmutzer, 1781, Vienna, Albertina.

²¹Portrait in oil by Johann Baptist Lampi, 1785, Vienna, Akademie der Bildenden Künste.

²²Kaunitz, in fact, seems to have been in personal contact with Batoni. HHStA, StK, Vorträge 119/A/143, Cf. Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 5 September 1775, AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/B/52-55. When receiving a painting by Batoni, Kaunitz made a report totally in his own hand and later suggested Batoni be given 300-400 ducats as a reward, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 31 December, 2 April 1773.

²³HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 405/B/84-85, Kaunitz to Chevalier Mechel, 22 August 1783.

²⁴Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, p. 124.

²⁵The painting passed to the Andrassy family in the 19th century and now hangs in Budapest. Kaunitz's garden was so famous that Voltaire referred to him as "the man of the triangle" in his correspondence. Bestermann, correspondence XXIX, 205, No. 6187, XXX, 166-167, No. 6334.

²⁶HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 405/B/15-16, Kaunitz to Calzabigi, 18 September 1775.

²⁷HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/C/86, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d. HHStA, StK, Vorträge 118/B/180-181, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 12 July 1775. Cf. Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, pp. 112-113.

²⁸AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/E/51-52, Sperges to Kaunitz, Kaunitz to Sperges, n. d. (1776).

²⁹AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/E/48-50, Kaunitz to Colloredo, 22 April 1776.

³⁰ONB, Handschriftsammlung, Autographe 195/21, Kaunitz Ausweisung nach welcher die vier Kais. Königl. pensionirte Künstler während ihres Aufenthalts zu Rom sich zu verhalten haben, n. d.

³¹Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, p. 124.

³²HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 405/B/84-85, Kaunitz to Chevalier Mechel, 22 August 1783.

³³HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 405/B/84-85, Kaunitz to Cardinal Herzan, 28 April 1783.

³⁴Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, pp. 124-125, 212-213.

³⁵C. F. Pohl, Joseph Haydn (3 vols.; Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1882-1927) II, 160, 163.

³⁶Haydn had personally solicited a letter from Kaunitz before the famous London trip. The letter is published in Ibid. III, 15, but with the wrong date--which was in fact 13 December 1790. Cf. H. C. Robbins Landon, ed., The Collected Correspondence and London Notebooks of Joseph Haydn (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1959), p. 114.

³⁷Cf. Alfred Einstein, Gluck (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, Ltd., 1964), pp. 39-40, 64-66.

³⁸Hewig and E. H. Mueller von Asow, ed., The Collected Correspondence and Papers of Christoph Willibald Gluck Stewart Thomson, trans., (N. Y.: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1962), pp. 25-26.

³⁹Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, p. 108.

⁴⁰Otto Erich Deutsch, ed., Mozart: A Documentary Biography Eric Blom, Peter Branscome and Jeremy Noble, trans., (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 16, and Emily Anderson, ed. and trans., The Letters of Mozart and his Family (2nd ed., 2 vols.; London: Macmillan, 1966) I, 6-7, Nos. 2 & 3.

⁴¹Anderson, Letters of Mozart I, 75, No. 50.

⁴²Ibid. I, 81, No. 55.

⁴³Deutsch, Mozart, p. 80.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 224, 239, Anderson, Letters of Mozart II, 889, No. 525.

⁴⁵Joseph's comment after the first performance of The Abduction from the Seraglio was: "Too beautiful for our ears, and far too many notes, my dear Mozart." This by no means betrayed any musical ignorance on the part of the emperor, but rather was an indication that the Mannheim practise of using fuller orchestration, particularly in the winds, which

Mozart had learned in 1778, was still odd-sounding to the Italianate ear of the emperor. Alfred Einstein, Mozart: His Character, His Work Arthur Mendel and Nathan Broder, trans., (N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 458. By 1788 Joseph had become used to the orchestration of Mozart, but still confessed to Count Rosenberg, "Mozard's [sic] music is certainly too difficult for the singers." Deutsch, Mozart, p. 315. In contrast to this, Joseph was so taken with Salieri's Armida that he not only praised it in a letter to his brother but even went so far as to promise to send him the score. HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/D/162-163, Joseph to Leopold, 3 June 1771.

⁴⁶ Zinzendorf has become notorious among music historians for the consistency of his bad musical taste. He thought the music for Abduction was "pilfered from various others," considered The Impresario "very mediocre," wrote of The Marriage of Figaro, "the opera bored me," and characterized Mozart's music as "hands without head," found the first performance of Don Giovanni merely "agreeable", confessing that he was "very much bored" at a subsequent one, complained of having been "regaled with the most tedious spectacle" after hearing La Clemenza di Tito, and called The Magic Flute "an incredible farce." Only for Così fan tutte did Zinzendorf have a positive appraisal, calling the music "charming". As Deutsch has pointed out, this was the first and last time the count deigned to praise Mozart. Deutsch, Mozart, pp. 203, 262, 274, 278, 313, 319, 362, 404, 412.

⁴⁷ Anderson, Letters of Mozart II, 814-815, No. 459.

⁴⁸ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/C/212-214, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 20 April 1786.

⁴⁹ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/C/215, Van Swieten to Maria Theresia, 25 April 1768.

⁵⁰ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/C/244-247, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 30 April 1768.

⁵¹ For example, Kaunitz recommended that the empress accept a dedication from the Lyon publisher Bruys Ponthur for a life of St. Theresa. HHStA, StK, Vorträge 115/D/74-75, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 15 September 1774. While the empress accepted this suggestion, she would not do the same when Kaunitz recommended she accept the title of an Honorary Protector of the British Academy of Sciences because too many "inconveniences" with regard to religion could creep into Austria. HHStA, StK, Vorträge 106/D/92-93, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 14 November 1770. Kaunitz also convinced both Joseph and Maria Theresia to accept the title of Honorary Patron from the Art Academy of Santa Luca in Rome. AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/B/5-16, Kaunitz to Joseph and Maria Theresia, 18 January 1773.

⁵²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 104/B/69-70, 77-78, Kaunitz to Joseph, 16 August 1769, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 17 August 1769. In his formal reply to Klopstock, Kaunitz praised the poet's work both in the field of history and poetry. He indicated that German history was a field that needed to be expanded and complimented Klopstock's zeal in promoting patriotism. HHStA, StK, Wissenschaft und Kunst 11/X/48-49, Kaunitz to Klopstock, 28 August 1769. Cf. Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, pp. 117-118, 212.

⁵³HHStA, StK, Wissenschaft und Kunst 6/VI/16-21, Kaunitz to Mercy-Argenteau, 1 April 1775.

⁵⁴Walter Wagner, Die Geschichte der Akademie der Bildenden Künste in Wien (Vienna: Verlag Brüder Rosenbaum, 1967), p. 29. Wagner's work has supplanted the previous major study on the Academy of Visual Arts, Carl von Lützow, Geschichte der kaiserlichen königlichen Akademie der Bildenden Künste (Vienna: Verlag von Carl Gerold's Sohn, 1877).

⁵⁵Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, p. 127.

⁵⁶Wagner, Akademie, p. 29.

⁵⁷AABK, Verwaltungsakten 1/C/23-26, Schmutzer to Maria Theresia, n. d. (1766).

⁵⁸HHStA, KA, Staatsratakten I, No. 1320, Kaunitz StR Votum, 8 July 1767.

⁵⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 102/C/39-44, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 16 November 1769.

⁶⁰AABK, Verwaltungsakten 1/C/78-86, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 18 August 1769. The copy of this report in the Staatskanzlei is dated 21 August 1769. HHStA, StK, Vorträge 104/B/81-84.

⁶¹AABK, Verwaltungsakten 1/C/116-117, "Passport", 18 August 1770.

⁶²AABK, Verwaltungsakten 1/C/37-55, Schmutzer to Kaunitz, 26 July 1768.

⁶³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 102/C/39-44, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 16 November 1768.

⁶⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 106/A/3, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 2 August 1770. AABK, Verwaltungsakten 1/C/112-113, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 15 August 1770.

⁶⁵Wagner, Akademie, pp. 26-28.

⁶⁶A classic example of Meytens' style is his group portrait of the imperial family, painted in 1750. Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum.

⁶⁷Wagner, Akademie, p. 33.

⁶⁸AABK, Verwaltungsakten 1/C/118-121, Entwurf, n. d.

⁶⁹AABK, Verwaltungsakten 1/C/135, Marcy to Maria Theresia, 26 June 1770.

⁷⁰AABK, Verwaltungsakten 1/C/124-133, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 25 May 1770.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²AABK, Verwaltungsakten 1/C/112-113, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 15 August 1770.

⁷³AABK, Verwaltungsakten 1/C/166-169, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 24 March 1771.

⁷⁴AABK, Verwaltungsakten 1/C/173-178, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 15 May 1771.

⁷⁵Joseph to Kaunitz, on the above.

⁷⁶AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/11-27, Fanti to Maria Theresia, 15 February 1772.

⁷⁷AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/28-33, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 20 March 1772.

⁷⁸HHStA, VA, .15: Akademie der Bildenden Künste 61/III/No. 2, Anton Maron to Maria Theresia, n. d. (1772).

⁷⁹Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, on the report of 20 March as above.

⁸⁰AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/47-49, Proclamation, 18 October 1772.

⁸¹AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/40-46, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 23 May 1772.

⁸²Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, on the above.

⁸³AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/52-55, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 12 June 1772.

⁸⁴AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/50-51, Anonyme Verleumdungen gegen den als Prof. f. Kunstgeschichte berufener Friedr. Just. Riedel aus Erfurt, n. d.

⁸⁵Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, on report of 23 May as above, but only returned to Kaunitz several weeks later with the comment: "nach villen nachsichten habe entlich unter meinen papire dise wider gefunden."

⁸⁶AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/56, Kaunitz to Riedel, 8 July 1772.

⁸⁷AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/57-72, Riedel to Kaunitz, 6, 19 August 1772.

⁸⁸AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/73-75, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 26 August 1772.

⁸⁹AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/78-80, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 14 October 1772.

⁹⁰AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/83-84, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 28 October 1772.

⁹¹Wagner, Akademie, p. 52.

⁹²AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/88-93, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including imperial resolution, 27 October 1772.

⁹³AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/A/86-87, Protektorats-Decret, 1 November 1772.

⁹⁴AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/B/1-4, Protektorats-Decret, 16 January 1773.

⁹⁵ AABK, Sitzungsprotokolle des akademischen Rates 1/B/13-14, Kaunitz to akademischer Rat, 19 December 1773. The statutes were not actually published until 1800. Cf. Wagner, Akademie, p. 44.

⁹⁶ AABK, Verwaltungsakten 2/B-F, 3/A-C, passim, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia and Joseph, 1773-1780. For Kaunitz's activities in the internal business of the academy during 1772-1780 see AABK, Sitzungsprotokolle des akademischen Rates 1/A-H, passim.

⁹⁷ Wagner, Akademie, pp. 48-49.

⁹⁸ HHStA, VA, 15: Akademie der Bildenden Künste 61/III/3, Kaunitz to Kollowrath, 14 December 1783.

⁹⁹ HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/H/191-193, Joseph to Kaunitz, 22 November 1780.

¹⁰⁰ Novotny, Staatskanzler Kaunitz, pp. 66-67.

¹⁰¹ Arneth, MT IX, 269-271.

¹⁰² HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/202-203, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 4 April 1767.

¹⁰³ HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/255 (falsely numbered and inserted between folios 221 and 223), Kaunitz to Joseph, 6 November 1767.

¹⁰⁴ Arneth, MT IX, 271-272.

¹⁰⁵ HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/222-225, Kaunitz draft, 8 August 1768.

¹⁰⁶ HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/226-227, for example, Kaunitz to Prince Saxe-Hildburghausen and to Prince Joseph Wenzel Liechtenstein, 11 August 1768.

¹⁰⁷ HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/232-238, Kaunitz to Afflisio, 23 August 1768, Kaunitz to Mercy-Argenteau, 6 January 1769, Kaunitz to Orsini-Rosenberg, 6 February 1769. HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/308-325, Kaunitz to various actors, Autumn 1769.

¹⁰⁸ HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/239-242, Kaunitz "Adresse au Public", n. d. (1769).

¹⁰⁹HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/243-244, Kaunitz subscription project, 10 October 1769.

¹¹⁰HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/326-331, 338-346, Kaunitz to Kohary, July 1770.

¹¹¹HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/347-348, Kaunitz to Kohary, 17 July 1770.

¹¹²HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/351-352, Kohary to Maria Theresia (dictated, drafted and corrected by Kaunitz), 20 July 1770.

¹¹³HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/363-365, Kaunitz to Kohary, 29 August 1770.

¹¹⁴Arneth, MT IX, 274-275.

¹¹⁵HHStA, StK, Interiora 108/434-437, Kaunitz memoire, 10 February 1775.

¹¹⁶Arneth, MT IX, 275-276.

CHAPTER XI: DAMOCLEAN SWORD

¹Hans Bleckweern, "Die Regimenter der Kaiserin," Maria Theresia: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Heereswesens ihrer Zeit (Graz, Vienna, Cologne: Hermann Böhlau Nachf., 1967), p. 25. On the role of the army in the emergence of absolutism see also Gerhard Papke, Militär-geschichte des Absolutismus, 1648-1789 (Frankfurt a/M: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1965).

²Jürg Zimmermann, Militärverwaltung und Heeresaufbringung in Österreich bis 1806 (Frankfurt a/M: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1965), pp. 72-83, Johann Christoph Allmayer-Beck, "Wandlungen im Heereswesen zur Zeit Maria Theresias," in Beiträge as above, p. 23.

³Mikoletzky, Österreich, p. 226.

⁴Arneth, MT VII, 228.

⁵Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 1-12, No. 1.

⁶Th. G. von Karajan, Maria Theresia und Graf Sylva Tarouca (Vienna: Gerold's Sohn, 1859), p. 69.

⁷Arneth, MT VII, 185.

⁸Thadden, Daun, p. 453.

⁹Arneth, MT VII, 185-186.

¹⁰Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. III, 335-361.

¹¹Beer, "Denkschriften . . .," p. 144. Although he characterized the maintenance of a large standing army as one of the main ills of the monarchy, he maintained that there was little that could be done about it, p. 135.

¹²Arneth, MT VI, 246, VII, 1.

¹³Even Frederick himself acknowledged that while all seemed lost after Kundersdorf, Austria's unwillingness to follow up the victory turned the scales in his favour. It was this, not the death of the Czarina Elizabeth, that he described as "the miracle of the House of Brandenburg." See Frederick to Prince Henry, 1 September 1759, in Politische Correspondenz Friedrich's des Grossen (Berlin: Verlag von Alexander Dunker, 1891) Vol. XVIII, 510-511, No. 11393.

¹⁴Pfister, p. 160.

¹⁵Thadden, Daun, pp. 418-419.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 420-421, Pfister, pp. 161-162. For a side by side description and comparison of Daun and Laudon see Friedrich Walter, "Feldmarschall Leopold Joseph Graf Daun und Feldmarschall Gideon Ernst Freiherr von Laudon," in Gestalter der Geschichte Österreichs, pp. 263-278.

¹⁷Posaner, pp. 51-59.

¹⁸Thadden, Daun, p. 451.

¹⁹ See above, p. 42.

²⁰ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 96/C/103-110, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 2 December 1765.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Kotasek, Lacy, pp. 70-71.

²³ Eduard Wertheimer, ed., "Zwei Schilderungen des Wiener Hofes im XVIII. Jahrhundert," AOG LXII (1881), 232.

²⁴ Arneth, MT IX, 511-512.

²⁵ Wilhelm Edlen von Janko, Laudon's Leben (Vienna: Verlag von Carl Gerold's Sohn, 1869), p. 363. On Laudon see further, Rudolf Kiszling, "Feldmarschall Gideon Freiherr von Laudon," OGL IX (1965), 318-320. Gordon A. Craig, "Command and Staff Problems in the Austrian Army, 1740-1866," in The Theory and Practice of War: Essays Presented to Captain B. H. Liddell Hart ed. by Michael Howard (London: Cassell, 1965), p. 47 suggests that Laudon's popularity, which was "greater than any Austrian commander since Eugene of Savoy," alienated Joseph who did not wish to share the limelight.

²⁶ Edith Kotasek, ed., "Die Privatkorrespondenz des Feldmarschalls Grafen Lacy mit Maria Theresia und Joseph II," MOSTA IV (1951), 167-183. Cf. Arneth, MT IX, 502-510.

²⁷ Kotasek, Lacy, pp. 78-79.

²⁸ The Lacy Vortrag was given to Kaunitz with the date of 29 December 1766, postdating Joseph's, HHStA, StK, Vorträge 98/D/116-127, but the empress had seen the report as early as 28 November and the emperor shortly thereafter. Cf. Arneth, MT VII, 222-223, 225, 530.

²⁹ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 98/D/100-115, Joseph Denkschrift, 28 December 1766.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Wandruszka, Leopold I, 343, 365.

³² HHStA, StK, Vorträge 99/A/83-102, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 24 January 1767.

³³Ibid.

³⁴HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 4/D/10-16, Maria Theresia to Joseph, 4 February 1767.

³⁵HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 674 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 13 April 1767. Unfortunately Hock-Bidermann, the major source on the Staatsrat debates since the destruction of the Kabinetsarchiv, remained silent on military reforms.

³⁶HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 24, No. 674, Joseph resolution, 16 April 1767.

³⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 100/A/53-54, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 28 July 1767.

³⁸Arneth, MT VII, 228.

³⁹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2474 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 7 November 1767.

⁴⁰HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/A/92-146, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 25 January 1768, sections 43 and 44.

⁴¹Ibid., section 45.

⁴²Franz Vaniček, Spezialgeschichte der Militärgränze (4 vols., Vienna, Wilhelm Braumüller, 1875), II, 403-488.

⁴³Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial Institution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 41-42.

⁴⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1072 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 29 May 1767.

⁴⁵HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 25, No. 1072, Joseph resolution, 6 June 1767.

⁴⁶Rothenberg, pp. 42-43.

⁴⁷HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1091 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 23 May 1768.

⁴⁸HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 28, No. 1091, Joseph resolution, 26 May 1768.

⁴⁹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 105 of 1768, Kaunitz StR Votum, 10 February 1768.

⁵⁰HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 27, No. 105, Joseph resolution, 29 February 1768.

⁵¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2334 of 1768, Kaunitz StR Votum, 18 October 1768.

⁵²HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 29, No. 2334, Joseph resolution, 19 October 1768.

⁵³Alphons Wrede, Geschichte der k. und k. Wehrmacht. Die Regimenter, Corps, Branchen und Anstalten von 1618 bis Ende des XIX Jahrhunderts (5 Vols., Vienna: L. W. Seidel, 1898-1903), V, 221-227. Cf. Arneth, MT VII, 216-217.

⁵⁴Rothenberg, p. 44, has suggested that the inspector-general's investigations led to increased attention being paid to military details of all kinds, which in turn was responsible for the ever-growing amount of paperwork and the more highly organized border administration. No mention is made of the Generalsreglement of 1 September 1769. On the regulation see Kotasek, pp. 96-105 and Kurt Peball, "Das Generalsreglement der Kaiserlich-königlichen österreichischen Armee vom 1. September 1769," in Maria Theresia: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Heerswesens ihrer Zeit, pp. 81-128.

⁵⁵Rothenberg, p. 60.

⁵⁶Erna Lesky, "Die österreichische Pestfront an der k. k. Militärgrenze," Saeculum VIII (1957), 82-105. Lesky even maintains, p. 88, that the expansion of the military border to Transylvania was primarily conceived as an anti-plague not troop-augmentation measure.

⁵⁷As Rothenberg maintains, p. 45.

⁵⁸Kotasek, pp. 79-80.

⁵⁹Arneth, MT VII, 214.

⁶⁰HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 105 of 1768, Kaunitz StR Votum, 10 February 1768.

⁶¹Kotasek, pp. 88–89.

⁶²HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2381 of 1767 and No. 912 of 1768, Kaunitz StR Vota, 14 November 1767 and 8 June 1768.

⁶³HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/C/124–125, Joseph to Leopold, 8 September 1768.

⁶⁴Alfred Ritter von Arneth, ed., Die Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs über Österreich im achzehnten Jahrhundert, *Fontes Rerum Austria-carum* II/22 (Vienna: K. K. Hof und Staatsdruckerei, 1863), 314–317.

⁶⁵Kotasek, pp. 80–81.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Arneth, MT IX, 496.

⁶⁸HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 924 of 1769, Kaunitz StR Votum, 2 May 1769.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 32, No. 2346, Maria Theresia nota, n. d. (May 1769).

⁷²Ibid., Maria Theresia to Chotek, 21 May 1769.

⁷³Ibid., Protocol record.

⁷⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2346 of 1769, Kaunitz StR Votum, 26 June 1769.

⁷⁵HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 32, No. 2346, Imperial resolution, 30 June 1769.

⁷⁶HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 33, No. 4515, Protocol record.

⁷⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 105/A/5-6, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 5 January 1770.

⁷⁸HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 4215 of 1769, Kaunitz StR Votum, 4 January 1770.

⁷⁹HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 33, No. 4215, Imperial resolution, 1 February 1770.

⁸⁰Mitrofanov I, 359-360, Beidtel I, 63.

⁸¹Kotasek, pp. 82-83.

⁸²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 106/B/80, Pergen to Kaunitz, reporting a conversation of Weber with Frederick II, 22 September 1770.

⁸³Kotasek, p. 110.

⁸⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 116/C/215-251, Hofkriegsrat report, n. d. (late 1774).

⁸⁵HHStA, StK, Vorträge 116/C/253-312, Lacy Gutachten, 8 December 1774, and Joseph Gutachten, n. d. (December 1774).

⁸⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 117/B/7-14, Observationes Augustissimae of Maria Theresia, 3 February 1775, quoted in part in Arneth, MT IX, 537-542.

⁸⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 117/B/50-73, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 14 February 1775.

⁸⁸HHStA, StK, Vorträge 117/B/77-78, Joseph nota, 2 March 1775.

⁸⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 117/C/44-47, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 10 March 1775.

⁹⁰HHStA, StK, Vorträge 117/E/238-255, Joseph nota, 17 May 1775.

⁹¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 117/E/218-219, Kaunitz to Joseph, n. d. (late May 1775).

⁹²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 128/C/88-97, Kaunitz to Joseph, 16 March 1779.

⁹³Ernst Benedikt, Kaiser Joseph II., 1741-1790 (Vienna: Gerold & Co., 1936), pp. 263-264.

⁹⁴From various undated drafts of 1779, it becomes clear that Kaunitz had been ordered to work with Hofkammer president Kollowrat on various expedients to raise 66,000,000 fl. to cover military expenses. HHStA, StK, Vorträge 130/C/102-123, Kaunitz to Joseph (drafts), n. d. (late 1779).

⁹⁵HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1676 of 1768, Kaunitz StR Votum, 29 July 1768.

⁹⁶HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 26, No. 2040, Protocol record, 2 September 1767.

⁹⁷HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1676 of 1768, Kaunitz StR Votum, 29 July 1768.

⁹⁸Otruba, p. 139. The brief and incomplete analysis offered by Otruba, pp. 139-142, is the only published account of this entire project. There is also a brief reference to it in Friedrich Wallisch, Die Flagge Rotweissrot. Männer und Taten der österreichischen Kriegsmarine in vier Jahrhunderten (Graz, Vienna: Verlag Styria, 1956), pp. 26-28. There is however no information in the recent Anthony Sokol, The Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Navy (Annapolis, Md.: U. S. Naval Institute, 1968).

⁹⁹Otruba, p. 140, has cited the cost at 600 fl. This is undoubtedly a printing error.

¹⁰⁰HHStA, KA, Staatsratakten I, No. 1372, StR Vota and Imperial Resolution, June 1767.

¹⁰¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1761 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 11 August 1767.

¹⁰²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 99/C/8-15, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 2 March 1767.

¹⁰³HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2040 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 16 September 1767.

¹⁰⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/B/3-10, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including Imperial resolution, 2 June 1768.

¹⁰⁵ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 102/A/1-4, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including Imperial resolution, 1 July 1768.

¹⁰⁶ Otruba, pp. 140-141.

¹⁰⁷ HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 28, No. 1676, Protocol record.

¹⁰⁸ HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1676 of 1768, Kaunitz StR Votum, 29 July 1768.

¹⁰⁹ HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 28, No. 1676, Imperial resolution, 1 August 1768.

¹¹⁰ Otruba, p. 142.

¹¹¹ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 105/C/153-154, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 21 May 1770.

¹¹² HHStA, StK, Provinzen: Küstenland 1/A/13-16, Maria Theresia to Auersperg, 21 May 1770, and Kaunitz to Auersperg, 24 May 1770.

¹¹³ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 110/A/38-42, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including Imperial resolution, 7 August 1772.

¹¹⁴ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 125/A/225-226, Kaunitz to Joseph, including Imperial resolution, 23 January 1778.

¹¹⁵ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 131/C/107-133, Benjowsky project, n. d. (1780).

¹¹⁶ HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/G/291-294, Binder to Kaunitz, 29 April 1780.

¹¹⁷ HHStA, StK, Vorträge 131/C/142-148, Kaunitz to Joseph 29 April 1780.

¹¹⁸ HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/H/157-158, Joseph to Kaunitz, 30 March 1780.

¹¹⁹ HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/H/159-160, Kaunitz to Joseph, Joseph to Kaunitz, 30 March 1780.

¹²⁰ HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/G/287-290, Binder to Kaunitz, 30 April 1780.

¹²¹ Franz von Pollack-Parnau, Eine Österreichische-ostindische Handelscompagnie, 1775-1785: Ein Beitrag zur österreichischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte unter Maria Theresia und Joseph II. Beiheft zur VSWG, No. 12 (Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, 1927), p. 64.

¹²² Hugo Hantsch, Die Geschichte Österreichs (2 vols., Graz: Verlag Styria, 1953), II, 207.

CHAPTER XII: THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF THE MONARCHY

¹ Wertheimer, "Zwei Schilderungen . . .," p. 217.

² Adolf Beer, "Die Staatsschulden und die Ordnung des Staatshaushaltes unter Maria Theresia," AOG LXXXII (1895), 33-34.

³ Mitrofanov I, 396.

⁴ Otruba, pp. 21-28, Hock-Bidermann, pp. 79-82, Mikoletzky, Österreich pp. 215-216.

⁵ Beer, "Denkschriften . . .," p. 135.

⁶ Beer, "Staatsschulden . . .," p. 124.

⁷ Ibid., p. 19.

⁸ Hanns Leo Mikoletzky, Kaiser Franz I. Stephan und der Ursprung des Habsburgisch-Lothringischen Familienvermögens (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1961), pp. 18-38.

⁹ HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 4/B/4-7, Joseph to Maria Theresia, 2 October 1765.

¹⁰Mikoletzky, Kaiser Franz I. Stephan, pp. 64-67.

¹¹HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/C/128, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, n. d. (September 1765).

¹²HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/H/12-13, Joseph to Kaunitz, 9 September 1765.

¹³HHStA, StK, Vorträge 96/B/137-195, Kaunitz to Joseph, including Imperial resolution, report of meeting, Vota of Hagen, Stettner, Colloredo and Bathjanji, 9 October 1765, Kaunitz to Joseph, n. d., HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/H/19-20, Joseph to Kaunitz, 9 October 1765.

¹⁴Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 141-143, No. 58.

¹⁵The debate between Joseph and Leopold, including Maria Theresia's letters on the subject are published in Ibid., I, 139-174, Nos. 57-72. Cf. Arneth, MT VII, 172-178, Wandruszka, Leopold I, 136-155.

¹⁶HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/H/29-30, Joseph to Kaunitz, 3 November 1765.

¹⁷HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/H/31-32, Joseph to Kaunitz, 6 November 1765.

¹⁸Hock-Bidermann, p. 80.

¹⁹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 96/B/222-231, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 29 October 1765. The protocol of the commission which Kaunitz enclosed in his report is dated 28 October 1765, HHStA, KA, Nachlass Kaunitz a/32-33.

²⁰Ibid., Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, Imperial resolution on the above.

²¹Beer, "Staatsschulden . . .," pp. 22-23.

²²Hock-Bidermann, p. 80.

²³Beer, "Staatsschulden . . .," p. 136, statistical table.

²⁴Otruba, p. 28.

²⁵Mikoletzky, Österreich, pp. 215-216.

²⁶Mitrofanov I, 400.

²⁷Helen P. Liebel-Weckowicz, "Count Karl v. Zinzendorf and the Liberal Revolt against Joseph II's Economic Reforms, 1783-1790," Sozialgeschichte Heute: Festschrift für Hans Rosenberg zum 70. Geburtstag ed. by Hans-Ulrich Wehler. Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), Vol. 11, pp. 70-71. The earlier career of Zinzendorf has been treated in greater detail in two further papers by the same author: "The 'New Economics' and the Rise of Enlightened Reform in Austria, 1765-1790. Karl von Zinzendorf and the Physiocratic Influence on Joseph II," paper read to the American Historical Association, annual meeting, 28 December 1970, Boston, U. S. A., and, "Physiocrat Economics and the Economic Reforms of Maria Theresia and Joseph II," paper read to the VI International Congress of Economic History, 19-23 August 1974, Copenhagen, Denmark.

²⁸Liebel, "Zinzendorf . . .," p. 70, "Physiocrat Economics . . .," pp. 6-7, 10.

²⁹Kaunitz's thought seemed to mirror the Encyclopédie article on "Farms" in particular. Written by Quesnay, it had ascribed the deterioration of farming to high taxation and conscription, the two bêtes noires of Kaunitz.

³⁰Kaunitz kept in touch with many of the leading salon figures. See for example, HHStA, SS, Grosse Korrespondenz 405/B/7-8, 62-63, Kaunitz to Mme. Blondel, 31 July 1774, Kaunitz to Grimm, 13 February 1777.

³¹On Tuscany see Wandruszka, Leopold I, 261-278. The definitive work on Baden is Helen P. Liebel, Enlightened Bureaucracy versus Enlightened Despotism in Baden, 1750-1792, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 55, Part 5 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1965).

³²Arneth, MT VII, 210-211, 449-450, Mitrofanov I, 400.

³³It was on 12 July 1767 that Kaunitz received the order to address his regular reports to the empress again. HHStA, StK, Vorträge 100/A/11-12, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 12 July 1767. Cf. Arneth, MT IX, 426-427.

³⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 100/A/43-50, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 28 July 1767.

³⁵See below, pp. 352-353.

³⁶Wangermann, Austrian Achievement, p. 90.

³⁷The Zinzendorf proposals are discussed most extensively in Beer, "Staatsschulden . . .," pp. 38-44. See also Hock-Bidermann, pp. 82-85, Arneth, MT IX, 431-433.

³⁸Beer, "Staatsschulden . . .," pp. 45-46.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 46-47.

⁴⁰HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1996 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 16 September 1767.

⁴¹HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 25, No. 1996, secretarial note, 18 September 1767.

⁴²Hock-Bidermann, pp. 85-86.

⁴³Pettenegg, p. 113.

⁴⁴Beer, "Staatsschulden . . .," pp. 48-49, fn. 2.

⁴⁵See above pp. 54-55.

⁴⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/A/92-146, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 25 January 1768, section 69.

⁴⁷Ibid., Sections 48-50, 58-60, 63-79.

⁴⁸Beer, "Staatsschulden . . .," pp. 49-57, Hock-Bidermann, pp. 86-88, Arneth, MT IX, 436-438.

⁴⁹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 3570 & 3657 of 1769, Kaunitz StR Votum, 24 February 1770.

⁵⁰HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 33, Nos. 3570 & 3657, Imperial resolutions, 6 July 1770.

⁵¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 3951 of 1770, Kaunitz StR Votum, 23 November 1770.

⁵²HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 37, No. 3951, Imperial resolution, 4 January 1771.

⁵³Arneth, MT IX, 440-441.

⁵⁴Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. III, 351-355.

⁵⁵Beer, "Denkschriften . . .," pp. 111-113.

⁵⁶Arneth, MT IX, 608-609, fn. 712.

⁵⁷Schünemann, p. 20.

⁵⁸HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1987 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 8 September 1767.

⁵⁹HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 25, No. 1987, Imperial resolution, 16 September 1767.

⁶⁰HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2285 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 13 October 1767.

⁶¹HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 26, No. 2285, Imperial resolution, 30 October 1767.

⁶²HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2336 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 23 October 1767.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 26, No. 2336, Imperial resolution, 30 October 1767.

⁶⁵Schünemann, pp. 34-38. Though Kaunitz did not share the protectionist policies of Austro-Bohemian industrial interests, he supported the anti-Hungarian approach for political reasons. See above, pp. 83-84. The purely political motive becomes even clearer when shortly thereafter he would not endorse a similar approach to the Banat. See Schünemann, p. 67.

⁶⁶Liebel, "Physiocrat Economics . . .," p. 10.

⁶⁷Joseph Kumpfmüller, "Die Hungersnot von 1770 bis 1772 in Österreich" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 1969), p. 11.

⁶⁸Erika Weinzierl-Fischer, "Die Bekämpfung der Hungersnot in Böhmen 1770-1772 durch Maria Theresia und Joseph II," MOSTA VII (1954), 483.

⁶⁹Kumpfmüller, pp. 33-48, Weinzierl-Fischer, pp. 478-514.

⁷⁰Fritz Blaich, "Die wirtschaftspolitische Tätigkeit der kommission zur Bekämpfung der Hungersnot in Böhmen und Mähren (1771-1772)," VSWG LVI (1969), 299-331.

⁷¹Liebel, "Physiocrat Economics . . .," pp. 10-12.

⁷²Ibid., p. 11.

⁷³Kumpfmüller, p. 37.

⁷⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 256 of 1772, Kaunitz StR Votum, n. d. (February 1772).

⁷⁵Adolf Beer, "Die Zollpolitik und die Schaffung eines einheitlichen Zollgebietes unter Maria Theresia," MIOG XIV (1893), 237-239.

⁷⁶HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 233 of 1770, Kaunitz StR Votum, between 7 and 14 February 1770.

⁷⁷HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 34, No. 233, Imperial resolution, 15 February 1770.

⁷⁸See above, pp. 74-76, Cf. Liebel, "Physiocrat Economics . . .," p. 12, Schünemann, p. 39.

⁷⁹Arneth, MT IX, 609, fn. 715.

⁸⁰Ibid., IX, 455-456, Liebel, "Physiocrat Economics . . .," p. 14.

⁸¹Schünemann, pp. 45-46.

⁸²HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 48, No. 1939, Protocol record, 4 September 1773.

⁸³Schünemann, p. 46.

⁸⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 1939 of 1773, Kaunitz StR Votum, 20 January 1774.

⁸⁵Liebel, "Physiocrat Economics . . .," p. 14.

⁸⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 114/B/21-32, Joseph nota, 11 February 1774. Cf. Adolf Beer, "Studien zur Geschichte der Österreichischen Volkswirtschaft unter Maria Theresia: I. Die österreichische Industriepolitik," AOG LXXXI (1895), 95-97, Schünemann, pp. 47-50.

⁸⁷Schünemann, pp. 50-51, HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 48, No. 1939, Imperial resolution, 27 April 1774. Schünemann, working from the original Staatsratakten in which the voti are undated, erroneously sees Kaunitz's votum of 20 January as a reply to Joseph's nota of 11 February. The protocol record makes clear that the original debate was terminated and was re-opened only as a result of Joseph's intervention.

⁸⁸HHStA, StK, Vorträge 114/C/153-156, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including Maria Theresia's draft and Imperial resolution, 30 March 1774.

⁸⁹Arneth, MT IX, 457-458.

⁹⁰Höck-Bidermann, pp. 93-94.

⁹¹Arneth, MT IX, 469-485 was the first detailed treatment of the subject. The most important modern analysis remains that of Pollack-Parnau, op. cit. See also Mikoletzky, Österreich, pp. 235-237, Otruba, pp. 129-131, and Adolf Beer, "Die österreichische Handelspolitik unter Maria Theresia und Joseph II," AOG LXXXVI (1898), 103-110.

⁹²Arneth, MT IX, 470.

⁹³Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. I, 34, 123.

⁹⁴Beer, "Handelpolitik . . .," p. 95.

⁹⁵Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 108-109, No. 240.

⁹⁶Pollack-Parnau, p. 27.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 63.

CHAPTER XIII: THE AGRARIAN SECTOR

¹Ernst Bruckmüller, "Die Grundherrschaft," and Roman Sandgruber, "Agrarpolitik zwischen Krisen und Konjunktoren," both in Alfred Hoffmann, ed., Bauernland Oberösterreich: Entwicklungsgeschichte seiner Land- und Forstwirtschaft (Linz: Rudolf Trauner Verlag, 1974), Günter Franz, ed., Deutsche Agrargeschichte (5 vols., Stuttgart: Verlag Eugen Ulmer, 1962-1970), Vol. 2: Wilhelm Abel, Geschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft vom frühen Mittelalter bis zum 19. Jahrhundert (1962), Vol. 3: Friedrich Lütge, Geschichte der deutschen Agrarverfassung vom frühen Mittelalter bis zum 19. Jahrhundert (Second edition, 1967), Vol. 4: Günther Franz, Geschichte des deutschen Bauernstandes vom frühen Mittelalter bis zum 19. Jahrhundert (1970).

²See above, pp. 82-83.

³Sigmund Frauendorfer, Ideengeschichte der Agrarwirtschaft und Agrarpolitik im Deutschen Sprachgebiet (2 vols.; Bonn, Munich, Vienna: Bayerischer Landwirtschaftsverlag, 1957) I, 190.

⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1029 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 10 May 1767.

⁵HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 25, No. 1029, Imperial resolution, 12 May 1767.

⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 98/C/3-4, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 3 November 1766.

⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 100/B/3-4, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 1 September 1767.

⁸HHStA, StK, Vorträge 101/A/92-146, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 25 January 1768, section 67.

⁹On the activities of Raab, Hoyer and Kaschnitz on crown estates see William E. Wright, Serf, Seigneur and Sovereign: Agrarian Reform in Eighteenth-Century Bohemia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966). Wright tends to give Raab too much credit for originality. See also by the same author, "The Initiation of Robota Abolition in Bohemia," Journal of Central European Affairs XVIII, 3 (October, 1958), 239-253.

Cf. Grünberg II, 423-425. For the history of robot abolition outside Bohemia see Friedrich Lütge, "Die Robot-Abolition unter Kaiser Joseph II," in Wege und Forschungen der Agrargeschichte: Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Günter Franz, ed. by Willi A. Boelcke and Heinz Haushofer (Frankfurt a. M.: DLG Verlag, 1967), pp. 153-170.

¹⁰On the robot see Edith Murr Link, The Emancipation of the Austrian peasant, 1740-1798 (N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 48-61. See also Grünberg I, 70-87.

¹¹Grünberg I, 160-166, Arneth, MT IX, 339-341.

¹²Grünberg II, 155-171.

¹³Arneth, MT IX, 593, fn. 540.

¹⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 671 of 1770, Kaunitz StR Votum, 3 May 1770.

¹⁵HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 34, No. 671, Imperial resolution, and Maria Theresia to Hatzfeld, 10 May 1770.

¹⁶Ibid., Imperial resolution, 10 May 1770. Cf. Hock-Bidermann, p. 69.

¹⁷HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 34, No. 671, Maria Theresia to Chotek, 12 July 1770. Cf. Grünberg II, 187-188.

¹⁸Hock-Bidermann, p. 69.

¹⁹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2474 of 1770, Kaunitz StR Votum, 4 August 1770.

²⁰HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 36, No. 2474, Imperial resolution, 17 August 1770. Cf. Grünberg II, 192.

²¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 3736 of 1770, Kaunitz StR Votum, 28 October 1770.

²²HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 37, No. 3736, Imperial resolution, 31 October 1770.

²³Grünberg I, 201-205, II, 204-207.

- ²⁴Arneth, MT IX, 349-350.
- ²⁵HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/E/172-173, Joseph to Leopold, 7 January 1773.
- ²⁶Hock-Bidermann, pp. 71-73, Grünberg I, 206-207.
- ²⁷Arneth, MT IX, 351.
- ²⁸HHStA, StK, Vorträge 112/B/55-58, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including Imperial resolution, 18 June 1773.
- ²⁹Grünberg I, 208.
- ³⁰Ibid. II, 219-220.
- ³¹Henry Marczali, Hungary in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), p. 192.
- ³²Grünberg II, 222-226, Hock-Bidermann, pp. 70-71.
- ³³Grünberg II, 226-227.
- ³⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 263 of 1774, Hatzfeld, Kressel and Kaunitz StR Voti, 5-14 February 1774.
- ³⁵HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 5/A/335-348, Joseph Gutachten, 23 February 1774. Cf. Arneth, MT IX, 353-355.
- ³⁶Grünberg II, 226-234.
- ³⁷Ibid. II, 238-240.
- ³⁸Arneth, MT IX, 593, fn. 557. On the agrarian revolt in Bohemia see Victor L. Tapié, L'Europe de Marie Thérèse: Du baroque aux lumières (Paris: Fayard, 1973), pp. 277-302.
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- ⁴³Grünberg II, 250-251.
- ⁴⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 119/A/44-91, Blanc to Kaunitz, 28 June 1775.
- ⁴⁵Hock-Bidermann, pp. 77-78.
- ⁴⁶Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 71, No. 220.
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- ⁴⁹Grünberg II, 257-270.
- ⁵⁰Arneth, ed., M. T., Jos. Corresp. II, 87, No. 225.
- ⁵¹Arneth, ed., Briefe an Kinder u. Freunde II, 66-67.
- ⁵²Ernst Denis, La Bohême depuis la Montagne-Blanche (2 vols., Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1903) II, 561.
- ⁵³Arneth, MT IX, 377-378.
- ⁵⁴HHStA, StK, Vorträge 121/C/186-187, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 17 November 1776.
- ⁵⁵Arneth, MT IX, 598, fn. 592.
- ⁵⁶Grünberg II, 294-295.
- ⁵⁷Ibid., p. 295.
- ⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 296-297.

⁵⁹HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/F/277-278, Joseph to Leopold, 16 January 1777, quoted in part in François Fejtö, Un Habsburg Révolutionnaire, Joseph II: Portrait d'un despote éclairé (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1953), pp. 139-140.

⁶⁰HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 5/A/349-350, Joseph to Maria Theresia, 18 January 1777.

⁶¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 122/A/266-345, Kaunitz to Joseph and Maria Theresia, 31 January, 1, 4, 5, 6, February 1777, including five draft patents.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/F/281-282, Joseph to Leopold, 6 February 1777.

⁶⁴HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 7/F/285-286, Joseph to Leopold, 13 February 1777.

⁶⁵Arneth, ed., Briefe an Kinder u. Freunde II, 67-70.

⁶⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 122/A/406-409, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 28 February 1777.

⁶⁷HHStA, FA, Sammelbände 70/A/13, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 28 February 1777.

⁶⁸Grünberg II, 79, Arneth, MT IX, 380-381.

CHAPTER XIV: EUDAEMONISM TRIUMPHANT

¹HHStA, StK, Vorträge 110/D/13-57, Blanc Vorschläge die Verbesserungen in Inneren betreffend, 4 December 1772.

²Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1932) (Peter Gay, trans., N. Y.: Columbia University Press, 1954), pp. 66-67.

³Otruba, p. 179.

⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 804 of 1770, Kaunitz StR Votum, 24 March 1770.

⁵HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 882 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 24 June 1767.

⁶HHStA, KA, Staatsratakten I, No. 1346, StR Vota, including Kaunitz, 5 June 1767.

⁷Otruba, p. 165.

⁸Louise Sommer, Die österreichischen Kameralisten in Dogmen- geschichtlicher Darstellung (reprint of the edition Vienna, 1920-1925, Aalen: Scienta Verlag, 1967), pp. 170-444, Robert A. Kann, A Study in Austrian Intellectual History: From Late Baroque to Romanticism (N. Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 146-258.

⁹Beer, "Denkschriften . . .," pp. 106-107.

¹⁰Konrad Schünemann, Österreichs Bevölkerungspolitik unter Maria Theresia (Berlin: Deutsche Rundschau, gmbh, 1935), Mikoletzky, Österreich, pp. 238-240, Otruba, pp. 165-178. The bidding for immigrants led to ever more attractive inducements being offered. Under Joseph II advertisements were taken out in newspapers in Baden and Württemberg, offering, among other things, free transportation to the place of destination, a free house, animals and equipment upon arrival, complete freedom of worship, exemption from military service for the oldest son and a ten-year exemption from state taxes. Günther Franz, ed., Quellen zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bauernstandes in der Neuzeit (Vienna, Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1963), pp. 290-292.

¹¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 474 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 1 April 1767.

¹²HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 164 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 20 February 1767.

¹³HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 24, No. 164, Maria Theresia to Hatzfeld, 24 March 1767.

¹⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 474 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 1 April 1767.

¹⁵HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1667 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 4 August 1767.

¹⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 102/A/42-46, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 20 July 1768.

¹⁷Ibid., Imperial resolution, Maria Theresia to Lacy, n. d. (July 1768).

¹⁸On the separation of the judicial and administrative functions of government see OZV 2/I/1, 175-193. On the codification of the civil law the most modern analysis is Strakosch, op. cit., see also Philipp Harras von Harrasowsky, Geschichte der Codification des österreichischen Civilrechts (Vienna: G. J. Manz, 1868). On the penal code see Hock-Bidermann, pp. 42-48 and Arneth, MT IX, 198-214.

¹⁹On the compromise nature of the Codex Theresianus see the lengthy analysis of Strakosch, pp. 50-77.

²⁰Strakosch, p. 88, following Arneth, MT IX, 193, maintains that "when and where appeared the first doubts about the Code is nowhere evident."

²¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 3260 of 1766, Kaunitz StR Votum, 23 April 1767.

²²HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 3046 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 1 February 1768.

²³HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 23, No. 3260, Imperial resolution, 1 May 1767.

²⁴Strakosch, p. 88, could discern no reason why Waldstätten received this commission.

²⁵Friedrich von Maasburg, ed., "Gutachtliche Äusserungen des österreichischen Staatsrathes über den von der Compilations Commission im Entwurfe vorgelegten Codex Theresianus Civilis," Allgemeine Österreichische Gerichtszeitung XXXII (1881), Nos. 53-55.

²⁶HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2021 of 1770, Kaunitz StR Votum, 14 October 1770.

²⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 111/B/98-99, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 23 February 1773.

²⁸HHStA, StK, Vorträge 111/B/120-123, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, including draft note to Hatzfeld and Imperial resolution, 26 February 1773.

²⁹Strakosch, pp. 98-215.

³⁰Hock-Bidermann, p. 42, Arneth, MT IX, 198-199.

³¹Angelo Mauri, "La cattedra di Cesare Beccaria," Archivio storico italiano Series 7, XX (1933), 207-209.

³²Arneth, MT X, 176-180, Mauri, pp. 199-262, Cf. Wandruszka, Österreich und Italien, pp. 69-71.

³³Hock-Bidermann, pp. 42-43.

³⁴Ibid., p. 43.

³⁵Arneth, MT IX, 200-213, Hock-Bidermann, pp. 44-47.

³⁶HHStA, StK, Vorträge 119/C/151-201, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 31 December 1775.

³⁷HHStA, StK, Vorträge 120/A/11-14, Maria Theresia to Kaunitz, 2 January 1776.

³⁸On the censorship reforms of Maria Theresia see Klingenstein, Staatsverwaltung, pp. 158-202.

³⁹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2191 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 7 October 1767.

⁴⁰HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1748 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 6 August 1767.

⁴¹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 1543 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 25 July 1767.

⁴²HHStA, StK, Vorträge 114/C/63-66, Kaunitz to Maria Theresia, 9 March 1774.

⁴³The most important recent study of Sonnenfels' ideas and influence is Karl-Heinz Osterloh, Joseph von Sonnenfels und die österreichische Reformbewegung im Zeitalter des aufgeklärten absolutismus, Historische Studien, Hoft 409 (Lübek, Hamburg: Matthiesen Verlag, 1970). See also Kann, pp. 146-258 and Paul P. Bernard, Jesuits and Jacobins: Enlightenment and Enlightened Despotism in Austria (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971), pp. 32-51.

⁴⁴Joseph Feil, Sonnenfels und Maria Theresia (Vienna: C. Gerold's Sohn, 1859), p. 11.

⁴⁵HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 45 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 20 January 1767.

⁴⁶Fournier, p. 428.

⁴⁷HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 24, No. 45, Imperial resolution, Maria Theresia to Chotek, 23 January 1767.

⁴⁸Osterloh, pp. 126-128.

⁴⁹HHStA, KA, Staatsratakten I, No. 1420, Stupan, Blümegen, Starhemberg and Kaunitz vota, 20 June-1 July 1767. Cf. Hock-Bidermann, p. 61.

⁵⁰Kann, Austrian Intellectual History, p. 177.

⁵¹HHStA, KA, Staatsratakten I, No. 1420, Recirculandum (4 July): Stupan, Blümegen and Starhemberg vota, Imperial resolution, 20 July 1767.

⁵²HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 2531 of 1767, Kaunitz StR Votum, 15 November 1767.

⁵³HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 26, No. 2531, Maria Theresia to Chotek and Hatzfeld, 17 November 1767.

⁵⁴Osterloh, p. 128.

⁵⁵Brechka, pp. 132-142, Mikoletzky, Österreich, pp. 256-259.

⁵⁶Helfert, pp. 117-118. On the control of education by the religious orders, primarily the Piarists and Jesuits, see Mikoletzky, Österreich, pp. 251-256.

⁵⁷Helfert, pp. 119-130.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 190-195, Arneth, MT IX, 227-228.

⁵⁹Helfert, pp. 196-206.

⁶⁰HHStA, StK, Interiora 67b/A/102-105, Gebler StR Votum, n. d. (January 1771), VA, Nachlass Pergen 27/19/123-134, Stupan StR Votum, 23 January 1771, Binder StR Votum, 30 January 1771, Blümegen StR Votum, 1 February 1771, KA, Kaunitz Voten I, No. 239 of 1771, Kaunitz StR Votum, 21 March 1771. Cf. Hock-Bidermann, p. 63, Helfert, pp. 209-212.

⁶¹HHStA, VA, Nachlass Pergen 27/19/125-136, Joseph Gutachten, 15 April 1771.

⁶²HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 38, No. 239, Imperial resolution, 16 April 1771.

⁶³HHStA, VA, Nachlass Pergen 27/19/41-63, Pergen to Maria Theresia, 16 July 1771.

⁶⁴HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 2809 of 1771, Kaunitz StR Votum, 4 September 1771.

⁶⁵HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 40, No. 2809, Imperial resolution, 6 September 1771.

⁶⁶HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 3530 of 1771, Kaunitz StR Votum, 3 November 1771. Cf. Helfert, pp. 231-232.

⁶⁷HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle Vol. 41, No. 3530, Imperial resolution, 8 November 1771.

⁶⁸Helfert, p. 233.

⁶⁹HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 4021 of 1771, Kaunitz StR Votum, 9 December 1771.

⁷⁰See above p. 93.

⁷¹Helfert, p. 243.

⁷²Ibid., p. 297.

⁷³HHStA, KA, Kaunitz Voten II, No. 2805 of 1773, Kaunitz StR Votum, 27 December 1773.

⁷⁴HHStA, KA, Staatsratprotokolle, Vol. 48, No. 2805, Imperial resolution, 4 January 1774, Hock-Bidermann, p. 65.

CONCLUSION

¹Leonard Krieger, An Essay on the Theory of Enlightened Despotism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

²Most recently, Francois Bluche, Le despotisme éclairé (Paris: A. Fayard, 1968). The gap between the theory and practice of enlightened absolutism has been the special concern of Fritz Hartung in "Die Epochen der absoluten Monarchie in der neueren Geschichte," Historische Zeitschrift CXLV (1931), 46-52, and "Der aufgeklärte Absolutismus," Historische Zeitschrift CLXXX (1955), 15-42.

³That the essence of Frederick's conception of the state was determined by an "aristocratic-militarist ideology" which identified state power with restricted caste power, stabilizing royal absolutism by converting it into an aristocratic oligarchy, was pointed out by Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). On the failure of enlightened despotism to be more than a conservative holding-action in the face of emerging modern society, see Liebel, "Enlightened Despotism . . .," p. 168, Starkosch, p. 164.

⁴HHStA, StK, Wissenschaft und Kunst 1/1/3, Kaunitz to de Silva, 29 March 1769.

⁵Starkosch, pp. 121-122.

⁶Rosenberg, p. 22.

⁷Zöllner, "Bemerkungen . . .," p. 211.

⁸Walter's only explanation for this was that the Staatsrat was an illusion devised by Kaunitz to get rid of his enemies. Walter, "Eintritt . . .," pp. 45-51.

⁹For Kaunitz's bitter assessment of Joseph, see his famous memorandum prepared for Leopold in 1790 but never submitted, in Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin, Heiliges Römisches Reich, 1776-1806: Reichsverfassung und Staatssouveränität (2 vols., Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1967) II, 204-205, Aktenstück 36.

¹⁰Arneth, MT IX, 199, 322-324.

¹¹Zöllner, "Bemerkungen . . .," pp. 214-215.

¹²Leonard Krieger, Kings and Philosophers, 1689-1789 (N. Y.: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970), pp. 253-255.

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